List of figures |
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xv | |
List of tables |
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xix | |
List of acronyms |
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xx | |
List of symbols |
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xxii | |
Preface |
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xiii | |
Instruction to readers |
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xxv | |
Acknowledgments |
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xxvii | |
Module 1 The market |
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1 | (62) |
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1 Economic approach to tourism and hospitality |
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3 | (21) |
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1.1 Tourism and hospitality |
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3 | (3) |
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1.1.1 The making of modem tourism |
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3 | (2) |
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1.1.2 The essence of hospitality |
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5 | (1) |
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1.1.3 Tourism versus hospitality |
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6 | (1) |
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1.2 Breadth and depth of tourism and hospitality |
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6 | (4) |
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1.2.1 Breadth of the tourism industry |
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8 | (1) |
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1.2.2 Depth of the tourism industry |
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8 | (1) |
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1.2.3 Supply expansion in tourism and hospitality |
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9 | (1) |
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1.3 The tourist and the tourist economy |
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10 | (7) |
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1.3.1 Tourism and the tourist |
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10 | (3) |
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1.3.2 Tourism consumption |
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13 | (2) |
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1.3.3 Global tourism growth and distribution |
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15 | (2) |
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1.4 Economic significance of tourism |
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17 | (3) |
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20 | (1) |
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21 | (1) |
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22 | (1) |
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23 | (1) |
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2 Demand, supply, and the market |
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24 | (24) |
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24 | (2) |
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26 | (5) |
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2.2.1 Laws of demand and supply |
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26 | (2) |
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28 | (1) |
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2.2.3 Demand and supply versus quantity demanded and supplied |
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29 | (2) |
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2.3 Economic surplus and market efficiency |
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31 | (3) |
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2.3.1 Consumer surplus, producer surplus, and social surplus |
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31 | (1) |
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2.3.2 Price controls and deadweight loss |
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32 | (2) |
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34 | (1) |
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2.4 Determinants of demand and supply |
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34 | (7) |
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2.4.1 Push factors versus pull factors |
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34 | (3) |
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2.4.2 Demand drives supply |
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37 | (3) |
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2.4.3 Supply creates demand |
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40 | (1) |
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41 | (1) |
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42 | (3) |
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45 | (2) |
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47 | (1) |
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3 Uber's surge pricing and market efficiency |
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48 | (15) |
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3.1 What is a surge in demand? |
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48 | (1) |
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3.2 How does surge pricing work? |
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49 | (5) |
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3.2.1 Riders, drivers, and surge multipliers |
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49 | (1) |
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3.2.2 Surge pricing works |
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50 | (2) |
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3.2.3 Surge pricing fails |
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52 | (2) |
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3.3 Welfare analysis of surge pricing |
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54 | (3) |
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54 | (2) |
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56 | (1) |
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3.4 Information, price signal, and market efficiency |
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57 | (2) |
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3.4.1 Surge multiplier as the price signal |
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57 | (1) |
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3.4.2 "The use of knowledge in society" |
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58 | (1) |
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59 | (1) |
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60 | (1) |
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61 | (2) |
Module 2 Demand |
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63 | (90) |
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4 Consumer choice and demand |
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65 | (25) |
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65 | (2) |
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4.2 Utility, preference, and indifference curve |
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67 | (5) |
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4.2.1 Utility and diminishing marginal utility |
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67 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Consumption bundle and preference relation |
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68 | (1) |
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69 | (3) |
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4.3 Budget constraint and consumer optimization |
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72 | (4) |
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72 | (2) |
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4.3.2 Consumer optimization |
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74 | (1) |
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4.3.3 Equalization of marginal utility per dollar |
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75 | (1) |
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4.4 Derivation of the demand curve |
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76 | (2) |
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4.4.1 Consumer optimization and the demand curve |
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76 | (1) |
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4.4.2 Properties of the demand curve |
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77 | (1) |
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77 | (1) |
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4.5 The work-leisure tradeoff |
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78 | (5) |
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4.5.1 Substitution effect |
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78 | (2) |
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80 | (1) |
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4.5.3 Opportunity cost of leisure |
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80 | (3) |
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83 | (1) |
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84 | (3) |
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87 | (2) |
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89 | (1) |
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5 Elasticity of consumer demand |
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90 | (26) |
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5.1 The responsiveness of demand |
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90 | (2) |
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5.2 Defining and calculating elasticity |
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92 | (5) |
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93 | (2) |
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5.2.2 Midpoint elasticity |
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95 | (1) |
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95 | (2) |
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5.3 Interpretation of elasticity |
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97 | (1) |
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5.3.1 Nature of the effect |
