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E-grāmata: Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis

(Professor of Economics, University of Leicester)
  • Formāts: 1400 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 27-Oct-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191024863
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  • Formāts: 1400 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 27-Oct-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191024863
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This is the first definitive introduction to behavioral economics aimed at advanced undergraduate and postgraduate students. Authoritative, cutting edge, yet accessible, it guides the reader through theory and evidence, providing engaging and relevant applications throughout. It is divided into nine parts and 24 chapters:

Part I is on behavioral economics of risk, uncertainty, and ambiguity. The evidence against expected utility theory is examined, and the behavioral response is outlined; the best empirically supported theory is prospect theory.

Part II considers other-regarding preferences. The evidence from experimental games on human sociality is given, followed by models and applications of inequity aversion, intentions based reciprocity, conditional cooperation, human virtues, and social identity.

Part III is on time discounting. It considers the evidence against the exponential discounted utility model and describes several behavioral models such as hyperbolic discounting, attribute based models and the reference time theory.

Part IV describes the evidence on classical game theory and considers several models of behavioral game theory, including level-k and cognitive hierarchy models, quantal response equilibrium, and psychological game theory.

Part V considers behavioral models of learning that include evolutionary game theory, classical models of learning, experience weighted attraction model, learning direction theory, and stochastic social dynamics.

Part VI studies the role of emotions; among other topics it considers projection bias, temptation preferences, happiness economics, and interaction between emotions and cognition.

Part VII considers bounded rationality. The three main topics considered are judgment heuristics and biases, mental accounting, and behavioral finance.

Part VIII considers behavioral welfare economics; the main topics are soft paternalism, and choice-based measures of welfare. Finally, Part IX gives an abbreviated taster course in neuroeconomics.

