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Civil Liability and Financial Security for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities [Hardback]

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  • Formāts: Hardback, 478 pages, height x width x depth: 235x158x30 mm, weight: 830 g, 13 Tables, black and white; 14 Line drawings, black and white
  • Izdošanas datums: 20-Oct-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1107167167
  • ISBN-13: 9781107167162
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Civil Liability and Financial Security for Offshore Oil and Gas ActivitiesPalielināt
  • Formāts: Hardback, 478 pages, height x width x depth: 235x158x30 mm, weight: 830 g, 13 Tables, black and white; 14 Line drawings, black and white
  • Izdošanas datums: 20-Oct-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1107167167
  • ISBN-13: 9781107167162
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9781107167162.html
Keywords:
"Civil Liability and Financial Security for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities provides insights into the liability and compensation regime for offshore- related damage. The book analyses the legal regime in a variety of states (including the US and the UK)as well as the EU regime. In addition the various compensation mechanisms and amounts available today to compensate offshore-related damage are described and critically analysed. Moreover, based on in-depth interviews with a wide variety of relevant stakeholders including insurers, representatives from supervisory authorities, and oil and gas producer. This volume also provides a variety of policy recommendations, formulated to provide an optimal compensation regime for offshore-related damage"--

Civil Liability and Financial Security for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities provides insights into the liability and compensation regime for offshore-related damage. The book analyses the legal regime in a variety of states (including the US and the UK) as well as the EU regime. In addition, the various compensation mechanisms and amounts available today to compensate offshore-related damage are described and critically analysed. Moreover, the book is based on in-depth interviews with a wide variety of relevant stakeholders including insurers, representatives from supervisory authorities, and oil and gas producers. This volume also provides a variety of policy recommendations, formulated to provide an optimal compensation regime for offshore-related damage.

Papildus informācija

This book analyses how damage resulting from offshore-related incidents is compensated in European waters, whilst providing models to improve such compensation.
List of Figures and Tables
xvi
List of Contributors
xviii
Preface and Acknowledgements xix
List of Abbreviations
xxi
1 Introduction 1(11)
Michael Faure
Niels Philipsen
Hui Wang
1.1 Background for This Book
1(4)
1.2 Objective of This Book
5(1)
1.3 Methodology
5(5)
1.3.1 Legal Analysis
6(2)
1.3.2 Law and Economics
8(1)
1.3.3 Empirics
9(1)
1.3.4 Integration
10(1)
1.4 Structure
10(2)
2 Offshore-Related Damage: Facts and Figures
12(56)
Kristel De Smedt
Hui Wang
2.1 General Issues Concerning Offshore Activities
12(6)
2.1.1 Terminology in Offshore Activities
12(1)
2.1.2 Industry Structure of Offshore Activities
13(2)
2.1.3 Stakeholders
15(3)
2.1.4 Importance of Offshore Activities
18(1)
2.2 Location of Installations and Facilities in the European Union
18(4)
2.2.1 General Information
18(2)
2.2.2 Offshore Interests in the North Sea
20(1)
2.2.3 Offshore Interests in the Mediterranean Sea
21(1)
2.3 Overview of Major Offshore Accidents
22(19)
2.3.1 Sources of Information
22(1)
2.3.1.1 Worldwide Database
22(2)
2.3.1.2 National Regulatory Authorities
24(7)
2.3.1.3 Regional Database
31(2)
2.3.1.4 Industry Database
33(3)
2.3.1.5 Observation from Available Data
36(1)
2.3.2 Overview of Serious Accidents Involving Offshore Facilities
37(4)
2.4 Analysis of Recent Offshore Accidents in Europe: Case Studies
41(4)
2.4.1 Gulfaks C Incident (19 May 2010): A Near Miss
41(1)
2.4.2 Valhall PCP Production Platform Fire (13 July 2011)
41(1)
2.4.3 Escape of Hydrocarbons at Ula Field Norway (12 September 2012)
42(1)
2.4.4 Gannet Alpha Oil Spill (10 August 2011)
43(1)
2.4.5 Elgin Platform Blowout (26 March 2012)
44(1)
2.5 Analysis of Recent Offshore Accidents Outside EU Waters
45(23)
2.5.1 Montara
45(1)
2.5.1.1 Facts of the Incident
45(3)
2.5.1.2 Trans-Boundary Complaints from Indonesia
48(1)
2.5.2 Deepwater Horizon
49(1)
2.5.2.1 Facts of the Incident and Legal Issues
49(4)
2.5.2.2 Overview of Legal Proceedings
53(3)
2.5.2.3 Post-Macondo Responses
56(1)
2.5.2.4 Summary
57(1)
2.5.3 More Accidents in 2015
58(1)
2.5.3.1 Petrobras Brazil Offshore Explosion
58(1)
2.5.3.2 Pemex Mexico Offshore Accidents
59(1)