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97 | (1) |
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5.3.2 Magnitude of the effect |
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97 | (1) |
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5.4 Major elasticities of demand |
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98 | (8) |
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5.4.1 Price elasticity of demand |
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99 | (1) |
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5.4.2 Income elasticity of demand |
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100 | (4) |
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5.4.3 Cross-price elasticity of demand |
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104 | (2) |
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5.5 Price elasticity and firm revenue |
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106 | (4) |
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5.5.1 Price elasticity of linear demand |
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106 | (1) |
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5.5.2 Price elasticity and firm revenue |
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107 | (3) |
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110 | (1) |
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111 | (2) |
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113 | (2) |
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115 | (1) |
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6 Network effects in market demand |
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116 | (22) |
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6.1 Individual demand versus market demand |
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116 | (5) |
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6.1.1 Additivity in market demand |
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117 | (1) |
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6.1.2 Demand interdependence and non-additivity |
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118 | (2) |
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6.1.3 Network externality and network effects |
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120 | (1) |
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6.2 Network effects and market demand |
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121 | (7) |
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121 | (2) |
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123 | (1) |
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124 | (4) |
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6.3 Nonfunctional demand and utility |
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128 | (3) |
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6.3.1 Functional demand versus nonfunctional demand |
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128 | (1) |
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6.3.2 Functional utility versus nonfunctional utility |
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129 | (2) |
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6.4 Consumer belief and information cues |
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131 | (1) |
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132 | (1) |
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133 | (3) |
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136 | (1) |
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137 | (1) |
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7 Demand for Pinot Noir versus Merlot: The Sideways effect |
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138 | (15) |
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7.1 Sideways and the wines |
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139 | (1) |
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7.2 Sideways on wine consumption |
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140 | (4) |
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7.2.1 Standardization and comparisons |
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140 | (1) |
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7.2.2 The Sideways effect on quantity |
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141 | (1) |
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7.2.3 The Sideways effect on price |
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142 | (2) |
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7.3 Decomposing price and the Sideways effect |
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144 | (3) |
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7.3.1 Change in price or quantity |
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144 | (1) |
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7.3.2 Changes in both price and quantity |
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145 | (2) |
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7.4 Consumer knowledge and the Sideways effect |
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147 | (3) |
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7.4.1 Consumer knowledge and wine consumption |
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147 | (1) |
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7.4.2 Heterogeneity of the Sideways effect |
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147 | (3) |
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150 | (1) |
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151 | (1) |
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151 | (2) |
Module 3 Supply |
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153 | (92) |
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8 Firm production and cost |
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155 | (23) |
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155 | (4) |
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156 | (2) |
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8.1.2 Diminishing marginal product |
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158 | (1) |
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8.2 Derivation of cost curves |
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159 | (6) |
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159 | (1) |
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160 | (2) |
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162 | (3) |
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8.3 Cost and short-run production |
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165 | (2) |
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8.3.1 Revenue, cost, and profit |
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165 | (1) |
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166 | (1) |
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167 | (1) |
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8.4 Cost and long-run production |
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167 | (4) |
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8.4.1 Long-run average cost |
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167 | (2) |
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169 | (1) |
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8.4.3 Why economies of scale arise |
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170 | (1) |
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171 | (1) |
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172 | (3) |
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175 | (2) |
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177 | (1) |
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9 Competition and market structure |
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178 | (25) |
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9.1 Market structure in a nutshell |
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178 | (3) |
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9.1.1 What is market structure |
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178 | (3) |
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9.1.2 Market structures in tourism and hospitality |
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181 | (1) |
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181 | (6) |
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9.2.1 Market demand versus firm demand |
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182 | (1) |
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9.2.2 Positive profit, zero profit, and shutdown |
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183 | (2) |
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9.2.3 Derivation of the supply curve |
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185 | (2) |
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187 | (3) |
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9.3.1 Downward-sloping demand curve |
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187 | (1) |
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9.3.2 Marginal revenue curve |
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188 | (1) |
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9.3.3 Output and price decision |
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189 | (1) |
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9.4 Monopolistic competition |
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190 | (2) |
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9.4.1 Product differentiation and demand |
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190 | (2) |
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9.4.2 Monopolistic competition in the long run |
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192 | (1) |
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192 | (4) |
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9.5.1 Strategic competition |
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192 | (1) |
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9.5.2 Duopoly and Bertrand competition |
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193 | (2) |
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195 | (1) |
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196 | (1) |
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197 | (3) |
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200 | (2) |
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202 | (1) |
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10 Market concentration and market power |
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203 | (24) |
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10.1 Market definition and market boundary |
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203 | (3) |
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10.1.1 Market boundary by product |
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203 | (2) |
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10.1.2 Market boundary by location |
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205 | (1) |
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10.1.3 Market concentration and market power |
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205 | (1) |
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10.2 Measuring market concentration |
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206 | (9) |
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10.2.1 Four-firm concentration ratio |
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207 | (2) |
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10.2.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index |
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209 | (2) |
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211 | (4) |
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10.3 Measuring market power |
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215 | (3) |
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10.3.1 Lerner index and price elasticity of demand |
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215 | (1) |
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10.3.2 Lerner index and demand substitutability |
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216 | (2) |
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10.4 Industry versus sector |
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218 | (3) |
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10.4.1 The complementary nature of the tourism industry |
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218 | (1) |
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10.4.2 Market concentration in tourism and hospitality |
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219 | (2) |
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221 | (1) |
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222 | (2) |
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224 | (2) |
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226 | (1) |
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11 Airbnb versus hotels in supply adjustment |
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227 | (18) |
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11.1 Performance metrics in the lodging industry |
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227 | (3) |
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227 | (2) |
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11.1.2 Occupancy, ADR, and RevPAR |
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229 | (1) |
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11.2 Discrepancy in market performance |
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230 | (4) |
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11.2.1 Airbnb ADR and occupancy are stationary |
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230 | (1) |
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11.2.2 Airbnb ADR and occupancy are lower |
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231 | (3) |
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11.3 Demand seasonality and supply adjustment |
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234 | (6) |
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234 | (3) |
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11.3.2 Demand seasonality and market equilibrium |
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237 | (2) |
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11.3.3 Cost and host behavior of Airbnb |
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239 | (1) |
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11.4 Competition in the lodging industry |
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240 | (1) |
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241 | (1) |
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242 | (2) |
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244 | (1) |
Module 4 Firm behavior and strategy |
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245 | (76) |
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12 Monopoly and price discrimination |
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247 | (23) |
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12.1 Price discrimination versus uniform pricing |
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247 | (2) |
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12.1.1 Uniform pricing of a monopolist |
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247 | (1) |
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12.1.2 What is price discrimination |
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248 | (1) |
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12.2 Third-degree price discrimination |
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249 | (4) |
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12.2.1 Demand heterogeneity by consumer segment |
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249 | (1) |
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12.2.2 Pricing on consumer segments |
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250 | (3) |
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12.2.3 Discontinuity in market demand |
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253 | (1) |
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12.3 Second-degree price discrimination |
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253 | (4) |
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12.3.1 Block selling and diminishing marginal utility |
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253 | (1) |
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12.3.2 Pricing on sale blocks |
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254 | (1) |
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255 | (2) |
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12.4 First-degree price discrimination |
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257 | (3) |
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12.4.1 Pricing on individuals |
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257 | (1) |
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12.4.2 Social optimum and market efficiency |
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258 | (1) |
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12.4.3 An example of first-degree price discrimination |
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259 | (1) |
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12.5 Market imperfection, information, and price discrimination |
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260 | (3) |
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12.5.1 Price discrimination and market efficiency |
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260 | (1) |
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12.5.2 Information acquisition about demand |
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261 | (1) |
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12.5.3 Economic discrimination versus social discrimination |
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262 | (1) |
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263 | (1) |
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264 | (3) |
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267 | (2) |
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269 | (1) |
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13 Starbuas pricing: Tall, Grande, and Venti |
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270 | (15) |
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13.1 Receptacle size and price tag |
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270 | (2) |
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13.2 Second-degree price discrimination |
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272 | (6) |
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272 | (3) |
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13.2.2 Why the Tall is the optimal single size |
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275 | (1) |
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13.2.3 Optimal sizes and prices for Grande and Venti |
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276 | (2) |
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13.3 Third-degree price discrimination |
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278 | (4) |
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278 | (1) |
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13.3.2 Nonfunctional utility and elasticity of demand |
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279 | (1) |
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13.3.3 Elasticity of demand across sizes |
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280 | (2) |
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13.4 Rationality versus irrationality |
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282 | (1) |
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282 | (1) |
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283 | (1) |
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284 | (1) |
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14 Duopoly and product differentiation |
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285 | (21) |
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14.1 Horizontal versus vertical product differentiation |
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285 | (2) |
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14.2 Minimum product differentiation |
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287 | (4) |
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14.2.1 Assumptions of the model |
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288 | (1) |
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14.2.2 Location choice and price competition |
