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Cyber Persistence Theory: Redefining National Security in Cyberspace [Hardback]

4.13/5 (60 ratings by Goodreads)
(Research Staff Member, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA)), Foreword by (General, U.S. Army), (Cyber Persistence Subject Matter Expert, US Cyber Command and National Security Agency), (Professor of Political Science, University of Cincinnati)
  • Formāts: Hardback, 266 pages, height x width x depth: 159x241x18 mm, weight: 463 g
  • Sērija : Bridging the Gap
  • Izdošanas datums: 27-Mar-2023
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0197638252
  • ISBN-13: 9780197638255
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  • Hardback
  • Cena: 106,73 €
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  • Formāts: Hardback, 266 pages, height x width x depth: 159x241x18 mm, weight: 463 g
  • Sērija : Bridging the Gap
  • Izdošanas datums: 27-Mar-2023
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 0197638252
  • ISBN-13: 9780197638255
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
A bold re-conceptualization of the fundamentals driving behavior and dynamics in cyberspace.

Most cyber operations and campaigns fall short of activities that states would regard as armed conflict. In Cyber Persistence Theory, Michael P. Fischerkeller, Emily O. Goldman, and Richard J. Harknett argue that a failure to understand this strategic competitive space has led many states to
misapply the logic and strategies of coercion and conflict to this environment and, thus, suffer strategic loss as a result. The authors show how the paradigm of deterrence theory can neither explain nor manage the preponderance of state cyber activity. They present a new theory that illuminates the
exploitive, rather than coercive, dynamics of cyber competition and an analytical framework that can serve as the basis for new strategies of persistence. Drawing on their policy experience, they offer a new set of prescriptions to guide policymakers toward a more stable, secure cyberspace.

Recenzijas

Cyber Persistence Theory is an important addition to our collective understanding of the dynamics of cyberspace and its implications for national security. It provides sound insight and excellent analysis on how we can meet the challenges of cyber in the hyper-connected, digitally driven world we find ourselves in today. Excellent work on a topic of increasing importance to all! * Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN (ret) former Commander, US Cyber Command and Director, National Security Agency (2014-2018) * This timely new book is destined to go down as a major milestone in the development of new strategic thought for twenty-first century. With admirable clarity and powerful prose, the authors first dismantle the deterrence-focused paradigm that has so far guided US defense strategy in cyber space and then formulate a new organizing concept. Anyone interested in cyber security must come to terms with this new thinking. * Brad Roberts, Center for Global Security Research * Michael Fischerkeller, Emily Goldman, and Richard Harknett have once again made an incredibly valuable contribution to the development of American cyber policy and strategy through the writing of Cyber Persistence Theory. The authors push its readership to think beyond classical deterrence theory to new concepts for engaging and defeating undeterred adversaries in cyberspace. In short, this book argues the need for change and to take more risk to close an increasingly larger risk in our defense and national security as well as our public safety posture as American citizens To do so, the authors argue will require not only persistent engagement, but a 'whole-of-nation plus' effort. A must-read for both national and cyber security professionals! * Robert J. Butler, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber and Space Policy * Time will tell whether cyberspace operations can have coercive effect, but it is unambiguously true that to date, nations have used cyberspace mostly to gain advantage in competing with other nations. Understanding how they do so is a new challenge that scholars of international relations would do well to take on, and this book is a superb point of departure for them. * Herb Lin, Hank J. Holland Fellow in Cyber Policy and Security, Hoover Institution, Stanford University * This book helps to fill a crucial gap in strategic thinking about the fundamentals of cyberspace and sets out a clear course of action for the US government. It is a must-read for students, analysts and policymakers. * Max Smeets, Senior Researcher ETH Zurich, Center for Security Studies, and author of No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle Develop a Military Cyber-Force *

Foreword ix
Acknowledgments xi
1 The Misapplied Nexus of Theory and Policy
1(2)
War, coercion, and deterrence
3(3)
It's strategic exploitation
6(1)
Purpose of this book
7(2)
2 The Structure of Strategic Environments
9(28)
Thinking structurally
11(1)
The structure of the conventional and nuclear strategic environments
11(5)
Deterrence
16(1)
Defense and deterrence by denial
17(1)
Technology but not technological determinism
18(2)
Structure and imperatives
20(1)
Existing strategic environments and cyber activity
21(2)
The structure of the third strategic environment
23(3)
An alternative theory
26(9)
Conclusion
35(2)
3 Cyber Behavior and Dynamics
37(18)
State behaviors
37(9)
Inter-state phenomena and dynamics
46(5)
A consideration of escalation actions and dynamics
51(2)
Potential impact of AI on behavior and dynamics
53(2)
Tacit Coordination, Tacit Cooperation, And Tacit Bargaining
55(1)
Conclusion
56(2)
4 Theory And The Empirical Record
58(1)
Operational Persistence
59(2)
Exploitation And The Cyber Fait Accompli
61(4)
Strategic Outcomes
65(9)
Competitive Interaction And Escalation Within Cyberspace
74(3)
Current Scarcity Of Direct Cyber Engagement
77(5)
Data Representativeness And Counterfactual Exploration
82(3)
Conclusion
85(1)
5 Cyber Stability
86(33)
Stability And Initiative Persistence
86(1)
Destabilizing Elements
87(3)
Stabilizing Mechanisms In An Initiative Persistent Environment
90(2)
Seeking Consensus On International Law (Or Other International Formal Agreements)
92(6)
Tacit Coordination--mutual Understandings Through Independent Expressions Of Opinio Juris
98(12)
Tacit Bargaining--seeking Mutually Dependent, Mutual Understandings Through Cyber Interactions
110(5)
Ever-Changing Technology
115(3)
Conclusion
118(1)
6 The Cyber Aligned Nexus Of Theory And Policy
119(8)
Policy Implications
121(4)
Paradigm Change
125(2)
7 United States Case Study
127(32)
2010 TO 2014
129(3)
2015 TO 2017
132(2)
2018 To 2021
134(6)
Viewing Us Cyber Strategy Through The Lens Of Kuhnian Paradigm Change
140(6)
Actions To Further Institutionalize A Kuhnian Change
146(3)
Organizing to seize the initiative--from whole-of-government to whole-of-nation-plus
149(7)
US choices
156(1)
Conclusion
156(3)
Notes 159(56)
Bibliography 215(36)
Index 251
Michael Fischerkeller is a research staff member in the Information, Technology and Systems Division at the Institute for Defense Analyses, a Federally Funded Research and Development Center. Michael has spent his entire professional career supporting the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Combatant and Multi-National Force commanders, and the Intelligence Community. His areas of expertise are cyber strategy, strategic / operational concept development, and analysis / assessment.

Emily O. Goldman serves as a strategist at US Cyber Command and a thought leader on cyber policy. She was cyber advisor to the Director of Policy Planning at the Department of State, 2018-19. From 2014 to 2018, she directed the US Cyber Command / National Security Agency Combined Action Group, reporting to a four-star commander and leading a team that wrote the 2018 US Cyber Command vision, Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority. She has also worked as a strategic communications

advisor for US Central Command and for the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department. She holds a doctorate in Political Science from Stanford University and was a Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis, for two decades. Dr. Goldman has published and lectured widely on strategy, cybersecurity, arms control, military history and innovation, and organizational change.

Richard J. Harknett is Professor and Director of the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Cincinnati. He also co-directs the Ohio Cyber Range Institute, a state-wide organization supporting education, workforce, economic, and research development in cybersecurity. He served as Scholar-in-Residence at US Cyber Command and National Security Agency and has held two Fulbright Professor positions.