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Cyberspace in Peace and War [Hardback]

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  • Formāts: Hardback, 496 pages, height x width: 254x177 mm, weight: 1206 g, 20 illustrations, 5 figures, 5 tables
  • Sērija : Transforming War
  • Izdošanas datums: 15-Oct-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Naval Institute Press
  • ISBN-10: 1682470326
  • ISBN-13: 9781682470329
  • Hardback
  • Cena: 78,06 €
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  • Pievienot vēlmju sarakstam
  • Formāts: Hardback, 496 pages, height x width: 254x177 mm, weight: 1206 g, 20 illustrations, 5 figures, 5 tables
  • Sērija : Transforming War
  • Izdošanas datums: 15-Oct-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Naval Institute Press
  • ISBN-10: 1682470326
  • ISBN-13: 9781682470329
In a world in which cyberspace is becoming every country's center of gravity, the issue of cyberwar can no longer be ignored. Cyberspace in Peace and War is the first comprehensive, instructional guide to the challenge of cyberwar: how to conduct it but, more importantly, how to avoid it using a mix of cybersecurity policies coupled with deterrence, escalation, signaling, and norms strategies. The result of over twenty years of analysis and assessment by author Martin C. Libicki, this text should be of particular interest to those concerned with the current and future challenges that face the digital frontier. Though written from a U.S. perspective, the principles discussed are globally relevant.

Cyberspace in Peace and War presents a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity, cyberwar, and cyber terrorism. From basic concepts to advanced principles, Libicki examines the sources and consequences of system compromises, addresses how cybersecurity policies can strengthen countries defenses--leaving them less susceptible to cyberattack, and explores cybersecurity in the context of military operations, highlighting unique aspects of the digital battleground and strategic uses of cyberwar. He provides the technical and geopolitical foundations of cyberwar necessary to understand the policies, operations, and strategies required for safeguarding an increasingly online infrastructure.

Cyberspace in Peace and War guides readers through the complexities of cybersecurity and cyberwar and challenges them to understand the topics in new ways.



The world typically remembers the space race as the Cold War competition between the USSR and the United States, beginning with the Soviet launch of the first satellite (Sputnik I) in 1957 and culminating in the U.S. moon landing in 1969. But even before Sputnik, the United States had already taken important steps outside of the public eye. The Eisenhower administration quietly worked to establish a precedent for peaceful satellite flight over international borders and to use space-based surveillance systems to gain information that would minimize the chance of a surprise Soviet attack. The Air Force, convinced that space would ultimately become a realm of combat, conducted initial studies about hypersonic armed vehicles that could skim the upper atmosphere or even orbit the planet. For the supporters of armed space exploitation, as for many Americans in general, deterrence dictated preeminence. High-profile Soviet space accomplishments suddenly made these issues seem more urgent and transformed the degree to which the debate was made public.

Between 1954 and 1961 military planners and political leaders competed to cultivate public attitudes that would support their plans for seizing the initiative in space security issues. Key Air Force figures such as Chief of Staff Gen. Thomas White labored hard for the development of armed flight technologies that could traverse both air and space environments. The Air Force's flagship vehicle for controlling aerospace was the Dynamic Soarer space glider bomber, a heat-resistant single-seat space shuttle meant to conduct reconnaissance, bombing, and other missions to ensure American superiority--and peace. In contrast, President Eisenhower envisioned non-weaponized satellite reconnaissance systems as the best tools to ensure peace. In keeping with the low-profile but important roles that CIA actions and U.S. Information Agency initiatives played overseas, Eisenhower's policy relied on space reconnaissance happening quietly and behind the scenes.

The Other Space Race is the story of how neither policy was fully realized. By examining the important but largely forgotten period of research between 1954 and 1961, Nicholas Michael Sambaluk provides a more meaningful context for understanding space security policy and space history.

