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xvii | |
Acknowledgements |
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xxiii | |
Introduction Subject, Purpose and Method |
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1 | (2) |
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Chapter 1 Subject and Purpose |
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3 | (4) |
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3 | (2) |
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5 | (2) |
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7 | (10) |
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I The Sources of EU Competition Law |
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7 | (1) |
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II Intersection Between Patent and Competition Law: Consequences for the Analysis |
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8 | (1) |
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8 | (3) |
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IV Reference to the Pharmaceutical Industry |
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11 | (1) |
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V Applicable and Comparative Law |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (4) |
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Part I An Introduction to Competition |
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17 | (60) |
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Chapter 3 Competition: An Approximation |
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19 | (16) |
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19 | (1) |
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II The Economic Constitution of the European Union |
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20 | (2) |
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III Competition as an Object of Policymaking and Law |
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22 | (8) |
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23 | (1) |
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2 Workable and Effective Competition |
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24 | (1) |
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25 | (2) |
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4 The Chicago and Post-Chicago School |
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27 | (1) |
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5 Development of the More Economic Approach in the EU |
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28 | (2) |
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30 | (2) |
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32 | (3) |
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Chapter 4 Introduction to the System of Competition Law |
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35 | (24) |
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I The Disciplines of Competition Law |
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35 | (6) |
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1 Antitrust Law/Competition Law in the Narrow Sense |
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35 | (1) |
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2 Law Against Unfair Competition |
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36 | (1) |
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36 | (1) |
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2.2 Further Relevance of the Law Against Unfair Competition in This Book |
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37 | (2) |
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3 Intellectual Property Law |
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39 | (2) |
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II Patents in Competition |
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41 | (16) |
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1 Justification of Patent Law |
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41 | (1) |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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44 | (2) |
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2 The Relationship Between Patent and Competition Law |
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46 | (1) |
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2.1 Development of the Underlying Principles Based on the Example of the USA |
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46 | (1) |
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46 | (1) |
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b Compatibility (Harmony) Thesis |
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47 | (2) |
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49 | (1) |
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2.2 Development in the EU |
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50 | (1) |
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50 | (1) |
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b The Specific Subject Matter |
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51 | (2) |
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53 | (2) |
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3 Restriction of Property Rights for the Goals of the Union |
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55 | (2) |
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57 | (2) |
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Chapter 5 Introduction to Competition in the Pharmaceutical Market |
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59 | (18) |
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59 | (1) |
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II The Situation in the Market |
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60 | (4) |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (1) |
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3 Products (Types of Drugs) |
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62 | (1) |
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62 | (1) |
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63 | (1) |
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3.3 Second-Generation Products |
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63 | (1) |
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64 | (1) |
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64 | (2) |
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1 Drug Research and Development |
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64 | (1) |
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64 | (1) |
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1.2 Pharmaceutical Product Life Cycle |
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65 | (1) |
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2 Systematics of Drug Development |
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66 | (4) |
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2.1 A Brief Historical Perspective |
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67 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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a Discovery Period (Basic Research) |
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68 | (1) |
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68 | (1) |
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69 | (1) |
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d Marketing Approval and Monitoring |
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70 | (1) |
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IV The Importance of Patents for the Pharmaceutical Sector |
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70 | (6) |
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1 Types of Pharmaceutical Patents |
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71 | (1) |
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71 | (1) |
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72 | (1) |
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72 | (1) |
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2 Different Pharmaceutical Products |
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73 | (1) |
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2.1 Structurally Similar Active Substances |
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74 | (1) |
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74 | (1) |
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74 | (1) |
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c Derivates, such as Salts, Esters or Ethers |
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74 | (1) |
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2.2 Metabolites and Prodrugs |
