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| Acknowledgements |
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1 | (18) |
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4 | (1) |
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What is different about e-cheating? |
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5 | (2) |
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Academic integrity, fraud, hacking and e-cheating |
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7 | (1) |
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An affordance-based taxonomy of e-cheating approaches |
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8 | (9) |
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Providing access to unauthorised information |
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9 | (2) |
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Cognitive offloading to a tool |
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11 | (2) |
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Outsourcing work to a person |
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13 | (2) |
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Disrupting the assessment process |
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15 | (2) |
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E-cheating: a significant problem, but what can we do about it? |
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17 | (1) |
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18 | (1) |
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19 | (19) |
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20 | (1) |
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Two key features of assessment security |
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21 | (3) |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (2) |
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(Im)perfect assessment security |
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24 | (1) |
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Approaches to improving assessment security |
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25 | (11) |
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Detection, evidence and penalties |
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25 | (1) |
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26 | (6) |
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32 | (3) |
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35 | (1) |
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Problems with assessment security |
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36 | (1) |
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36 | (2) |
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3 The E-Cheating lifecycle and how to disrupt it |
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38 | (21) |
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39 | (4) |
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Students don't just find e-cheating; e-cheating finds students |
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39 | (2) |
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Review sites, discount codes and seduction |
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41 | (1) |
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42 | (1) |
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Approaches for disrupting e-cheating awareness raising |
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42 | (1) |
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43 | (5) |
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Contract cheating websites |
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44 | (1) |
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E-cheating hardware websites |
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45 | (1) |
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46 | (1) |
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Large-scale e-commerce sites |
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46 | (1) |
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47 | (1) |
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Approaches for disrupting e-cheating purchases |
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47 | (1) |
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48 | (4) |
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Human cheating content production |
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48 | (3) |
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Computerised cheating content production |
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51 | (1) |
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Approaches for disrupting e-cheating content production |
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51 | (1) |
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Delivery, submission and after-sales care |
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52 | (5) |
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52 | (1) |
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53 | (1) |
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54 | (1) |
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Approaches for disrupting e-cheating delivery, submission and after-sales care |
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55 | (2) |
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57 | (2) |
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4 Cybersecurity, E-Cheating and assessment security |
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59 | (11) |
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59 | (2) |
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Implications of cybersecurity for assessment security |
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61 | (4) |
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Cybersecurity depends on an adversarial mindset |
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61 | (1) |
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Assessment security has a harder authentication problem to solve than regular cybersecurity's authentication problem |
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61 | (1) |
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The contexts of assessment security impose some challenging constraints for security |
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62 | (1) |
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Assessment security depends on hardware security and software security |
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62 | (1) |
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Assessment security will always be imperfect, but that doesn't mean we shouldn't try |
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63 | (1) |
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Security through obscurity is not enough |
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63 | (1) |
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Once an expert makes software that can cheat, everybody can cheat |
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64 | (1) |
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Attack is easier than defence |
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64 | (1) |
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Attackers don't need to account for laws, policy, ethics, student rights or public opinion |
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64 | (1) |
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Improving assessment security through cybersecurity |
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65 | (4) |
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65 | (1) |
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Disclosure and transparency |
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66 | (2) |
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68 | (1) |
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Working with cybersecurity |
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69 | (1) |
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69 | (1) |
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5 Lessons from E-Cheating in games and gambling |
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70 | (13) |
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70 | (3) |
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73 | (2) |
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Cheating in online gambling |
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75 | (2) |
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Anti-cheating technologies in games and gambling |
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77 | (2) |
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What lessons can we learn? |
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79 | (3) |
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Even with much bigger budgets, e-cheating cannot be completely defeated |
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79 | (1) |
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Schneier is right: once an expert writes software that can do something, anybody can do that something |
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80 | (1) |
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Honest players are a big asset in reducing cheating |
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80 | (1) |
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Anti-cheating technologies reify particular understandings of e-cheating |
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80 | (1) |