Recenzijas

It is many years since the subject of African economic development has been treated with the best insights and methods that modern social science has to offer. Cramer, Sender, and Oqubay have set a new standard in this respect. * David Booth, African Affairs * The publication of this book is a landmark occasion for the field of behavioural economics. Until now there has been no comprehensive survey of the field suitable for graduate students. Professor Dhami has thoroughly and rigorously filled that gap. The book will be placed in a handy place in my office since I plan to consult it regularly. * Richard H. Thaler, University of Chicago * The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis offers a fascinating mix of theory and evidence and is the most comprehensive synthesis of behavioral economics at an advanced level. It will be very useful for advanced researchers as well as for graduate students in behavioral economics and beyond. * Ernst Fehr, University of Zurich * This book is a tour de force, a literal encyclopedia of behavioral economics. Its extraordinary breadth and depth, spanning all aspects from psychological foundations to the most recent advances and seamlessly integrating theory with experiments, will make it the must-have reference for anyone interested in this field, and more generally in where economics is headed. It will quickly become the standard textbook for all graduate courses in behavioral economics, and a much-thumbed companion for all researchers working at the frontier. * Roland Benabou, Princeton University * For someone like myself, who started by being ignorant of the richness of the conversation within behavioral economics on a variety of issues, this magisterial volume is the ideal introduction, at once lucid and sophisticated. * Abhijit Banerjee, Massachusetts Institute of Technology * In Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis, Sanjit Dhami offers the first summary and exposition of research in this rapidly growing and increasingly influential subfield. The coverage is comprehensive, extending even to the recent subtopics of behavioural welfare economics and neuroeconomics. The book is distinguished by its detailed yet readable coverage of theory and evidence and its balanced discussion of the philosophical and methodological differences and similarities between behavioural and neoclassical approaches to microeconomics. Select undergraduates, graduate students, and interested scholars will all gain from this masterful book. * Vincent P. Crawford, University of Oxford and University of California, San Diego * Economic theory in the twentieth century developed an extremely powerful repertoire of analytical techniques for studying human behavior.Sanjit Dhami has performed a monumental task in consolidating this research and explaining the results in a rigorous yet accessible manner, while highlighting major controversies and sketching the central research questions facing us today. * Herbert Gintis, Santa Fe Institute * In the development of any field there comes a moment where the results already established must be synthesized, explained and consolidated both for those in the field and those outside. In this amazing volume Sanjit Dhami has done just that and far more. This book will serve as an encyclopedic must-have reference for anyone seeking to do work in this field or just curious about it. The coverage is exhaustive and the exposition extremely clear and at a level suitable for advanced undergraduates, graduate students and professionals. This is truly an achievement. * Andrew Schotter, New York University and Center for Experimental Social Science * Displaying wit and wisdom, in Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis Professor Dhami conveys both the substance and the excitement of the burgeoning field of behavioral economics. This remarkable volume will serve as a reference for practitioners and a compelling entry-point for the curious. * George Loewenstein, Carnegie Mellon University * This is a unique and truly remarkable achievement. It is a magnificent overview of behavioral economics, by far the best there is, and it should define the field for at least a generation. But it is much more than that. It is also a brilliant set of original discussions, with pathbreaking thinking on every important topic. An invaluable resource for policymakers, students, and professors - and if they want to try something really special, for everyone else. * Cass Sunstein, coauthor of Nudge and Founder and Director of the Program on Behavioral Economics and Public Policy, Harvard Law School * The expansion of behavioral economics during the past twenty years has been remarkable, much of it concerning strategic interaction and using tools from game theory. Sanjit Dhami's amazing book summarizes - and even defines - the field, broadly as well as in depth. His coverage of theory as well as of experiments is superb. The Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis will be an indispensable resource for students and scholars who wish to understand where the action is. * Martin Dufwenberg, University of Arizona * Sanjit Dhami's Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis is a major and most impressive achievement. It provides an exhaustive account and a masterful synthesis of the state of the art after more than three decades of behavioral economics. For many years to come it will be an indispensable reference for researchers in economics and psychology, and it is bound to become the standard text in graduate and advanced undergraduate courses on behavioural and experimental economics. * Klaus M. Schmidt, University of Munich * This is the most complete and stimulating book on behavioral economics. With elegance and unprecedented elaborateness, it ties together a wealth of experimental findings, rigorous theoretical insights and exciting applications across all relevant fields of behavioral research. Sanjit Dhami's work has been shaped by numerous comments from the leaders in the field. Now, in the years to come, it will be the standard that shapes how the next generation of students and researchers think about behavior and its science. * Axel Ockenfels, University of Cologne, Speaker of the Cologne Excellence Center of Social and Economic Behavior * This book covers all relevant theoretical aspects of behavioral economics in great depth. A great strength is its comprehensiveness: it covers the whole field. The book thus is unique in bringing to the fore the unity and diversity of the behavioral approach. The material is well-organized and accessible to a wide audience. It is invaluable to anyone teaching or studying any topic in behavioral economics, showing how the topic fits into the whole. * Peter Wakker, Erasmus University Rotterdam * Foundations of Behavioral Economic Analysis will be a central textbook for behavioral economics. One key feature is its appealing focus on the interplay between theory and evidence. For researchers, it will be a great source of information, puzzles, and challenges for the many years to come. It is a major achievement. * Xavier Gabaix, New York University, Stern School * Sanjit Dhami has spent more than 10 years on the monumental task to lay out the foundations of behavioral economics. The result is a major achievement. The book provides a comprehensive and encompassing survey and I think it will shape how the next generation of researchers thinks about the field. Overall, this is an excellent book that can be commended to advanced students of behavioural economics and to non-behavioural economics who are looking for an entry point into the field. It will also serve researchers in behavioural economics as an authoritative reference book. It is a must-have for anyone with a serious interest in the field. * Jean-Robert Tyran, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics * The Foundations of Behavioural Economic Analysis is a major contribution to the contemporary economic studies in the areas of behavioural economics, psychology and game theory. It will remain as a major treatise on behavioural economics for many decades. I cannot think that another book will supersede this book in terms of rigour, comprehensiveness, and analytical sophistication in the foreseeable future. This book is also a very interesting and extremely useful publication for academic analysis, policy design and practical applications. * Professor.Sardar M. N.Islam, Victoria University * Almost all the chapters follow a basic structure: they sketch the neoclassical theory; review evidence on its empirical plausibility; introduce alternative behavioral theories; finally go on to discuss further evidence of the newer theories' relative successes and failures compared to the neoclassical theories. A lot of thought has gone into writing the introductions of each section as they outline the broad trends, debates, and core empirical results, making it easy to get into the detailed chapters with a clear idea of the direction of research in that topic.To sum it up, the book ends up doing exactly what it promised, take stock of behavioral economicscourse text for advanced students.., a research handbook for behavioral economists, and an invitation to economists and other social scientists of all persuasions to explore this exciting new field. * Utteeyo Dasgupta, Studies in Microeconomics *

