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Carbon Capture and Storage: Efficient Legal Policies for Risk Governance and Compensation [Hardback]

(University of Aberdeen), (Inst Transnational Legal Res)
  • Formāts: Hardback, 376 pages, height x width x depth: 229x152x19 mm
  • Sērija : Carbon Capture and Storage
  • Izdošanas datums: 14-Apr-2017
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • ISBN-10: 0262035596
  • ISBN-13: 9780262035590
  • Hardback
  • Cena: 65,12 €
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  • Formāts: Hardback, 376 pages, height x width x depth: 229x152x19 mm
  • Sērija : Carbon Capture and Storage
  • Izdošanas datums: 14-Apr-2017
  • Izdevniecība: MIT Press
  • ISBN-10: 0262035596
  • ISBN-13: 9780262035590

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) systems inject highly compressed carbon dioxide gas deep into geological formations in order to contain the gas, and its harmful effects on the planet, for the foreseeable future and beyond -- for centuries or even millennia. Used effectively, CCS could lessen the impact of climate change while carbon-free energy sources are developed. And yet CCS is not widely deployed. In this book, Michael Faure and Roy Partain offer a theoretical and practical discussion of one of the main obstacles to CCS adoption: complex liability and compensation issues.

Faure and Partain point out that current liability rules are unclear in their application to CCS. Causation is complicated, and the timeline of hundreds of years goes beyond the lifetimes of people or corporations. Examining the subject from legal and economic perspectives, they consider whether rules of civil liability can govern CCS risk; how a liability system might address the open-ended timeline; what role public and private regulatory measures could play; and whether compensation should be provided from public or private resources. They investigate the utility of different forms of insurance and of such financial tools as guarantees, deposits, and catastrophe bonds. They offer not only a rigorous framework for assessing policy but also a summary of policy recommendations they develop from their findings.

