Preface |
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xiii | |
Acknowledgments |
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xvii | |
Authors |
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xix | |
Chapter 1 Introduction |
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1 | (6) |
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1 | (2) |
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1.2 Potential Use of the Book |
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3 | (1) |
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1.3 Philosophy of the Authors |
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4 | (3) |
Chapter 2 Background |
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7 | (4) |
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7 | (1) |
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2.2 Applications of Technology |
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7 | (3) |
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7 | (1) |
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2.2.2 Aircraft Development |
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8 | (1) |
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9 | (1) |
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9 | (1) |
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10 | (1) |
Chapter 3 Cybernetic Organizational Model |
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11 | (18) |
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11 | (1) |
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3.2 Controller Design and Operation |
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12 | (1) |
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13 | (1) |
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13 | (1) |
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3.5 Use of Feedback in VSM |
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14 | (1) |
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3.6 Complexity of Operations |
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15 | (1) |
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3.7 Enhanced VSM Representation |
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16 | (2) |
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3.8 VSM Application to Aircraft Traffic Control Study |
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18 | (1) |
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3.9 ATC in Saudi Air Space |
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19 | (1) |
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3.10 Analysis of the ATM Operation |
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20 | (3) |
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3.11 Human Reliability Assessment |
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23 | (1) |
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3.12 Linking VSM and CAHR |
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23 | (3) |
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26 | (1) |
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27 | (2) |
Chapter 4 Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety and Its Application |
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29 | (12) |
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29 | (1) |
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4.2 General Approach to Control of Systems |
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29 | (5) |
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4.3 Impact of Ashby's Law |
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34 | (1) |
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4.4 Examples: Application of Ashby's Law |
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34 | (5) |
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4.4.1 Fermi's Chicago Pile (CP1) Nuclear Experiment and Xenon |
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35 | (1) |
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4.4.2 Effect of Management Decisions on the Fukushima Accident Progression |
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36 | (1) |
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4.4.3 Failure of San Onofre NPP Steam Generators |
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37 | (2) |
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4.5 Methods to Enhance the Probability of Good Decision-Making |
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39 | (1) |
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39 | (2) |
Chapter 5 Probability Risk Assessment |
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41 | (6) |
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41 | (2) |
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43 | (1) |
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43 | (1) |
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44 | (3) |
Chapter 6 Rasmussen's Human Behavior Groups |
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47 | (4) |
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6.1 Introduction to Skill-, Rule-, and Knowledge-Based Behavior |
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47 | (2) |
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6.2 Application of Skill, Rule, Knowledge Behavior Rules |
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49 | (1) |
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50 | (1) |
Chapter 7 Case Studies of Accidents for Different Industries |
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51 | (52) |
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7.1 Scope: Analysis of Accidents |
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51 | (1) |
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7.2 Accidents: Analysis Approach |
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51 | (2) |
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53 | (3) |
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7.4 Nuclear Industry Accidents |
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56 | (18) |
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7.4.1 Three Mile Island Unit #2 |
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56 | (6) |
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7.4.1.1 Accident Analysis |
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57 | (1) |
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7.4.1.2 Organizational Analysis |
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58 | (1) |
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7.4.1.3 Review of a VSM Model following TMI Organizational Analysis |
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59 | (3) |
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62 | (4) |
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7.4.2.1 Description of Plant |
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63 | (1) |
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7.4.2.2 Accident Description |
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63 | (1) |
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7.4.2.3 Accident and Organizational Analysis |
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64 | (1) |
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7.4.2.4 Comments on Chernobyl Organization |
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65 | (1) |
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7.4.3 Fukushima Daiichi Accident |
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66 | (8) |
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7.4.3.1 TEPCO and Fukushima Plant Organizations |
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66 | (1) |
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7.4.3.2 Comments on the Preaccident Status |
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67 | (1) |
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7.4.3.3 Accident Description |
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68 | (4) |
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7.4.3.4 TEPCO Daiichi OrganizationPrior to Accident |
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72 | (1) |
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7.4.3.5 Reorganized Daiichi during Response to Emergency |
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73 | (1) |
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74 | (4) |
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7.5.1 Union Carbide Sevin (Pesticide) Plant, Bhopal, India, 1984 |
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74 | (4) |
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74 | (1) |
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7.5.1.2 Accident Analysis |
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75 | (2) |
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7.5.1.3 Organizational Analysis |
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77 | (1) |
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7.6 Oil and Gas Industries |
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78 | (7) |
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7.6.1 Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Blowout Gulf of Mexico Oil Accident |
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78 | (7) |
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78 | (1) |
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7.6.1.2 Accident Description |
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78 | (1) |
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7.6.1.3 Accident Analysis |
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79 | (2) |
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7.6.1.4 Organizational Analysis |
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81 | (1) |
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81 | (3) |
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7.6.1.6 Organization (VSM) Comments |
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84 | (1) |
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7.6.1.7 Postscript on the Macondo Well Accident |
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84 | (1) |
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85 | (2) |
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85 | (2) |
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7.7.1.1 Kings Cross Underground Fire, November 18, 1987 |
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86 | (1) |
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7.7.1.2 Organization Analysis |
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86 | (1) |
