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E-grāmata: Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency [Taylor & Francis e-book]

(Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA), (Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA), (Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, USA)
  • Formāts: 230 pages, 56 Tables, black and white; 44 Illustrations, black and white
  • Izdošanas datums: 12-Apr-2013
  • Izdevniecība: CRC Press Inc
  • ISBN-13: 9780429253966
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  • Taylor & Francis e-book
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Critical Infrastructure System Security and ResiliencyPalielināt
  • Formāts: 230 pages, 56 Tables, black and white; 44 Illustrations, black and white
  • Izdošanas datums: 12-Apr-2013
  • Izdevniecība: CRC Press Inc
  • ISBN-13: 9780429253966
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Taylor & Francis e-booksMore info about Taylor & Francis e-books
Rokasgrāmatas mājas lapa: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9780429253966
Security protections for critical infrastructure nodes are intended to minimize the risks resulting from an initiating event, whether it is an intentional malevolent act or a natural hazard. With an emphasis on protecting an infrastructure's ability to perform its mission or function, Critical Infrastructure System Security and Resiliency presents a practical methodology for developing an effective protection system that can either prevent undesired events or mitigate the consequences of such events.

Developed at Sandia National Labs, the authors analytical approach and methodology enables decision-makers and security experts to perform and utilize risk assessments in a manner that extends beyond the theoretical to practical application. These protocols leverage expertise in modeling dependenciesoptimizing system resiliency for effective physical protection system design and consequence mitigation.

The book begins by focusing on the design of protection strategies to enhance the robustness of the infrastructure components. The authors present risk assessment tools and necessary metrics to offer guidance to decision-makers in applying sometimes limited resources to reduce risk and ensure operational resiliency.

Our critical infrastructure is vast and made up of many component parts. In many cases, it may not be practical or affordable to secure every infrastructure node. For years, expertsas a part of the risk assessment processhave tried to better identify and distinguish higher from lower risks through risk segmentation. In the second section of the book, the authors present examples to distinguish between high and low risks and corresponding protection measures. In some cases, protection measures do not prevent undesired events from occurring. In others, protection of all infrastructure components is not feasible. As such, this section describes how to evaluate and design resilience in these unique scenarios to manage costs while most effectively ensuring infrastructure system protection.

