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E-grāmata: EU Competition Law Volume II: Mergers and Acquisitions

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  • Sērija : EU Competition Law series
  • Izdošanas datums: 14-Dec-2021
  • Izdevniecība: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781802203462
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EU Competition Law Volume II: Mergers and AcquisitionsPalielināt
  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Sērija : EU Competition Law series
  • Izdošanas datums: 14-Dec-2021
  • Izdevniecība: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781802203462
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This book is a Claeys and Casteels title, now formally part of Edward Elgar Publishing.This third edition also provides a unique insight and guide into the way that Commission officials approach cases in practice.

This book is a Claeys and Casteels title, now formally part of Edward Elgar Publishing.



With extensive updating in the decade since the publication of the second edition, and written by the key Commission and European Court officials in this area, as well as leading practitioners, the third edition of this unique title provides meticulous and exhaustive coverage of EU Merger Law.



Containing over 1500 pages of detailed practical analysis and commentary across two volumes, the book provides a unique insight into the way that Commission officials approach cases in practice, and an invaluable guide for all those practising in the field of mergers and acquisitions.



In addition to substantive analysis and procedural guidance, detailed attention is given to specific sectors, including energy, financial services, telecoms, media and internet, as well as transportation.



Quite simply, this book should be on the desk of every competition lawyer practising in the EU, and all those outside of the EU who need to understand the dynamics of EU merger control.



Key features:



  • Written with the authority of those closest to the rule-making

  • A unique insight into the Commission approach

  • Exhaustive coverage of EU Merger control

  • Extensively updated since the second edition

  • Broad coverage of specific sectors

Recenzijas

This new work is impressive and, unusually, addresses all aspects of EU merger control in a single work, across two volumes and more than 1,500 pages. It does so in both an authoritative and accessible manner, drawing on the team of authors' breadth and depth of experience and knowledge and illustrated by frequent references to relevant legislation, guidelines, Court case law and Commission decisions. It is, like its predecessor editions, destined to be an invaluable guide and reference for all involved in merger control work, whether before the Commission, national competition authorities or the courts. -- Matthew O'Regan, Competition Law Journal This new work is impressive and, unusually, addresses all aspects of EU merger control in a single work. It does so in both an authoritative and accessible manner, drawing on the team of authors' breadth and depth of experience and knowledge and illustrated by frequent references to relevant legislation, guidelines, Court case law and Commission decisions. It is, like its predecessor editions, destined to be an invaluable guide and reference for all involved in merger control work, whether before the Commission, national competition authorities or the courts. -- Matthew ORegan, Competition Law Journal