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7.7.1.3 Comments on Railway Accidents |
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87 | (1) |
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7.8 NASA and Air Transport |
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87 | (7) |
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7.8.1 NASA Challenger Accident, January 28, 1986 |
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87 | (4) |
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87 | (1) |
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7.8.1.2 Description of the Shuttle |
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88 | (1) |
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88 | (1) |
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7,8.1.4 Description of Accident |
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88 | (1) |
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7.8.1.5 Accident Analysis |
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89 | (1) |
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90 | (1) |
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7.8.2 Tenerife, Canary Islands Runway Accident, March 1977 |
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91 | (3) |
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91 | (1) |
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7.8.2.2 Accident Location |
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92 | (1) |
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7.8.2.3 Accident: Sequence of Events |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (1) |
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94 | (1) |
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7.9 Ancillary Safety-Related Incidents |
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94 | (9) |
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7.9.1 NPP Containment Sump Blockage |
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95 | (1) |
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7.9.2 Hungarian VVER Fuel Cleaning Accident |
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96 | (1) |
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7.9.3 San Onofre NPP: Replacement Steam Generators |
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97 | (2) |
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7.9.4 Northeast Utilities: Impact of Management Change |
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99 | (4) |
Chapter 8 Lessons Learned from a Series of Accidents |
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103 | (8) |
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103 | (1) |
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8.2 Listing of the Lessons Learned for Each Accident |
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104 | (5) |
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8.2.1 Three Mile Island Unit #2 Accident |
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104 | (1) |
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104 | (1) |
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105 | (1) |
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105 | (1) |
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8.2.5 BP Oil Refinery Accident |
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106 | (1) |
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8.2.6 Deepwater Horizon/Macondo Oil Release Accident |
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106 | (1) |
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8.2.7 Railways Accidents, Including Subsurface Railways |
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106 | (1) |
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8.2.8 NASA Challenger Accident |
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107 | (1) |
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107 | (1) |
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8.2.10 NPP Containment Sump Blockage |
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108 | (1) |
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8.2.11 Fuel Cleaning Accident |
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108 | (1) |
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8.2.12 Replacement of Steam Generators |
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108 | (1) |
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8.2.13 Impact of Management, NU Operations |
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109 | (1) |
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109 | (2) |
Chapter 9 Role of Regulation in Industrial Operations |
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111 | (8) |
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111 | (1) |
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112 | (1) |
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9.3 Lessons from Review of NRC Reports |
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113 | (4) |
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117 | (1) |
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117 | (2) |
Chapter 10 Integration of Tools Related to Decision-Making |
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119 | (12) |
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119 | (2) |
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10.2 Integration and Roles of Each Element |
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121 | (10) |
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10.2.1 Beer's Cybernetic Model |
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121 | (1) |
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10.2.2 Ashby's Law of Requisite Variety |
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122 | (1) |
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10.2.3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment Studies |
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122 | (2) |
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10.2.4 Rasmussen's Human Behavior Types |
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124 | (1) |
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10.2.5 Case Studies of Accident for Different Industries |
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124 | (1) |
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10.2.6 Training Methods and Role of Advisors |
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125 | (1) |
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125 | (1) |
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10.2.7 Simulation of Processes and Its Value |
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126 | (1) |
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126 | (18) |
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10.2.8.1 Organizational Dynamic Model |
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126 | (1) |
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127 | (1) |
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10.2.8.3 Probabilistic Risk Assessment |
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127 | (1) |
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10.2.8.4 Rasmussen's Human Behavioral Models |
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127 | (1) |
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10.2.8.5 Accident Case Studies |
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128 | (1) |
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10.2.8.6 Training Methods |
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128 | (1) |
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10.2.8.7 Simulation Processes |
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129 | (2) |
Chapter 11 Use of Simulation for Different Operations |
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131 | (6) |
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131 | (1) |
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131 | (2) |
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133 | (1) |
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11.4 Future Uses: Decision-Making |
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134 | (1) |
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135 | (2) |
Chapter 12 Training Approaches for Management |
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137 | (4) |
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137 | (1) |
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137 | (1) |
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12.3 Technical Tools for Managers |
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138 | (1) |
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139 | (2) |
Chapter 13 Investment in Safety |
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141 | (14) |
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141 | (1) |
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13.2 Managing for Shareholder Value |
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141 | (1) |
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13.3 Brief Overview of the Principles of MSV |
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142 | (2) |
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13.4 Using the J-Value to Estimate the Level of Investment Needed for Safety |
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144 | (9) |
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13.4.1 Formulation of the J-Value |
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145 | (3) |
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13.4.2 Limiting Risk Multiplier |
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148 | (2) |
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13.4.3 Application of the J-Value |
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150 | (3) |
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13.4.3.1 J-Value Analysis |
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151 | (2) |
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153 | (2) |
Chapter 14 Conclusions and Comments |
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155 | (4) |
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155 | (1) |
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156 | (1) |
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156 | (3) |
Appendix: Admiral Rickover's Management Principles |
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159 | (4) |
References |
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163 | (4) |
Index |
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167 | |