|
1 Why "Peace Journalism" and Why Al-Jazeera's Coverage of Bahrain and Syria? |
|
|
1 | (24) |
|
|
1 | (2) |
|
1.2 Peace Journalism Model |
|
|
3 | (1) |
|
|
4 | (6) |
|
|
4 | (6) |
|
1.4 Theoretical Framework and Methodology |
|
|
10 | (4) |
|
1.4.1 Peace Journalism Orientations |
|
|
10 | (2) |
|
1.4.2 Peace Journalism Frames |
|
|
12 | (1) |
|
1.4.3 Evaluative Criteria of Peace Journalism Frames |
|
|
13 | (1) |
|
|
14 | (1) |
|
|
15 | (1) |
|
1.7 Outline of Book Chapters |
|
|
16 | (9) |
|
|
19 | (6) |
|
2 Al-Jazeera's Relationship with Qatar Before, During and After the Arab Spring (1996--2021) |
|
|
25 | (28) |
|
|
25 | (2) |
|
|
27 | (1) |
|
2.3 Al-Jazeera's Independence |
|
|
28 | (2) |
|
2.4 Why Was Al-Jazeera Founded? |
|
|
30 | (2) |
|
2.5 Al-Jazeera's Coverage of Conflicts |
|
|
32 | (1) |
|
2.6 Foundation of Al-Jazeera English |
|
|
33 | (3) |
|
2.7 Differences Between Al-Jazeera Arabic and English |
|
|
36 | (1) |
|
2.8 Al-Jazeera's Role Before the Arab Spring: Qatar's Public Diplomacy |
|
|
37 | (4) |
|
2.8.1 New Public Diplomacy |
|
|
39 | (1) |
|
|
40 | (1) |
|
2.9 Al-Jazeera's Role After the Arab Spring: Qatar's Propaganda |
|
|
41 | (3) |
|
|
44 | (9) |
|
|
46 | (7) |
|
3 Peace Journalism Model: Characteristics, Misconceptions and Challenges |
|
|
53 | (38) |
|
|
53 | (1) |
|
3.2 Definition of Peace Journalism |
|
|
54 | (1) |
|
3.3 Evolving of Peace Journalism Characteristics |
|
|
55 | (2) |
|
|
55 | (1) |
|
|
56 | (1) |
|
3.3.3 Shinar's Five Headings |
|
|
56 | (1) |
|
|
56 | (1) |
|
3.4 Critics of Galtung's Peace Journalism Model |
|
|
57 | (4) |
|
3.4.1 Gilboa's Three-Dimensional Framework |
|
|
57 | (2) |
|
3.4.2 Actor-Event Framework |
|
|
59 | (1) |
|
3.4.3 Reconciliatory Function Characteristics |
|
|
60 | (1) |
|
3.5 Expanding Peace Journalism Model |
|
|
61 | (1) |
|
|
61 | (1) |
|
3.5.2 Human Rights Journalism |
|
|
62 | (1) |
|
3.6 Epistemology of Peace Journalism |
|
|
62 | (4) |
|
|
62 | (2) |
|
3.6.2 Critical Pragmatism |
|
|
64 | (2) |
|
3.7 "Which Facts Are Allowed Through the Gate?" |
|
|
66 | (2) |
|
3.8 Peace Journalism and Objectivity |
|
|
68 | (4) |
|
|
68 | (2) |
|
|
70 | (1) |
|
3.8.3 Objectivity and Propaganda |
|
|
71 | (1) |
|
3.9 Peace Journalism and Advocacy Role |
|
|
72 | (3) |
|
3.9.1 Good Journalism or Advocacy Journalism? |
|
|
72 | (2) |
|
3.9.2 Advocacy Frameworks |
|
|
74 | (1) |
|
3.10 Challenges Facing Peace Journalism |
|
|
75 | (5) |
|
|
75 | (1) |
|
|
76 | (3) |
|
|
79 | (1) |
|
3.11 Possibility of Practising Peace Journalism |
|
|
80 | (2) |
|
|
82 | (1) |
|
|
83 | (8) |
|
|
85 | (6) |
|
4 Theoretical Framework and Research Questions |
|
|
91 | (52) |
|
|
91 | (1) |
|
4.2 Theoretical Framework |
|
|
92 | (5) |
|
4.2.1 Peace Journalism Frames |
|
|
92 | (3) |
|
4.2.2 Evaluative Criteria of Peace Journalism Frames |
|
|
95 | (2) |
|
4.3 Time Frame of Selected Online Articles |
|
|
97 | (1) |
|
|
98 | (1) |
|
4.4 RQ1 and 6: Peace Journalism Framing in Bahrain's and Syria's Conflicts |
|
|
98 | (31) |
|
4.4.1 Peace Journalism Frames and Evaluative Criteria in Bahrain and Syria Coverage |
|
|
98 | (2) |
|
4.4.2 Significance of Context in Founding Evaluative Criteria of PJ Frames |
|
|
100 | (1) |
|
4.4.3 Context of Bahrain's Uprising |
|
|
101 | (8) |
|
4.4.4 Proposed Evaluative Criteria of PJ Frames in Bahrain's Coverage |
|
|
109 | (8) |
|
