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Environmental Law and Economics: Theory and Practice [Hardback]

(Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam), (University of Aberdeen)
  • Formāts: Hardback, 392 pages, height x width x depth: 235x156x24 mm, weight: 660 g, Worked examples or Exercises; 1 Tables, black and white
  • Izdošanas datums: 10-Oct-2019
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108429483
  • ISBN-13: 9781108429481
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Environmental Law and Economics: Theory and PracticePalielināt
  • Formāts: Hardback, 392 pages, height x width x depth: 235x156x24 mm, weight: 660 g, Worked examples or Exercises; 1 Tables, black and white
  • Izdošanas datums: 10-Oct-2019
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • ISBN-10: 1108429483
  • ISBN-13: 9781108429481
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9781108429481.html
Keywords:
In Environmental Law and Economics, Michael G. Faure and Roy A. Partain provide a detailed overview of the law-and-economics methodology developed and employed by environmental lawyers and policymakers. The authors demonstrate how this approach can transcend political divisions in the context of international environmental law, environmental criminal law, and the property rights approach to environmental law. Private law solutions and public regulatory approaches are also explored, including traditional command-and-control and market-based forms of regulation. The book not only shows how the law-and-economics framework can be used to protect the environment, but also to examine deeper questions involving environmental federalism and the effectiveness of environmental law in developing economies. In clear, digestible prose that does not require readers to possess a background in microeconomics or mathematics, the authors introduce the theory and practice of environmental law and economics that have been so critical in the creation of robust environmental policy.

This is a detailed overview of the law-and-economics methodology developed and employed by environmental lawyers and policymakers. It will appeal to students and scholars in a range of disciplines interested in environmental policy and will be useful to practicing lawyers and policymakers assembling and testing their arguments and policy options.

Recenzijas

'Here, Faure (Erasmus Univ. Rotterdam) and Partain (Univ. of Aberdeen) offer a detailed discussion of the important issues in environmental law, policy, and economics, drawing on both theoretical predictions and empirical studies.' R. M. Ramazani, Choice

Papildus informācija

A detailed overview of the law-and-economics methodology developed and employed by environmental lawyers and policymakers.
Preface xv
Acknowledgements xvii
List of Abbreviations
xix
1 Introduction
1(9)
1.1 Why a Book on Environmental Law and Economics?
1(3)
1.2 Readership
4(1)
1.3 Methodology
5(3)
1.4 Synopsis and Structure
8(2)
2 Environmental Harm and Efficiency
10(27)
2.1 Principles of Environmental Law, from an Economic Perspective
11(2)
2.2 Pollution as an Externality
13(5)
2.2.1 External Effects for Firms and States
13(2)
2.2.2 Internalising the Externality as Goal of Environmental Law
15(1)
2.2.3 EIAs and Internalising Externalities
16(2)
2.3 The Coase Theorem
18(9)
2.3.1 Reciprocal Nature of Harm
18(2)
2.3.2 Example of Conflicting Coasean Property Rights
20(1)
2.3.3 The Coase Theorem: A Few Constraints
21(2)
2.3.4 Practical Value of the Coase Theorem
23(1)
2.3.5 Transboundary Application of the Coase Theorem
24(3)
2.4 The Need for Legal and Policy Instruments
27(7)
2.4.1 Determining Optimal Pollution Levels
27(2)
2.4.2 Rules of Civil Liability
29(1)
2.4.3 Public Regulation: Command and Control
30(1)
2.4.4 Market-Based Instruments
31(1)
2.4.5 Suasive Mechanisms
32(1)
2.4.6 Voluntary and Private Mechanisms
32(1)
2.4.7 Smart Instrument Mixes
33(1)
2.5 Summary and Conclusion
34(3)
3 Property Rights Approach to Environmental Law
37(26)
3.1 Importance of Establishing Property Rights
38(5)
3.1.1 The `Tragedy of the Commons'
38(2)
3.1.2 Property Rights as a Remedy
40(3)
3.2 Examples of Property Rights Approaches to Wildlife
43(9)
3.2.1 Protection of Elephants
45(1)