In a world in which cyberspace is becoming every country's center of gravity, the issue of cyberwar can no longer be ignored.Cyberspace in Peace and War is the first comprehensive, instructional guide to the challenge of cyberwar: how to conduct it but, more importantly, how to avoid it using a mix of cybersecurity policies coupled with deterrence, escalation, signaling, and norms strategies. The result of over twenty years of analysis and assessment by author Martin C. Libicki, this text should be of particular interest to those concerned with the current and future challenges that face the digital frontier. Though written from a U.S. perspective, the principles discussed are globally relevant.

Cyberspace in Peace and War presents a comprehensive understanding of cybersecurity, cyberwar, and cyber terrorism. From basic concepts to advanced principles, Libicki examines the sources and consequences of system compromises, addresses how cybersecurity policies can strengthen countries defenses--leaving them less susceptible to cyberattack, and explores cybersecurity in the context of military operations, highlighting unique aspects of the digital battleground and strategic uses of cyberwar. He provides the technical and geopolitical foundations of cyberwar necessary to understand the policies, operations, and strategies required for safeguarding an increasingly online infrastructure.

Cyberspace in Peace and War guides readers through the complexities of cybersecurity and cyberwar and challenges them to understand the topics in new ways.

Recenzijas

"This volume is encyclopedic, creative, and readable, challenging in its detail and reflections, and equally useful for political and military experts who are not steeped in cyber technology and technical specialists who need grounding in policy and strategy. Richard K. Betts, PhD, Director, Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, and author of Enemies of Intelligence and American Force

Martin Libicki has given us just we need in the complex area of cyber: a clear and comprehensive analysis of the entire range of issues from the technical to the operational and political. It is an indispensable one-stop shopping resource that can be read with great benefit by both novices and experts. Robert Jervis, Adlai E. Stevenson Professor of International Politics, Columbia University

Delivers both a thorough introduction to the topic and a compelling set of recommendations on what to do about the national security challenge of our time. Robert Knake, Whitney Shepardson senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations

A comprehensive and readable discussion of a complicated topic, and an important contribution to a vital issue. Bruce Schneier, lecturer at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government

This work is likely to become well known for having bridged the divides that exist among technologists, strategists, operators, and policymakers in their search for solutions to cyberspaces multifaceted challenges, and should be read by every student and practitioner of these disciplines." - Military Technology

[ This book] introduces additional nuances into the debate about digital conflicts and, at the same time, resist the temptation to regard them as acts analogous to nuclear conflicts or wars using conventional weapons. - Russia in Global Politics

This book is a must-read for those in Australias military high command and other government departments with a responsibility for national security. One thing is certain, the hackers, especially those that are government-sponsored, will already have it on their e-book shelves. Australian Defence Force Journal

"[ T]his book is recommended for those who want a basic understanding of cyberspace to those who currently hold a position within the realm of national security and everyone in-between. This book is truly a modern classic on the topic of cyberspace." Air & Space Power Journal