Table of Cases before the European Commission
xxxvii
Table of Cases before the European Court
xcviii
Table of Legislation and Official Documents
cxi
BOOK ONE
PART 1 INTRODUCTION
1(68)
Chapter 1 Overview
1(22)
1 Introduction
1(4)
2 The history of European merger control
5(7)
3 The legal basis of the Merger Regulation
12(1)
4 Objectives and general principles
12(1)
5 The residual application of Articles 101 FEU and Article 102 TFEU to concentrations
13(3)
6 The acquisition of minority interests
16(3)
7 Merger control at national level
19(4)
Chapter 2 The evolution of EU merger control since 1990
23(28)
1 Introduction
23(1)
2 The main phases of evolution in the application of the Merger Regulation
24(27)
2.1 The Merger Review 2002-2004 and new `recast' Merger Regulation 2004
31(5)
2.2 Revised substantive test
36(1)
2.3 The revised referral system
37(4)
2.4 Procedural changes under the Merger Regulation since 2004
41(6)
2.5 Recent judicial developments
47(4)
Chapter 3 Implementation and Enforcement
51(18)
1 Overview
51(1)
2 The Merger Regulation
52(1)
3 The Implementing Regulation
52(3)
4 The Commission's Notices and Guidelines
55(6)
5 Best Practice Guidelines
61(1)
6 The framework of decision-making in merger cases
62(2)
7 The operational handling of merger cases by DG Competition
64(1)
8 The system of `checks and balances'
65(4)
PART 2 JURISDICTION
69(138)
Chapter 1 Introduction
69(6)
1 Exclusivity of the European Union's jurisdiction
69(1)
2 Jurisdiction under the EEA Agreement
70(1)
3 Territorial scope of application of the Merger Regulation
71(2)
4 Jurisdiction in the United Kingdom under the Withdrawal Agreement
73(2)
Chapter 2 Concentrations
75(52)
1 The concept of a concentration
75(2)
2 Mergers - Article 3(1)(a)
77(1)
3 Acquisition of control
78(49)
3.1 Concept
78(1)
3.1.1 Person or undertaking acquiring control
79(2)
3.1.2 Acquisitions by a State or state-owned undertakings
81(5)
3.1.3 Target
86(2)
3.1.4 Means of exercising control
88(4)
3.1.5 Acquisition of control on a lasting basis
92(5)
3.1.6 Internal restructuring
97(1)
3.2 Sole control
97(1)
3.2.1 Majority of voting rights
98(1)
3.2.2 Minority shareholdings conferring legal control
98(1)
3.2.3 Situations leading to negative sole control
99(1)
3.2.4 Minority shareholdings conferring de facto sole control
99(2)
3.2.5 Control by other means
101(1)
3.3 Joint control
101(1)
3.3.1 Equality in voting rights
102(1)
3.3.2 Veto rights over strategic decisions
102(3)
3.3.3 Joint exercise of voting rights
105(1)
3.3.4 De facto joint control
106(3)
3.3.5 Casting votes
109(1)
3.4 Changes in structure and quality of control
109(2)
3.5 Interrelated transactions
111(1)
3.5.1 Interrelated transactions linked by conditionality
112(6)
3.5.2 Staggered transactions: Article 5(2) subparagraph 2 Merger Regulation
118(2)
3.5.3 Series of transactions in securities
120(1)
3.6 Situations where no concentrations arise, Article 3(5)
121(1)
3.6.1 Financial institutions
121(2)
3.6.2 Office-holders such as insolvency receivers
123(1)
3.6.3 Financial holding companies
123(1)
3.7 Termination of jurisdiction due to abandonment of transaction
124(3)
Chapter 3 Joint ventures
127(20)
1 Introduction: application of the Merger Regulation to joint ventures
127(6)
2 Full-functionality
133(9)
2.1 Activity on the market - Activities beyond one specific function for the parent companies
134(2)
2.2 Sufficient resources and personnel
136(2)
2.3 Supply relationship
138(4)
3 Performing the functions on a lasting basis
142(2)
4 Changes in the activity of a joint venture
144(3)
4.1 Changes in the activity of a full-function joint venture
144(1)
4.2 Joint venture becoming full-function
145(2)
Chapter 4 European Union dimension
147(22)
1 Introduction
147(1)
2 European Union dimension
148(2)
3 Undertakings concerned
150(2)
4 Group turnover
152(5)
4.1 Article 5(4), (5)
153(3)
4.2 Differences between the concept of a group under Article 5(4) and the concept of control under Article 3
156(1)
5 Calculation of turnover
157(12)
5.1 Principles of calculation of turnover
157(6)
5.2 Geographic allocation of turnover
163(2)
5.3 Rules for specific sectors, Article 5(3)
165(4)
Chapter 5 Referrals
169(26)
1 Introduction
169(3)
2 Referrals to Member States according to Article 9
172(6)
2.1 Substantive criteria
173(2)
2.2 Procedural aspects
175(1)
2.3 Scope of the receiving Member State's jurisdiction
176(2)
3 Pre-notification referrals to Member States pursuant to Article 4(4)
178(3)
3.1 Substantive criteria
178(1)
3.2 Procedural aspects
179(2)
4 Referrals to the Commission pursuant to Article 22
181(7)
4.1 Substantive criteria
182(2)
4.2 Procedural aspects
184(2)
4.3 Scope of the Commission's jurisdiction
186(2)
4.4 Call upon Member States to act, Article 22 (5)
188(1)
5 Pre-notiflcation referrals to the Commission according to Article 4(5)
188(7)
5.1 Substantive criteria
189(1)
5.2 Procedural aspects
190(5)
Chapter 6 Remaining competences of the Member States
195(12)
1 Protection of legitimate national interests under Article 21 (4)
195(7)
1.1 General principles underlying Article 21 (4)
196(1)
1.2 Per se legitimate interests
197(2)
1.3 Other types of public interests
199(1)
1.4 Procedure and sanctions
200(2)
2 Mergers in the defence sector
202(5)
PART 3 DEFINITION OF THE RELEVANT MARKET
207(106)
Chapter 1 Introduction
207(24)
1 The objective of market definition