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Independent bodies can regulate and keep records on individuals that span contexts |
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81 | (1) |
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Some degree of secrecy and undercover operations is necessary to keep ahead of e-cheating |
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81 | (1) |
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Anti-cheating can be offered as a service |
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82 | (1) |
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To understand c-cheating's future, look to games and gambling |
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82 | (1) |
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82 | (1) |
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6 E-Cheating, assessment security and artificial intelligence |
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83 | (15) |
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What AI is and what it can and cannot do |
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83 | (2) |
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85 | (5) |
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AI can already meet some learning outcomes for students; do we still need to assess them? |
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86 | (1) |
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What if AI becomes so good at meeting outcomes for students that we can't spot it? |
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87 | (2) |
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Where is the boundary between AI help and AI cheating? |
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89 | (1) |
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AI for assessment security |
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90 | (6) |
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Can AI detect e-cheating? |
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90 | (1) |
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Can AI be the decision-maker? |
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90 | (5) |
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AI is imperfect but it scales well |
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95 | (1) |
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What will humans and machines need to do? |
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96 | (1) |
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97 | (1) |
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7 Surveillance and the weaponisation of academic integrity |
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98 | (10) |
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Academic integrity, e-cheating, assessment security and surveillance culture |
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99 | (1) |
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Who will surveil students and to what end? |
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100 | (2) |
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Routine surveillance will catch too many |
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102 | (1) |
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Trust, surveillance and Ramification |
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102 | (1) |
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The future of surveillance is weaponisation |
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103 | (1) |
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Alternatives to surveillance |
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104 | (1) |
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105 | (2) |
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107 | (1) |
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8 Metrics and standards for assessment security |
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108 | (20) |
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The problems of metricless assessment security |
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108 | (1) |
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Difficulty to cheat metrics |
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109 | (7) |
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110 | (5) |
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Limitations of cheating difficulty metrics |
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115 | (1) |
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Detection accuracy metrics |
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116 | (3) |
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Limitations of detection accuracy metrics |
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119 | (1) |
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119 | (1) |
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Limitations of proof metrics |
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120 | (1) |
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120 | (2) |
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Limitations of prevalence metrics |
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122 | (1) |
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Learning, teaching, assessment and student experience metrics |
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122 | (2) |
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Limitations of learning, teaching, assessment and student experience metrics |
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123 | (1) |
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Towards standards for assessment security |
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124 | (2) |
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126 | (2) |
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9 Structuring and designing assessment for security |
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128 | (13) |
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Assessment design trumps assessment security |
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128 | (2) |
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Assessment design decisions |
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130 | (2) |
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What doesn't work in designing assessment for security |
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132 | (1) |
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Obvious mistakes that weaken assessment security |
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133 | (2) |
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Reusing the same assessment task |
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133 | (1) |
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Unsupervised online tests |
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133 | (1) |
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Take-home `one right answer' or lower-level tasks |
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134 | (1) |
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Poor examination practices |
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134 | (1) |
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Invigilation and assessment security |
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135 | (1) |
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Group work and assessment security |
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135 | (1) |
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Authentic restrictions and assessment security |
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136 | (1) |
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Programmatic assessment security |
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137 | (1) |
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Dialogic feedback and assessment security |
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138 | (1) |
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Random assessment security checks |
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139 | (1) |
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Assessment design and quality control processes |
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139 | (1) |
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140 | (1) |
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10 Conclusion: Securing assessment against E-Cheating |
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141 | (5) |
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Focus on assessment security alongside academic integrity |
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141 | (1) |
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Take an affordance-based approach to understanding e-cheating, and a principles-based approach to stopping it |
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142 | (1) |
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Perfect is the enemy of good, so aim for incremental improvements |
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143 | (1) |
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Build a culture of Evidence and disclosure |
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143 | (1) |
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Resist assessment conservatism and assessment security theatre |
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144 | (2) |
| References |
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146 | (18) |
| Index |
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164 | |
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām