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E-grāmata: Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) [Taylor & Francis e-book]

  • Formāts: 276 pages, 13 Line drawings, color; 10 Halftones, color
  • Izdošanas datums: 20-Jan-2021
  • Izdevniecība: CRC Press
  • ISBN-13: 9781003130826
  • Taylor & Francis e-book
  • Cena: 74,69 €*
  • * this price gives unlimited concurrent access for unlimited time
  • Standarta cena: 106,70 €
  • Ietaupiet 30%
  • Formāts: 276 pages, 13 Line drawings, color; 10 Halftones, color
  • Izdošanas datums: 20-Jan-2021
  • Izdevniecība: CRC Press
  • ISBN-13: 9781003130826

Countering Cyber Sabotage: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering (CCE) introduces a new methodology to help critical infrastructure owners, operators and their security practitioners make demonstrable improvements in securing their most important functions and processes. 

Current best practice approaches to cyber defense struggle to stop targeted attackers from creating potentially catastrophic results. From a national security perspective, it is not just the damage to the military, the economy, or essential critical infrastructure companies that is a concern. It is the cumulative, downstream effects from potential regional blackouts, military mission kills, transportation stoppages, water delivery or treatment issues, and so on. CCE is a validation that engineering first principles can be applied to the most important cybersecurity challenges and in so doing, protect organizations in ways current approaches do not. The most pressing threat is cyber-enabled sabotage, and CCE begins with the assumption that well-resourced, adaptive adversaries are already in and have been for some time, undetected and perhaps undetectable.

Chapter 1 recaps the current and near-future states of digital technologies in critical infrastructure and the implications of our near-total dependence on them. Chapters 2 and 3 describe the origins of the methodology and set the stage for the more in-depth examination that follows. Chapter 4 describes how to prepare for an engagement, and chapters 5-8 address each of the four phases. The CCE phase chapters take the reader on a more granular walkthrough of the methodology with examples from the field, phase objectives, and the steps to take in each phase. Concluding chapter 9 covers training options and looks towards a future where these concepts are scaled more broadly.

