Atjaunināt sīkdatņu piekrišanu

E-grāmata: Bounded Rationality: Heuristics, Judgment, and Public Policy

3.75/5 (8 ratings by Goodreads)
,
  • Formāts: 552 pages
  • Sērija : The MIT Press
  • Izdošanas datums: 12-Jul-2022
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262369664
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
  • Formāts - PDF+DRM
  • Cena: 120,22 €*
  • * ši ir gala cena, t.i., netiek piemērotas nekādas papildus atlaides
  • Ielikt grozā
  • Pievienot vēlmju sarakstam
  • Šī e-grāmata paredzēta tikai personīgai lietošanai. E-grāmatas nav iespējams atgriezt un nauda par iegādātajām e-grāmatām netiek atmaksāta.
Bounded Rationality: Heuristics, Judgment, and Public PolicyPalielināt
  • Formāts: 552 pages
  • Sērija : The MIT Press
  • Izdošanas datums: 12-Jul-2022
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780262369664
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

DRM restrictions

  • Kopēšana (kopēt/ievietot):

    nav atļauts

  • Drukāšana:

    nav atļauts

  • Lietošana:

    Digitālo tiesību pārvaldība (Digital Rights Management (DRM))
    Izdevējs ir piegādājis šo grāmatu šifrētā veidā, kas nozīmē, ka jums ir jāinstalē bezmaksas programmatūra, lai to atbloķētu un lasītu. Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu, jums ir jāizveido Adobe ID. Vairāk informācijas šeit. E-grāmatu var lasīt un lejupielādēt līdz 6 ierīcēm (vienam lietotājam ar vienu un to pašu Adobe ID).

    Nepieciešamā programmatūra
    Lai lasītu šo e-grāmatu mobilajā ierīcē (tālrunī vai planšetdatorā), jums būs jāinstalē šī bezmaksas lietotne: PocketBook Reader (iOS / Android)

    Lai lejupielādētu un lasītu šo e-grāmatu datorā vai Mac datorā, jums ir nepieciešamid Adobe Digital Editions (šī ir bezmaksas lietotne, kas īpaši izstrādāta e-grāmatām. Tā nav tas pats, kas Adobe Reader, kas, iespējams, jau ir jūsu datorā.)

    Jūs nevarat lasīt šo e-grāmatu, izmantojot Amazon Kindle.

"An accessible and self-contained treatment of the current state of thinking about rationality in economics and other social sciences"--

Two leaders in the field explore the foundations of bounded rationality and its effects on choices by individuals, firms, and the government.

Bounded rationality recognizes that human behavior departs from the perfect rationality assumed by neoclassical economics. In this book, Sanjit Dhami and Cass R. Sunstein explore the foundations of bounded rationality and consider the implications of this approach for public policy and law, in particular for questions about choice, welfare, and freedom. The authors, both recognized as experts in the field, cover a wide range of empirical findings and assess theoretical work that attempts to explain those findings. Their presentation is comprehensive, coherent, and lucid, with even the most technical material explained accessibly. They not only offer observations and commentary on the existing literature but also explore new insights, ideas, and connections.
 