List of Abbreviations and Unique Terms
ix
1 Introduction
1(10)
1.1 Carbon Capture and Storage: Risks and Rewards
1(3)
1.2 Coals and Methodology of This Book
4(2)
1.3 Limits of Its Goals
6(1)
1.4 Structure of This Book
7(4)
2 Survey of CCS Technologies and Risks
11(36)
2.1 Nature and Scale of Subterranean Storage Structures
12(5)
2.1.1 Geology, Geochemistry, and Geophysics
12(3)
2.1.2 Global Storage Capacity
15(2)
2.2 CO2 Injection and Storage
17(4)
2.2.1 Based on Preexisting Technologies
17(2)
2.2.2 Methods and Techniques
19(2)
2.3 Historical CO2 Venting from Subterranean Reservoirs
21(3)
2.4 Risks from CCS Activities
24(15)
2.4.1 Fugitive CO2 and Other Migrating Fluids
26(3)
2.4.2 Risks from Surface and Atmospheric Events
29(3)
2.4.3 Risks from Subterranean Events
32(7)
2.5 Of Permanence, Risk, and Remedies
39(4)
2.5.1 Identification of Long-Run Risks
40(1)
2.5.2 Remedies for Migration Problems
41(2)
2.6 Summary
43(4)
3 Clarifying Liability Rules for CCS
47(42)
3.1 Scholastic Calls for Clarification of CCS Liability Rules
48(9)
3.2 Multiple Rules of Overlapping Civil Liability
57(8)
3.2.1 Strict Liability
58(2)
3.2.2 Trespass
60(2)
3.2.3 Nuisance
62(1)
3.2.4 Negligence
63(2)
3.3 Law and Economics on the Role of Civil Liability Rules
65(3)
3.4 Evaluating Strict Liability for CCS
68(13)
3.4.1 Abnormally Hazardous Activities
69(6)
3.4.2 Dominant Actor Accidents (Unilateral Accidents)
75(2)
3.4.3 Novel and Uncertain Risks
77(1)
3.4.4 Efficiency of Bespoke Safety Plans (Policy of Decentralization)
78(1)
3.4.5 Overwhelming Transaction Costs of Justice
79(2)
3.5 Evaluating Negligence for CCS
81(5)
3.5.1 Risk Aversion and Imperfect Insurance
81(2)
3.5.2 Insolvent Tortfeasors
83(1)
3.5.3 Strategic Avoidance of Liability by Tortfeasors
84(1)
3.5.4 Inaccurately Determined Damages
85(1)
3.6 Conclusion and Results
86(3)
4 Policy Options for CCS Liability Rules
89(18)
4.1 Refocusing on the Goals and Limits of Liability Rules
89(2)
4.2 Determination of Responsible Actors
91(4)
4.2.1 Stakeholders
91(2)
4.2.2 Property Law Clarifications
93(2)
4.3 Force Majeure
95(1)
4.4 Attribution of Liability
96(1)
4.5 Effect of Regulation
97(2)
4.6 Causation
99(2)
4.7 Joint and Several Liability
101(1)
4.8 Remedies: Limited Financial Amounts?
102(2)
4.9 Conclusion and Results
104(3)
5 Postclosure Liability Transfers and Indemnifications
107(18)
5.1 Long-Term Liability Issues
108(2)
5.2 Latency Period Planning and Civil Liability Rules
110(6)
5.2.1 Scope of Polluter Pays
112(1)
5.2.2 Risk of Operator Extinction
113(1)
5.2.3 Support of Nascent Industry
114(2)
5.3 Addressing Externalities and Beneficiaries
116(1)
5.4 Policies in Place
117(6)
5.4.1 In European Countries
118(1)
5.4.2 In North America
119(3)
5.4.3 In Australia
122(1)
5.5 Conclusion
123(2)
6 Publicly and Privately Regulating CCS Activities
125(24)
6.1 Evaluating Public Regulations for CCS
126(12)
6.1.1 Regulations Work When Civil Liability Rules Would Fail
127(2)
6.1.2 Addressing Asymmetric Information
129(2)
6.1.3 Information-Revealing Mechanisms
131(1)
6.1.4 Operating beyond Monetary Incentives
132(2)
6.1.5 Ensuring Resolution of Injuries and Damages
134(3)
6.1.6 Powerful When Court Institutions Are Weak
137(1)
6.1.7 Public Regulations Can Be Inefficient Too
137(1)
6.2 Evaluating Private Regulations for CCS
138(6)
6.2.1 Theory of Private Regulation
139(1)
6.2.2 Advantages of Self-Regulation vis-a-vis Public Regulation
140(4)
6.2.3 Disadvantages of Self-Regulation over Public Regulation
144(1)
6.3 Regulations Benefit from Availability of Civil Liability Rules
144(5)
6.3.1 Civil Liability Rules Improve Regulatory Efficacy
145(1)
6.3.2 Civil Liability Rules Defend the Function of Regulatory Designs
146(3)
7 Compensation via Market-Based Measures
149(36)
7.1 Goals of Compensation for CCS Policy
150(1)
7.2 Insurance for CCS
151(17)
7.2.1 Insurance and Risk Aversion
152(2)
7.2.2 Barriers to Market Entry
154(2)
7.2.3 Dealing with Insurer Ambiguity
156(1)
7.2.4 Predictability of CCS-Related Risks
157(1)
7.2.5 Cover in Time
158(3)
7.2.6 Capacity
161(2)
7.2.7 Curing Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
163(3)
7.2.8 Insurability of CCS?
166(2)
7.3 Alternative Compensation Mechanisms
168(17)
7.3.1 Self-Insurance and Captives
169(2)
7.3.2 Risk-Sharing Agreements
171(6)
7.3.3 Guarantees and Deposits
177(2)
7.3.4 Financial Provisions: Letters of Credit and Bonding Instruments
179(4)
7.3.5 Capital Accounts: Trust Funds and Escrow Accounts
183(1)
7.3.6 Conclusion
183(2)
8 Compensation Using Public Resources
185(22)
8.1 Compulsory Financial Guarantees?
186(3)
8.2 Direct Compensation by Government?
189(5)
8.3 A Compensation Fund for CCS-Related Damage?
194(5)
8.4 Compensation Fund: A Second Best Solution?
199(1)
8.5 Reinsurer of Last Resort
200(3)
8.6 Creation of a Public CCS Utility
203(1)
8.7 Conclusion
204(3)
9 Policy Recommendations
207(12)
9.1 A Review of the Policy Recommendations
207(8)
9.1.1 Foreseeable Risks and Potential to Mitigate or Remedy
207(1)
9.1.2 Choice of Strict Liability over Negligence
208(1)
9.1.3 Determination of Liable Parties
209(1)
9.1.4 Disarming Regulatory Defense and Force Majeure
210(1)
9.1.5 No Caps to Liability Exposure
211(1)
9.1.6 Planning for Operator Extinction
211(1)
9.1.7 The Need for Both Public and Private Forms of Regulation
212(1)
9.1.8 Private Market Means of Compensation
213(1)
9.1.9 Public Resource Means of Compensation
213(1)
9.1.10 CCS Storage Is Welfare Enhancing
214(1)
9.2 Climate Change Liability
215(1)
9.3 Position of Developing Countries
215(1)
9.4 Concluding Observations
216(3)
Notes 219(108)
Bibliography 327(24)
Index 351