3.2.2 Effectiveness of CITES?
46(1)
3.2.3 Protecting Rhinoceros via Property Rights
47(1)
3.2.4 Localised Management
48(3)
3.2.5 Conditions for Effective Management
51(1)
3.3 First-Use Doctrine
52(9)
3.3.1 Economic Principles
52(2)
3.3.2 Examples
54(1)
3.3.2.1 US Cases
54(2)
3.3.2.2 European Examples
56(2)
3.3.3 Economic Analysis
58(3)
3.4 Summary and Conclusion
61(2)
4 Environmental Standard Setting
63(16)
4.1 Legal versus Economic Meaning of Standards
64(1)
4.2 Types of Environmental Standards
64(6)
4.2.1 Quality and Target Standards
65(1)
4.2.2 Emission Standards
66(1)
4.2.3 Technology or Production Standards
67(1)
4.2.4 Optimal Standard-Setting and Cost-Benefit Analysis
68(1)
4.2.5 Optimal Specificity
69(1)
4.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis and Guidelines of Standard Setting
70(4)
4.3.1 What Are These Guidelines?
70(1)
4.3.1.1 BPM in the United Kingdom
71(1)
4.3.1.2 ALARA in the Netherlands
72(2)
4.3.1.3 BATNEEC in the IPPC Directive
74(1)
4.4 Standard-Setting Guidelines and Economic Analysis
74(3)
4.5 Summary and Conclusion
77(2)
5 Principles of Environmental Law and Environmental Economics
79(27)
5.1 Introduction
79(2)
5.2 Sustainable Development
81(3)
5.2.1 Sources
81(1)
5.2.2 Legal and Economic Interpretation
82(1)
5.2.3 Valuing Future Generations
83(1)
5.3 Prevention at Source
84(1)
5.3.1 Sources
84(1)
5.3.2 Legal and Economic Interpretation
84(1)
5.4 Proximity Principle
85(4)
5.4.1 Free Trade versus Environmental Protection
86(1)
5.4.2 Exceptions to Article 34: Trade-Restricting Measures
86(2)
5.4.3 Trade of Waste between Efficiency and Ethics
88(1)
5.5 Precautionary Principle
89(4)
5.5.1 Sources and Contents
89(2)
5.5.2 Economic Interpretation
91(1)
5.5.3 The Use of the Precautionary Principle
92(1)
5.6 Polluter Pays Principle
93(3)
5.6.1 Sources
93(1)
5.6.2 Economic Interpretation
94(2)
5.7 Environmental Law and Human Rights
96(3)
5.7.1 Environmental Rights in Constitutions
96(1)
5.7.2 ECHR Case Law
97(1)
5.7.3 Economic Interpretation
98(1)
5.8 Integration
99(4)
5.8.1 Integration of Laws: Codification
99(1)
5.8.2 External Integration
100(1)
5.8.3 IPPC
101(1)
5.8.4 Economic Interpretation
101(2)
5.9 Summary and Conclusion
103(3)
6 Pricing Environmental Harm
106(13)
6.1 Introduction
106(1)
6.2 Importance of Cost-Benefit Analysis for Environmental Policy: General
107(5)
6.2.1 Importance for Environmental Policy
107(2)
6.2.2 Limits of Cost-Benefit Analysis
109(3)
6.3 Cost-Benefit Analysis in Environmental Law and Policy
112(4)
6.3.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis at the European Level
113(1)
6.3.2 Economic Analysis of Soil Clean-Up
114(2)
6.4 Economic Methods to Evaluate Environmental Damage
116(1)
6.5 Summary and Conclusion
117(2)
7 Market-Based Instruments
119(26)
7.1 Introduction
119(1)
7.2 Role of Environmental Information in the Markets
120(1)
7.3 Regulation by Command and Control
121(3)
7.4 Environmental Permit Trading
124(1)
74.1 Basic Principles
124(6)
7.4.2 Design Issues
125(1)
7.4.3 The EU Emissions Trading Scheme
126(1)
7.4.4 Efficacy of Emission Trading Systems
127(1)