207(1)
2 Practical principles
208(1)
3 Source of guidance
209(3)
4 Basic concepts
212(15)
4.1 Competitive constraints
212(1)
4.2 A framework for analysis: the hypothetical monopolist test
213(4)
4.3 Demand-side substitution
217(1)
4.4 Supply-side substitution
218(4)
4.5 Price discrimination
222(2)
4.6 Chains of substitution
224(2)
4.7 One-way substitution
226(1)
5 Collection of evidence
227(4)
Chapter 2 Relevant product market
231(58)
1 Introduction
231(1)
2 Assessing demand-side substitution
232(29)
2.1 Indirect evidence
233(1)
2.1.1 Functional substitutability: factors taken into account in determining demand-side substitutability
233(1)
2.1.2 Product characteristics/end-use
234(2)
2.1.3 Industry product classifications
236(1)
2.1.4 Consumer preferences
237(1)
2.1.5 Price levels
238(3)
2.2 Direct evidence of substitutability: historical switching
241(1)
2.2.1 Natural experiments: launch of new products
241(1)
2.2.2 Shock analysis
242(1)
2.3 Direct evidence of substitutability: prices/quantitative methods
243(1)
2.3.1 Own price elasticity of demand
243(2)
2.3.2 Cross-price elasticity
245(1)
2.3.3 Critical loss/critical elasticity analysis
246(5)
2.3.4 Stationarity analysis
251(1)
2.4 Switching costs and other barriers to switching
252(1)
2.4.1 Commercial barriers
253(1)
2.4.2 Legal barriers and other barriers to switching
254(1)
2.4.3 Timing
255(1)
2.5 Price discrimination
255(1)
2.5.1 Different categories of customers
256(2)
2.5.2 Different distribution channels and customer groups
258(3)
3 Assessing supply-side substitution
261(6)
3.1 No significant costs
264(1)
3.2 In the short term
265(1)
3.3 Profitability
266(1)
4 Specific issues
267(21)
4.1 Chains of substitution
267(1)
4.1.1 Overlapping end-use
268(1)
4.1.2 Continuum of end-use
269(1)
4.2 Cluster markets
270(1)
4.3 Differentiated products
271(2)
4.4 Private labels versus branded goods
273(2)
4.5 Merchant markets and captive sales
275(2)
4.6 Aftermarkets
277(2)
4.7 Technology and innovation markets
279(3)
4.8 Emerging markets
282(2)
4.9 Two-sided and multi-sided markets (platforms)
284(3)
4.10 Data markets
287(1)
5 Conclusions on product market definition
288(1)
Chapter 3 Relevant geographic market
289(24)
1 Introduction
289(1)
2 Assessing demand-side substitution
290(15)
2.1 Current market structure
290(1)
2.1.1 Current geographic pattern of purchases
291(1)
2.1.2 Trade flows
292(2)
2.1.3 Similarity of market shares
294(1)
2.2 Prices
295(1)
2.2.1 Price differences
296(1)
2.2.2 Price movements
297(3)
2.3 Transport costs
300(1)
2.4 Demand-side barriers to switching
301(1)
2.4.1 Consumer preferences
302(1)
2.4.2 Need for proximity
303(1)
2.4.3 National procurement policies
304(1)
3 Assessing supply-side substitution
305(3)
3.1 Regulatory barriers
306(1)
3.2 Adaptation cost
306(1)
3.3 Trade barriers
307(1)
3.4 Critical loss analysis
307(1)
3.5 Natural experiments
307(1)
4 Specific Issues
308(4)
4.1 European market integration
308(2)
4.2 Chains of substitution
310(2)
5 Conclusions on geographic market definition
312(1)
PART 4 THE SUBSTANTIVE ASSESSMENT OF MERGERS
313(330)
Chapter 1 Introduction
313(50)
Introduction
313(1)
1 The relevant counterfactual and the notion of causation
314(8)
2 Horizontal, vertical and conglomerate mergers
322(3)
2.1 Horizontal effects
322(1)
2.2 Vertical effects
323(1)
2.3 Conglomerate effects
324(1)
2.4 Relative prominence of the different types of effects
324(1)
3 The substantive test
325(29)
3.1 The dominance test in merger control before 2004
329(5)
3.2 The significant impediment to effective competition (`SIEC')test
334(1)
3.2.1 The removal of legal uncertainty as to the scope of the dominance test
334(2)
3.2.2 Implications of the introduction of the significant impediment to effective competition test
336(1)
3.2.2.1 Dominance remains a relevant form of significant impediment to effective competition
337(1)
3.2.2.2 The application of the new substantive test: intervention rate and cases of non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets
338(6)
3.3 Factors relevant to the competitive assessment
344(1)
3.3.1 Overview of the relevant criteria
344(1)
3.3.1.1 Criteria referred to in Article 2(1) of the Merger Regulation
344(3)
3.3.1.2 Consistency with other provisions of EULaw
347(1)
3.3.1.3 Time periods considered in the Commission's assessment
348(2)
3.3.2 Standard of proof
350(4)
4 Substantial part of the internal market
354(9)
4.1 Sub-national markets
355(1)
4.1.1 Economic importance of the area concerned
355(3)
4.1.1.1 General geographical factors
358(1)
4.1.1.2 Aggregation of contiguous local markets
358(1)
4.1.1.3 Aggregation of local markets subject to the same economic strategy determined at a national level
359(1)
4.2 National markets
360(3)
Chapter 2 Anticompetitive effects
363(200)
1 Introduction
363(1)
2 Non-coordinated effects
364(145)
2.1 Introduction
364(1)
2.2 Coordinated versus non-coordinated effects
365(1)
2.3 Horizontal effects
366(1)
2.3.1 Cournot competition (firms set volume, market decides price)
366(1)
2.3.2 Bertrand competition (firms set prices, market decides volumes)
367(1)
2.3.3 Market shares
368(2)
2.3.3.1 Presumptions and indications
370(3)
2.3.3.2 Safe harbour and HHI levels
373(2)
2.3.3.3 Relevance of the gap with competitors
375(2)
2.3.3.4 Evolution of market shares
377(1)
2.3.3.5 Merger with a recent entrant