List of Illustrations xiii
List of Acronyms and Abbreviations xv
Introduction 1(4)
Part I. Foundations
Chapter 1 Emblematic Attacks
5(14)
Cybercrime and Other System Intrusions
5(4)
The Advanced Persistent Threat
9(2)
Distributed Denial-of-Service Attacks
11(3)
Stuxnet and Other Destructive Attacks
14(5)
Chapter 2 Some Basic Principles
19(13)
Cyberwar and Cyberspace
20(3)
How Hackers Work
23(3)
Agoras and Castles
26(2)
Most Cyberattacks Have Transitory Effects
28(4)
Chapter 3 How to Compromise a Computer
32(9)
Abuses by Authorized Internal Users
32(2)
Abuses by Everyday External Users
34(1)
Altered Instructions via Supply Chain Attack
35(1)
Malware
36(5)
Chapter 4 The Search for Cybersecurity
41(18)
Applications Are Often the Weak Links in the Security Chain
41(1)
The Role of Input Filtering
42(1)
The Role of Operating Systems
43(1)
The Role of People
43(1)
The Role of Cryptography
44(2)
A Role for Firewalls?
46(3)
The Role of Air-Gapping
49(1)
Relationships among Machines, Systems, and Engineering
50(2)
Mixing and Matching Security Actions
52(4)
Measures and Countermeasures
56(1)
What Could We Learn?
57(2)
Chapter 5 Defending Against Attacks of High and of Broad Consequence
59(11)
Attacks of High Consequence
59(1)
Identifying Near-Catastrophes to Get Ahead of Catastrophes
60(1)
Hedging to Deal with Exceptions to the Power-Law Rule
61(1)
Scalability Influences How Well a Near-Catastrophe Predicts a Catastrophe
62(1)
Attacks of Broad Consequence
63(3)
Implications for Learning
66(2)
Is Information Sharing a Panacea?
68(2)
Chapter 6 What the Government Can and Cannot Do
70(19)
First, Why Should the Government Do Anything?
70(3)
What the Wise Men Recommended
73(1)
Good Policies
74(3)
Panaceas
77(3)
Bad Ideas
80(5)
On Using Extraordinary Incentives to Juice the Cybersecurity Workforce
85(2)
Can Governments Cope with Surprise?
87(2)
Part II. Policies
Chapter 7 What Should Be Secret
89(11)
The Calculus
89(1)
Denying an Adversary Something
90(1)
Affecting Adversary Knowledge
91(1)
Affecting Adversary Decisionmaking
91(2)
Adverse to Us
93(1)
Some Implications of Logical Classification Rules
93(2)
The Importance of Aggregate Privacy
95(2)
The Benefits of Discretion
97(1)
Conclusions and Implications
98(2)
Chapter 8 What Does China's Economically Motivated Cyberespionage Cost the United States?
100(14)
What's at Stake?
101(3)
How Much Trade Is at Issue?
104(1)
Displaced U.S. Exports
105(4)
Displaced Value Added by U.S. Corporations
109(1)
Summary Calculations
110(3)
Conclusions
113(1)
Chapter 9 Return to Vendor
114(6)
What Should the NSA Do About Zero Days?
114(1)
Retain or Return: Some Criteria
115(1)
After How Long Should a Zero Day Be Returned to Vendor?
116(2)
Irrelevant Considerations
118(1)
Conclusions
119(1)
Chapter 10 Cybersecurity Futures
120(9)
Better Offense
120(1)
A Larger Attack Surface
121(2)
Better Defense
123(2)
New Tools for Defense
125(1)
A Three Mile Island in Cyberspace
126(3)
Chapter 11 Operational Cyberwar
129(12)
Possible Effects
129(2)
Timing Cyberattacks
131(1)
The Role of Surprise
132(2)
Hiding the Attack to Facilitate Its Repetition
134(1)
An Operational Cyberwar Scenario
135(1)
Would China Use Operational Cyberwar the Same Way?
136(1)
Why Supremacy Is Meaningless and Superiority Unnecessary
137(1)
Coda: A Note of Skepticism on the Potential of Operational Cyberwar
138(3)
Part III. Operations
Chapter 12 Organizing a Cyberwar Campaign
141(7)
Why a Campaign?
141(2)
The Insertion of Operational Cyberwar into Kinetic Operations
143(2)
Whose Campaign?
145(1)
The Rogue Cyberwarrior Challenge
146(2)
Chapter 13 Prof essionalizing Cyberwar