7.4.4.1 The `Living Legend' of the US S02 Trading Programme
127(1)
7.4.4.2 Effectiveness of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
128(2)
7.5 Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES)
130(2)
7.6 Environmental Taxation
132(6)
7.6.1 Basic Principles and Advantages
132(1)
7.6.2 Critical Issues
133(1)
7.6.3 Some Success Stories
134(1)
7.6.4 The Influence of Private Interest
135(3)
7.7 Elasticities and Distributional Effects on Environmental Welfare
138(4)
7.8 Summary and Conclusion
142(3)
8 Liability Rules
145(37)
8.1 Economic Principles of Accident Law: Introduction
145(9)
8.1.1 The Goal of Tort Law
145(3)
8.1.2 The Unilateral Case
148(1)
8.1.2.1 Negligence
149(1)
8.1.2.2 Strict Liability
150(1)
8.1.2.3 Differences
150(1)
8.1.3 The Bilateral Case
151(1)
8.1.4 The Activity Level
152(2)
8.2 Negligence versus Strict Liability to Control Environmental Harm
154(7)
8.2.1 Economic Criteria
154(2)
8.2.2 A Few Refinements
156(1)
8.2.2.1 Information Differences
156(1)
8.2.2.2 Insolvency: Strict Liability versus Negligence
157(1)
8.2.2.3 Positive Externalities
157(1)
8.2.3 Strict Liability in Environmental Law
158(1)
8.2.3.1 International Level
158(1)
8.2.3.2 Strict Environmental Liability in Statutes
159(2)
8.2.3.3 Strict Environmental Liability in Case Law
161(1)
8.3 Causation
161(3)
8.3.1 Importance of Causation
162(1)
8.3.2 Causal Uncertainty and `Probability of Causation'
162(1)
8.3.3 Threshold Liability versus Causal Apportionment
163(1)
8.4 Financial Caps
164(3)
8.4.1 Economic Analysis of Caps
165(1)
8.4.1.1 When Costs Are Not Fully Internalised
165(1)
8.4.1.2 A Remedy to Uninsurability?
166(1)
8.4.2 Legal Analysis of Caps
166(1)
8.4.3 Contractual Limitations
167(1)
8.5 Liability Channelling
167(4)
8.5.1 Examples
168(1)
8.5.2 Analysis
169(2)
8.6 Joint and Several Liability
171(2)
8.7 Latency and Retroactive Liability
173(3)
8.7.1 Introduction
173(1)
8.7.2 Statutes of Limitations
173(1)
8.7.3 Examples
174(1)
8.7.4 Time Lapse and Incentives to Prevent Accidents
175(1)
8.8 Empirics
176(3)
8.8.1 Deterrent Effect of CERCLA
176(2)
8.8.2 Strict Liability versus Negligence
178(1)
8.8.3 Increased Liability and Liability Avoidance
178(1)
8.9 Summary and Conclusion
179(3)
9 Environmental Regulation
182(29)
9.1 Differences between Liability Rules and Regulation
183(3)
9.2 Public Interest Criteria for Regulation
186(3)
9.2.1 Information Asymmetry as a Criterion for Regulatory Intervention
186(1)
9.2.2 Insolvency Risk
187(1)
9.2.3 Missing Liability Litigation
188(1)
9.2.4 Administrative Costs
188(1)
9.3 The Need to Regulate Environmental Pollution
189(1)
9.4 Safety Regulation in Practice
190(1)
9.5 Private Interest Theory of Regulation
191(5)
9.5.1 Lobbying for Barriers to Entry or Lenient Standards
191(3)
9.5.2 Influence of Private Interest on Instrument Choice
194(1)
9.5.3 The Choice for the Level of Government
195(1)
9.5.4 Liability Law and Rent Seeking
195(1)
9.5.5 Importance
196(1)
9.6 Self-Regulation, Private Regulation, and Mechanism Design
196(4)
9.7 Combination of Various Instruments
200(8)
9.7.1 Optimality of Diverse Instrumentation
200(1)
