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E-grāmata: Allocation in Networks

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(University of Copenhagen), Foreword by (Rice University)
  • Formāts: EPUB+DRM
  • Sērija : Allocation in Networks
  • Izdošanas datums: 06-Nov-2018
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262348683
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Allocation in NetworksPalielināt
  • Formāts: EPUB+DRM
  • Sērija : Allocation in Networks
  • Izdošanas datums: 06-Nov-2018
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262348683
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A comprehensive overview of networks and economic design, presenting models and results drawn from economics, operations research, and computer science; with examples and exercises.

This book explores networks and economic design, focusing on the role played by allocation rules (revenue and cost-sharing schemes) in creating and sustaining efficient network solutions. It takes a normative approach, seeking economically efficient network solutions sustained by distributional fairness, and considers how different ways of allocating liability affect incentives for network usage and development. The text presents an up-to-date overview of models and results currently scattered over several strands of literature, drawing on economics, operations research, and computer science.

The book's analysis of allocation problems includes such classic models from combinatorial optimization as the minimum cost spanning tree and the traveling salesman problem. It examines the planner's ability to design mechanisms that will implement efficient network structures, both in large decentralized networks and when there is user-agent information asymmetry. Offering systematic theoretical analyses of various compelling allocation rules in cases of fixed network structures as well as discussions of network design problems, the book covers such topics as tree-structured distribution systems, routing games, organizational hierarchies, the “price of anarchy,” mechanism design, and efficient implementation. Appropriate as a reference for practitioners in network regulation and the network industry or as a text for graduate students, the book offers numerous illustrative examples and end-of-chapter exercises that highlight the concepts and methods presented.



A comprehensive overview of networks and economic design, presenting models and results drawn from economics, operations research, and computer science; with examples and exercises.
Foreword xi
Preface xiii
Introduction xv
References xxvi
1 Some Basics
1(34)
1.1 Graphs
1(13)
1.1.1 Notation and Basic Definitions
1(3)
1.1.2 Cycles
4(2)
1.1.3 Trees
6(4)
1.1.4 Directed Graphs
10(4)
1.2 Cooperative Games
14(9)
1.2.1 Notation and Basic Definitions
15(4)
1.2.2 Allocation Rules
19(2)
1.2.3 Monotonicity versus the Standalone Principle
21(2)
1.3 Graphs and Games
23(8)
1.3.1 Games with Graph Restrictions
23(5)
1.3.2 From Graphs to Games
28(3)
1.4 Exercises
31(4)
References
33(2)
2 Trees
35(66)
2.1 Fixed Trees
36(27)
2.1.1 Chains
36(20)
2.1.2 Standard Fixed Trees
56(7)
2.2 Minimum-Cost Spanning Trees
63(18)
2.2.1 The Model
64(1)
2.2.2 Allocation in Spanning Trees
65(6)
2.2.3 The MCST Problem as a Game
71(5)
2.2.4 Axioms and Characterizations
76(5)
2.3 Model Variations
81(12)
2.3.1 Congestion
81(5)
2.3.2 Individual Guarantees and Decentralized (Pricing) Rules
86(3)
2.3.3 Minimum-Cost Steiner Trees
89(4)
2.4 Exercises
93(8)
References
96(5)
3 Cycles
101(28)
3.1 Fixed Route
102(8)
3.1.1 The Model
103(1)
3.1.2 Fixed-Route Game
104(1)
3.1.3 Proportional Allocation
105(2)
3.1.4 Limited Cost Information
107(2)
3.1.5 Limited Budgets
109(1)
3.2 Traveling Salesman
110(3)
3.2.1 Traveling Salesman Game
111(1)
3.2.2 Practical Application
112(1)
3.3 Chinese Postman
113(4)
3.3.1 The Model and the Game
113(2)
3.3.2 A Particular Allocation Rule
115(2)
3.4 k-Connectivity and Reliability
117(8)
3.4.1 k-Connectivity
118(4)
3.4.2 Reliability
122(3)
3.5 Exercises
125(4)
References
127(2)
4 General Networks
129(70)
4.1 Hierarchies with Joint Control
131(4)
4.1.1 The Model
131(1)
4.1.2 Axioms and Characterization
132(3)
4.2 Networks with Redundant Connections
135(25)
4.2.1 The Model
136(4)
4.2.2 Cost Ratios and Liability Indices
140(4)
4.2.3 Axioms for Cost-Ratio Indices
144(2)
4.2.4 Characterization Results
146(2)
4.2.5 Limited Reliability
148(7)
4.2.6 Cost Responsibility
155(5)
4.3 Capacity Networks
160(6)
4.3.1 The Model
161(1)
4.3.2 Allocation Rules
162(2)
4.3.3 The Capacity Problem as a Game
164(2)
4.4 Minimum-Cost Connection Networks
166(6)
4.4.1 The Model
166(1)
4.4.2 Axioms
167(1)
4.4.3 Characterization Results
168(4)
4.5 Network (Value) Games
172(7)
4.5.1 The Model
173(2)
4.5.2 Extensions of the Shapley Value
175(4)
4.6 Row Problems
179(14)
4.6.1 Transmission Networks
179(6)
4.6.2 Max-Flow Problems
185(8)
4.7 Exercises
193(6)
References
197(2)
5 Allocation in Decentralized Networks
199(36)
5.1 Anarchy
201(2)
5.1.1 PoA/PoS
202(1)
5.2 Network Cost-Sharing Games
203(7)
5.2.1 Strong Nash Equilibrium
209(1)
5.3 Network Formation Games
210(8)
5.3.1 Pairwise Stability
211(4)
5.3.2 Alternative Stability Notions
215(2)
5.3.3 Directed Networks
217(1)
5.4 Bidding Mechanisms
218(7)
5.4.1 Bargaining in Connection Networks
221(4)
5.5 Strategyproofness
225(5)
5.5.1 Moulin Mechanisms
225(4)
5.5.2 Engineering Applications
229(1)
5.6 Exercises
230(5)
References
232(3)
6 Efficient Implementation
235(32)
6.1 Truthful Reporting: Preliminary Examples
237(3)
6.1.1 The MCST Model
237(3)
6.1.2 Capacity Networks
240(1)
6.2 Implementation: The MCST model
240(4)
6.2.1 The Game Form
241(1)
6.2.2 The Setup
242(1)
6.2.3 Implementation
243(1)
6.3 Implementation: The MCCN model
244(8)
6.3.1 The Setup
245(2)
6.3.2 Implementation
247(3)
6.3.3 Alternative Game Form
250(2)
6.4 Welfare-Maximizing Networks
252(7)
6.4.1 The Setup
254(1)
6.4.2 Maskin Monotonicity
255(2)
6.4.3 Implementation Results
257(2)
6.5 Subscription Mechanisms
259(4)
6.5.1 The Setup
259(1)
6.5.2 Two Game Forms
260(1)
6.5.3 Implementation Results
261(2)
6.6 Exercises
263(4)
References
265(2)
Index 267
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