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Blueprint for Corporate Governance: Strategy, Accountability, and the Preservation of Shareholder Value [Hardback]

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  • Formāts: Hardback, 240 pages, height x width x depth: 236x160x26 mm, weight: 489 g, 1 Hardback
  • Izdošanas datums: 25-Feb-2003
  • Izdevniecība: Amacom
  • ISBN-10: 081440586X
  • ISBN-13: 9780814405864
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  • Cena: 31,30 €
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Blueprint for Corporate Governance: Strategy, Accountability, and the Preservation of Shareholder ValuePalielināt
  • Formāts: Hardback, 240 pages, height x width x depth: 236x160x26 mm, weight: 489 g, 1 Hardback
  • Izdošanas datums: 25-Feb-2003
  • Izdevniecība: Amacom
  • ISBN-10: 081440586X
  • ISBN-13: 9780814405864
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9780814405864.html
Keywords:
Focusing on good governance practices rather than social criticism, this book offers managers guidance for protecting shareholder value. It offers a historical review of the corporation, identifying key factors contributing to or diminishing efficiency. It also outlines various stock valuation and asset pricing models, backing the discussion with financial data and real-world examples. Kaen teaches finance at the University of New Hampshire. Annotation (c) Book News, Inc., Portland, OR (booknews.com)
Corporate Governance: An Overview
1(16)
Introduction
1(1)
The Modern Corporation
2(1)
Civic Republicanism
3(2)
Liberalism
5(1)
The Corporation Complicates the World
6(2)
The Separation of Management and Ownership
8(9)
The Trustee Approach
9(2)
Managerial Capitalism and the Managerial Technocracy
11(3)
The Contractual Shareholder Model
14(3)
The Governance Structure of American Corporations
17(16)
A Schematic Contractual Governance Structure
17(12)
The Owners
19(5)
Voting Rights
24(1)
The Board of Directors
25(1)
Corporate Executives and Senior Managers
26(1)
Creditors
27(1)
Relationships With Suppliers and Customers
28(1)
An Organic Version of the Modern Corporation
29(2)
Do Managers Accept the Shareholder Supremacy Model?
31(2)
Markets: Can You Trust Them?
33(24)
Introduction
33(1)
Financial Market Efficiency
34(11)
Weak-Form Efficiency (Past Prices)
35(2)
Semistrong-Form Efficiency (Public Information)
37(6)
Strong-Form Efficiency
43(2)
Market Inefficiencies and Anomalies
45(3)
IPOs
45(1)
Earnings Announcements
46(1)
The 2000 NASDAQ Crash
47(1)
What Market Efficiency Means for Managers and Governance
48(5)
How Are We Doing?
48(2)
Don't Try to Outguess or Beat the Market
50(1)
Don't Try to Fool Investors
51(2)
Transparency and Market Efficiency
53(4)
Valuation
57(16)
Introduction
57(1)
Valuing Common Stock
57(5)
Cash Dividends and Earnings
59(1)
Investors' Required Rate of Return
59(3)
The Capital Asset Pricing Model
62(2)
Does the CAPM Work?
64(1)
Assets in Place Versus Growth Opportunities
65(5)
An Expanded Valuation Model
66(4)
Relative Valuation Using Comparables
70(3)
Corporate Governance Issues in Investment Decisions
73(16)
Introduction
73(1)
The NPV Rule
74(5)
A Stylized NPV Example
75(1)
The Data
75(2)
The Present Values
77(1)
Interpreting NPV
78(1)
Do Investors Behave as Predicted by the NPV Rule?
79(2)
Implication of the NPV Rule for Internal Allocation of Capital
81(1)
Legitimate and Illegitimate Criticisms of the NPV Rule
82(7)
Strategic Options and the NPV Rule
84(1)
Competitive Analysis Approach
85(4)
Corporate Governance Issues and the Financing Decision
89(16)
Introduction
89(2)
The Setup
91(10)
Shareholder/Bondholder Conflicts of Interest
93(1)
The Events
94(1)
How Creditors Protect Themselves with Covenants
95(1)
Shareholder/Manager Conflicts of Interest
96(3)
The Financing Decision and Customers
99(1)
The Financing Decision and Employees
100(1)
Bank Debt Versus Public Debt
101(2)
Does Where You Raise Funds Matter?