Foreword xi
Michael J. Assante
Preface xxi
Author Bio xxix
Introduction xxxi
I Running to Stand Still and Still Falling Behind
1(28)
"I Can Deal with Disruption; I Can't Handle Destruction"
1(1)
Implications for Critical Infrastructure and National Security
2(4)
Goodbye to Full Manual: Automating Critical Infrastructure
3(3)
What It Means to be a Full Digitally Dependent in an Insecure-by-Design World
6(3)
Race to the Bottom
7(1)
Insecure-by-Design
8(1)
A Strategy Based on Hope and Hygiene
9(7)
The Hollow Promise of Cyber-insurance
11(1)
Experts Speak Out on Hygiene
11(2)
The Most Optimistic Take
13(1)
A Deep Ocean of Security Solutions
14(1)
Don't Stop Now
15(1)
Congress Asks a Good Question
16(2)
Thoughts and Questions
18(11)
2 Restoring Trust: Cyber-Informed Engineering
29(28)
Software Has Changed Engineering
32(3)
INL and Engineering
33(2)
Engineers Still Trust the Trust Model
35(2)
Unverified Trust
35(2)
Trusting What Works: CIE in Detail
37(11)
Security as a Co-equal Value to Safety
48(9)
Failure Mode, Near Misses, and Sabotage
51(1)
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
52(1)
Inter-chapter Transition Thoughts and Questions
53(4)
3 Beyond Hope and Hygiene: Introducing Consequence-Driven, Cyber-Informed Engineering
57(20)
Safety First in Idaho
58(3)
Failure Mode Analysis, Misuse, and Mis-operation
59(1)
Origins in Idaho and Elsewhere
60(1)
CCE from a Threat Perspective
61(6)
The USG Is Using CCE to Better Secure National Critical Functions (NCFs)
62(2)
CCE to Secure the Rest of Critical Infrastructure
64(3)
Methodology Hacking and Calculating Risk
67(5)
True Intent Company-Wide Conversion
72(1)
Transitioning to a Closer Look at CCE
73(4)
4 Pre-engagement Preparation
77(10)
Objectives of Pre-engagement Preparation
78(1)
Pre-engagement Preparation Walkthrough
78(8)
Establish the Need
78(2)
Scoping and Agreements
80(4)
Open-Source Research
84(1)
Refine Initial Taxonomy and Determine Knowledge Base Requirements
85(1)
Form and Train Execution Teams
85(1)
Transitioning to Phase I
86(1)
5 Phase I: Consequence Prioritization
87(18)
Objective of Phase I
88(1)
Killing Your Company--Investigating Potential HCEs
89(2)
Phase I Walkthrough
91(7)
Getting Started with Assumptions and Boundaries
91(2)
High-Consequence Event Scoring Criteria
93(2)
Event Development
95(3)
HCE Validation
98(1)
The (Reasonable) Resistance
98(3)
The CIO
98(1)
The CISO
99(1)
Operators and Engineers
100(1)
Sequencing and Key Participants
101(2)
Entity-Side
102(1)
The CCE Team
102(1)
Preparing for Phase 2
103(2)
6 Phase 2: System-of-Systems Analysis
105(18)
Objectives
106(1)
Mapping the Playing Field
106(2)
Phase 2 Walkthrough
108(12)
Translating HCEs into Block Diagrams
110(1)
Data Collection Efforts
111(2)
Data Categories
113(4)
Pursuing the "Perfect Knowledge" View
117(1)
Populating the Functional Taxonomy
117(3)
Preparing for Phase 3
120(3)
7 Phase 3: Consequence-Based Targeting
123(18)
Phase 3 Objectives
124(1)
Becoming your Worst (and Best) Enemy
124(6)
Cyber Kill Chains
125(2)
Phase 3 Team Roles
127(3)
Phase 3 Walkthrough
130(7)
Develop Scenario Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for Each HCE
130(4)
Critical Information Needs
134(1)
Deliver CONOPS and Iterate with SMEs
135(1)
Attack Scenario Complexity and Confidence
136(1)
Present CONOPS to C-Suite
137(1)
Threat Intelligence from Different Sources
137(2)
Preparing for Phase 4
139(2)
8 Phase 4: Mitigations and Protections
141(24)
Phase 4 Objectives
142(1)
Taking Targets Off the Table
142(5)
Phase 4 Walkthrough
147(4)
Identifying Gaps in Expertise
147(1)
Develop and Prioritize Mitigation Options
148(2)
Validate Mitigations
150(1)
Present and Validate Mitigations with Entity SMEs
150(1)
Develop Adversary Tripwires (NCF Engagements Only)
151(1)
A Longer Look at Non-digital Mitigations
151(9)
Humans Back in the Loop
158(2)
Revisiting Phase I's Next-Worst HCEs
160(1)
Codifying CCE's Learnings in Policy
161(4)
9 CCE Futures: Training.Tools, and What Comes Next
165(16)
CCE Training Options
165(3)
ACCELERATE Workshops
166(1)
CCE Team Training
166(2)
CCE Tool Suites and Checklists
168(2)
Tools
168(1)
Checklists
169(1)
A More Inherently Secure Critical Infrastructure
170(11)
Certification and Scaling via Partners
170(1)
Ensuring Cybersecurity for Safety
171(1)
Policy Prognostications
172(3)
Emerging Technology Only Elevate CCE's Importance
175(1)
Injecting Cyber into Engineering Curricula
175(2)
Last Word
177(4)
Acknowledgments 181(4)
Glossary 185(14)
Appendix A CCE Case Study: Bakavia Substation Power Outage 199(60)
Appendix B CCE Phase Checklists 259(11)
Index 270
Andy Bochman is the Senior Grid Strategist for Idaho National Laboratorys National and Homeland Security directorate. In this role, Mr. Bochman provides strategic guidance on topics at the intersection of grid security and resilience to INL leadership as well as senior US and international government and industry leaders. A frequent speaker, writer, and trainer, Mr. Bochman has provided analysis on electric grid and energy sector infrastructure security actions, standards, and gaps to the Department of Energy, Department of Defense, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council (ESCC), and most of the US state utility commissions. Teaming with DOE, NARUC, USAID, and international partners, he has cyber-trained grid operators, and is a cybersecurity subject matter expert listed with the US State Department Speakers Bureau. Mr. Bochman has testified before the US Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee on energy infrastructure cybersecurity issues and before FERC on the security readiness of smart grid cybersecurity standards. He has also held recurring conversations on grid security matters with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) and the National Security Council (NSC). Prior to joining INL, he was the Global Energy & Utilities Security Lead at IBM and a Senior Advisor at the Chertoff Group in Washington, DC. Mr. Bochman earned a Bachelor of Science degree from the US Air Force Academy and a Master of Arts degree from the Harvard University Extension School.

Sarah Freeman is an Industrial Control Systems (ICS) cyber security analyst at Idaho National Laboratory (INL), where she provides US government partners and private sector entities with actionable cyber threat intelligence, developing innovative security solutions for the critical infrastructure within the US. At Idaho National Laboratory, Ms. Freeman pursues innovative threat analysis and cyber defense approaches, most recently Consequence driven Cyber-informed Engineering (CCE). As Principle Investigator on a laboratory discretionary research, her current research is focused on new signatures and structured methods for cyber adversary characterization. Following the December 2015 electric grid attacks, Ms. Freeman participated in the DOE-sponsored training for Ukrainian asset owners in May 2016. She has also researched the Ukrainian 2015 and 2016 cyber-attacks and the Trisis/Hatman incident. Ms. Freeman earned a Bachelor of Arts from Grinnell College and a Masters in Security and Intelligence Studies from the University of Pittsburgh.