378(1)
2.3.4 Other relevant factors
379(1)
2.3.4.1 Closeness of substitution
379(4)
2.3.4.2 Assessment of the competitive position of rivals (`repositioning')
383(1)
2.3.4.3 Switching cost and dual/multi sourcing
384(2)
2.3.4.4 Competitors' ability and incentive to increase supply
386(4)
2.3.4.5 Ability of merged entity to hinder expansion by competitors
390(1)
2.3.5 Use of economic modelling and econometric techniques
391(8)
2.3.6 Special cases
399(1)
2.3.6.1 Minority shareholdings in competitors
399(5)
2.3.6.2 Mergers leading to less innovation
404(11)
2.3.6.3 Mergers creating/strengthening market power vis-a-vis suppliers
415(6)
2.3.6.4 Mergers with a significant potential competitor
421(5)
2.3.7 Mergers involving digital markets
426(2)
2.3.8 Merger creating/strengthening a third party's (dominant) position
428(1)
2.4 Vertical effects
429(1)
2.4.1 Introduction
429(3)
2.4.1.1 Forms of vertical effects
432(1)
2.4.1.2 Economic approach towards vertical mergers
433(1)
4.2.1.3 Illustration of the different concerns that can arise in vertical cases
434(4)
2.4.2 Restricted access to supplies (`input foreclosure')
438(1)
2.4.2.1 Ability to restrict competitors' access to inputs
439(8)
2.4.2.2 Incentives to restrict competitors' access to inputs
447(8)
2.4.2.3 Foreseeable effects on competition
455(3)
2.4.3 Restricted access to markets (`customer foreclosure')
458(1)
2.4.3.1 Ability and incentives to restrict competitors' access to customers
459(5)
2.4.3.2 Foreseeable effects on competition
464(1)
2.4.4 Access to information
464(4)
2.5 Conglomerate effects
468(1)
2.5.1 Introduction
468(1)
2.5.1.1 Notion of conglomerate merger
468(2)
2.5.1.2 Forms of conglomerate effects
470(4)
2.5.2 Conglomerate effects resulting from leveraging strategies
474(1)
2.5.2.1 Forms of leveraging
475(8)
2.5.2.2 Analytical framework set out by the EU Courts with respect to conglomerate effects resulting from leveraging
483(1)
2.5.2.3 Ability and incentive to leverage
484(11)
2.5.2.4 Foreseeable effects on competition
495(6)
2.5.3 Conglomerate effects resulting from portfolio (or range) effects
501(1)
2.5.3.1 Notion of `portfolio effect'
501(2)
2.5.3.2 Example of the Commission's decisional practice
503(2)
2.5.3.3 Relevant factors
505(3)
2.5.3.4 Foreseeable effects on competition
508(1)
3 Coordinated effects
509(54)
3.1 Introduction
509(2)
3.2 Coordination amongst oligopolists
511(1)
3.2.1 Introduction
511(1)
3.2.1.1 Notion of collective dominance
512(7)
3.2.1.2 The conditions set out in Airtours
519(2)
3.2.1.3 The Bertelsmann/Sony judgments
521(1)
3.2.2 General pre-requisite: reaching terms of coordination
522(1)
3.2.2.1 Forms of coordination
523(3)
3.2.2.2 Market structure (including number of players)
526(4)
3.2.2.3 Market characteristics
530(8)
3.2.3 Specific conditions
538(1)
3.2.3.1 Transparency (monitoring deviations)
538(2)
3.2.3.2 Sustainability (deterrent mechanisms)
540(3)
3.2.3.3 Stability (absence of external constraints)
543(1)
3.2.4 Illustration of the Commission approach
544(5)
3.2.5 Coordinated effects resulting from vertical and conglomerate mergers
549(2)
3.3 Coordination through joint ventures amongst parent companies (`spill-over effects')
551(1)
3.3.1 Introduction
551(1)
3.3.1.1 Evolution of the Merger Regulation on joint ventures from 1989 to 1997
552(1)
3.3.1.2 Specific additional test applied to full-function joint ventures: `coordinated' effects between parent companies examined under Article 101 TFEU
552(2)
3.3.2 Likelihood of coordination
554(1)
3.3.2.1 Coordination between parent companies
555(1)
3.3.2.2 Coordination on JV's market, upstream/downstream markets or on neighbouring (product or geographic) markets
556(1)
3.3.2.3 Causality between creation of JV and coordination (direct consequence)
557(2)
3.3.3 Appreciable restriction of competition (elimination of competition)
559(1)
3.3.4 Applicability of Article 101 TFEU
560(1)
3.3.4.1 Article 101(1) TFEU
560(1)
3.3.4.2 Article 101(3) TFEU
560(1)
3.3.5 Consequences of the assessment under Article 2(4)
561(2)
Chapter 3 Countervailing factors
563(80)
1 Introduction
563(1)
2 Entry
563(23)
2.1 Likelihood of entry
565(1)
2.1.1 Barriers to entry
566(1)
2.1.1.1 Legal barriers to entry
567(2)
2.1.1.2 Technical barriers to entry
569(2)
2.1.1.3 Other barriers to entry
571(3)
2.1.2 Profitability of entry
574(1)
2.1.2.1 Costs of entry
575(2)
2.1.2.2 Market features (growingv. declining markets)
577(1)
2.1.2.3 History of entry
578(1)
2.2 Timeliness of entry
579(5)
2.3 Sufficiency of entry
584(2)
3 Buyer Power
586(19)
3.1 Notion of buyer power
586(3)
3.2 Forms of buyer power
589(1)
3.2.1 Credibility of recourse to alternative sources
589(4)
3.2.2 Sponsoring expansion or entry
593(2)
3.2.3 Vertical integration
595(3)
3.2.4 Refusal to buy other products
598(2)
3.2.5 Delay purchases
600(1)
3.3 Incentives to exercise buyer power, exclusivity and universality
601(1)
3.4 Measuring buyer power
602(3)
4 Efficiencies
605(22)
4.1 Introduction
605(1)
4.1.1 Legal basis
605(1)
4.2 Early Commission practice
606(1)
4.2.1 Initial examples
606(2)
4.2.2 Was there ever an efficiency offence?
608(3)
4.3 Efficiencies under the 2004 Merger Regulation
611(1)
4.4 Examples of positive treatment of efficiencies
612(3)
4.5 Approach to efficiencies in the Merger Guidelines
615(1)
4.6 Principles for taking efficiencies into account
616(1)
