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E-grāmata: Defending the Axioms: On the Philosophical Foundations of Set Theory

3.88/5 (27 ratings by Goodreads)
(University of California, Irvine)
  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 27-Jan-2011
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191616532
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  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 27-Jan-2011
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191616532

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Mathematics depends on proofs, and proofs must begin somewhere, from some fundamental assumptions. The axioms of set theory have long played this role, so the question of how they are properly judged is of central importance. Maddy discusses the appropriate methods for such evaluations and the philosophical backdrop that makes them appropriate.

Mathematics depends on proofs, and proofs must begin somewhere, from some fundamental assumptions. For nearly a century, the axioms of set theory have played this role, so the question of how these axioms are properly judged takes on a central importance. Approaching the question from a broadly naturalistic or second-philosophical point of view,Defending the Axioms isolates the appropriate methods for such evaluations and investigates the ontological and epistemological backdrop that makes them appropriate. In the end, a new account of the objectivity of mathematics emerges, one refreshingly free of metaphysical commitments.

Recenzijas

'an engaging contribution to an important philosophical debate [ which] deserves to be read far beyond the ranks of philosophers of mathematics' * Journal of Philosophy *

Preface ix
Introduction 1(1)
I The Problem
2(36)
1 An historical reversal
3(3)
2 How applied mathematics became pure
6(21)
3 Where we are now
27(11)
II Proper Method
38(22)
1 The meta-philosophy
38(3)
2 Some examples from set-theoretic practice
41(11)
3 Proper set-theoretic method
52(3)
4 The challenge
55(5)
III Thin Realism
60(28)
1 Introducing Thin Realism
61(3)
2 What Thin Realism is not
64(7)
3 Thin epistemology
71(6)
4 The objective ground of Thin Realism
77(6)
5 Retracing our steps
83(5)
IV Arealism
88(25)
1 Introducing Arealism
88(1)
2 Mathematics in application
89(7)
3 What Arealism is not
96(3)
4 Comparison with Thin Realism
99(4)
5 Thin Realism/Arealism
103(10)
V Morals
113(25)
1 Objectivity in mathematics
114(3)
2 Robust Realism revisited
117(6)
3 More examples from set-theoretic practice
123(8)
4 Intrinsic versus extrinsic
131(7)
Bibliography 138(9)
Index 147
Penelope Maddy is Distinguished Professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of California, Irvine. She is the author of Naturalism in Mathematics (OUP, 1997), Realism in Mathematics (OUP, 1992), and Second Philosophy (OUP, 2007).