148(10)
Battle Damage Assessment
148(3)
Collateral Damage
151(4)
Other Parameters
155(1)
Programming and Budgeting for Cyberwar
156(2)
Chapter 14 Is Cyberspace a Warfighting Domain?
158(10)
Cyberwar Operations Are About Usurping Command and Control
159(1)
Cyberspace as Multiple Media
160(1)
Defend the Domain or Ensure Missions?
160(1)
As for Offensive Operations
161(1)
It Raises the Attention to DDOS Attacks
162(2)
Other Errors from Calling Cyberspace a Warfighting Domain
164(1)
No Domain, No Cyber Equivalent of Billy Mitchell
165(2)
Conclusions
167(1)
Chapter 15 Strategic Implications of Operational Cyberwar
168(11)
Influencing Others Against Digitization
168(5)
The Importance of Conventional Dissuasion
173(3)
The Challenge of Alliance Defense in Cyberspace
176(3)
Chapter 16 Stability Implications of Operational Cyberwar
179(8)
Attack Wins
179(2)
Getting the Jump Wins
181(2)
The Risks of Acting Are Reduced
183(1)
The Risks of Not Acting Are Increased
184(2)
A Missing Element of Caution
186(1)
Conclusions
186(1)
Chapter 17 Strategic Cyberwar
187(9)
Strategic Cyberwar May Focus on Power Grids and Banks
187(2)
How Coercive Can a Strategic Cyberwar Campaign Be?
189(1)
Strategic Cyberwar as Information War
190(1)
The Conduct of Cyberwar
191(1)
Indications and Warning
192(1)
Managing the Effects of Cyberwar
193(1)
Terminating Cyberwar
194(1)
Conclusions
195(1)
Part IV. Strategies
Chapter 18 Cyberwar Threats as Coercion
196(6)
A Limited Cyberwar Campaign
196(2)
A Coercive Campaign
198(3)
Conclusions and Implications for Mutually Assumed Disruption
201(1)
Chapter 19 The Unexpected Asymmetry of Cyberwar
202(8)
The Third World Disadvantage
202(2)
The Particular U.S. Advantage
204(2)
Was This All an Exercise in Nostalgia?
206(1)
A Silver Lining Arising from Kerckhoff's Principle
207(1)
The Influence of Third Parties on the Balance of Power in Cyberspace
208(2)
Chapter 20 Responding to Cyberattack
210(11)
First-Strike Cyberattacks May Have a Variety of Motives
210(2)
Some Supposed Attacks Are Not
212(1)
Should the Target Reveal the Cyberattack-and When?
213(2)
Non-Retaliatory Responses
215(1)
Economic Responses
216(1)
Sub Rosa Cyberwar
217(3)
Doing Nothing Is Also an Option
220(1)
Conclusions
220(1)
Chapter 21 Deterrence Fundamentals
221(8)
Cyberdeterrence Differs from Nuclear and Criminal Deterrence
222(1)
The Rationale for Deterrence
223(1)
What Makes Deterrence Work?
224(2)
The Core Message of Deterrence
226(3)
Chapter 22 The Will to Retaliate
229(9)
The Risks of Reprisals
229(1)
Third-Party Cyberattacks
230(1)
There May Be Bigger Issues on the Table
230(1)
Credibility May Not Be Easy to Establish
231(1)
The Signals Associated with Carrying Out Reprisals May Get Lost in the Noise
232(1)
The Impact of Good Defenses on Credibility Is Mixed
233(1)
Can Extended Deterrence Work in Cyberspace?
233(2)
Why Credibility Makes Attribution an Issue
235(2)
Conclusions
237(1)
Chapter 23 Attribution
238(13)
What Will Convince?
238(2)
How Good Would Attribution Be?
240(1)
When Attribution Seems to Work
241(1)
What Could Make Attribution So Hard?
242(1)
When Can Countries Be Blamed for What Started Within Their Borders?
243(3)
Will the Attacker Always Avoid Attribution?
246(1)
Why an Attacker May Favor Ambiguous Attribution over None at All
247(1)
What Should Be Revealed about Attribution?
248(3)
Chapter 24 What Threshold and Confidence for Response?
251(11)
A Zero-Tolerance Policy?
251(1)
Non-Zero Thresholds
252(2)
Should Pulled or Failed Punches Merit Retaliation?
254(1)
What About Retaliating Against Cyberespionage?
254(2)