4.6.1 Benefit to consumers
617(1)
4.6.2 Pass on to customers
618(3)
4.6.3 Merger specificity
621(2)
4.6.4 Verifiability
623(2)
4.7 Efficiencies: overall competitive appraisal v. quantification of restrictive effects
625(2)
5 Failing firm defence
627(16)
5.1 General pre-condition: lack of causation
627(5)
5.2 The failing division
632(3)
5.3 Specific criteria considered in practice
635(1)
5.3.1 Failing firm forced out of the market
635(2)
5.3.2 No less anticompetitive merger
637(1)
5.3.3 Exit of assets
638(2)
5.4 Related questions of causation
640(3)
PART 5 ANCILLARY RESTRAINTS
643(26)
Chapter 1 Ancillary Restraints
643(26)
1 Introduction
643(1)
2 The notion of ancillary restraints
644(6)
2.1 Restriction of competition
644(1)
2.2 Not an integral part of the concentration
645(1)
2.3 Directly related to the concentration and necessary for its implementation
646(1)
2.3.1 Directly related to the concentration
646(1)
2.3.2 Necessary for implementing the concentration
647(3)
3 The legal status of ancillary restraints
650(2)
4 The examination of the ancillary nature of restraints in merger decisions
652(7)
4.1 The Commission's initial practice and the change brought by the 2001 Notice
652(2)
4.2 The Lagardere judgment
654(1)
4.3 The new Merger and Implementing Regulations, the 2005 Notice and beyond
655(4)
5 The most common ancillary restraints
659(10)
5.1 Non-competition clauses
661(1)
5.1.1 Acquisition of an undertaking (or parts thereof)
661(2)
5.1.2 Creation of a joint venture
663(1)
5.2 Non-solicitation and confidentiality clauses
664(1)
5.3 Licensing agreements
665(1)
5.3.1 Acquisition of an undertaking (or parts thereof)
665(1)
5.3.2 Creation of a joint venture
666(1)
5.4 Purchase/supply obligations and distribution agreements
667(1)
5.4.1 Acquisition of an undertaking (or parts thereof)
667(1)
5.4.2 Creation of a joint venture
668(1)
PART 6 PROCEDURE
669(94)
Chapter 1 Introduction
669(16)
1 General overview
669(6)
1.1 Preventive control system
670(1)
1.2 Administrative procedure
670(2)
1.3 Two-phase procedure
672(2)
1.4 Obligation to issue a formal decision within a legally binding deadline
674(1)
2 Actors
675(2)
2.1 The Commission
675(1)
2.2 The Parties
675(1)
2.2.1 Notifying parties
675(1)
2.2.2 Other involved parties
676(1)
2.2.3 Third parties
676(1)
2.3 The Member States
677(1)
3 Deadlines
677(8)
3.1 Phase I
678(1)
3.2 Phase II
679(1)
3.3 Suspension
680(2)
3.4 Start of deadlines after the decision has been annulled by the Court
682(1)
3.5 Instances where no deadline is running
683(2)
Chapter 2 Notification
685(18)
1 Introduction
685(1)
2 Pre-notification contacts
686(3)
3 Timing of notification
689(1)
4 Formalities of notification
690(3)
5 Completeness of the notification
693(2)
6 The suspension obligation
695(8)
6.1 The rule
695(3)
6.2 The exception
698(1)
6.3 The possibility of derogation
699(4)
Chapter 3 Fact finding and investigation
703(10)
1 Overview
703(1)
2 Powers of investigation
704(6)
2.1 Requests for information
704(2)
2.2 Interview
706(1)
2.3 Inspections
707(3)
3 Other means of fact-finding
710(1)
3.1 Meetings with parties and third parties
710(1)
3.2 Studies
710(1)
4 Liaison with Member States' authorities
711(2)
Chapter 4 Phase I proceedings
713(14)
1 The Phase I procedure
713(9)
1.1 Overview
713(2)
1.2 The serious doubts test
715(3)
1.3 Simplified procedure
718(4)
2 Types of Phase I decisions
722(5)
2.1 Article 6(1)(a) decision: inapplicability of the Merger Regulation
722(2)
2.2 Article 6(1)(b) decision: non-opposition
724(1)
2.3 Article 6(1)(c) decision: opening of proceedings
725(2)
Chapter 5 Phase II proceedings
727(22)
1 Overview
727(1)
2 In-depth investigation
728(2)
3 Rights of defence and to be heard
730(12)
3.1 The statement of objections
732(3)
3.2 Access to the file
735(3)
3.3 The formal oral hearing
738(3)
3.4 Hearing of third parties
741(1)
4 Post-hearing procedure
742(1)
5 Consultation of the Advisory Committee
742(2)
6 The decision of the College of Commissioners
744(1)
7 Types of final Phase II decisions
745(4)
7.1 Article 8(1) decision: unconditional clearance
745(1)
7.2 Article 8(2) decision: clearance after modification
745(2)
7.3 Article 8(3) decision: prohibition
747(2)
Chapter 6 Special procedures
749(10)
1 Overview
749(1)
2 Dissolution orders and other measures restoring the ex ante situation
750(3)
3 Interim measures
753(2)
4 Revocation of a clearance decision
755(1)
5 sanctions
756(3)
5.1 Fines
756(1)
5.2 Periodic penalty payments
757(2)
Chapter 7 Notification and publication of decisions
759(4)
1 Notification
759(1)
2 Publication
760(3)
PART 7 REMEDIES
763(102)
Chapter 1 Introduction
763(12)
1 The importance of remedies in EU merger control
763(4)
1.1 Merger control's most frequently used tool to protect competition
763(2)
1.2 Remedies consume significant resources and have important economic consequences
765(2)
2 Recent debate and controversy surrounding remedies
767(8)
2.1 Are merger remedies effective?
767(4)
2.2 The structural vs. behavioural debate
771(1)
2.3 The call for ex post assessments of remedies
771(4)
Chapter 2 Legal framework and criteria for assessing remedies
775(10)
1 Terminology: `remedies', `commitments', `conditions and obligations'
775(1)
2 Legal framework
776(2)
2.1 Remedies in Phase II
776(1)
2.2 Remedies in Phase I and the requirement of'clear-cut' remedies
777(1)