After examining the traditional neoclassical framework, which they refer to as the Bayesian rationality approach (BRA), and its empirical issues, Dhami and Sunstein offer a detailed account of bounded rationality and how it can be incorporated into the social and behavioral sciences. They also discuss a set of models of heuristics-based choice and the philosophical foundations of behavioral economics. Finally, they examine libertarian paternalism and its strategies of “nudges.” 
Acknowledgments xi
1 Introduction
1(22)
2 What Is Rationality and What Is the Evidence for It?
23(86)
2.1 Introduction
23(6)
2.2 A Simple Taxonomy of Situations
29(8)
2.3 The Bayesian Rationality Approach
37(1)
2.4 Rationality under Certainty
38(5)
2.5 Rationality under Risk and Uncertainty
43(4)
2.6 Rationality in Choices Made over Time
47(5)
2.7 Rationality in Strategic Interaction
52(2)
2.8 What Rationality Is Not
54(2)
2.8.1 Rationality Does Not Imply Self-Regarding Preferences
54(1)
2.8.2 Rationality Does Not Imply Absence of Emotions in Decision-Making
55(1)
2.8.3 Rationality Does Require Perfect Attention and Unlimited Computing Power
56(1)
2.9 Evidence on Consistent Preferences
56(3)
2.10 Evidence on Limited Attention
59(2)
2.11 Evidence on Overconfidence
61(3)
2.12 Evidence on Rationality in Risk and Uncertainty
64(5)
2.12.1 Nonlinear Probability Weighting
64(4)
2.12.2 Reference Dependence
68(1)
2.12.3 More Violations
69(1)
2.13 Evidence on Rationality in Time Discounting
69(7)
2.14 Evidence on Rationality in Strategic Interaction
76(3)
2.15 Do Humans Follow the Rules of Mathematical Statistics?
79(13)
2.15.1 Biases in Producing a Full Sampling Distribution
80(4)
2.15.2 Do People Use Bayes' Law?
84(4)
2.15.3 Conservatism
88(1)
2.15.4 A Modification of Bayes' Law
89(3)
2.16 Appendix: A Primer on Decision Theory
92(17)
2.16.1 Expected Utility Theory
93(3)
2.16.2 Probability Weighting Function
96(3)
2.16.3 Rank Dependent Utility
99(2)
2.16.4 Prospect Theory
101(8)
3 The Case for Bounded Rationality
109(60)
3.1 Introduction
109(5)
3.2 How Reasonable Is the Assumption of Mathematical Optimization?
114(29)
3.2.1 A Basic Problem in Dynamic Optimization
115(4)
3.2.2 Emotions and Optimization in Microfinance Contracts
119(7)
3.2.3 Bubbles in Financial Markets
126(1)
3.2.4 Will Non-Optimizing Individuals Simply Perish?
127(4)
3.2.5 Optimization or Heuristics? An Application from Microfinance Contracts
131(3)
3.2.6 Optimization or Heuristics? An Application to Tax Evasion
134(4)
3.2.7 Assessing a Three-Way Leaders Debate
138(5)
3.3 Strategic Interaction
143(6)
3.4 The Role of Social Norms
149(7)
3.5 On Methodology in Economics
156(5)
3.6 Preferences and Beliefs: The Role of History, Culture, and Institutions
161(4)
3.6.1 Effect of Preferences on Institutions
162(1)
3.6.2 Effect of Institutions on Preferences
163(2)
3.7 The Macroeconomy as a Complex, Adaptive System
165(4)
4 Behavioral Models of Heuristics-Based Choice
169(96)
4.1 Risk as Feelings
177(3)
4.2 Attribute-Based Models in Time Discounting
180(5)
4.2.1 Vague Time Preferences Model
181(2)
4.2.2 The Similarity Relation and Time Preference
183(1)
4.2.3 Trade-off Attribute Model of Intertemporal Choice
184(1)
4.3 Heuristics and Optimization I: Heuristics for Temporal Choices and Delay-Discounting Models
185(3)
4.4 Heuristics and Optimization II: Mental Accounting and Prospect Theory
188(2)
4.5 Aspiration Adaptation Theory
190(8)
4.5.1 A Cooperation Problem
192(3)
4.5.2 A Coordination Problem
195(3)
4.6 Evidential Reasoning
198(5)
4.7 Kantian Rationality
203(4)
4.8 Winner's Curse in Financial Markets
207(4)
4.9 Complexity and Bounded Rationality: Thinking about Macroeconomics
211(15)
4.9.1 Inductive Reasoning, Adaptive Rules, and Emergent Phenomena
215(1)
4.9.2 Neighborhood Segregation as an Emergent Phenomenon
216(3)
4.9.3 Chaos: Extreme Dependence on Initial Conditions
219(2)
4.9.4 Agent-Based Models
221(5)
4.10 Evolutionary Game Theory and Stochastic Social Dynamics
226(8)
4.10.1 Evolutionary Game Theory
226(5)
4.10.2 Stochastic Social Dynamics
231(3)
4.11 Narratives and Contagion
