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Control of Corporate Europe [Mīkstie vāki]

Edited by (, European Corporate Governance Institute and Université Libre de Bruxelles), Edited by (, Italian Finance Mininstry and University of Siena)
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 356 pages, height x width x depth: 234x156x19 mm, weight: 507 g, numerous figures and tables
  • Izdošanas datums: 10-Oct-2002
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199257531
  • ISBN-13: 9780199257539
  • Mīkstie vāki
  • Cena: 165,25 €
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  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 356 pages, height x width x depth: 234x156x19 mm, weight: 507 g, numerous figures and tables
  • Izdošanas datums: 10-Oct-2002
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • ISBN-10: 0199257531
  • ISBN-13: 9780199257539
Written by an international team of authors, this book provides the first systematic account of the control of corporate Europe based on voting block data disclosed in accordance with the European Union's Large Holdings Directive (88/627/EEC). The study provides detailed information on the voting control of companies listed on the official markets in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and, as a benchmark comparison, the United States. The authors record a high concentration of control of corporations in many European countries with single blockholders frequently controlling more than fifty per cent of corporate votes. In contrast, a majority of UK listed companies have no blockholder owning more than ten per cent of shares, and a majority of US listed companies have no blockholder with more than six per cent of shares. Those chapters devoted to individual countries illustrate how blockholders can use legal devices to leverage their voting power over their cash-flow rights, or how incumbents prevent outsiders from gaining voting control. It is shown that the cultural and linguistic diversity of Europe is (almost) matched by its variety of corporate control arrangements.

Recenzijas

This book gives the first comprehensive picture of large corporate holdings in the EU and will become a standard reference book on the subject. * Financial Adviser *

List of Figures
xi
List of Tables
xiv
Notes on Contributors xvii
Introduction
1(45)
M. Becht
C. Mayer
The Separation of Ownership and Control in Austria
46(25)
K. Gugler
S. Kalss
A. Stomper
J. Zechner
Shareholding Cascades: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium
71(35)
M. Becht
A. Chapelle
L. Renneboog
Ownership and Voting Power in France
106(22)
L. Bloch
E. Kremp
Ownership and Voting Power in Germany
128(26)
M. Becht
E. Bohmer
Pyramidal Groups and the Separation Between Ownership and Control in Italy
154(34)
M. Bianchi
M. Bianco
L. Enriques
Ownership and Control in the Netherlands
188(19)
A. de Jong
R. Kabir
T. Marra
A. Roell
Ownership and Control of Spanish Listed Firms
207(21)
R. Crespi-Cladera
M. A. Garcia-Cestona
Ownership and Control in Sweden: Strong Owners, Weak Minorities, and Social Control
228(31)
J. Agnblad
E. Berglof
P. Hogfeldt
H. Svancar
Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the United Kingdom
259(26)
M. Goergen
L. Renneboog
Beneficial Ownership in the United States
285(15)
M. Becht
Appendix I: The Large Holdings Directive 300(7)
Appendix II: Proposal for a Council Directive 307(10)
Appendix III: Comparative tables 317(4)
Index 321


Fabrizio Barca is General Director for Development at the Italian Treasury, President of the OECD Territorial Policies Committee, and Director of a Research Programme on Corporate and Public Administration Governance at Siena University.

Marco Becht teaches at the Institute for European Studies, the Solvay Business School, and the Law Faculty of the Université Libre de Bruxelles. Becht's research focuses on corporate governance and empirical corporate finance. He is a Resident Fellow at ECARES and a Research Associate of CEPR.