3 Basic criteria for assessing remedies
778(5)
3.1 The remedy must entirely eliminate the competition problem
778(1)
3.2 The remedy must be proportionate
779(3)
3.3 The remedy must be capable of being implemented in a short period of time
782(1)
4 The burden to submit remedies is on the parties but the burden of proof is on the Commission
783(2)
Chapter 3 Designing the remedy
785(6)
1 Key documents
785(1)
2 Practical aspects of remedies discussions between the Commission and parties
785(1)
3 Market test of proposed remedies
786(3)
4 Modifying proposed remedies and the issue of `late remedies'
789(2)
Chapter 4 Types of remedies
791(38)
1 Labels and their relevance
791(4)
1.1 Structural and behavioural remedies
791(1)
1.2 Structural remedies: only divestitures?
792(3)
1.3 All divestiture remedies include ancillary behavioural remedies
795(1)
2 Divestiture remedies
795(24)
2.1 The Commission's preference for divestitures
795(4)
2.2 The structural vs. behavioural debate
799(3)
2.3 Divestitures are preferred but not risk-free either
802(1)
2.4 Scope of the divested business
803(1)
2.4.1 Divestiture of a viable business
803(2)
2.4.2 Divestiture of a stand-alone business
805(2)
2.4.3 Carve-outs and divestitures of assets
807(1)
2.5 Third party rights in relation to the divestiture
808(1)
2.6 Finding a suitable purchaser of the divestiture
809(1)
2.6.1 Purchaser criteria
809(1)
2.7 Standard arrangement, upfront buyer clause, fix-it-first remedy
810(1)
2.7.1 Standard arrangement
811(2)
2.7.2 Upfront buyer clause
813(1)
2.7.3 Fix-it-first remedy
814(1)
2.7.4 Which arrangement in which case?
814(1)
2.7.4.1 Regular vs. upfront/fix-it-first
815(1)
2.7.4.2 Upfront buyer clause vs. fix-it-first
816(2)
2.7.4.3 Prevalence of each type of remedy
818(1)
2.7.4.4 Different terminology in the United States
819(1)
3 Removal of links with competitors
819(2)
4 Access remedies
821(6)
4.1 Digital sector: interoperability remedies
822(2)
4.2 Telecoms sector
824(1)
4.3 Media sector
825(1)
4.4 Airline mergers: slot remedies
826(1)
5 Other behavioural remedies
827(2)
Chapter 5 Implementing the remedy
829(18)
1 Interpreting the remedy
829(1)
2 Appointment of a monitoring trustee
830(3)
3 Approval of a suitable purchaser
833(9)
3.1 The parties' search for and negotiations with a purchaser
833(1)
3.2 Submission of the purchaser proposal
834(1)
3.3 Assessment of the purchaser proposal
835(1)
3.3.1 Does the purchaser meet the purchaser requirements?
835(1)
3.3.1.1 The purchaser must be independent from and unconnected to the parties
835(1)
3.3.1.2 The purchaser's financial resources
836(1)
3.3.1.3 The purchaser's expertise, ability and incentive
837(1)
3.3.1.4 The acquisition by the purchaser should not create prima facie competition concerns nor give rise to a risk that the implementation of the commitments will be delayed
838(1)
3.3.1.4.1 Prima facie competition concerns
838(2)
3.3.1.4.2 Other regulatory concerns
840(1)
3.3.2 The divestiture agreement: is the divestiture being sold in a manner consistent with the commitments?
841(1)
3.4 The Commission's decision on the suitability of the purchaser
841(1)
4 Duration of remedies
842(2)
4.1 Divestiture remedies
842(1)
4.2 Access and behavioural commitments
843(1)
5 Modifying the remedies
844(3)
Chapter 6 Enforcing the remedy
847(18)
1 Commissions powers to investigate compliance
847(1)
2 Complaints from third parties
847(2)
3 Breach of the remedies
849(3)
3.1 Distinction between `conditions' and `obligations'
849(1)
3.2 Breach of an obligation
850(1)
3.3 Breach of a condition
851(1)
3.4 Examples
852(1)
4 Arbitration and expert determination as a parallel enforcement mechanism
852(11)
4.1 Arbitration
852(4)
4.2 Expert determination
856(2)
4.3 Safeguards to protect third parties relying on arbitration
858(2)
4.4 Other features of merger arbitration
860(1)
4.5 Actual arbitration cases
861(2)
5 Enforcing the remedy in national courts
863(2)
BOOK TWO
PART 8 Merger Control In Specific Sectors
865(510)
Chapter 1 Financial services
865(74)
1 Introduction
865(1)
2 Jurisdictional issues
865(9)
2.1 Trading activities by financial services providers
866(1)
2.2 Calculation of turnover
866(1)
2.3 Prudential rules and other legitimate national interests
866(4)
2.4 Nationalisation of banks
870(2)
2.5 Resolution of banks
872(2)
3 Market definition
874(42)
3.1 Banking
874(1)
3.1.1 Retail banking services
875(2)
3.1.2 Corporate banking services
877(1)
3.1.3 Investment banking
878(1)
3.1.4 Financial market services
879(1)
3.1.5 Asset management
880(2)
3.1.6 Private equity investment
882(1)
3.1.7 Leasing
883(1)
3.1.8 Factoring
883(1)
3.1.9 Fund administration
884(1)
3.1.10 Credit management services and debt purchasing
885(1)
3.2 Payment services
886(1)
3.2.1 Card payments
887(1)
a Card issuing
887(2)
b Merchant acquiring
889(2)
c Card processing
891(1)
d Other card-related markets
891(3)
3.2.2 Account-to-account payments
894(1)
3.2.3 Mobile payments
895(2)
3.3 Insurance
897(1)
3.3.1 Life insurance
898(1)
3.3.2 Non-life insurance
899(2)
3.3.3 Reinsurance
901(1)
3.3.4 Insurance distribution
901(1)
3.3.5 Insurance brokerage
902(2)
3.3.6 Insurance underwriting
904(1)
3.3.7 Additional insurance-related markets
904(1)
a Third party administration claims management
904(1)
b Loss adjusting services
905(1)
c Actuarial software for life insurance
906(1)
