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Belief and Cult: Rethinking Roman Religion [Hardback]

  • Formāts: Hardback, 496 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, 11 b/w illus.
  • Izdošanas datums: 02-Aug-2022
  • Izdevniecība: Princeton University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0691165084
  • ISBN-13: 9780691165080
  • Hardback
  • Cena: 52,11 €
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  • Formāts: Hardback, 496 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, 11 b/w illus.
  • Izdošanas datums: 02-Aug-2022
  • Izdevniecība: Princeton University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0691165084
  • ISBN-13: 9780691165080
"A major new take on how Roman religion functioned cognitively to impact participants at both the individual level and the social"--

"A groundbreaking reinterpretation that draws on cognitive theory to show that belief wasn't absent from-but rather was at the heart of-Roman religionBelief and Cult argues that belief isn't uniquely Christian but was central to ancient Roman religion. Drawing on cognitive theory, Jacob Mackey shows that despite having nothing to do with salvation or faith, belief underlay every aspect of Roman religious practices-emotions, individual and collective cult action, ritual norms, social reality, and social power. In doing so, he also offers a thorough argument for the importance of belief to other non-Christian religions.At the individual level, the book argues, belief played an indispensable role in the genesis of cult action and religious emotion. However,belief also had a collective dimension. The cognitive theory of Shared Intentionality shows how beliefs may be shared among individuals, accounting for the existence of written, unwritten, or even unspoken ritual norms. Shared beliefs permitted the choreography of collective cult action and gave cult acts their social meanings. The book also elucidates the role of shared belief in creating and maintaining Roman social reality. Shared belief allowed the Romans to endow agents, actions, and artifacts with socio-religious status and power. In a deep sense, no man could count as an augur and no act of animal slaughter as a successful offering to the gods, unless Romans collectively shared appropriate beliefs about these things.Closely examining augury, prayer, the religious enculturation of children, and the Romans' own theories of cognition and cult, Belief and Cult promises to revolutionize the understanding of Roman religion by demonstrating that none of its features makes sense without Roman belief"--

A groundbreaking reinterpretation that draws on cognitive theory to show that belief wasn’t absent from—but rather was at the heart of—Roman religion

Belief and Cult argues that belief isn’t uniquely Christian but was central to ancient Roman religion. Drawing on cognitive theory, Jacob Mackey shows that despite having nothing to do with salvation or faith, belief underlay every aspect of Roman religious practices—emotions, individual and collective cult action, ritual norms, social reality, and social power. In doing so, he also offers a thorough argument for the importance of belief to other non-Christian religions.

At the individual level, the book argues, belief played an indispensable role in the genesis of cult action and religious emotion. However, belief also had a collective dimension. The cognitive theory of Shared Intentionality shows how beliefs may be shared among individuals, accounting for the existence of written, unwritten, or even unspoken ritual norms. Shared beliefs permitted the choreography of collective cult action and gave cult acts their social meanings. The book also elucidates the role of shared belief in creating and maintaining Roman social reality. Shared belief allowed the Romans to endow agents, actions, and artifacts with socio-religious status and power. In a deep sense, no man could count as an augur and no act of animal slaughter as a successful offering to the gods, unless Romans collectively shared appropriate beliefs about these things.

Closely examining augury, prayer, the religious enculturation of children, and the Romans’ own theories of cognition and cult, Belief and Cult promises to revolutionize the understanding of Roman religion by demonstrating that none of its features makes sense without Roman belief.

Recenzijas

"A Choice Outstanding Academic Title of the Year" "[ It is] difficult to exaggerate the importance of Mackaysbook as a statement on ancient Roman religion. . . . Essential."---R. E. Winn, Choice "A very important book."---Jennifer Larson, History of Religions "A courageous attempt to challenge a longstanding tradition in the field to de-emphasize belief with a highly theoretical approach that insists on beliefs centrality. . . . Belief and Cult argues constructively for the significant role of belief in human cognition and potential ways to re-introduce the discussion of belief back to the study of Roman religion."---Jerry Kou, Reading Religion "Important. . . . Mackeys Belief and Cult is one of the most significant contributions to our understanding of Roman religion in the last two decades."---Alexander Nice, Religious Studies Review

