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xi | |
Author biography |
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xiii | |
Preface |
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xv | |
Acknowledgments |
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xxi | |
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1 The battle for technology: the global arena |
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1 | (28) |
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1.1 Technology as a key factor of a superpower's influence |
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1 | (9) |
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1.1.1 "The rise of China" debate |
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2 | (2) |
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1.1.2 The dilemma of "engagement versus decoupling" |
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4 | (1) |
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1.1.3 The "developmental state" narrative |
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5 | (3) |
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1.1.4 The EU, the excellent "prey" |
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8 | (2) |
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1.2 Historical and recent technology developments in China and the United States |
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10 | (19) |
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10 | (3) |
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13 | (2) |
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15 | (2) |
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1.2.4 R&D at the corporate level |
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17 | (1) |
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17 | (1) |
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1.2.5 R&D expenditures of corporations |
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18 | (1) |
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1.2.5.1 Venture capital investments |
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18 | (1) |
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19 | (10) |
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2 The war of arguments: the European battlefield |
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29 | (25) |
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29 | (10) |
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2.1.1 Economic development debates |
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31 | (5) |
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36 | (3) |
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2.2 A summary of the EU's position on China |
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39 | (3) |
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2.3 Technological development and regulatory f ramework in the EU |
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42 | (12) |
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2.3.1 Technological development and its policies in the EU |
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42 | (2) |
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2.3.1.1 Weak corporate financing |
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44 | (1) |
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2.3.1.2 Weak public funding |
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44 | (1) |
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2.3.1.3 The weakness in innovation and 5G sector |
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45 | (1) |
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2.3.2 The regulatory framework |
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46 | (8) |
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3 Economic and political interests of the major powers: the United States, Germany, and Russia |
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54 | (25) |
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3.1 The changing American stance on China |
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54 | (9) |
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3.1.1 From the "pivot to Asia" concept to the "new cold war" |
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54 | (2) |
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56 | (1) |
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3.1.1.2 The consequences of technological decoupling |
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57 | (2) |
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3.1.2 The link between new technologies and the rise of new authoritarian regimes? |
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59 | (1) |
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3.1.3 Fraying ties with Europe |
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60 | (3) |
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3.2 The core interests of German industry |
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63 | (6) |
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3.2.1 German and Chinese trade ties |
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63 | (1) |
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3.2.2 Direct investments in Germany and China |
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64 | (3) |
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67 | (2) |
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69 | (10) |
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3.3.1 From "Greater Europe" to "Greater Eurasia" |
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69 | (1) |
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3.3.2 Potential in technology cooperation with China |
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70 | (2) |
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3.3.3 Unbalanced trade and investment relations |
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72 | (1) |
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73 | (6) |
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4 Chinese investment and 5G cooperation in the EU: France, Germany, and Italy |
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79 | (28) |
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4.1 Germany: a case study |
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79 | (5) |
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79 | (1) |
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4.1.2 The legal framework |
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80 | (1) |
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4.1.3 Technology-intensive sectors |
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81 | (3) |
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84 | (8) |
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84 | (1) |
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4.2.2 The legal framework |
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85 | (1) |
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4.2.3 The French approach to investments and China |
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86 | (2) |
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4.2.4 Chinese investments in French technology-intensive sectors? |
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88 | (4) |
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92 | (15) |
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92 | (4) |
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4.3.2 The legal framework |
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96 | (1) |
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4.3.3 Technology-intensive sectors and investments |
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97 | (10) |
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5 Chinese investment and 5G networks in the Visegrad countries |
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107 | (26) |
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5.1 The historical background |
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107 | (2) |
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5.2 The work of division in Europe |
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109 | (4) |
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5.3 The consequences of backwardness and asymmetrical dependence |
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113 | (1) |
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5.4 Cooperation between the CEE countries and China |
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114 | (2) |
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116 | (17) |
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116 | (3) |
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119 | (1) |
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120 | (3) |
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123 | (10) |
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133 | (24) |
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6.1 Technology in the Chinese economic model |
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133 | (3) |
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136 | (3) |
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6.3 The EU's China policy |
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139 | (2) |
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6.4 Major powers: the United States, Germany, and Russia |
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141 | (2) |
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6.5 China polices of the three old members of the EU |
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143 | (6) |
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6.6 China policy in the Visegrad countries |
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149 | (3) |
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152 | (5) |
Index |
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157 | |