4.4.5 Context of the Al-Ghouta Attack |
|
|
117 | (5) |
|
4.4.6 Proposed Evaluative Criteria of PJ Frames in Syria's Coverage |
|
|
122 | (7) |
|
4.5 RQ2 and 7: Influence of "Here and Now" on Absence and Presence of PJ Frames |
|
|
129 | (1) |
|
4.6 RQ3 and 8: Dominant Sources in the Bahrain and Syria Coverage |
|
|
130 | (1) |
|
4.7 RQ4 and 9: Framing of Syrian and Bahraini Conflicts |
|
|
131 | (1) |
|
4.8 RQ5 and 10: Pro- and Anti-Qatar Framing in the Bahrain and Syria Coverage |
|
|
132 | (3) |
|
4.9 RQ11: Estimation of the Number of Syrian Victims |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
4.10 RQ12: Extent of Depending on News Wires in the Coverage of Bahrain and Syria |
|
|
135 | (1) |
|
|
136 | (7) |
|
|
137 | (6) |
|
5 Bahrain's Uprising: Pro-democracy Protests or Sectarian Movement? |
|
|
143 | (48) |
|
|
143 | (1) |
|
|
144 | (1) |
|
5.3 AJA Coverage of Bahrain's Protests (March--June 2011): A Quantitative Analysis |
|
|
145 | (23) |
|
5.3.1 AJA: Sectarian Framing of Bahrain's Protests and Protesters |
|
|
145 | (1) |
|
5.3.2 Implications of Excluding the Peace/Conflict-Orientated Frames in AJA |
|
|
146 | (9) |
|
5.3.3 AJA: Implications of Excluding the Truth- and Solution-Orientated Frames |
|
|
155 | (4) |
|
5.3.4 AJA: Implications of Including Official Sources and Excluding the Marginalised |
|
|
159 | (5) |
|
5.3.5 AJA: Pro-Qatar and GCC Framing |
|
|
164 | (3) |
|
5.3.6 Can PJ Still Be Implemented in AJA? |
|
|
167 | (1) |
|
5.4 AJE Coverage of Bahrain's Protests: Quantitative Analysis |
|
|
168 | (11) |
|
5.4.1 AJE: Implications of Applying the Peace-, Solution- and Truth-Orientated Frames |
|
|
168 | (4) |
|
5.4.2 AJE: Implications of Applying the People-Orientated Frame |
|
|
172 | (3) |
|
5.4.3 AJE: Anti-Qatar Framing |
|
|
175 | (1) |
|
5.4.4 AJE's Shouting in the Dark: An Ideal Example of Peace Journalism |
|
|
175 | (4) |
|
5.5 Differences Between AJA and AJE |
|
|
179 | (2) |
|
|
181 | (10) |
|
|
182 | (9) |
|
6 Syria's CWs Coverage (2013): Peace Deal or Military Action to "Punish" the Perpetrator? |
|
|
191 | (58) |
|
|
191 | (1) |
|
|
192 | (1) |
|
6.3 Implications of Not Displaying Peace Journalism Framing in AJA and AJE |
|
|
193 | (1) |
|
6.4 Omission of Significant Facts |
|
|
194 | (18) |
|
6.4.1 Geopolitics of the Syrian Conflict |
|
|
194 | (2) |
|
6.4.2 Omission of the Context of Previous CW Attacks |
|
|
196 | (5) |
|
6.4.3 Omission of Al-Qaeda-Affiliated Groups as Potential Suspects |
|
|
201 | (8) |
|
6.4.4 Omission of Alternative Accounts |
|
|
209 | (3) |
|
6.5 Favouring Opposition Sources over the Regime |
|
|
212 | (10) |
|
6.5.1 Double Standard Coverage of the Syrian Regime and Opposition |
|
|
214 | (2) |
|
6.5.2 Double Standards Between Al-Nusra's Captive and Leader |
|
|
216 | (6) |
|
6.6 Pro-Qatar Framing in AJA and AJE |
|
|
222 | (2) |
|
6.7 Reporting Claims as Facts |
|
|
224 | (7) |
|
6.7.1 Launching Point and Range of Rockets Fired at Al-Ghouta Claims |
|
|
224 | (3) |
|
6.7.2 Intelligence Claims |
|
|
227 | (2) |
|
6.7.3 Number of Victims Claim |
|
|
229 | (2) |
|
6.8 AJA and AJE: Differences and Similarities |
|
|
231 | (8) |
|
6.8.1 Significant Application of Solution Frame in AJA and AJE |
|
|
231 | (1) |
|
6.8.2 AJE Is More People-Orientated than AJA |
|
|
232 | (2) |
|
6.8.3 AJA Uses More Emotive Language than AJE |
|
|
234 | (5) |
|
|
239 | (10) |
|
|
240 | (9) |