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75 | (1) |
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2.3 Combinations of Ingredients |
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75 | (1) |
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3 Reference Points for Patenting Strategies |
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75 | (1) |
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76 | (1) |
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Part II Strategic Patenting |
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77 | (32) |
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Chapter 6 Why Firms Patent |
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79 | (12) |
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I Patentability Requirements |
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79 | (2) |
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80 | (1) |
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80 | (1) |
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3 The Inventive Step and Non-obviousness |
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81 | (1) |
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81 | (1) |
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81 | (5) |
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82 | (1) |
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83 | (1) |
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83 | (2) |
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2.2 Other Strategic Motives |
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85 | (1) |
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86 | (2) |
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86 | (1) |
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86 | (1) |
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87 | (1) |
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88 | (3) |
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Chapter 7 Patenting Strategies |
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91 | (18) |
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I Development of Patenting Strategies |
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91 | (2) |
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II Offensive Versus Defensive Patenting |
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93 | (1) |
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III Patenting Strategies and Their Blocking Impact on Competition and Innovation |
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94 | (11) |
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95 | (1) |
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95 | (1) |
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1.2 Blocking Potential of Basic Patents |
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95 | (2) |
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1.3 Effects of Blocking Basic Patents on the Market |
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97 | (2) |
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99 | (1) |
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99 | (3) |
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2.2 Effects of Blocking Patents on the Market in Fencing and Flooding Strategies |
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102 | (1) |
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a Different Patent Holders Holding Patents of a Patent Cluster |
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102 | (1) |
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b One Patent Holder Holds the Patent Cluster |
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103 | (1) |
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104 | (1) |
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4 Pre-empted Patent Application |
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105 | (1) |
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IV Patent Law Remedies to Counter Blocking Patents |
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105 | (2) |
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V Summary of the Preceding Evaluation |
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107 | (2) |
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Part III Defining Markets and Establishing Dominance |
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109 | (28) |
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Chapter 8 Market Power Versus Dominance: Introduction and Definition |
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111 | (4) |
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Chapter 9 Market Definition |
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115 | (14) |
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I The Relevant Market: A Definition |
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115 | (1) |
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II Patents and the Definition of the Relevant Market |
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116 | (1) |
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117 | (5) |
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117 | (1) |
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2 Quantitative Approaches |
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118 | (1) |
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119 | (1) |
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4 Pharmaceutical Product Markets |
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120 | (2) |
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IV Technology or Licensing Markets |
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122 | (3) |
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122 | (1) |
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2 Pharmaceutical Technology Markets |
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123 | (2) |
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125 | (4) |
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Chapter 10 Establishing a Dominant Position |
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129 | (6) |
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129 | (1) |
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II Relevant Factors in Assessing Market Power |
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130 | (2) |
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III Market Power and Patents |
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132 | (3) |
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Chapter 11 Consequences for the Evaluation of Conduct Involving Patents |
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135 | (2) |
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Part IV Implications from Case Law and the Patent Misuse Doctrine for Blocking |
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Patent Applications under EU Competition Law |
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137 | (2) |
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Chapter 12 Case Law on the Abuse of a Dominant Position and Patents |
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139 | (30) |
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139 | (1) |
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II CICRA and Others v. Renault |
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139 | (1) |
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140 | (2) |
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142 | (1) |
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V Magill, IMS Health and Microsoft |
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143 | (2) |
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VI AstraZeneca v. Commission |
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145 | (8) |
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145 | (1) |
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2 Reasoning Concerning the Acquisition of the Supplementary Protection Certificate by Delivering Misleading Information |
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146 | (2) |
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148 | (1) |
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3.1 Comment on the Concept of Abuse as Used in the AstraZeneca Case |
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149 | (1) |
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149 | (1) |
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b The Relevance of Showing Anticompetitive Effects |
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149 | (1) |
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c Is There a `Role' for Intent? |
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150 | (1) |
