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E-grāmata: Epistemic Value

Edited by (University of Stirling), Edited by (University of Edinburgh), Edited by (University of Stirling)
  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 03-Sep-2009
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191571121
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  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 03-Sep-2009
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191571121
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Recent epistemology has reflected a growing interest in issues about the value of knowledge and the values informing epistemic appraisal. Is knowledge more valuable that merely true belief or even justified true belief? Is truth the central value informing epistemic appraisal or do other values enter the picture? Epistemic Value is a collection of previously unpublished articles on such issues by leading philosophers in the field. It will stimulate discussion of the nature of knowledge and of directions that might be taken by the theory of knowledge. The contributors are Jason Baehr, Michael Brady, Berit Brogaard, Michael DePaul, Pascal Engel, Catherine Elgin, Alvin Goldman, John Greco, Stephen Grimm, Ward Jones, Martin Kusch, Jonathan Kvanvig, Michael Lynch, Erik Olsson, Wayne Riggs and Matthew Weiner.

Recenzijas

This impressive collection of essays exhibits the recent āvalue turnā in epistemology. * Mark T. Nelson, MIND *

List of Contributors
vii
Acknowledgements viii
Introduction 1(18)
Alan Millar
Adrian Haddock
Duncan Pritchard
I. THE VALUE OF KNOWLEDGE
Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge
19(23)
Alvin I. Goldman
Erik J. Olsson
Is There a Value Problem?
42(18)
Jason Baehr
Testimony and the Value of Knowledge
60(35)
Martin Kusch
The Value of Understanding
95(17)
Jonathan Kvanvig
Ugly Analyses and Value
112(27)
Michael R. De Paul
The Goods and the Motivation of Believing
139(24)
Ward E. Jones
Practical Reasoning and the Concept of Knowledge
163(20)
Matthew Weiner
Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value
183(21)
Pascal Engel
Luck, Knowledge, and Control
204(21)
Wayne D. Riggs
II. TRUTH AND EPISTEMIC APPRAISAL
The Values of Truth and the Truth of Values
225(18)
Michael P. Lynch
Epistemic Normativity
243(22)
Stephen R. Grimm
Curiosity and the Value of Truth
265(19)
Michael S. Brady
The Trivial Argument for Epistemic Value Pluralism, or, How I Learned to Stop Caring about Truth
284(25)
Berit Brogaard
APPENDIX. SYMPOSIUM ON JONATHAN KVANVIG'S The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding
A. Precis of The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding 309(4)
Jonathan Kvanvig
B. The Value Problem 313(9)
John Greco
C. Is Understanding Factive? 322(9)
Catherine Z. Elgin
D. Understanding, Knowledge, and the Meno Requirement 331(8)
Wayne D. Riggs
E. Responses to Critics 339(14)
Jonathan Kvanvig
Index 353
Adrian Haddock has been a Lecturer in the Department of Philosophy at Stirling since 2004. His current interests lie in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of action. He recently edited (with Fiona Macpherson) Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge (Oxford University Press, 2008).



Alan Millar has taught at the University of Stirling since 1971, where he is now a Professor of Philosophy. His main current interests are in the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of mind. His book Understanding People (Oxford University Press) was published in 2004. He was elected to a Fellowship of the Royal Society of Edinburgh in 2005.



Since 2007, Professor Duncan Pritchard has occupied the Chair in Epistemology at the University of Edinburgh. Before that he was Professor of Philosophy at the University of Stirling. He has published extensively in the theory of knowledge, including two books, Epistemic Luck (Oxford University Press, 2005) and What is this Thing Called Knowledge? (Routledge, 2006). In 2007 he was awarded a Philip Leverhulme Prize.