2.5.4 Risk of a Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill in the European Union?
59(1)
2.5.4.1 Different Depths and Pressures
59(1)
2.5.4.2 Concerns after Macondo
60(1)
2.5.4.3 Expert Evaluation
61(3)
2.5.4.4 Limits of Expert Opinion
64(2)
2.5.4.5 Summary
66(2)
3 Analysis of Existing Legal Regimes
68(129)
Michael Faure
Jing Liu
Hui Wang
3.1 Introduction
68(1)
3.2 International Legal Framework
69(17)
3.2.1 The Civil Liability Convention and the Fund Convention
70(1)
3.2.1.1 The Civil Liability Convention
71(6)
3.2.1.2 Compensation Funds in the International Regime
77(2)
3.2.1.3 Voluntary Mechanisms
79(2)
3.2.2 UNCLOS
81(2)
3.2.3 MARPOL 73/78
83(1)
3.2.4 The OPRC Convention
84(1)
3.2.5 Ongoing Discussion at the IMO
85(1)
3.3 Offshore Liability Regimes
86(5)
3.3.1 Regional Arrangements
86(1)
3.3.2 North-East Atlantic Ocean (North Sea)
87(1)
3.3.2.1 The OSPAR Convention
87(1)
3.3.2.2 The Nordic Convention
88(1)
3.3.3 The Mediterranean Sea
88(2)
3.3.4 The Baltic Sea
90(1)
3.3.5 The Black Sea
91(1)
3.3.6 Summary of the Regional Seas Arrangements
91(1)
3.4 Current EU Regime on Offshore Activities
91(6)
3.4.1 EU Interest in Offshore Activities
91(1)
3.4.2 Council Directive 92/91 EEC
92(1)
3.4.3 Hydrocarbons Licensing Directive 1994 (94/22/EC)
92(1)
3.4.4 The Marine Strategy Framework Directive
93(1)
3.4.5 Communication of 2010
93(1)
3.4.6 Directive on Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Operations
94(3)
3.5 Offshore Liability Regimes: Country Studies
97(74)
3.5.1 Introduction
97(1)
3.5.2 United Kingdom
98(1)
3.5.2.1 National Interest in Offshore Activities
98(1)
3.5.2.2 Legal Framework
98(5)
3.5.2.3 Basis of Liability
103(1)
3.5.2.4 Relationship with Regulation
104(1)
3.5.2.5 Causation
104(1)
3.5.2.6 Attribution of Liability
105(1)
3.5.2.7 Damages and Remedies
105(2)
3.5.2.8 Amount of Compensation
107(1)
3.5.2.9 Claim Settlement
108(1)
3.5.2.10 Compensation Mechanisms
109(6)
3.5.3 Norway
115(1)
3.5.3.1 National Interest in Offshore Activities
115(1)
3.5.3.2 Legal Framework
116(3)
3.5.3.3 Basis of Liability
119(1)
3.5.3.4 Relationship with Regulation
120(1)
3.5.3.5 Causation
120(1)
3.5.3.6 Attribution of Liability
121(1)
3.5.3.7 Damages and Remedies
122(1)
3.5.3.8 Amount of Compensation
123(1)
3.5.3.9 Claim Settlement
123(1)
3.5.3.10 Compensation Mechanisms
124(2)
3.5.4 Denmark
126(1)
3.5.4.1 National Interest in Offshore Activities
126(1)
3.5.4.2 Legal Framework
126(2)
3.5.4.3 Basis of Liability
128(1)
3.5.4.4 Relationship with Regulation
129(1)
3.5.4.5 Attribution of Liability
129(1)
3.5.4.6 Damages and Remedies
129(1)
3.5.4.7 Compensation Mechanisms
130(1)
3.5.5 United States
131(1)
3.5.5.1 National Interest in Offshore Activities
131(1)
3.5.5.2 Legal Framework
131(5)