9.7.2 Liability and Regulation: Exclusivity?
201(1)
9.7.3 Violation of Regulation and Liability
201(2)
9.7.4 Compliance with Regulation and Liability
203(3)
9.7.5 The Search for Smart Mixes of Instruments
206(1)
9.7.6 Optimal Instrument Mixes in Practice
207(1)
9.8 Summary and Conclusion
208(3)
10 Environmental Crime
211(22)
10.1 Introduction
211(1)
10.2 Why Shift to Public Enforcement?
212(2)
10.3 Administrative or Criminal Law?
214(2)
10.4 How to Deter?
216(6)
10.4.1 Raising Probabilities or Penalties?
216(2)
10.4.2 Empirics
218(2)
10.4.3 Fne Harrington Paradox
220(2)
10.5 Optimal Sanctions
222(3)
10.6 Corporate Environmental Crime
225(2)
10.7 Enforcement Strategies
227(4)
10.7.1 Deterrence or Cooperation?
227(3)
10.7.2 Targeting and Risk-Based Enforcement
230(1)
10.8 Summary and Conclusion
231(2)
11 Insurance for Environmental Damage
233(20)
11.1 Introduction
233(1)
11.2 Insurance Theory Applied to Environmental Liability
234(5)
11.2.1 The Utilitarian Approach
234(1)
11.2.2 The Transaction Cost Approach
235(1)
11.2.3 Applied to Environmental Insurance
236(3)
11.3 Moral Hazard
239(4)
11.3.1 Definition
239(1)
11.3.2 Remedies
239(1)
11.3.2.1 Monitoring
239(1)
11.3.2.2 Exposing the Insured to Partial Risk
240(1)
11.3.2.3 Combination
240(1)
11.3.3 Moral Hazard in Environmental Insurance
241(1)
11.3.3.1 Monitoring via Policy and Licence Conditions
241(1)
11.3.3.2 Risk Differentiation
242(1)
11.3.3.3 The Need for Specialisation
243(1)
11.4 Adverse Selection
243(2)
11.4.1 The Problem
243(1)
11.4.2 The Cure
244(1)
11.5 Capacity
245(2)
11.6 Causal Uncertainty and Joint and Several Liability
247(2)
11.6.1 Joint and Several Liability
247(1)
11.6.2 Causal Uncertainty
248(1)
11.7 Compulsory Financial Guarantees
249(1)
11.8 Summary and Conclusion
250(3)
12 Compensation for Environmental Damage
253(22)
12.1 Introduction
253(1)
12.2 Self-Insurance
254(1)
12.2.1 Theory
254(1)
12.2.2 Evaluation
254(1)
12.3 Risk-Sharing Agreements
255(3)
12.3.1 Theory
255(1)
12.3.2 Case Study: Pools for Vessel-Induced Pollution (P&I Clubs)
256(1)
12.3.3 Policy Analysis
257(1)
12.4 Guarantees, Deposits, and Bonds
258(3)
12.4.1 Theory
258(1)
12.4.2 Deposits, Funds, and Bonds as Alternatives to Guarantees
259(1)
12.4.3 Evaluation
260(1)
12.5 Compensation Funds
261(12)
12.5.1 Various Types of Funds
261(1)
12.5.1.1 The Rise of Compensation Funds
261(1)
12.5.1.2 Limitation Fund
262(2)
12.5.1.3 Advancement Fund
264(1)
12.5.1.4 Guarantee Fund
264(1)
12.5.1.5 A General Environmental Fund
264(1)
12.5.2 Case Study: The Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF)
265(1)
12.5.2.1 Historical Experience
265(2)
12.5.2.2 Conditions for an Effective Rapid Claims Handling Mechanism
267(2)
12.5.3 Funds versus Insurance
269(1)
12.5.3.1 Risk Differentiation
269(1)
12.5.3.2 Costs
270(1)