103(2)
Corporate Governance Dividend Issues
105(12)
Introduction
105(1)
The Setup: Why Pay Cash Dividends?
106(1)
Solving Informational Asymmetry Problems
107(3)
Dividends, Free Cash Flow, and Conflicts of Interest
110(3)
Dividends and Growth Opportunities
110(1)
Dividends and Legal Systems
111(2)
Dividends, Taxes, and Share Repurchases
113(1)
An Example of Disgorging Cash: Ford Motor Company
114(1)
Explicit Free Cash Flow Dividend/Share Repurchase Policies
115(2)
Corporate Governance and Managerial Compensation
117(32)
Introduction
117(1)
The Problem
118(1)
Measuring Effort and Performance
119(2)
Common Pay and Performance Schemes
121(15)
Base Salary Examples
122(1)
Short-Term Incentive Plans
123(1)
Short-Term Incentive Examples
124(1)
Problems With Short-Term Incentive Plans
125(1)
Problems with Accounting Measures
125(1)
Problems with Budgets
126(1)
Potential Gaming Behavior
127(1)
Long-Term Incentive Plans
128(2)
Examples of Long-Term Incentive Plans
130(1)
Problems with Stock Option and Restricted Stock Plans
130(2)
Reported Earnings and Paying Managers with Stock or Stock Options
132(2)
Abusive Manipulation of Earnings
134(2)
EVA®: A Very Popular Compensation Plan and Corporate Governance Metric
136(5)
A Stylized EVA Example
137(3)
Using EVA to Set Compensation
140(1)
The Evidence About Pay and Performance
141(1)
Pay and Performance in 2000
142(7)
The Corporate Control Market
149(20)
Introduction
149(1)
Why a Corporate Control Market?
150(5)
A Restructuring Plan for LeisurePark
151(2)
A Tender Offer for LeisurePark
153(2)
Mergers and Acquisitions
155(7)
United Airlines and US Airways
156(2)
Hewlett-Packard and Compaq
158(1)
When Do Mergers Create Value?
159(2)
How Can Mergers Destroy Shareholder Value?
161(1)
Divestitures, Spin-Offs, and Carve-Outs
162(2)
Going Public: IPOs
164(1)
Why Go Public?
164(1)
LBOs and MBOs
165(4)
Why LBOs and MBOs?
166(1)
Potential Problems for Public Investors
167(2)
The Board of Directors and Shareholders Rights
169(18)
Introduction
169(1)
A Historical Perspective
170(2)
From World War II to the 1970s
170(1)
Boards Again Attract Attention
171(1)
Composition and Compensation of the Board of Directors
172(6)
Board Committees
173(1)
Board Compensation
174(4)
The CEO and the Board Chair
178(1)
Shareholder Rights
178(5)
Voting Rights
179(1)
How Many Votes for Each Shareholder?
179(1)
Confidentiality Issues
180(1)
ERISA and Institutional Investor Voting Responsibilities
181(1)
Electing the Board of Directors
181(1)
Cumulative Voting
181(1)
Staggered Boards
182(1)
Poison Pills, Supermajority Rules, and Greenmail
183(2)
A Shareholder Rights Plan at First Virginia Banks (FVA)
184(1)
Evidence About Antitakeover Devices
184(1)
Board Governance and Firm Performance
185(2)
Alternative Governance Systems: Germany and Japan
187(24)
Introduction
187(1)
The German System
188(3)
German Governing Boards
189(1)
Absence of Corporate Control Market
190(1)
Universal Banking: A German Governance Solution
191(5)
Advantages of Universal Banking
191(2)
Disadvantages of Universal Banking
193(1)
Banks May Care About Firm Survival, Not Share Price
194(1)
Weak Investor Protection Laws
194(1)
Absence of an Equity Market Hinders Formation of New Firms
195(1)
What's the Evidence with Respect to Germany?
196(3)
Why German Firms Adopt an American Governance Structure
197(2)
The Japanese Keiretsu
199(5)
Reciprocal and Control-Oriented Share Ownership
200(2)
Relational Contracting
202(2)
A Critique of the Keiretsu
204(3)
Advantages of the Keiretsu
204(1)
Disadvantages of the Keiretsu
205(1)
Japanese Reforms
206(1)
Convergence or Diversity?
207(2)
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
209(2)
Notes 211(4)
Index 215(12)
About the Author 227