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1 Global Criminal Networking in Sport: Online Betting-Related Match-Fixing |
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1 | (18) |
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1.1 Online Sport Betting in a Complex Context of Globalisation and `Internet-isation' |
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2 | (8) |
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1.1.1 Complexity Triggered by Economic Globalisation |
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2 | (2) |
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1.1.2 Internet and Globalisation of Sports Betting: New Market Behaviour |
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4 | (4) |
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1.1.3 Estimating the Size of Global Online Sports Betting Market |
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8 | (2) |
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1.2 Online Betting-Related Match-Fixing: New Opportunities and Empirical Evidence |
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10 | (7) |
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1.2.1 New Fixing Opportunities: Legal and Illegal Sports Betting Markets |
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10 | (2) |
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1.2.2 Some (Non-exhaustive) Empirical Evidence |
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12 | (3) |
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1.2.3 Fraudulent Online Sports Betting and Money Laundering |
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15 | (2) |
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17 | (2) |
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2 Challenging Standard Economics and Policies |
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19 | (36) |
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2.1 Modelling Online Betting-Related Match-Fixing |
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20 | (10) |
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2.1.1 Standard Economics in the Face of Online Betting-Related Match-Fixing |
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20 | (2) |
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2.1.2 An Economic Model of Interaction Between Match-Fixing and Sport Betting |
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22 | (8) |
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2.2 Which Tools to Combat Online Betting-Related Match-Fixing? |
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30 | (22) |
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2.2.1 Surveillance and Monitoring of Online Sports Betting |
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31 | (3) |
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2.2.2 Initiatives to Save Sport Integrity at Bay |
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34 | (6) |
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2.2.3 Public Regulation of Online Sports Betting |
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40 | (6) |
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2.2.4 Property Rights and Privatisation of Sporting Fixtures and Outcomes |
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46 | (3) |
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2.2.5 A `Sportbet-Tobin' Tax? |
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49 | (3) |
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52 | (3) |
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3 Doping: Which Economic Crime in Sport? |
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55 | (36) |
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3.1 Doping: A Snapshot of Empirical Evidence |
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57 | (22) |
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3.1.1 Looking at the Tip of an Iceberg |
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57 | (13) |
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3.1.2 The Market for Performance-Enhancing Drugs: Guesstimates |
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70 | (4) |
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3.1.3 Unobservable Doping Distorts Observed Sporting Outcomes |
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74 | (2) |
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3.1.4 A Natural Experiment of Doping at the 2014 Sochi Winter Games |
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76 | (1) |
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3.1.5 The Impact of Doping on Fans, TV Viewers and Sponsors |
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77 | (2) |
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3.2 Standard Economics Analysis of Doping as a Crime |
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79 | (9) |
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3.2.1 Beckerian Economics of Crime: Once Again |
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79 | (2) |
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3.2.2 Game Theory: Doping as a Dominant Strategy |
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81 | (7) |
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88 | (3) |
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4 Moving Beyond Inefficient Policies to Combat Doping |
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91 | (28) |
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4.1 A Limited Efficiency of Economic Recipes to Combat Doping |
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92 | (13) |
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4.1.1 Anti-doping Recipes Derived from Standard Theory |
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93 | (3) |
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4.1.2 Limited Efficiency of Anti-doping Combat |
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96 | (1) |
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4.1.2.2 Anti-doping Inefficiency from Testing to Sanctioning |
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97 | (3) |
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4.1.2.2 The Negative List System Is Inefficient |
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100 | (2) |
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4.1.2.2 Anti-doping Institutional Weaknesses |
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102 | (3) |
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4.2 Towards an Analytical and Policy Renewal |
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105 | (11) |
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4.2.1 Game Theory and Renewed Strategies to Combat Doping |
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105 | (3) |
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4.2.2 A New Option: Incentives That Transform Doping into a Self-Defeating Strategy |
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108 | (8) |
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4.3 Conclusion: In Support of New Tools to Combat Major Sport Manipulations |
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116 | (1) |
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116 | (3) |
| Conclusion: End of the Roadmap |
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119 | (2) |
| Index |
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121 | |
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