|
7 Al-Jazeera's (2011--2013) "Double Standards" Coverage of the Bahraini and Syrian Conflicts |
|
|
249 | (22) |
|
|
249 | (1) |
|
7.2 Comparison Between the Findings of Bahrain's Uprising in 2011 and Syria's Second CW Attack in 2013 |
|
|
250 | (1) |
|
7.3 Politics of Media Ownership |
|
|
251 | (2) |
|
7.4 Double Standards of Qatar's Foreign Policy in Bahrain and Syria |
|
|
253 | (3) |
|
7.5 AJA and AJE: Journalism Culture, Journalists and Target Audience |
|
|
256 | (3) |
|
7.6 Developments of Events: Here and Now |
|
|
259 | (6) |
|
|
265 | (1) |
|
|
265 | (6) |
|
|
267 | (4) |
|
8 Gulf Crisis (2014-2021): Al-Jazeera's Dramatic Shift from Pro- to Anti-Bahraini Regime |
|
|
271 | (1) |
|
|
271 | (2) |
|
|
273 | (1) |
|
8.3 Truth Frame in AJA and AJE |
|
|
274 | (1) |
|
8.3.1 AJA: Intensive Focus on "Human Rights Violations" After 2017 Gulf Crisis |
|
|
274 | (2) |
|
8.3.2 AJE: Consistent Focus on "Human Rights Violations" During All Research Periods |
|
|
276 | (1) |
|
8.3.3 AJA and AJE: Reporting "Protesters' Violence" as a "Fact" |
|
|
277 | (1) |
|
8.4 AJA and AJE: More Reporting on "Torture" and "Sexual Assaults" After 2017 Crisis |
|
|
278 | (2) |
|
8.5 AJA and AJE: More Dependence on Human Rights Sources After 2017 Gulf Crisis |
|
|
280 | (2) |
|
8.6 Possible Reasons Behind the Increase of "Human Rights" Coverage |
|
|
282 | (3) |
|
8.6.1 AJA: Delegitimising the Bahraini Regime to Serve Qatar's Interest |
|
|
282 | (2) |
|
8.6.2 AJE: Less Influenced by Qatar's Foreign Policy |
|
|
284 | (1) |
|
8.7 Framing of Saudi Military Intervention and Israeli-Bahraini "Normalisation Deal" |
|
|
285 | (6) |
|
8.7.1 AJ A: Critical Coverage of Saudi Troops After the 2017 Gulf Crisis |
|
|
285 | (1) |
|
8.7.2 AJE: Critical Coverage of Saudi Troops Before and After 2017 Gulf Crisis |
|
|
286 | (1) |
|
8.7.3 AJA: Critical Coverage of "Normalisation Deal" |
|
|
287 | (3) |
|
8.7.4 AJE: Critical Coverage of "Normalisation Deals" |
|
|
290 | (1) |
|
8.8 Domination of "Al-Jazeera" as the Main Source of News After 2017 Gulf Crisis |
|
|
291 | (1) |
|
8.9 AJA and AJE: Peace Frame and Representation of "Protests" and "Protesters" |
|
|
292 | (9) |
|
8.9.1 AJA: Sectarian Framing of Bahrain's Uprising During All Research Periods |
|
|
292 | (6) |
|
8.9.2 AJE: Less Sectarian Framing of Bahrain's Uprising During All Research Periods |
|
|
298 | (3) |
|
8.10 AJA and AJE: Limited Application of People Frame |
|
|
301 | (2) |
|
8.11 AJA and AJE: Increase in Solution Frame After the 2017 Gulf Crisis |
|
|
303 | (2) |
|
8.12 Overall Peace Journalism Framing in AJA and AJE |
|
|
305 | (1) |
|
|
306 | (9) |
|
|
309 | (6) |
|
|
315 | (14) |
|
|
315 | (1) |
|
9.2 Quantitative Findings |
|
|
316 | (1) |
|
|
317 | (5) |
|
9.3.1 Implications of Not Including PJ Frames in 2011 Bahrain's Uprising Coverage |
|
|
317 | (1) |
|
9.3.2 Implications of Not Including PJ Frames in the Al-Ghouta CW Attack Coverage |
|
|
318 | (1) |
|
9.3.3 Double Standard Coverage of Bahrain's (2011) and Syria's (2013) Conflicts |
|
|
319 | (1) |
|
9.3.4 Al-Jazeera After 2017 Gulf Crisis: Legitimisation of Bahrain's Uprising |
|
|
319 | (1) |
|
9.3.5 AJA and AJE: Similarities and Differences |
|
|
320 | (1) |
|
9.3.6 Factors Behind Inclusion and Exclusion of PJ Frames |
|
|
321 | (1) |
|
9.4 Suggestions and Limitations |
|
|
322 | (7) |
|
|
325 | (4) |
Index |
|
329 | |