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1 | (14) |
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1.1 History and Philosophy of Science |
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1 | (3) |
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1.2 Integrated History and Philosophy of Science |
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4 | (3) |
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1.3 Integrated HPS in Practice: The Case of the Origin of Genetics |
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7 | (2) |
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9 | (6) |
Part I History |
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2 Mendel's Pisum Revisited |
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15 | (22) |
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15 | (1) |
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2.2 Mendel and Gartner on Entwicklung (Development) |
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16 | (8) |
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2.3 Mendel's "Entwicklungsreihe (Developmental Series)" |
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24 | (3) |
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2.4 Mendel's Novel Conceptualisation: The Laws of Developmental Series |
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27 | (3) |
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2.5 Mendel and the Study of Heredity |
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30 | (3) |
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33 | (1) |
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34 | (3) |
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3 De Vries' Mendelism Reassessed |
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37 | (16) |
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3.1 The Rediscovery Story |
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37 | (2) |
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3.2 No Mendel, No Mendelians' |
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39 | (5) |
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3.2.1 The 3:1 Ratio in the 1896 Notes |
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40 | (2) |
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3.2.2 Mendel and the Law of Segregation |
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42 | (2) |
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3.3 De Vries' Introduction of Segregation |
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44 | (5) |
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3.3.1 From Mendel to Mendelism |
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44 | (1) |
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3.3.2 From Activeness to Dominance |
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45 | (3) |
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3.3.3 From Correspondence to Segregation |
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48 | (1) |
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49 | (1) |
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50 | (3) |
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4 Weldon's Choice Reconsidered |
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53 | (20) |
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4.1 The Mendelian-Biometrician Controversy |
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53 | (1) |
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4.2 Weldon as a Biometrician |
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54 | (2) |
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4.3 Weldon's Theory of Inheritance |
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56 | (8) |
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57 | (1) |
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4.3.2 The Methodology of the Study of Inheritance |
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58 | (2) |
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4.3.3 The Aim of Theory of Inheritance |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (2) |
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4.3.5 Summary and Remarks |
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63 | (1) |
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4.4 Weldon, No Biometrician |
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64 | (3) |
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4.4.1 Pearson vs. Weldon Reconsidered |
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64 | (2) |
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4.4.2 Beyond Mendelism and Biometry |
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66 | (1) |
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67 | (1) |
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67 | (6) |
Part II Integrated HPS |
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5 Exemplarising the Origin of Genetics |
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73 | (28) |
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73 | (1) |
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5.2 The Theory-Based Accounts of the Origin of Genetics |
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74 | (6) |
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80 | (1) |
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5.4 A New Interpretation of Exemplar and the Exemplar-Based Approach |
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81 | (5) |
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5.5 An Exemplar-Based Account of the Origin of Genetics |
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86 | (10) |
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96 | (1) |
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97 | (4) |
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6 A Functional Account of the Progress in Early Genetics |
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101 | (18) |
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6.1 Scientific Progress and the Origin of Genetics |
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101 | (1) |
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6.2 A New Functional Approach to Scientific Progress |
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102 | (2) |
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6.3 How Early Genetics Progressed |
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104 | (3) |
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6.4 The Problems of the Kuhn-Laudan Functional Approach Revisited |
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107 | (4) |
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6.5 Beyond Knowledge, Truth, and Intervening |
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111 | (5) |
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116 | (1) |
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116 | (3) |
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7 The Problem of the Long Neglect Revisited: An Exemplar-Based Explanation |
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119 | (18) |
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7.1 Two Problems of the Long Neglect |
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119 | (2) |
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7.2 The Traditional Diagnoses of the Long Neglect |
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121 | (4) |
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7.2.1 Explanation 1: Mendel's Work Was Not Accepted |
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121 | (2) |
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7.2.2 Explanation 2: Mendel's Work Was Unknown |
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123 | (1) |
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7.2.3 Summary and Remarks |
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124 | (1) |
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7.3 Mendel's Contribution Reconsidered |
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125 | (2) |
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7.3.1 The Traditional Philosophical Analyses |
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125 | (1) |
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7.3.2 The Exemplar-Based Analysis |
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126 | (1) |
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7.4 Why Mendel's Contribution Was Neglected |
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127 | (3) |
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7.4.1 The Nature of the Long Neglect |
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127 | (1) |
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7.4.2 The Exemplar-based Explanation |
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128 | (2) |
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7.4.3 The Exemplar-Based Explanation and Old Intellectual Explanations |
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130 | (1) |
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130 | (1) |
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131 | (6) |
Part III Philosophy |
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8 A New Mode of Conceptual Continuity |
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137 | (22) |
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8.1 Conceptual Change: Variance and Continuity |
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137 | (3) |
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8.2 What if Everything Changes? The Case of the Concept of Dominance |
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140 | (6) |
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8.3 A Holistic Approach to Conceptual Change |
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146 | (2) |
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8.4 Two Modes of Continuity and Conceptual Continuity |
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148 | (3) |
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8.5 The Case of the Concept of Dominance Revisited |
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151 | (3) |
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154 | (1) |
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155 | (4) |
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9 The Gap Problem in Hypothetico-Deductivism |
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159 | (18) |
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9.1 Mendel's Evidence and the Gap Problem |
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159 | (3) |
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9.2 The Diagnosis of the Gap Problem and the Achinsteinian Solution |
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162 | (4) |
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9.3 A New Solution: From Evidence to Evidential Practice |
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166 | (3) |
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9.4 The Gap Problem Revisited |
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169 | (3) |
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9.4.1 The Defence of Descriptive Adequacy |
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169 | (1) |
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9.4.2 The Defence of Philosophical Adequacy |
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169 | (3) |
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9.5 Normativity and Contextualism in H-D Evidential Practice |
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172 | (2) |
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174 | (1) |
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174 | (3) |
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10 Promisingness in Theory Choice |
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177 | (16) |
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10.1 Theory Choice in Science |
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177 | (1) |
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10.2 The Choices in the Mendelian-Biometrician Controversy |
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178 | (3) |
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10.3 Promisingness as Potential Usefulness |
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181 | (3) |
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10.4 Promisingness, Potential Progressiveness, Potential Fertility, and Fruitfulness |
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184 | (5) |
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10.5 Argument from Normativity |
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189 | (1) |
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189 | (1) |
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190 | (3) |
Appendix |
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193 | (2) |
Index |
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195 | |