3.5.5.3 Basis of Liability
136(1)
3.5.5.4 Relationship with Regulation
137(1)
3.5.5.5 Causation
137(1)
3.5.5.6 Attribution of Liability
138(1)
3.5.5.7 Damages and Remedies
139(2)
3.5.5.8 Amount of Compensation
141(3)
3.5.5.9 Claim Settlement
144(2)
3.5.5.10 Compensation Mechanisms
146(7)
3.5.5.11 Jurisdictional Issues
153(1)
3.5.5.12 Criminal Liability
153(1)
3.5.6 Australia
154(1)
3.5.6.1 National Interest in Offshore Activities
154(1)
3.5.6.2 Legal Framework
155(3)
3.5.6.3 Basis of Liability
158(2)
3.5.6.4 Relationship with Regulation
160(1)
3.5.6.5 Causation
160(1)
3.5.6.6 Attribution of Liability
160(1)
3.5.6.7 Damages and Remedies
161(1)
3.5.6.8 Amount of Compensation
161(1)
3.5.6.9 Compensation Mechanisms
161(2)
3.5.7 Canada
163(1)
3.5.7.1 National Interest in Offshore Activities
163(1)
3.5.7.2 Legal Framework
163(1)
3.5.7.3 Basis of Liability
164(1)
3.5.7.4 Attribution of Liability
164(1)
3.5.7.5 Damages and Remedies
164(1)
3.5.7.6 Amount of Compensation
165(1)
3.5.7.7 Applicability in Time
165(1)
3.5.7.8 Compensation Mechanisms
166(1)
3.5.8 Comparative Analysis
166(1)
3.5.8.1 Best Practice?
166(1)
3.5.8.2 Comparison of Legislation
167(1)
3.5.8.3 Comparative Comments
167(4)
3.6 Another High-Risk Sector: Nuclear
171(24)
3.6.1 International Compensation System for Nuclear Damage
172(1)
3.6.1.1 Origin of the International Regime
172(1)
3.6.1.2 First-Generation Nuclear Liability Conventions
173(5)
3.6.1.3 Second-Generation Nuclear Liability Conventions
178(4)
3.6.2 The Compensation System for Nuclear Damage in the United States
182(1)
3.6.2.1 Liability for Nuclear Damage
183(4)
3.6.2.2 The Requirement of Financial Protection
187(3)
3.6.2.3 Compensation under the Convention on Supplementary Compensation
190(1)
3.6.3 Critical Comparison
191(4)
3.7 Concluding Observations
195(2)
4 Pooling Mechanisms for Offshore Liability
197(39)
Michael Faure
Jing Liu
4.1 Theory: Pooling versus Insurance
198(3)
4.2 OPOL
201(9)
4.2.1 Origins of OPOL
201(1)
4.2.2 Main Features
202(1)
4.2.3 Rules and Membership
203(1)
4.2.4 Financial Responsibility
204(1)
4.2.5 Claims Handling
205(1)
4.2.6 Enforcement
206(1)
4.2.7 Practice
207(1)
4.2.8 Evaluation
208(2)
4.3 OIL and OCIL
210(4)
4.3.1 OIL
211(2)
4.3.2 OCIL
213(1)
4.4 Protection and Indemnity Clubs
214(3)
4.4.1 Origins
214(1)
4.4.2 Coverage
214(1)
4.4.3 Entry and Premiums
215(2)
4.4.4 Available Amount
217(1)
4.5 Risk Pooling in the Nuclear Sector
217(12)
4.5.1 Risk Pooling in the Price-Anderson Act
218(1)
4.5.1.1 A Second Tier of Compensation
218(1)
4.5.1.2 Collectively Financed Through Retrospective Premiums
219(1)
4.5.2 The Mutual Pool for Property Damage in the United States
220(1)
4.5.3 Mutual Nuclear Pools in Europe
221(2)
4.5.4 Nuclear Liability and Pooling System in Germany
223(4)