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3.2 Interim Conclusion on Cases Involving Patents Within the Abuse Concept Delivered by the Court |
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151 | (2) |
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153 | (1) |
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154 | (11) |
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154 | (2) |
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2 Reasoning of the Commission Concerning the Acquisition of the Azad Technology |
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156 | (1) |
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3 Definition of the Relevant Market |
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157 | (3) |
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160 | (1) |
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4.1 Implications for the Primary Acquisition of Blocking Patents |
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160 | (2) |
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4.2 Implications for the Secondary Acquisition of Blocking Patents |
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162 | (3) |
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IX Conclusions Drawn from Case Law |
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165 | (4) |
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Chapter 13 Implications of the Patent Misuse Doctrine |
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169 | (4) |
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I Limitations of the Conclusions Drawn from Case Law |
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169 | (1) |
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II Patent Misuse Doctrine |
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170 | (3) |
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1 Definition and Scope of the Patent Misuse |
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170 | (1) |
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2 Limitations of the Patent Misuse Doctrine in Identifying Abusive Behaviour |
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170 | (1) |
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3 Implications for Further Analysis |
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171 | (2) |
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Part V The Concept of Abuse in EU Competition Law |
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173 | (70) |
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Chapter 14 Analysis of Article 102 TFEU |
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175 | (44) |
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I Drafting History of Article 102 TFEU |
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175 | (2) |
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II Text-Based Approximation |
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177 | (3) |
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1 The Search for an EU-Autonomous Characterisation of the Term `Abuse' |
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177 | (1) |
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2 Etymology and Linguistic Usage |
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178 | (2) |
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III The Role and Structure of Article 102 TFEU |
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180 | (5) |
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1 The Role of Article 102 TFEU Within EU (Competition) Law |
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180 | (2) |
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2 Systematics of Article 102 TFEU |
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182 | (1) |
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3 Exclusionary and Exploitative Abuses |
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183 | (2) |
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IV The Concept of Abuse in Article 102 TFEU |
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185 | (32) |
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1 Overview of the Section |
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185 | (1) |
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2 Court Practice over Time |
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185 | (1) |
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2.1 From the Beginning to Commercial Solvents |
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185 | (2) |
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2.2 United Brands: Refusal to Supply, Discriminatory and Unfair Prices |
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187 | (3) |
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2.3 Hoffmann-La Roche and Intel: Fidelity Rebates and Exclusive Dealing |
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190 | (1) |
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190 | (1) |
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191 | (2) |
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2.4 AKZO: Predatory Pricing |
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193 | (1) |
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2.5 Hilti and Microsoft: Tying and Bundling |
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193 | (2) |
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2.6 Deutsche Telecom and TeliaSonera Sverige: Margin Squeeze |
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195 | (1) |
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195 | (3) |
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3 `Competition on the Merits' |
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198 | (1) |
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3.1 Appearance of the Principle |
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198 | (2) |
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3.2 Relevance in Practice |
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200 | (2) |
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4 Form-Based Versus Effect-Based Concepts |
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202 | (1) |
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4.1 Anticompetitive Effects |
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202 | (1) |
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a The Difficulty of Measuring Anticompetitive Effects |
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202 | (1) |
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b The Elements of Market Structure |
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203 | (1) |
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c Changeability of Market Structure |
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204 | (2) |
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206 | (1) |
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a The Problem with Identifying Intent |
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206 | (3) |
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b Case Law on the Role of Intent in EU Competition Law |
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209 | (3) |
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c The Role of Intent in EU Competition Law: A Comment Based on Case Law |
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212 | (3) |
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215 | (2) |
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217 | (2) |
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Chapter 15 Abuse of a Dominant Position as a Manifestation of the Abuse of Rights? |
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219 | (24) |
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219 | (1) |
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II Similarities Between the Abuse of Rights and the Abuse of a Dominant Position |
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220 | (3) |
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1 Recapitulation of the Analysis |
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220 | (1) |
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1.1 Historical Perspective |
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220 | (1) |
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220 | (1) |
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1.3 The Role and Structure of Article 102 TFEU |
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221 | (1) |
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1.4 The Courts' Understanding of Abuse in Article 102 TFEU |
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221 | (1) |
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1.5 Results of the Interpretation |
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221 | (1) |