With insight from the authors decades of experience, this book provides a high-level, practical analytical framework that public and private sector owners and operators of critical infrastructure can use to better understand and evaluate infrastructure security strategies and policies. Strengthening the entire homeland security enterprise, the book presents a significant contribution to the science of critical infrastructure protection and resilience.
List of Figures
xiii
List of Tables
xv
Foreword xvii
Acknowledgments xxi
About the Authors xxiii
Acronyms and Abbreviations xxv
Section I SECURITY RISK ASSESSMENT
1 Introduction to Security Risk Assessment
3(8)
Security Risk Assessment
5(1)
Protection System Robustness
6(1)
Security System Resiliency
6(1)
System Approach for Security Risk Assessment
7(3)
Determine Undesired Events, Associated Critical Assets, and Available Resources
8(1)
Threat Analysis
8(1)
Assess Likelihood of Initiating Event
8(1)
Estimate Protection System Effectiveness
9(1)
Assess Consequences for Undesired Event
9(1)
Estimate Security Risk
9(1)
Upgrade the Protection System to Be Robust against Undesired Event
10(1)
Upgrade Security System to Be Resilient for Undesired Event
10(1)
Summary
10(1)
Reference
10(1)
2 Undesired Events, Associated Critical Assets, and Available Resources
11(8)
Critical Assets
11(5)
Logic Model
12(1)
Logic Gates
12(1)
Transfer Operations
13(1)
Primary Events
13(3)
Resources
16(1)
Summary
16(1)
References
17(2)
3 Threat Analysis
19(12)
Malevolent Threats
19(7)
Type of Adversary
23(1)
Adversary Capability
24(1)
Design Basis Threat
25(1)
Natural Hazards
26(2)
Hurricane
27(1)
Earthquake
27(1)
Tornado
27(1)
Flood
27(1)
Accidents
28(1)
Summary
29(1)
References
29(2)
4 Likelihood of Initiating Events
31(8)
Malevolent Threat
31(5)
Outsider Threat
32(2)
Insider Threat
34(2)
Natural Hazard Threat
36(1)
Accident Threat
36(2)
Summary
38(1)
References
38(1)
5 Assess Consequences and Responses for Undesired Event
39(4)
Reference Table for Consequences
39(2)
Estimating Consequence Level for Undesired Events
41(1)
Summary
42(1)
Reference
42(1)
6 Assessment of Protection System Effectiveness
43(20)
Assessment of Protection System Effectiveness for Malevolent Threat
43(5)
Adversary Scenarios
44(2)
Effective Physical Protection System for the Malevolent Threat
46(2)
Physical Protection System Effectiveness Assessment
48(1)
Assessment Example
49(3)
Protection System Effectiveness against Blast Attacks
52(1)
Assessment Example
52(1)
Mitigation of the Insider Threat
53(2)
Cyber Protection System Effectiveness
55(3)
Cyber Functions
56(1)
Assessment Example
57(1)
Effectiveness for Natural Hazards
58(2)
Protection System Effectiveness Assessment Example
59(1)
Protection System Effectiveness for Accidents
60(2)
Assessment Example
60(2)
Summary
62(1)
References
62(1)
7 Estimate Security Risk
63(12)
System Approach for Security Risk Assessment
63(5)
Determine Undesired Events, Associated Critical Assets, and Available Resources
64(1)
Threat Analysis
65(1)
Assess Likelihood of Initiating Event
65(1)
Estimate Protection System Effectiveness
65(2)
Assess Consequences for Undesired Event
67(1)
Estimate Security Risk
68(2)
Upgrade Protection System to Be Robust against Undesired Event
70(2)
Upgrade Security System to Be Resilient for Undesired Event
72(1)
Summary
72(3)
Section II EVALUATION AND DESIGN OF RESILIENT SYSTEMS
8 Motivating Infrastructure Resilience Analysis
75(4)
References
78(1)
9 Current State of Resilience Assessment
79(26)
Definitions of Resilience
80(4)
Domains
84(1)
Assessment Processes
85(14)
Structural Resilience Assessment Methodologies
86(1)
Qualitative Assessments
86(1)
Quantitative and Semiquantitative Indexes
87(2)
Performance-Based Measurement
89(1)
Seismic Resilience
90(1)
Probabilistic Assessment
91(2)
Economic Resilience
93(3)
Hybrid Approaches
96(3)
Gaps and Limitations
99(3)
Endnotes
102(1)
References
102(3)
10 Infrastructure Resilience Analysis Methodology
105(26)
Definition of Resilience
107(1)
Measurement of Resilience Costs
108(9)
Systemic Impact
109(2)
Total Recovery Effort
111(1)
Resilience Cost Calculation
112(2)
Use and Interpretation of Recovery-Dependent Resilience Costs and Optimal Resilience Costs Quantities
114(1)
Additional Notes on Calculation of Resilience Costs
115(1)
Qualitative Structural Analysis
116(1)
Absorptive Capacity
117(11)
Adaptive Capacity
119(2)
Restorative Capacity
121(2)
Additional Notes on Resilience Capacities
123(1)
Applying the Infrastructure Resilience Analysis Methodology
124(4)
Summary
128(1)
Endnote
129(1)
References
129(2)
11 Case Studies Using the Infrastructure Resilience Analysis Framework
131(40)
Qualitative Resilience Analysis Case Study
132(6)
Define Systems
132(1)
Define Scenario
133(1)
Perform Structural Analysis
134(4)
Analysis Conclusions
138(1)
Quantitative Resilience Analysis Case Study
138(14)
Define Systems
139(1)
Define Scenario
139(1)
Define Metrics and Obtain Data
140(1)
System Performance
140(2)
Total Recovery Effort
142(4)
Calculate Resilience Costs
143(3)
Perform Structural Analysis
146(1)
Absorptive Capacity
146(2)
Adaptive Capacity
148(2)
Restorative Capacity
150(1)
Conclusions
151(1)
Case Study on Optimizing Resilient Recovery Strategies
152(14)
Define Systems
152(1)
Define Scenario
153(2)
Define Metrics
155(2)
Obtain Data and Calculate Resilience Costs
157(1)
The Rail Network Analysis System
158(2)
Optimization
160(1)
Simulation Results
161(4)
Conclusions
165(1)
Summary
166(1)
Endnotes
167(1)
References
168(3)
12 Future Directions
171(4)
References
173(2)
Appendix A Example Use of Fault Trees to Identify Critical Assets 175(4)
Appendix B Physical Protection Features Performance Data 179(14)
Index 193
Betty E. Biringer is a mathematician currently conducting specialized technical assessments and research in the national interest as a distinguished member of the technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories. As the former manager of the Security Risk Assessment Department, she provided oversight and technical guidance for Sandias modeling and simulation tools for physical security vulnerability analyses and risk assessments. Ms. Biringer was actively involved in the development and implementation of most of Sandias service-marked Risk Assessment Methodology (RAM) tools for critical infrastructure elements, including dams, high-voltage electric power transmission, chemical facilities, communities, and energy. She has served as a subject matter expert for security risk on review panels for the Department of Homeland Securitys National Centers of Excellence. Her other primary research area is the development of methodologies for the assessment and mitigation of the insider threat.

Dr. Eric D. Vugrin is currently a distinguished member of the technical staff in the Resilience and Regulatory Effects Department at Sandia National Laboratories. His primary research interest is the development of analytical tools and methods for infrastructure analysis. Most recently, his research has focused on capability development for vulnerability, consequence, and resilience analysis of chemical supply chains, transportation networks, electrical power systems, and other infrastructure networks. These efforts provided support and guidance to the U.S. Department of Homeland Securitys Infrastructure Protection, Science and Technology, and Policy programs. Prior to his work in the area of infrastructure analysis, he performed risk analyses for complex systems as Sandias technical lead for Total Systems Performance Assessment at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant, the worlds only certified, deep-underground repository for nuclear waste.

Dr. Drake E. Warren was a senior member of technical staff at Sandia National Laboratories until he joined the RAND Corporation as an associate policy researcher in 2011. While at Sandia, he worked on projects across a range of homeland security and national security issues, including projects that assessed the economic impacts of disruptions to industries and infrastructure systems caused by hurricanes, climate change, and other disruptive events. He helped develop frameworks for assessing the resilience and criticality of infrastructure and economic systems and led studies directed toward improving foresight of national security challenges.
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