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E-grāmata: Fiction and the Languages of Law: Understanding Contemporary Legal Discourse [Taylor & Francis e-book]

  • Formāts: 240 pages, 1 Line drawings, black and white
  • Sērija : Law, Language and Communication
  • Izdošanas datums: 30-Jun-2020
  • Izdevniecība: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781351163842
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Fiction and the Languages of Law: Understanding Contemporary Legal DiscoursePalielināt
  • Formāts: 240 pages, 1 Line drawings, black and white
  • Sērija : Law, Language and Communication
  • Izdošanas datums: 30-Jun-2020
  • Izdevniecība: Routledge
  • ISBN-13: 9781351163842
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Taylor & Francis e-booksMore info about Taylor & Francis e-books
Rokasgrāmatas mājas lapa: https://www.taylorfrancis.com/books/9781351163842

Contemporary legal reasoning has more in common with fictional discourse than we tend to realize. Through an examination of the U.S. Supreme Court’s written output during a recent landmark term, this book exposes many of the parallels between these two special kinds of language use. Focusing on linguistic and rhetorical patterns in the dozens of reasoned opinions issued by the Court between October 2014 and June 2015, the book takes nonlawyer readers on a lively tour of contemporary American legal reasoning and acquaints legal readers with some surprising features of their own thinking and writing habits. It analyzes cases addressing a huge variety of issues, ranging from the rights of drivers stopped by the police to the decision-making processes of the Environmental Protection Agency—as well as the term’s best-known case, which recognized a constitutional right to marriage for same-sex as well as different-sex couples. Fiction and the Languages of Law reframes a number of long-running legal debates, identifies other related paradoxes within legal discourse, and traces them all to common sources: judges’ and lawyers’ habit of alternating unselfconsciously between two different attitudes toward the language they use, and a set of professional biases that tends to prevent scrutiny of that habit.

Acknowledgments viii
1 Three ways of reading a term
1(26)
7.7 The big day
1(3)
1.2 The old school
4(6)
1.2.1 The professors: the wordsmith's fallacy
4(4)
1.2.2 The students: opinions as instruments
8(2)
1.3 The new old school: terms as units
10(3)
1.3.1 The statistics, authorship, and content
10(2)
1.3.2 SCOTUSblog and professional accounts of the term
12(1)
1.4 A fresh look at opinion content
13(10)
1.4.1 Why content matters
14(3)
1.4.2 What kind of content? Language, ontology, mind
17(2)
1.4.2.1 Law and literature
19(1)
1.4.2.2 Philosophy of legal language
20(1)
1.4.2.3 Legal cognition
21(2)
7.5 Plan of the book
23(4)
2 Fear of fiction
27(31)
2.7 Before post-truth
27(1)
2.2 The many faces of "fiction"
28(11)
2.2.1 Traditional legal fictions
28(2)
2.2.2 "Fiction" as epithet
30(2)
2.2.3 Taking fiction seriously
32(1)
2.2.3.1 Accounting for fiction through the twentieth century
32(2)
2.2.3.2 Contemporary views
34(2)
2.2.4 Some pitfalls of a simplified view
36(3)
2.3 The many functions offact
39(5)
2.3.1 Fact as foundation, field, and force
39(1)
2.3.2 Adjudicative, legislative, and metalinguistic fact
40(1)
2.3.3 The grounding of fact
41(2)
2.3.4 Discounting facts
43(1)
2.4 Tact and its foils
44(9)
2.4.1 Fact versus opinion (and law versus morals)
45(3)
2.4.2 Fact versus law
48(3)
2.4.3 The facts of law
51(2)
2.5 Double talk
53(5)
3 Real people, fictional characters, legal phantoms
58(33)
3.1 Writing minds into being
58(1)
3.2 Real people and true believers
59(10)
3.2.1 The legal logic of the intentional stance
60(2)
3.2.2 Judicial mindreading
62(1)
3.2.2.1 Criminal mens rea
63(3)
3.2.2.2 Discriminatory intent
66(3)
3.3 There's more to say about mental states
69(8)
3.3.1 Reading fictional minds
69(2)
3.3.2 Preserves of subjectivity
71(3)
3.3.3 Dangerous tools
74(3)
3.4 Legal phantoms
77(10)
3.4.1 The range of the reasonable
78(3)
3.4.2 Reducing reasonableness
81(3)
3.4.3 How to make a perspective objective
84(3)
3.5 Thought control
87(4)
4 Big personalities
91(30)
4.1 Plural minds
91(1)
4.2 Judicial character
92(11)
4.2.1 The "Supreme Wand"
93(1)
4.2.1.1 Panels as people
93(1)
4.2.1.2 Judicial role play
94(3)
4.2.2 The "impetuous vortex"
97(1)
4.2.2.1 What Congress wants
97(4)
4.2.2.2 What is a legislature?
101(2)
4.3 Groups outside the government
103(8)
4.3.1 Corporate thoughts
104(3)
4.3.2 Dimensions of group agency
107(4)
4.4 Personalities in the public sector
111(6)
4.4.1 Populating the public sector
111(3)
4.4.2 Boundary entities
114(3)
4.5 Taking role play seriously
117(4)
5 Virtual realities
121(30)
5.1 The law world
121(1)
5.2 The importance of the nonactual
122(3)
5.2.1 How to talk about the nonactual
122(1)
5.2.2 Why talk about the nonactual?
123(2)
5.3 Virtual realities in the law
125(15)
5.3.1 The dangers of speculation and the "categorical approach"
125(4)
5.3.2 When speculation is required
129(1)
5.3.2.1 Means-end review
130(1)
5.3.2.2 Reversible-error review
131(2)
5.3.3 Hypotheticals as how-tos
133(2)
5.3.3.1 Language, usage, meaning
135(2)
5.3.3.2 How to apply rules
137(2)
5.3.3.3 What will be
139(1)
5.4 Possible legal worlds
140(6)
5.4.1 Contemporary jurispathy
141(2)
5.4.2 Keeping options open
143(3)
5.5 Openness in a closed world
146(5)
6 Reading the layers of law
151(1)
6.1 Scripts that use texts as props
151(1)
6.2 Building blocks
152(7)
6.2.1 Action for reasons: instruction-props
153(2)
6.2.2 The eternal present: anchor-props
155(1)
6.2.2.1 Eternal precedent
155(2)
6.2.2.2 The weight of time and access to origins
157(2)
6.3 Embedding and stories of departure and return
159(6)
6.3.1 The "disastrous misadventure" of twentieth-century legal development
160(1)
6.3.2 Stories of mistaken departure in Obergefell
161(2)
6.3.3 Lawyering in layers
163(2)
6.4 Apotheosis of the wordsmith
165(6)
6.4.1 The "inner grammarian"
166(2)
6.4.2 Breaking it down
168(3)
6.5 Off the page
171(6)
Appendix: Supreme Court 2014 Term opinions listed alphabetically 177(32)
Bibliography 209(12)
Index 221
Dr Karen Petroski, St Louis University School of Law, USA, has been teaching law since 2008 and is trained in both literary analysis and law. She has published several articles and book chapters on legal fictions and the relationship between fictional and legal discourse, including chapters in Legal Fictions in Theory and Practice (ed. Maksymilian Del Mar & William Twining, Springer, 2015) and The Nature of Legal Interpretation: What Jurists Can Learn About Legal Interpretation from Linguistics and Philosophy (ed. Brian Slocum, Univ. of Chicago Press, 2017).
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