"The epistemic norms should matter. The ones philosophers typically focus on do not matter enough. So we should replace them. While the replacement norms will agree to some significant extent with more standard epistemic norms, they will vary quite significantly as well. They will permit us to form some seemingly bad beliefs - beliefs that violate all standard norms by going against our evidence, being incoherent, or even being clearly false - in order to improve other beliefs. In fact, they will sometimes allow our beliefs to be bad for no reason whatsoever. That paragraph summarizes the project of this book. What does it mean? First, what are epistemic norms? Answering this is complicated by the fact that there is no uncontroversial characterization ofthe epistemic and by my goal to engage with a wide variety of views. For that reason, I'll sketch the extension of what I am talking about rather than try to give a definition that all epistemic norms fit. This is only a sketch; anything that looks enough like the examples I'm giving here is probably an epistemic norm as well. Perhaps the most traditional characterization of epistemology is as the study of knowledge. I don't think that's how we should think about it, as you'll eventually see, but it's a good place to start. Knowledge is one possible epistemic norm - we might think that our beliefs should be knowledge, or that knowledge is that standard against which we should measure our beliefs. Knowing that p traditionally requires that one's belief that p be justified. The standards for justification are also epistemic norms. Sometimes philosophers talk about beliefs being warranted rather than justified, or about beliefs being rational, or theoretically rational (to differentiate these norms from those of practical rationality). These are also epistemic norms. Epistemic norms may have to do with the pursuit of truth, or accuracy, or knowledge, or wisdom, or understanding. Epistemic norms may say that our beliefs should fit the evidence, be coherent with one another, or be reliably formed. The epistemic norms can be norms on full, all-or-nothing belief, but they can also be norms on degrees of belief or credences: the norms discussed in the literature on Bayesian rationality - norms of probabilism andconditionalization, for example - are epistemic norms"--
In The End of Epistemology As We Know It Brian Talbot explores various ways in which epistemic norms could matter, and shows how epistemic norms as standardly understood fall short on each. He argues that we can and should replace existing norms with norms that matter more. These replacement norms will be quite different from the norms standardly accepted by philosophers.
In whichever way we try to explain the importance of the epistemic, it does not matter at all what we believe about most topics or why we believe it. When what we believe does matter, it is often not particularly important that our beliefs are true, but rather just that they are good enough for our purposes. When the truth is not what really matters, then no truth-connected epistemic notions, such as reliability, evidence, coherence, accuracy, or knowledge, are really normatively significant. Even when truth is genuinely important, Talbot argues, the standard epistemic norms do not properly aim at truth, because they do not allow us to sacrifice one true belief for the sake of others. In light of all of this, epistemic norms as standardly conceived are not really concerned with what matters.
Talbot explains how epistemic norms that genuinely matter should replace truth-based epistemic notions with conceptions of success, reasons, and justification aimed at the "good enough." These new norms will require us to form some seemingly bad beliefs--beliefs that violate all standard norms by going against our evidence, being incoherent, or even being clearly false--in order to improve other beliefs. In fact, they will sometimes allow our beliefs to be bad for no reason whatsoever. These arguments open the door for new projects in epistemology. They reveal the need for new accounts of epistemic goodness and rationality, and illuminate how to rigorously pursue these in ways that are genuinely attuned to what is worthwhile.
Epistemology is the philosophical study of how we should form our beliefs. It is one of the central areas of philosophical inquiry and has been so for as long as there have been philosophers. The End of Epistemology As We Know It challenges the views and methodology of almost every epistemologist, both historical and contemporary. In a call for radical reform of how epistemology is practiced and a rethinking of conventional wisdom in this area, Brian Talbot puts forward new epistemic norms that differ significantly from the norms of mainstream epistemic theories.