d Assistance services associated with insurance products
906(1)
3.4 Financial Markets Infrastructure -- stock exchange
907(1)
3.4.1 Financial derivatives
908(1)
3.4.2 Repos
909(1)
3.4.3 Clearing services
909(1)
3.4.4 Post-trade services (settlement, custody and collateral management)
910(2)
3.5 Financial information
912(1)
3.5.1 Proprietary market data
912(1)
3.5.2 Non-proprietary market data
913(1)
3.5.3 Indices
913(1)
3.5.4 Datafeeds
914(1)
3.5.5 Desktop solutions
914(1)
3.6 FinTech
915(1)
4 Assessment
916(14)
4.1 Banking
916(3)
4.2 Payment services
919(5)
4.3 Insurance
924(2)
4.4 Financial markets infrastructure -- stock exchange
926(2)
4.5 Financial information
928(1)
4.6 FinTech
929(1)
5 Remedies
930(9)
5.1 Banking
931(1)
5.2 Payment
932(2)
5.3 Insurance
934(2)
5.4 Financial markets infrastructure -- stock exchange
936(1)
5.5 Financial information
936(1)
5.6 FinTech
937(2)
Chapter 2 Telecommunications, media and internet services
939(222)
1 Introduction
939(16)
1.1 Telecommunications
939(8)
1.2 Media
947(4)
1.3 Internet services and platforms
951(3)
1.4 Statistics
954(1)
2 Market definition
955(92)
2.1 Telecommunications services
955(1)
2.1.1 The Commission Recommendation
956(4)
2.1.2 Telephony services
960(1)
2.1.2.1 Limited degree of substitution between fixed telephony and other types of transmission services
960(2)
2.1.2.2 Fixed telephony services
962(12)
2.1.2.3 Mobile markets
974(8)
2.1.3 Other services markets
982(5)
2.1.4 Internet connectivity markets
987(1)
2.1.4.1 Access markets
987(9)
2.1.4.2 Bundles of services
996(1)
2.1.4.3 Internet-based service markets
997(13)
2.2 Distribution of content
1010(1)
2.2.1 Online content
1011(6)
2.2.2 TV
1017(1)
2.2.2.1 Retail TV
1017(6)
2.2.2.2 Sale of TV advertising space
1023(1)
2.2.2.3 Wholesale supply of TV channels
1024(2)
2.2.3 Cinema, sporting rights and other content
1026(1)
2.2.3.1 Films
1027(3)
2.2.3.2 Other home entertainment content
1030(4)
2.2.4 Music, books, newspapers and magazines
1034(1)
2.2.4.1 Music
1034(5)
2.2.4.2 Books
1039(6)
2.2.4.3 Newspapers and magazines
1045(2)
3 Assessment
1047(100)
3.1 Introduction
1047(1)
3.2 Telecommunications
1047(1)
3.2.1 Unilateral effects
1048(1)
3.2.1.1 Mergers with incumbents: fixed telephony
1048(3)
3.2.1.2 Leading positions
1051(1)
3.2.1.3 Early unilateral effects analysis
1052(1)
3.2.1.4 4-to-3 or 3-to-2: mobile network operators mergers
1053(18)
3.2.1.5 MNOs and MVNOs
1071(1)
3.2.1.6 Convergence mergers
1072(3)
3.2.2 Coordinated effects
1075(7)
3.2.3 Article 2(4)
1082(1)
3.2.4 Vertical effects
1083(7)
3.2.5 Efficiencies
1090(2)
3.2.6 Remedies
1092(5)
3.3 Medias
1097(1)
3.3.1 The pay-TV cases
1097(20)
3.3.2 Book publishing: the Lagardere/Natexis/VUP case
1117(3)
3.3.3 The music cases
1120(11)
3.4 Internet-based services and platforms
1131(16)
4 Conclusion
1147(14)
Annex
Telecoms and Media Merger Decisions
1149(1)
Conditional and Prohibition Merger Decisions
1149(12)
Chapter 3 Electricity and gas
1161(132)
1 Introduction
1161(10)
2 The relevant market
1171(46)
2.1 Introduction
1171(1)
2.2 Electricity
1172(1)
2.2.1 Electricity: relevant product market
1172(13)
2.2.2 Electricity: relevant geographic market
1185(17)
2.3 Gas
1202(1)
2.3.1 Relevant product market
1202(11)
2.3.2 Relevant geographic market
1213(4)
3 Substantive assessment
1217(28)
3.1 Market shares and likely existence of market power on national markets
1218(2)
3.1.1 Competitive situation in the electricity markets
1220(11)
3.1.2 Competitive situation in the gas markets
1231(6)
3.2 The size and importance of competitors
1237(2)
3.3 `Maverick' competitors
1239(1)
3.4 Closeness of competition
1239(2)
3.5 Commercial advantages
1241(1)
3.6 Horizontal / vertical integration
1242(2)
3.7 Economies of scale, balancing
1244(1)
3.8 Advantageous generation portfolio
1244(1)
4 Categories of mergers and acquisitions common to the energy sector
1245(38)
4.1 Horizontal mergers
1246(1)
4.1.1 Acquisition of a competitor on the same relevant product and geographic market
1247(9)
4.1.2 Acquisition of a company active on the same relevant product market but in a neighbouring relevant geographic market
1256(7)
4.2 Vertical mergers
1263(11)
4.3 Conglomerate mergers
1274(3)
4.4 Coordinated effects
1277(6)
5 Remedies in energy cases
1283(10)
5.1 Introduction
1283(2)
5.2 Types of remedies accepted by the Commission
1285(1)
5.2.1 Divestitures
1285(3)
5.2.2 Increasing the level of competition on the affected markets
1288(1)
5.2.3 Access remedies
1289(2)
5.3 ENI/EDP/GDP (2004)
1291(2)
Chapter 4 Transport
1293(82)
1 Introduction
1293(2)
2 Merger control in the air transport sector
1295(42)
2.1 The regulatory environment
1296(2)
2.2 Market definition
1298(1)
2.2.1 Demand substitution
1299(1)
2.2.1.1 The point of origin/point of destination approach
1299(1)
2.2.1.2 Time sensitive and price sensitive passengers
1300(2)
2.2.1.3 Direct versus indirect flights
1302(1)
2.2.1.4 Airport substitution from a passengers' perspective
1303(2)
2.2.1.5 Inter-modal competition
1305(3)
2.2.2 Supply substitution
1308(1)
2.2.2.1 Network competition
1308(1)
2.2.2.2 Airport substitution from a suppliers' perspective
1309(1)
2.2.3 Cargo
1310(1)
2.3 Competitive assessment
1311(2)
2.3.1 Unilateral effects
1313(3)
2.3.2 Counterfactual
1316(4)
2.3.3 Quantitative analysis
1320(3)
2.3.4 Efficiencies
1323(3)
2.3.5 Cargo
1326(1)
2.4 Market entry barriers
1326(1)