Preface xv
Acknowledgments xix
Abbreviations xxi
Introduction: Roman Religion, from Intuitions to Institutions
1(26)
0.1 Roman Cult and the Question of Belief
1(4)
0.2 From Roman Intuitions to Roman Institutions
5(4)
0.3 HADD and Social Cognition
9(8)
0.4 Intentionality and Belief
17(10)
Part I Theoretical Foundations
Chapter 1 Losing Belief
27(32)
1.1 Introduction
27(1)
1.2 A History of Belief-Denial and the Belief-Action Dichotomy
27(17)
1.3 An Anatomy of Belief-Denial and the Belief-Action Dichotomy
44(11)
1.3.1 Belief Is Christian
44(2)
1.3.2 Belief Is a Concept
46(3)
1.3.3 Belief Is a Linguistic Practice
49(4)
1.3.4 Beliefs Are Unknowable
53(2)
1.4 Conclusion: Historical Empathy and Other Minds
55(4)
Chapter 2 Recovering Belief
59(39)
2.1 Introduction
59(1)
2.2 The Intentionality of Belief
60(15)
2.2.1 Belief Requires a Subject in Order to Exist
63(1)
2.2.2 Beliefs Are about Objects
64(1)
2.2.3 Beliefs Have Content
65(3)
2.2.4 Belief Is a Distinctive Psychological Mode
68(1)
2.2.5 Belief Has a Mind-to-World Direction of Fit
69(3)
2.2.6 Beliefs Define Their Own Conditions of Satisfaction
72(3)
2.2.7 Summary Thus Far
75(1)
2.3 Discursive Intentionality: Extending the Analysis to Language
75(2)
2.4 Belief-in
77(2)
2.5 Belief Intensity
79(3)
2.6 Intuition and Inference Produce Nonreflective and Reflective Beliefs
82(13)
2.6.1 The Two Systems and "Theological Incorrectness"
83(4)
2.6.2 Intuition and Roman Religious Culture
87(4)
2.6.3 Inference and Agency
91(4)
2.7 Conclusion
95(3)
Chapter 3 Belief and Emotion, Belief and Action
98(38)
3.1 Introduction
98(1)
3.2 Belief and Emotion
99(10)
3.2.1 What Is Emotion?
101(5)
3.2.2 Belief and Emotion in Apuleius and Livy
106(3)
3.3 Belief and Action
109(24)
3.3.1 A Simple Belief-Desire Model of Action
113(3)
3.3.2 Deontology: Desire-Independent Reasons for Action
116(10)
3.3.3 Pietas as a Deontology
126(4)
3.3.4 An Enriched Model of Action
130(3)
3.4 Action Theory and Folk Psychology
133(3)
Chapter 4 Shared Belief, Shared Agency, Social Norms
136(36)
4.1 Introduction
136(3)
4.2 Roman Consensus
139(4)
4.3 Shared Intentionality and Shared Agency
143(16)
4.3.1 Shared Intentionality
144(1)
4.3.2 Shared Agency and Joint Action
145(2)
4.3.3 Mutual Belief
147(2)
4.3.4 Aggregate versus Collective versus Joint Intentionality
149(4)
4.3.5 Jointly Sharing Beliefs and Agency in Sacrifice
153(6)
4.4 Norms, Collective Intentionality, Communal Common Ground, and Large-Scale Cooperation
159(6)
4.5 Conclusion
165(1)
4.6 Coda: Durkheim among the Ruins
166(6)
Chapter 5 Shared Belief, Social Ontology, Power
172(37)
5.1 Introduction
172(1)
5.2 Objective and Exterior or Subjective and Interior?
173(4)
5.3 A Social Ontology
177(24)
5.3.1 Imposition of Function
178(2)
5.3.2 Constitutive Rules
180(12)
5.3.3 Shared Intentionality and Social Ontology
192(2)
5.3.4 Societas versus "Emergent Social Entity"
194(7)
5.4 Concluding Caveats and Possible Objections
201(8)
Part II Case Studies
Chapter 6 Belief and Cult: Lucretius's Roman Theory
209(35)
6.1 Introduction
209(1)
6.2 Why Lucretius?
210(3)
6.3 Epicurean Action
213(1)
6.4 A Lucretian Archaeology of Religious Belief
214(6)
6.5 Excursus: Roman Epiphanies
220(7)
6.6 False Beliefs
227(6)
6.6.1 Philodemus on Religious Inference
231(2)
6.7 A Lucretian Aetiology of Cult
233(2)
6.8 A Cognitive Theory?
235(1)
6.9 Action Theory and Cult in Lucretius
236(3)
6.10 A Prescription for Cult Practice
239(3)
6.11 Conclusion
242(2)
Chapter 7 Ad incunabula: Children's Cult as Cognitive Apprenticeship
244(47)
7.1 Introduction
244(4)
7.2 Ontogeny of Social Cognition
248(3)
7.3 Learning to Pray: Imitation and Individual Agency
251(13)
7.4 Religious Participation: From Joint Attention to Cultural Cognition
264(18)
7.4.1 Ritual Norms, Overimitation, and Orthopraxy
271(8)
7.4.2 Joint Commitments
279(2)
7.4.3 Shared Beliefs
281(1)
7.5 Religious Instruction: Beyond Apprenticeship
282(8)
7.6 Conclusion
290(1)
Chapter 8 The "Folk Theology" of Roman Prayer: Content, Context, and Commitment
291(46)
8.1 Introduction
291(3)
8.2 Some Guiding Theoretical Principles
294(9)
8.3 Roman Prayer
303(4)
8.4 Prayer Form
307(4)
8.5 The Force of Prayer
311(8)
8.6 Counterintuitive Content
319(11)
8.7 Context and Commitment
330(5)
8.8 Conclusion
335(2)
Chapter 9 Inauguratio: Belief, Ritual, and Religious Power
337(34)
9.1 Introduction
337(2)
9.2 Cognition and Ritual Form
339(5)
9.3 Auspicia
344(3)
9.4 Cognition-about-Practice: Antony's Flaminate
347(14)
9.5 Cognition-in-Practice
361(1)
9.6 Constitutive versus Nonconstitutive Beliefs
362(7)
9.6.1 Constitutive Beliefs
362(5)
9.6.2 Nonconstitutive Beliefs
367(2)
9.7 Conclusion: Belief Religious Reality, and Power at Rome
369(2)
Chapter 10 Epilog: Comparison, Explanation, and Belief
371(24)
10.1 Introduction
371(1)
10.2 Prescendi's Model of Roman Sacrifice
372(1)
10.3 Roman Sacrifice in Dionysius of Halicarnassus's Antiquitates Romanae
373(3)
10.4 Roman Sacrifice in Arnobius of Sicca's Adversus Nationes
376(5)
10.5 Human Sacrifice in Caesar's De bello Gallico
381(4)
10.6 Comparison, Explanation, and Belief in Dionysius, Arnobius, and Caesar
385(7)
10.7 Believing in Belief
392(3)
Glossary 395(4)
References 399(48)
Index Locorum 447(12)
General Index 459
Jacob L. Mackey is assistant professor of classics at Occidental College.