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289 | (2) |
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14.2.3 Law of minimum product differentiation |
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291 | (1) |
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14.3 Maximum product differentiation |
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291 | (6) |
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14.3.1 What is maximum product differentiation? |
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291 | (1) |
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14.3.2 Equilibrium price in maximum product differentiation |
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292 | (4) |
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14.3.3 Sources of firm profit |
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296 | (1) |
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14.4 Consumer preference and product differentiation |
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297 | (3) |
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14.4.1 Dispersion of consumer preference |
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297 | (1) |
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14.4.2 Intensity of consumer preference |
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298 | (1) |
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14.4.3 Product differentiation beyond location |
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299 | (1) |
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14.5 Product differentiation and market efficiency |
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300 | (1) |
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301 | (1) |
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302 | (2) |
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304 | (1) |
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305 | (1) |
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15 McDonald's versus Burger King in product differentiation |
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306 | (15) |
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15.1 Firms in the fast food industry |
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306 | (3) |
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15.2 Location affecting price and profit |
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309 | (4) |
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15.2.1 McDonald's price and profit |
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309 | (1) |
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15.2.2 Burger King's price and profit |
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310 | (1) |
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15.2.3 McDonald's versus Burger King in pricing |
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311 | (2) |
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15.3 Competition and location choice |
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313 | (2) |
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15.3.1 McDonald's responds to Burger King's location |
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313 | (1) |
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15.3.2 Burger King responds to McDonald's location |
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314 | (1) |
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15.4 What affects location equilibrium |
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315 | (2) |
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15.4.1 Firm asymmetry and location choice |
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315 | (1) |
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15.4.2 Market size, the "center," and location choice |
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316 | (1) |
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317 | (1) |
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318 | (1) |
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319 | (2) |
Module 5 Transaction and Institution |
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321 | (58) |
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16 Intermediation and the bid-ask spread |
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323 | (21) |
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16.1 Transaction costs and the firm |
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323 | (3) |
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16.1.1 Walrasian auction and transaction costs |
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323 | (1) |
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16.1.2 The firm and the intermediary |
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324 | (2) |
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16.2 Bilateral search versus intermediation |
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326 | (3) |
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16.2.1 Buyers and sellers |
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326 | (1) |
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327 | (1) |
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328 | (1) |
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16.3 Determining the bid-ask spread |
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329 | (7) |
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16.3.1 Search costs and intermediary profit |
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329 | (2) |
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16.3.2 Bid-ask spread without search |
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331 | (2) |
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16.3.3 Bid-ask spread with search |
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333 | (3) |
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16.4 Intermediation versus disintermediation |
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336 | (3) |
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16.4.1 The emergence of intermediaries |
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336 | (1) |
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337 | (2) |
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339 | (1) |
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340 | (1) |
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341 | (2) |
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343 | (1) |
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17 The two-sided market and price structure |
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344 | (20) |
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17.1 Externality and the platform |
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344 | (2) |
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17.1.1 A descriptive framework |
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344 | (2) |
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17.1.2 Cross-side network externality |
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346 | (1) |
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17.2 What makes a two-sided market? |
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346 | (4) |
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17.2.1 The implicit market for interactions |
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346 | (1) |
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17.2.2 Demands for the platform |
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347 | (2) |
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17.2.3 Defining two-sidedness |
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349 | (1) |
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17.3 Price decision of the platform |
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350 | (6) |
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17.3.1 Profit maximization |
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350 | (1) |
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17.3.2 Implicit price of interactions |
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351 | (1) |
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17.3.3 Price structure on two sides |
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352 | (4) |
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17.4 The Coase theorem and platformization |
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356 | (2) |
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17.4.1 The failure of the Coase theorem |
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356 | (1) |
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17.4.2 Internalization of externality |
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357 | (1) |
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358 | (1) |
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359 | (1) |
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360 | (2) |
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362 | (2) |
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18 The platformization of OpenTable |
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364 | (15) |
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364 | (2) |
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18.2 OpenTable as a platform |
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366 | (2) |
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366 | (1) |
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18.2.2 Cross-side network effects |
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366 | (1) |
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18.2.3 Same-side network effects |
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367 | (1) |
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18.3 Structure of fees and user response |
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368 | (4) |
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368 | (2) |
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18.3.2 Restaurants' response |
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370 | (1) |
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371 | (1) |
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18.4 Firm revenue and growth |
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372 | (2) |
|
18.5 Platform competition and multi-homing |
|
|
374 | (1) |
|
|
375 | (1) |
|
|
376 | (1) |
|
|
377 | (2) |
Author Index |
|
379 | (1) |
Subject Index |
|
380 | |