234(8)
4.12 Mental Models
242(3)
4.13 Choice Bracketing
245(6)
4.13.1 Equity-Premium Puzzle
247(2)
4.13.2 Risk Aggregation
249(2)
4.13.3 Why Do People Engage in Narrow Choice Bracketing?
251(1)
4.14 Attitudes toward Very Low Probability Events
251(8)
4.14.1 Original Prospect Theory
253(2)
4.14.2 The Evidence on Behavior under Low Probability Events
255(3)
4.14.3 So What Is the Way Forward?
258(1)
4.15 Do People Take Account of Sunk Costs and Opportunity Costs?
259(6)
5 Kahneman and Tversky's Research Program on Heuristics and Biases
265(40)
5.1 Introduction
265(5)
5.2 The Representative Heuristic
270(5)
5.2.1 The Gambler's Fallacy
273(1)
5.2.2 The Hot Hand Fallacy
274(1)
5.3 Anchoring
275(3)
5.4 Hindsight Bias
278(3)
5.5 The Availability Heuristic
281(1)
5.6 The Conjunction Fallacy
282(2)
5.7 Regression to the Mean
284(2)
5.8 Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
286(1)
5.9 Confirmation Bias
286(2)
5.10 The Affect Heuristic
288(1)
5.11 Objections to the HBP
289(14)
5.11.1 Some Preliminaries
289(2)
5.11.2 Ecological Rationality
291(1)
5.11.3 One-Event Probabilities, Context, and Errors
292(1)
5.11.4 "We Cannot Be That Dumb" Critique
293(1)
5.11.5 Frequency versus Probability Format and the HBP
294(3)
5.11.6 Empirical Counterparts to the Heuristics
297(1)
5.11.7 How Can Heuristics Explain Events A and Not A?
298(2)
5.11.8 The Criticism of Appropriate Statistical Norms
300(2)
5.11.9 Systems 1 and 2
302(1)
5.12 Experts and the HBP Heuristics
303(2)
6 The Fast and Frugal Heuristics Research Program
305(36)
6.1 Introduction
305(4)
6.2 The FFP
309(7)
6.3 A Critique of the FFP
316(9)
6.3.1 What Is the Benchmark for Comparison?
316(1)
6.3.2 Empirical Testing of Heuristics in the FFP
317(4)
6.3.3 Training People in Using Statistics
321(2)
6.3.4 Does the FFP Tell Us Which Heuristic to Use?
323(2)
6.4 On Mathematical Optimization and As-If Theories
325(2)
6.5 On Distinct Domains of Choices in the HBP and FFP
327(6)
6.6 The Less Is More Effect
333(8)
6.6.1 A Critique of the Bias-Variance Trade-off
337(2)
6.6.2 Implications of the Less Is More Effect for the HBP
339(2)
7 Philosophical Foundations
341(20)
7.1 Introduction
341(2)
7.2 Choices and Welfare
343(3)
7.3 Direct and Indirect Judgments
346(5)
7.4 Practice and Theory
351(2)
7.5 The Pervasiveness of Indirect Judgments
353(1)
7.6 Defining Direct Judgments
354(2)
7.7 Welfare
356(2)
7.8 Paths Forward
358(3)
8 Optimal Taxation and Regulation in Behavioral Economics
361(42)
8.1 Introduction
361(2)
8.2 An Introduction to Multiple Selves
363(3)
8.3 Multiple Selves, Internalities, and Public Policy
366(8)
8.4 Limited Attention and Deadweight Loss from Taxation
374(6)
8.5 Tax Incidence under Limited Attention
380(2)
8.6 Internalities and Tax Efficiency: An Application to Sugar Taxes
382(3)
8.7 Present Biased Preferences and Procrastination: More Applications
385(7)
8.7.1 Procrastination: Fixing Ideas
386(3)
8.7.2 Job Search and Hard Paternalism
389(1)
8.7.3 Deadlines; Buying Single Cigarette Packs
390(1)
8.7.4 Inducing Farmers to Buy Fertilizers
391(1)
8.8 Behavioral Industrial Organization, Bounded Rationality, and Policy
392(11)
9 Libertarian Paternalism in Theory
403(20)
9.1 Introduction
403(2)
9.2 Mistakes and Welfare
405(2)
9.3 Libertarian Paternalism
407(8)
9.4 Government Error
415(4)
9.5 Remedies
419(4)
10 Libertarian Paternalism in Practice
423(20)
10.1 Behavioral Public Policy around the World
423(3)
10.2 FEAST
426(2)
10.3 Institutionalizing Behavioral Insights: Two Approaches
428(1)
10.4 Examples of Behavioral Public Policies
429(5)
10.4.1 Default Rules
429(2)
10.4.2 Policies on Savings
431(1)
10.4.3 School Meals
432(1)
10.4.4 Finance
432(1)
10.4.5 HealthCare
433(1)
10.4.6 Payroll Statements
434(1)
10.5 Disclosure
434(6)
10.5.1 Nutrition
435(1)
10.5.2 Finance
436(1)
10.5.3 HealthCare
437(1)
10.5.4 Fuel Economy
437(1)
10.5.5 Disclosure and Competition
438(2)
10.6 Structuring Choices
440(1)
10.7 Salience
440(3)
11 Epilogue
443(2)
Notes 445(10)
References 455(48)
Index 503
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/97802623696642e.html
Keywords: