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Competition and Regulation in Electricity Markets [Hardback]

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The volume presents researchers new to energy economics with a collection of standard works in the field. The 42 facsimile articles cover classics in economics and regulation from the 1920s to the 1980s, incentive regulation, competition in generation, market power, transmission and system operation, retail competition, liberalization impacts, and future developments. Among specific topics are recent (1949-50) developments in the theory of marginal cost pricing, productivity incentive clauses and rate adjustment for inflation, market behavior with large amounts of intermittent generation, contract networks of electric power transmission, and lessons from the history of independent system operators in the energy sector. Annotation ©2016 Ringgold, Inc., Portland, OR (protoview.com)
Acknowledgements ix
Introduction xiii
Sebastian Eyre
Michael G. Pollitt
PART I CLASSICS
A Economics
1 `A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation', Economic Journal, XXXVII (145), March, 47-61
5(15)
F.P. Ramsey
2 `The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates', Econometrica, 6 (3), July, 242-69
20(28)
Harold Hotelling
3 `Government Ownership and Operation of the Electric Industry', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 201, January, 43-9
48(7)
R.H. Montgomery
4 `Major Controversies as to the Criteria of Reasonable Public Utility Rates', American Economic Review, 30 (5), February, 379-89
55(11)
James C. Bonbright
5 `Recent Developments in the Theory of Marginal Cost Pricing', Review of Economic Studies, 17 (2), 107-26
66(20)
Nancy Ruggles
6 `Peak-Load Pricing', Journal of Business, 33 (2), April, 157-79
86(25)
M. Boiteux
B Regulation
7 `Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constraint', American Economic Review, 52 (5), December, 1052-69
111(18)
Harvey Averch
Leland L. Johnson
8 `What Can Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity', Journal of Law and Economics, V, October, 1-16
129(16)
George J. Stigler
Claire Friedland
9 `The Theory of Economic Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 3-21
145(19)
George J. Stigler
10 `Toward a More General Theory of Regulation', Journal of Law and Economics, 19 (2), August, 211-40
164(30)
Sam Peltzman
11 `Why Regulate Utilities?', Journal of Law and Economics, 11 (1), April, 55-65
194(11)
Harold Demsetz
12 `A Theory of Yardstick Competition', RAND Journal of Economics, 16 (3), Autumn, 319-27
205(9)
Andrei Shleifer
13 `Taxation by Regulation', Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2 (1), Spring, 22-50
214(29)
Richard A. Posner
14 `Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry', in Almarin Phillips (ed.), Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets,
Chapter 5, Washington, DC, USA: Brookings Institution Press, 135-73
243(39)
Leonard W. Weiss
15 `The Coal Question in England', Science, V (108), February, 175-6
282(3)
William Stanley Jevons
PART II INCENTIVE REGULATION
16 `Productivity Incentive Clauses and Rate Adjustment for Inflation', Public Utilities Fortnightly, 110, July, 11-18
285(8)
William J. Baumol
17 `Good Regulatory Regimes', RAND Journal of Economics, 20 (3), Autumn, 417-36
293(20)
Richard Schmalensee
18 `Designing Superior Incentive Regulation: Modifying Plans to Preclude Recontracting and Promote Performance', Public Utilities Fortnightly, 132 (5), March, 27, 30-32
313(4)
David E.M. Sappington
Dennis L. Weisman
19 `Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity Distribution and Transmission Networks', in Nancy L. Rose (ed.), Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned?,
Chapter 5, Chicago, IL, USA and London, UK: University of Chicago Press, 291-344
317(56)
Paul L. Joskow
PART III COMPETITION IN GENERATION
20 `Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11 (3), Summer, 119-38
373(20)
Paul L. Joskow
21 `A Capacity Market that Makes Sense', Electricity Journal, 18 (7), August/September, 43-54
393(12)
Peter Cramton
Steven Stoft
22 `The Texas Energy-Only Resource Adequacy Mechanism', Electricity Journal, 19 (10), December, 39-49
405(11)
Eric S. Schubert
David Hurlbut
Parviz Adib
Shmuel Oren
23 `Market Behaviour with Large Amounts of Intermittent Generation', Energy Policy, 38 (7), July, 3211-20
416(13)
Richard Green
Nicholas Vasilakos
PART IV MARKET POWER
24 `Power Markets and Market Power', Energy Journal, 16 (3), 39-66
429(28)
David M. Newbery
25 `Measuring Market Inefficiencies in California's Restructured Wholesale Electricity Market', American Economic Review, 92 (5), December, 1376-405
457(30)
Severin Borenstein
James B. Bushnell
Frank A. Wolak
26 `The Electricity Contract Market in England and Wales', Journal of Industrial Economics, XLVII (1), March, 107-24
487(18)
Richard Green
27 `A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing Behavior in California's Wholesale Electricity Market during Summer 2000', Energy Journal, 23 (4), 1-35
505(35)
Paul L. Joskow
Edward Kahn
28 `The Trouble with Electricity Markets: Understanding California's Restructuring Disaster', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 16 (1), Winter, 191-211
540(21)
Severin Borenstein
29 `Market Power in the England and Wales Wholesale Electricity Market 1995-2000', Economic Journal, 117 (520), April, 654-85
561(32)
Andrew Sweeting
30 `Market Power in US and EU Electricity Generation', in Francois Leveque and Howard Shelanski, Antitrust and Regulation in the EU and US: Legal and Economic Perspectives,
Chapter 6, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing, 160-81
593(24)
Richard Gilbert
David Newbery
PART V TRANSMISSION AND SYSTEM OPERATION
31 `Optimal Pricing in Electrical Networks over Space and Time', RAND Journal of Economics, 15 (3), Autumn, 360-76
617(17)
Roger E. Bohn
Michael C. Caramanis
Fred C. Schweppe
32 `Contract Networks for Electric Power Transmission', Journal of Regulatory Economics, 4 (3), September, 211-42
634(32)
William W. Hogan
33 `A Market Mechanism for Electric Power Transmission', Journal of Regulatory Economics, 10 (1), July, 25-59
666(35)
Hung-Po Chao
Stephen Peck
34 `Merchant Transmission Investment', Journal of Industrial Economics, LIII (2), June, 233-64
701(32)
Paul Joskow
Jean Tirole
35 `Transmission Expansion in Argentina 4: A Review of Performance', Energy Economics, 30 (4), July, 1462-90
733(32)
Stephen C. Littlechild
Carlos J. Skerk
PART VI RETAIL COMPETITION
36 `Do Consumers Switch to the Best Supplier?', Oxford Economic Papers, 62 (4), October, 647-68
765(22)
Chris M. Wilson
Catherine Waddams Price
37 `Municipal Aggregation and Retail Competition in the Ohio Energy Sector', Journal of Regulatory Economics, 34 (2), October, 164-94
787(34)
Stephen Littlechild
PART VII LIBERALISATION IMPACTS
38 `Lessons Learned From Electricity Market Liberalization', Energy Journal, 29, Special Issue: The Future of Electricity: Papers in Honor of David Newbery, 9-42
821(36)
Paul L. Joskow
PART VIII FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
39 `Can We? Administrative Limits Revisited', Public Administration Review, 70 (4), July/August, 527-34
857(8)
Christopher Hood
40 `Lessons from the History of Independent System Operators in the Energy Sector', Energy Policy, 47, August, 32-48
865(17)
Michael G. Pollitt
41 `Organizational Form and the Wires', in Deregulation, Innovation and Market Liberalization: Electricity Regulation in a Continually Evolving Environment,
Chapter 5, London, UK and New York, NY, USA: Routledge, 88-103, 169, references
882(19)
L. Lynne Kiesling
42 `Household Response to Dynamic Pricing of Electricity: A Survey of 15 Experiments', Journal of Regulatory Economics, 38 (2), October, 193-225 901
901
Ahmad Faruqui
Sanem Sergici
Edited by Sebastian Eyre, Visiting Fellow, Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation, London School of Economics and Michael G. Pollitt, Professor of Business Economics, Judge Business School, University of Cambridge, UK