12.5.4 A Compensation Fund for Environmental Damage?
271(1)
12.5.4.1 Guarantee Fund
271(1)
12.5.4.2 Restoration Fund
272(1)
12.6 Summary and Conclusion
273(2)
13 Environmental Federalism
275(17)
13.1 Introduction
275(1)
13.2 Starting Points
276(4)
13.2.1 Tiebout's Model of Federalism
276(2)
13.2.2 Competing Legal Orders
278(2)
13.2.3 Bottom-Up Federalism
280(1)
13.3 Criteria for Centralisation
280(6)
13.3.1 Transboundary Externalities
280(2)
13.3.2 Race to the Bottom
282(1)
13.3.3 Improving Trade
283(1)
13.3.4 Reduction of Transaction Costs
284(1)
13.3.5 Providing a Minimum Level of Protection
285(1)
13.4 Consequences for Environmental Standard Setting
286(2)
13.4.1 Introduction
286(1)
13.4.2 Environmental Quality Standards
286(1)
13.4.3 Emission Limit Values
287(1)
13.4.4 Policy
288(1)
13.5 Policy Perspective
288(2)
13.6 Summary and Conclusion
290(2)
14 The Role of Environmental Law in Developing Countries
292(23)
14.1 Introduction
292(1)
14.2 Environmental Kuznets Curve
293(4)
14.2.1 Concept
293(1)
14.2.2 Explanation
294(1)
14.2.3 Policy Consequences
295(2)
14.2.4 Importance
297(1)
14.3 Pollution Havens and the Porter Hypothesis
297(5)
14.3.1 Race to the Bottom or Top?
297(1)
14.3.2 Porter Hypothesis: Weak and Strong Versions
298(1)
14.3.3 Empirical Evidence of a Race to the Bottom
299(2)
14.3.4 Empirical Evidence of Races to the Top
301(1)
14.4 Optimal Environmental Regulation for Developing Countries
302(8)
14.4.1 Lacking Administrative Capacity
303(1)
14.4.2 Corruption
304(4)
14.4.3 Environmental Federalism in Developing Countries
308(1)
14.4.4 Indicators
309(1)
14.5 Example: India
310(3)
14.6 Summary and Conclusion
313(2)
15 Epilogue
315(8)
15.1 Our Motives
315(1)
15.2 An Effective Methodology for Environmental Law Research
316(1)
15.3 Legal Models and Policy Verification
317(1)
15.4 Sustainable Development
317(1)
15.5 An Evolving Methodology
318(1)
15.6 An Evolving `Law of the Environment'
318(1)
15.7 Evolution in Environmental Policies
319(1)
15.8 Conclusion
320(3)
References 323(38)
Index 361
Michael G. Faure is Professor of Comparative Law and Economics at the School of Law, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, and Professor of International and Comparative Environmental Law at Universiteit Maastricht. He is also Academic Director of the Maastricht European Institute for Transnational Legal Research (METRO), the Ius Commune Research School, and the European Doctorate in Law and Economics (EDLE) programme. He is an attorney at the Antwerp Bar and publishes in the areas of environmental criminal law, tort and insurance and economic analysis of accident law. Roy A. Partain is Chair and Professor of Commercial Law and Sustainability at the University of Aberdeen, as well as director of the Ph.D. in Law program and several LL.M. and LL.B. programs. His research explores the nexus between commercial law and sustainable development, including the liability issues arising from emergent and innovative technologies. He is a Member of the State Bar of Texas. He has advised and worked on research projects underwritten by ministries and research institutions in East Asia.