4.5.5 Towards a European Pool for Nuclear Liability?
227(2)
4.6 Concluding Observations
229(7)
4.6.1 Advantages of Pooling
229(3)
4.6.2 OPOL
232(1)
4.6.3 P&I Clubs
232(1)
4.6.4 Risk Sharing for Vessel-Based Pollution
233(1)
4.6.5 Summary
234(2)
5 The Use of Financial Market Instruments to Cover Liability Following a Major Offshore Accident
236(30)
Michael Faure
Hui Wang
5.1 Self-Insurance
237(5)
5.1.1 Theory
237(1)
5.1.2 Practice
238(2)
5.1.3 Analysis
240(2)
5.2 Capital Market
242(2)
5.2.1 Theory
242(1)
5.2.2 Practice
243(1)
5.2.3 Analysis
244(1)
5.3 Guarantees
244(2)
5.3.1 Theory
244(1)
5.3.2 Practice
245(1)
5.3.3 Analysis
245(1)
5.4 (Re-)Insurance
246(15)
5.4.1 Theory
246(2)
5.4.2 Practice
248(1)
5.4.2.1 Stakeholders in the Insurance Market (Major Insurance/Re-Insurance Providers)
248(2)
5.4.2.2 Structure of Coverage of Offshore Insurance
250(2)
5.4.2.3 Available Insurance Amount
252(3)
5.4.2.4 Cost Estimation
255(2)
5.4.2.5 Calculation of Premiums
257(1)
5.4.2.6 Influence of the Deepwater Horizon Incident on the Insurance Industry
258(2)
5.4.3 Analysis
260(1)
5.5 Risk-Pooling Schemes
261(2)
5.6 OPOL
263(1)
5.7 Combinations
264(2)
6 Potential of Financial and Insurance Instruments to Cover Liability Following a Major Offshore Accident
266(37)
Michael Faure
Hui Wang
6.1 Potential Costs of an Offshore Incident
267(9)
6.1.1 Potential Costs and Verifications
268(1)
6.1.1.1 Safety Regulation
269(1)
6.1.1.2 Technical Differences in Different Waters
269(2)
6.1.1.3 Differences in Operators
271(1)
6.1.1.4 Different Liability Standards
271(2)
6.1.2 Insolvency Risk and Different Scenarios
273(3)
6.2 Self-Guarantee Through Tax
276(1)
6.3 Expanding Possibility of Insurance?
277(12)
6.3.1 Mandatory Insurance and Increasing Coverage?
277(3)
6.3.2 Proposal of Munich Re-Insurance
280(1)
6.3.2.1 An SOS Cover
280(3)
6.3.2.2 Stakeholders Assessment
283(1)
6.3.2.3 Reaction by Munich Re
284(1)
6.3.2.4 Analysis
285(1)
6.3.3 Cover for Vessel-Based Pollution
286(1)
6.3.4 Developments in the Coverage of Nuclear Risk
287(2)
6.3.5 Summary
289(1)
6.4 Potential of Expanding Risk-Pooling Schemes
289(12)
6.4.1 Expanding OIL and OCIL
290(1)
6.4.2 Expanding OPOL?
291(2)
6.4.3 Noble Energy Proposal
293(1)
6.4.3.1 Background
293(1)
6.4.3.2 Contents of the Proposal
294(2)
6.4.3.3 Implementation?
296(1)
6.4.3.4 Reactions from Stakeholders
297(1)
6.4.3.5 Evaluation
298(1)
6.4.4 Challenges
299(2)
6.5 Summary: Flexibility
301(2)
7 Towards Optimal Liability and Compensation for Offshore Oil and Gas Activities
303(80)
Kristel De Smedt
Hui Wang
Michael Faure
7.1 Principles of Efficient Compensation and Liability Rules
304(4)
7.1.1 Why Compensate?
305(1)
7.1.2 Principles of Efficient and Fair Compensation
306(2)
7.2 Efficient Liability Rules
308(11)
7.2.1 Strict liability or Negligence?
308(1)
7.2.1.1 Economic Theory
308(4)
7.2.1.2 Application to Offshore-Related Risks
312(1)
7.2.2 Attribution of Liability
313(1)
7.2.2.1 Channelling of Liability
313(3)
7.2.2.2 Joint and Several Liability
316(1)
7.2.3 Financial Cap?
317(2)
7.3 Liability versus Regulation
319(12)
7.3.1 Criteria for Safety Regulation
319(1)
7.3.1.1 Information Asymmetry as a Criterion for Regulatory Intervention
320(1)
7.3.1.2 Insolvency Risk
320(1)
7.3.1.3 The Threat of a Liability Suit
321(1)
7.3.2 The Need to Regulate Offshore-Related Risks
322(2)
7.3.3 Private or Public Regulation?
324(2)
7.3.4 Liability and Regulation Combined
326(2)
7.3.5 Stakeholder Assessment
328(2)
7.3.6 Policy Conclusions
330(1)
7.4 Mandatory Financial Security
331(8)
7.4.1 Criteria for Mandatory Financial Security
331(1)
7.4.2 Application to Offshore-Related Risks
332(1)
7.4.3 Stakeholder Assessment in the European Union
333(2)
7.4.4 (European) Policy Issues
335(3)
7.4.5 Summary
338(1)
7.5 Compensation Instrument
339(20)
7.5.1 Self-Guarantee Through Taxes
339(1)
7.5.2 Mandatory Insurance and the Munich Re Proposal
340(1)
7.5.3 Risk-Sharing Pools
341(2)
7.5.4 A Role for Government in Providing Compensation?
343(1)
7.5.4.1 Direct Compensation by Government?
343(1)
7.5.4.2 Arguments in Favour
343(1)
7.5.4.3 Arguments Against
344(1)
7.5.4.4 Summary
345(1)
7.5.5 Re-Insurer of Last Resort?
346(1)
7.5.5.1 Arguments in Favour
346(1)
7.5.5.2 Arguments Against
347(1)
7.5.5.3 Summary
348(1)
7.5.6 A Compensation Fund?
349(1)
7.5.6.1 Funds versus Insurance
349(2)
7.5.6.2 Economic Principles to Shape a Fund
351(1)
7.5.6.3 Experiences with Environmental Funds
352(4)
7.5.6.4 A Fund for Offshore-Related Risks? Stakeholder Opinions
356(3)
7.6 Rapid Claims Management
359(17)
7.6.1 Existing Schemes
359(1)
7.6.1.1 OPOL
360(1)
7.6.1.2 Norway
360(1)
7.6.1.3 The Civil Liability and Fund Conventions
361(2)
7.6.1.4 Claims Settlement in the Deepwater Horizon Case
363(6)
7.6.2 Normative Analysis
369(1)
7.6.2.1 Need for a Mechanism
369(2)
7.6.2.2 Compensation Funds
371(1)
7.6.2.3 Stimulate Rapid Payment within Liability Law
372(1)
7.6.2.4 Combinations
372(2)
7.6.2.5 Evaluation
374(2)
7.7 Trans-Boundary Harm
376(3)
7.8 Scenarios
379(4)
7.8.1 Scenario 1: Damage Maximum US$250 Million
379(1)
7.8.2 Scenario 2: Damage between US$250 Million and US$750 Million
380(1)
7.8.3 Scenario 3: Damage above US$750 Million
381(2)
8 Concluding Remarks
383(5)
Michael Faure
Niels Philipsen
Hui Wang
8.1 General
383(1)
8.2 Efficient Liability Rules
384(1)
8.3 Mandatory Financial Security
385(1)
8.4 A Role for Government?
386(1)
8.5 Rapid Claims Mechanism
387(1)
References 388(18)
Appendix 1 Overview of Interviews with Stakeholders 406(2)
Appendix 2 Checklist for Country Studies 408(4)
Appendix 3 Oil Pollution Act Liability Limits, 2012 412(19)
Index 431
Michael Faure is Professor of Comparative Private Law and Economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam and Professor of Comparative and International Environmental Law at Maastricht University. He also serves as Academic Director of the Maastricht European Institute for Transnational Legal Research (METRO).