2.4.1 Regulatory constraints
1326(1)
2.4.2 Access constraints
1327(2)
2.4.3 Economies of scale and scope at `base' and `hub' airports
1329(1)
2.4.4 Feeder traffic
1330(1)
2.4.5 Other entry barriers
1331(2)
2.5 Remedies
1333(4)
3 Merger control in railway transport sector
1337(20)
3.1 The regulatory environment
1338(2)
3.2 Market definition
1340(1)
3.2.1 Upstream markets
1340(2)
3.2.2 Downstream markets
1342(1)
3.2.2.1 Freight transport
1342(4)
3.2.2.2 Passenger transport
1346(1)
3.3 Competitive assessment
1347(1)
3.3.1 Upstream markets
1347(1)
3.3.2 Downstream markets
1348(1)
3.3.2.1 Freight transport
1349(5)
3.3.2.2 Passenger transport
1354(3)
4 Merger control in the maritime sector
1357(18)
4.1 The regulatory environment
1357(4)
4.2 Market definition
1361(1)
4.2.1 Deep-sea liner shipping
1361(3)
4.2.2 Deep-sea non-liner shipping
1364(1)
4.2.3 Short-sea shipping
1365(2)
4.2.4 Container terminal services
1367(1)
4.3 Competitive assessment
1368(1)
4.3.1 Horizontal consolidation
1368(1)
4.3.1.1 Deep-sea liner shipping
1368(3)
4.3.1.2 Deep-sea non-liner shipping
1371(1)
4.3.1.3 Short-sea shipping
1371(1)
4.3.2 Vertical integration
1372(3)
PART 9 JUDICIAL REVIEW
1375(100)
Chapter 1 Introduction
1375(4)
Chapter 2 Action for annulment
1379(80)
1 Introduction
1379(1)
2 Admissibility
1380(40)
2.1 Challengeable act and locus standi
1380(1)
2.1.1 Key principles
1380(2)
2.1.2 Final decisions on the substance of the case
1382(1)
2.1.2.1 Challengeable act
1383(7)
2.1.2.2 Locus standi
1390(14)
2.1.3 Referral decisions
1404(1)
2.1.3.1 Decisions on the referral of a case to a Member State
1404(3)
2.1.3.2 Decisions on the referral of a case to the Commission
1407(1)
2.1.4 Decisions imposing a fine or a periodic penalty payment
1408(1)
2.1.5 Decisions adopted in the course of the procedure
1408(4)
2.1.6 Decisions concerning commitments
1412(3)
2.1.7 Decisions on the compatibility of national measures with Article 21 of the Merger Regulation
1415(1)
2.2 Time-limits
1416(1)
2.2.1 Key principles
1416(1)
2.2.2 Commission merger decisions
1417(3)
3 Grounds for annulment and standard of review
1420(13)
3.1 Lack of competence
1421(1)
3.2 Infringement of an essential procedural requirement
1422(2)
3.3 Infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application
1424(6)
3.4 Misuse of powers
1430(1)
3.5 Objection of illegality
1431(2)
4 Intervention
1433(10)
4.1 Conditions for the grant of leave to intervene
1433(1)
4.1.1 Aim of the intervention
1433(1)
4.1.2 Parties allowed to intervene
1433(7)
4.1.3 Time-limits and other procedural requirements
1440(1)
4.2 Procedural steps following the application for leave to intervene
1441(2)
5 The procedure before the General Court
1443(6)
5.1 Normal procedure
1443(3)
5.2 Expedited procedure
1446(3)
6 The annulment of a merger decision and the consequences thereof
1449(3)
6.1 Illegalities justifying the annulment of a merger decision
1449(1)
6.2 Partial annulment
1450(1)
6.3 Consequences of the annulment of a merger decision
1451(1)
7 Interim measures
1452(7)
7.1 Key principles
1452(2)
7.2 Assessment by the President of the General Court
1454(5)
Chapter 3 Other forms of judicial review
1459(16)
1 Introduction
1459(1)
2 Actions for failure to act
1459(2)
3 Actions for damages
1461(7)
3.1 Infringement of a rule of EU law intended to confer rights on individuals
1462(1)
3.2 Sufficiently serious breach
1463(2)
3.3 Causal link
1465(3)
4 Appeals against decisions of the General Court
1468(2)
5 Preliminary rulings
1470(2)
6 Infringement proceedings
1472(3)
PART 10 THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
1475(50)
Chapter 1 Introduction
1475(4)
Chapter 2 The merger regulation and international law
1479(6)
1 Introduction
1479(2)
2 The territorial reach of the Merger Regulation
1481(2)
3 The principle of non-discrimination
1483(2)
Chapter 3 The EEA Agreement
1485(6)
1 Introduction
1485(2)
2 The legal framework for merger control
1487(1)
3 Cooperation under the EEA Agreement
1488(3)
Chapter 4 International cooperation in merger cases
1491(24)
1 Introduction
1491(1)
2 EU/US cooperation
1492(13)
2.1 The 1991 Cooperation Agreement
1494(4)
2.2 Policy dialogue
1498(2)
2.3 Best Practices on Cooperation in Merger cases
1500(4)
2.4 Administrative Arrangements on Attendance (`AAA')
1504(1)
3 Bilateral cooperation with other jurisdictions
1505(6)
3.1 Dedicated cooperation agreements
1506(1)
3.2 Memoranda of Understanding (`MoUs')
1507(3)
3.3 Cooperation provisions in bilateral trade agreements
1510(1)
4 Ad-hoc cooperation with other countries
1511(1)
5 Recent examples of multilateral international cooperation
1511(2)
6 EU/UK cooperation following Brexit
1513(2)
Chapter 5 Cooperation on merger policy and best practices
1515(10)
1 Introduction
1515(1)
2 The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (`OECD')
1516(4)
3 The International Competition Network (`ICN')
1520(3)
4 The World Trade Organization (`WTO')
1523(2)
Index 1525
Edited by Christopher Jones, Principal, Energy Regulatory and Antitrust, Baker McKenzie, Brussels, Part-time Professor, Energy Law and Policy, European University Institute, Italy and Lisa Weinert, Associate, European and Competition Law Practice, Baker McKenzie, Brussels, Belgium
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/97818022034622e.html
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