A Deterministic Posture
256(2)
Other Advantages of a Probabilistic Deterrence Posture
258(2)
The Choice to Retaliate Under Uncertainty
260(2)
Chapter 25 Punishment and Holding Targets at Risk
262(6)
Punishment
262(1)
The Lack of Good Targets
262(2)
The Temptations of Cross-Domain Deterrence
264(1)
Will Targets Actually Hit Back at All?
265(1)
Summary Observations on Cyberdeterrence
265(3)
Chapter 26 Deterrence by Denial
268(5)
What Is Being Discouraged?
268(3)
Complicating Psychological Factors
271(1)
Dissuading Cyberattack by Defeating Its Strategy
271(2)
Chapter 27 Cyberwar Escalation
273(13)
Why Escalate?
273(1)
Escalation and Operational Cyberwar
274(1)
Escalation in Strategic Cyberwar
275(1)
The Difficulties of Tit-for-Tat Management
276(4)
Escalation into Kinetic Warfare
280(2)
Escalation Risks from Proxy Cyberwar
282(2)
Proxy Cyberattacks
284(1)
Conclusions
285(1)
Chapter 28 Brandishing Cyberattack Capabilities
286(7)
What Is Brandishing?
286(1)
Your Power or Their Powerlessness?
286(1)
How to Brandish Cyberattack Capabilities
287(1)
Escalation Dominance and Brandishing
288(2)
Counter-Brandishing
290(1)
Caveats and Cautions
291(2)
Chapter 29 Cyberattack in a Nuclear Confrontation
293(9)
The Basic Confrontation
293(2)
Disabling a Capability versus Thwarting a Threat
295(1)
Rogue State Strategies for Discrediting the Cyberwar Bluff
296(1)
Third-Party Caveats
297(2)
Other Caveats
299(1)
Is There Much Point to Disarming a Target State's Nuclear Capabilities?
299(1)
Should Targeting the Nuclear Command and Control Systems of Major Nuclear Powers Be Abjured?
300(1)
Summary
301(1)
Chapter 30 Narratives and Signals
302(9)
Narratives to Facilitate Crisis Control
302(1)
A Narrative Framework for Cyberspace
303(1)
Narratives as Morality Plays
304(1)
Narratives to Walk Back a Crisis
305(2)
Signaling
307(1)
What Can We Say with Signals that Would Come as News to Others?
308(1)
Ambiguity in Signaling
308(1)
Signaling Resolve
309(2)
Chapter 31 Strategic Stability
311(6)
Would Nuclear Dilemmas Echo in Cyberspace?
311(2)
Misperception as a Source of Crisis
313(2)
Excessive Confidence in Attribution or Preemption
315(1)
Can There Be a Cuban Missile Crisis in Cyberspace?
315(1)
Conclusions
316(1)
Part V. Norms
Chapter 32 Norms for Cyberspace
317(16)
Norms Against Hacking in General
317(1)
Norms on Who Did What
318(2)
Arms Control
320(1)
Law of Armed Conflict: Jus in Bello
320(3)
Law of Armed Conflict: Jus ad Bellum
323(1)
From the Tallinn Manual to Las Vegas Rules
324(1)
What the Tallinn Manual Says
325(3)
Viva Las Vegas
328(1)
But Not So Fast
329(1)
Why Not Las Vegas Rules for Outer Space as Well?
330(1)
Conclusions
331(2)
Chapter 33 Sino-American Relations and Norms in Cyberspace
333(14)
The United States Advocates Its Norms
333(2)
Can We Trade?
335(2)
One Deterrence, Two Deterrence, Red Deterrence, Blue Deterrence
337(3)
Why Red and Blue Deterrence Matter to Cyberspace
340(3)
A Modest Proposal for Improving Cyberspace Behavior
343(1)
Coda: The September Agreement between President XI and President Obama
344(3)
Chapter 34 Cyberwar: What Is It Good For?
347(5)
Modeling the Influence of Cyberattack Options
347(2)
How Much Cybersecurity Do We Really Need?
349(3)
Acknowledgments 352(1)
Notes 353(70)
Bibliography 423(38)
Index 461
Martin Libicki is a distinguished visiting professor at the U.S. Naval Academy, and a senior management scientist at the RAND Corporation. His work involves the national security implications of information technology, notably as it involves cybersecurity and cyberwar. He has a Ph.D., from U.C. Berkeley and graduated from MIT.