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E-grāmata: Contestants, Profiteers, and the Political Dynamics of Marketization: How Shareholders gained Control Rights in Britain, Germany, and France

(Senior Research Fellow, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies)
  • Formāts: 222 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 19-Jan-2018
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192548023
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  • Formāts: 222 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 19-Jan-2018
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780192548023

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Since the early 1980s, governments worldwide have taken a wide range of policy measures to strengthen and expand market-based competition. So far, the financial crisis that erupted in 2008 has not led to a significant policy reversal. Recent political events may well reflect widespread disenchantment with the consequences of neoliberal policies, but it remains to be seen whether the political leaders who rode to power by harnessing the discontent will deliver the market-restraining measures that many of their voters expect.

This book highlights the role of "profiteers" in political efforts to expand market-based competition. Political struggles surrounding the gradual marketization of corporate control in Britain, Germany and France from the 1860s provide empirical illustration. The book maps and analyzes the path-dependent evolution of support for shareholder rights relating to takeover bids among key interest groups, including managers, creditors, shareholders, and takeover service providers, as well as among political parties. By comparing the self-reinforcing and self-undermining policy feedback of market-enabling and market-restraining rules, it helps explain why market containment is an uphill struggle, while market expansion becomes easier with time.

Recenzijas

Regulating the markets in which struggles over corporate control take place is deeply political, but in ways that defy political tramlines. Helen Callaghan here carefully and revealingly unpicks the complex alliances and conflicts of interest that have determined changes on this issue. In so doing she also throws important new light on general debates about the nature of markets, varieties of capitalism, and processes of policy change. * Colin Crouch, Professor emeritus, University of Warwick, and External scientific member, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies * Based on her penetrating case studies, Callaghan constructs an elegant argument that processes of marketization, no matter how they proceed in different settings, take on a self-reinforcing momentum that makes them all but unstoppable, no matter how mixed the consequences may be. * J. Nicholas Ziegler, Brown University * Callaghan provides a hugely informative, interesting and important study of marketization politics and processes. A must read for everyone working in comparative political economynot only on the corporate governance examples here, but more generally on political responses to the economic dislocations of recent decades. Excellent book! * Peter Gourevitch, Distinguished Professor Emeritus, University of California, San Diego *

List of Figures
ix
Abbreviations xi
1 Introduction
1(20)
1.1 The Puzzle: Market Liberalization across Advanced Capitalist Democracies
3(5)
1.2 The Argument
8(3)
1.3 Research Operationalization
11(3)
1.4 Case Selection
14(2)
1.5 Epistemology, Ontology, and Method
16(3)
1.6 Outline
19(2)
2 The Political Dynamics of Marketizing "Corporate Control"
21(18)
2.1 The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Regulatory Challenge
21(8)
2.2 The Marketization of Corporate Control as a Political Process
29(3)
2.3 Economic Dynamics of the Market for Corporate Control
32(2)
2.4 Economic Dynamism and Political Salience
34(3)
2.5 Summary
37(2)
3 Britain
39(29)
3.1 The Prewar and Interwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
39(7)
Question 1 What prevented market-enabling reforms?
42(4)
3.2 Turning Point after World War II: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids
46(2)
Question 2 Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
46(2)
3.3 Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules
48(18)
Question 3 Why did pro-market groups prevail?
52(14)
3.4 Summary
66(2)
4 Germany
68(27)
4.1 The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
69(3)
4.2 Turning Point in the 1990s: The Removal of Barriers to Hostile Bids
72(21)
Question 1 What prevented market-enabling reforms?
73(13)
Question 2 Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
86(7)
4.3 Summary
93(2)
5 France
95(33)
5.1 The Prewar, Interwar, and Postwar Periods: Barriers to Hostile Bids
95(8)
Question 1 What prevented market-enabling reforms?
98(5)
5.2 First Turning Point after World War II: State Supervision of Incumbents
103(2)
5.3 Second Turning Point in the late 1960s: Steps toward Marketization
105(13)
Question 2 Why did incumbents' defenses crumble?
111(7)
5.4 Subsequent Evolution of Political Support for Market-Enabling Rules
118(8)
5.5 Summary
126(2)
6 Conclusion
128(17)
6.1 Findings
128(2)
6.2 Generalizability
130(1)
6.3 Alternative Explanations
131(6)
6.4 Value Added to Previous Research in the Same Empirical Domain
137(4)
6.5 Broader Theoretical Significance
141(4)
Bibliography 145(20)
Index 165
Helen Callaghan is a senior research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies. She studied Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) at the University of Oxford, obtained her Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and enjoyed a Max Weber Fellowship at the European University Institute before joining the MPIfG. Her research focuses on the politics of corporate governance in advanced industrialized economies. She has published peer reviewed articles in Comparative Political Studies, Comparative European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Review of International Political Economy, Socio-Economic Review, and West European Politics.