| Preface |
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iii | |
| Figures and Tables |
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ix | |
| Summary |
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xi | |
| Abbreviations |
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xix | |
| CHAPTER ONE Introduction |
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1 | (4) |
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1 | (1) |
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1 | (3) |
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2 | (1) |
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2 | (1) |
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3 | (1) |
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3 | (1) |
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Organization of the Report |
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4 | (1) |
| CHAPTER TWO Contextual Factors Shaping China's Response Options |
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5 | (34) |
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Contradictory National Security Goals and Responses to U.S. Military Transformation |
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6 | (1) |
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Key National Security Goals |
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7 | (7) |
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Regime Survival, Political Stability |
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7 | (1) |
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Increasing "Comprehensive National Power" and Military Modernization |
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8 | (2) |
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Preventing Taiwan Independence |
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10 | (2) |
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Economic Modernization: The Key Instrumentand the Key Constraint |
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12 | (1) |
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Contradictions Among Beijing's Security Goals |
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13 | (1) |
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Contextual Challenges and Constraints on Defense Modernization |
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14 | (22) |
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Trends in Cross-Strait Relations |
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15 | (1) |
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Stiffening Competition for Financial and Budgetary Resources |
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16 | (15) |
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Political Instability as an "Opportunity Cost" on National Security |
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31 | (2) |
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China's Militarily Relevant Technology Base |
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33 | (3) |
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The Impact of Contextual Forces on China's Response Strategies |
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36 | (3) |
| CHAPTER THREE Chinese Counter-Transformation Options: A Methodological Introduction |
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39 | (6) |
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Defining Network-Centric Warfare |
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39 | (3) |
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Typologizing Chinese Response Options |
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42 | (3) |
| CHAPTER FOUR Option One: Conventional Modernization "Plus" |
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45 | (32) |
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From People's War to Local War Under High-Tech Conditions |
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46 | (1) |
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PLA Strategic Response to High-Tech Enemies |
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47 | (12) |
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48 | (5) |
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Attacking the Center of Gravity |
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53 | (6) |
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Assessment of Chinese Strategy |
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59 | (1) |
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Operationalizing Chinese Strategies with Conventional Forces |
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59 | (14) |
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Attacks Against Naval Targets |
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60 | (7) |
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67 | (6) |
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73 | (4) |
| CHAPTER FIVE Option Two: Subversion, Sabotage, and Information Operations |
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77 | (18) |
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Center of Gravity Number One: The Will of the People on Taiwan |
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78 | (5) |
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Center of Gravity Number Two: U.S. Military Intervention |
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83 | (7) |
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Strategies for Attacking U.S. Logistics |
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83 | (1) |
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General JO and CNA Analysis |
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84 | (3) |
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Specific Targeting Analysis of Network Attacks Against Logistics |
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87 | (3) |
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Conclusions: Is the Scenario Realistic |
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90 | (5) |
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Chinese Strategies Against U.S. Logistics Systems and Operations |
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90 | (5) |
| CHAPTER SIX Option Three: Missile-Centric Strategies |
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95 | (38) |
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96 | (11) |
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Chinese Military Modernization and the Missile-Centric Scenario |
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96 | (1) |
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97 | (2) |
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China's Conventional Missile Doctrine |
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99 | (3) |
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Modernization of Chinese Missile Forces |
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102 | (3) |
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Three Potential Missile-Centric Strategies |
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105 | (2) |
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107 | (9) |
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Matching Chinese Military and Technical Capabilities |
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107 | (1) |
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108 | (4) |
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Altering Political Calculations |
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112 | (4) |
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116 | (4) |
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116 | (2) |
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118 | (2) |
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120 | (4) |
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U.S. Responses to Missile-Centric Strategies |
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124 | (5) |
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124 | (3) |
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Operational and Tactical Military Options |
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127 | (2) |
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129 | (4) |
| CHAPTER SEVEN Option Four: Chinese Network-Centric Warfare |
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133 | (12) |
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What Would China's Version of NCW Look Like? |
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133 | (9) |
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Specific Chinese Characteristics of NCW |
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138 | (2) |
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How Their NCW Might Affect Ours |
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140 | (2) |
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142 | (3) |
| APPENDIX Enhancing or Even Transcending Network-Centric Warfare? |
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145 | (12) |
| References |
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157 | |