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2 Limiting `Power' to Prevent Failure |
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222 | (1) |
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III Abuse of Rights in EU Law |
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223 | (8) |
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1 Origins of the General Principle of the Abuse of Rights |
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223 | (2) |
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2 Development in Early French and German Law |
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225 | (1) |
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3 Adoption of a General Principle of Law at the Union Level |
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226 | (1) |
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3.1 Prerequisites for the Acknowledgement of a General Principle Within the Law of the Union |
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226 | (1) |
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3.2 The Common Denominator in the Member States |
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227 | (1) |
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3.3 Findings from Case Law |
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228 | (3) |
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IV Abuse of Rights Principle Within the Abuse of a Dominant Position |
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231 | (8) |
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231 | (2) |
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2 Limitations to the Freedom of Competition |
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233 | (3) |
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3 Findings from the Analysis of the Drafting History of Article 102 TFEU in Comparison with Section 2 Sherman Act |
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236 | (2) |
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4 Understandings from Italy's Pfizer Decision |
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238 | (1) |
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239 | (4) |
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Part VI Blocking Patents as Abuse of a Dominant Position |
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243 | (62) |
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Chapter 16 Synthesis of the Preceding Analysis |
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245 | (4) |
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245 | (1) |
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II Relationship Between Patents and Article 102 TFEU |
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246 | (1) |
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III Outline of Further Analysis |
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246 | (3) |
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Chapter 17 Distortion of Competition Through Patent Application |
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249 | (14) |
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249 | (1) |
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II The Influence of Patents on Innovation and Difficulties Regarding the Measurement of Innovation |
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250 | (1) |
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III The Effect of Patents on Competition and Innovation Within the Application Process |
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251 | (8) |
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1 Before the Publication of the Application |
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251 | (1) |
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2 After the Publication of the Application |
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252 | (3) |
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3 After the Grant of the Patent |
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255 | (1) |
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3.1 The Power of the Patent Holder |
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255 | (1) |
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3.2 Distorting Effect of Patents |
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256 | (1) |
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3.3 Patent Pools as a Remedy to Counteract the Deterrent Effect of the Presence of Patents? |
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257 | (1) |
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258 | (1) |
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259 | (4) |
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Chapter 18 Balancing Interests |
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263 | (42) |
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I The Relevance of Fundamental Rights for the Analysis |
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263 | (3) |
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II Limitations to the Fundamental Right to Property |
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266 | (15) |
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266 | (1) |
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2 Patentability Requirements |
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267 | (1) |
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2.1 General Considerations |
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267 | (1) |
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2.2 Limitations to Patentability |
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268 | (3) |
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271 | (2) |
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273 | (1) |
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3 The Right to Not Use the Patent |
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273 | (1) |
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3.1 General Considerations |
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273 | (1) |
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3.2 Implications from the TRIPS Agreement |
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274 | (3) |
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3.3 Implications from Trademark Law |
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277 | (1) |
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3.4 Is Bad Faith Relevant in Patent Law after All? |
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278 | (2) |
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280 | (1) |
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III Unused Patents and the Purpose of Patent Law |
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281 | (10) |
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1 The Goal of This Section |
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281 | (1) |
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2 The Purpose of Patent Law |
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281 | (2) |
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3 Usage Requirement Analogous to Trademark Law |
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283 | (2) |
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4 The Interests of Securing One's Own Innovation |
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285 | (2) |
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5 The Effect of Weak Patents on the Market |
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287 | (2) |
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289 | (2) |
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291 | (2) |
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293 | (4) |
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Outlook: Global Shortages and the Role of Patents |
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297 | (1) |
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I Patents and Their Barriers |
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297 | (1) |
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II Are Patents Responsible for the Shortage? |
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298 | (2) |
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III Compulsory Licences as Internal Limitations to Patents |
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300 | (2) |
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302 | (3) |
Bibliography |
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305 | (28) |
Table of Decisions |
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333 | (16) |
Materials |
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349 | (6) |
Index |
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355 | |