List of Figures
xxi
List of Tables
xxxi
Introduction 1(78)
1 The antecedents of behavioral economics
3(2)
2 On methodology in economics
5(5)
3 The experimental method in economics
10(11)
4 Approach and organization of the book
21(4)
5 Five theoretical approaches in behavioral economics
25(23)
6 Five examples of behavioral evidence
48(31)
Appendix A The random lottery incentive mechanism
59(1)
Appendix B In lieu of a problem set
59(6)
References
65(14)
PART 1 Behavioral Economics of Risk, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity
Introduction to Part 1
79(4)
1 The Evidence on Human Choice under Risk and Uncertainty
83(27)
1.1 Introduction
83(1)
1.2 The elements of classical decision theory
84(5)
1.3 Subjective expected utility theory (SRU)
89(3)
1.4 Eliciting the utility function under EU
92(3)
1.5 Violations of expected utility theory
95(15)
2 Behavioral Models of Decision Making
110(103)
2.1 Introduction
110(5)
2.2 Probability weighting functions
115(9)
2.3 Rank dependent utility theory (RDU)
124(6)
2.4 Prospect theory (PT)
130(10)
2.5 Elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions in PT
140(8)
2.6 The axiomatic foundations of PT
148(4)
2.7 Third generation PT and stochastic reference points
152(1)
2.8 Stochastic reference points in PT under rational expectations
153(19)
2.9 Limitations of PT
172(9)
2.10 A Selection of Other Behavioral Theories
181(10)
2.11 Human behavior for extreme probability events
191(8)
2.12 Risk preferences and time preferences
199(14)
3 Applications of Behavioral Decision Theory
213(71)
3.1 Introduction
213(4)
3.2 The endowment effect and exchange asymmetries
217(18)
3.3 Prospect" theory preferences in primates
235(4)
3.4 Myopic loss aversion
239(3)
3.5 Why do people pay taxes?
242(6)
3.6 Explanation of Rabin's paradox using PT
248(2)
3.7 Goals as reference points
250(6)
3.8 Why is it so hard to find a taxi on a rainy day in New York?
256(7)
3.9 Some implications of inverse S-shaped weighting functions
263(1)
3.10 Contracts as reference points
264(8)
3.11 Moral hazard, loss aversion, and optimal contracts
272(6)
3.12 Renegotiation, long-term contracts, and loss aversion
278(6)
4 Human Behavior under Ambiguity
284(55)
4.1 Introduction
284(2)
4.2 A Problem for SHU: The Ellsberg Paradox
286(2)
4.3 Neoclassical models of ambiguity
288(13)
4.4 Behavioral models of ambiguity
301(38)
Exercises for Part 1
310(6)
References for Part 1
316(23)
PART 2 Other-Regarding Preferences
Introduction to Part 2
339(5)
5 The Evidence on Human Sociality
344(54)
5.1 Introduction
344(5)
5.2 Ultimatum and dictator games
349(8)
5.3 Gift exchange and trust games
357(13)
5.4 Public goods games
370(16)
5.5 How representative is the lab evidence?
386(9)
5.6 Indirect reciprocity
395(3)
6 Models of Other-Regarding Preferences
398(55)
6.1 Introduction
398(3)
6.2 The Fehr-Schmidt model
401(9)
6.3 The ERC model
410(2)
6.4 Fairness and stochastic dominance
412(5)
6.5 Behavioral political economy
417(9)
6.6 Fairness, general equilibrium, and welfare
426(5)
6.7 Evidence on models of social preference and reciprocity
431(13)
6.8 A Discussion of Other Promising Models
444(9)
7 Human Morality and Social Identity
453(25)
7.1 Introduction
453(2)
7.2 Human virtues
455(10)
7.3 Social identity
465(13)
8 Incentives and Other-Regarding Preferences
478(105)
3.1 Introduction
478(5)
8.2 Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences
483(12)
8.3 Incomplete contracts under other-regarding preferences
495(15)
8.4 Reciprocity and long-term contracts
510(17)
8.5 Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation: theoretical framework
527(13)
8.6 Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation: empirical evidence
540(43)
Exercises for Part 2
562(4)
References for Part 2
566(17)
PART 3 Behavioral Time Discounting
Introduction to Part 3
583(3)
9 The Evidence on Temporal Human Choice
586(19)
9.1 Introduction
586(1)
9.2 The discounted utility model
587(1)
9.3 The exponential discounted utility model (EDU)
588(6)
9.4 Anomalies of the EDU model
594(11)
10 Behavioral Models of Time Discounting
605(39)
10.1 Introduction
605(2)
10.2 Explaining the sign and magnitude effects
607(4)
10.3 Explaining the common difference effect
611(16)
10.4 Attribute-based models
627(5)
10.5 The reference time theory (RT)
632(12)
11 Applications of Present-Biased Preferences
644(65)
11.1 Introduction
644(2)
11.2 Two frameworks for modeling present-biased preferences
646(5)
11.3 Optimal consumption under hyperbolic discounting
651(13)
11.4 Endogenous retirement decisions
664(5)
11.5 Procrastination and preproperation
669(8)
11.6 Interdependence, multiple activities, and competition
677(2)
11.7 Optimal sin taxes
679(4)
11.8 Investment and leisure goods
683(5)
11.9 Other applications of hyperbolic discounting
688(21)
Exercises for Part 3
692(8)
References for Part 3
700(9)
PART 4 Behavioral Game Theory
Introduction to Part 4
709(4)
12 The Evidence on Strategic Human Choice
713(162)
12.1 Introduction
713(11)
12.2 Iterated deletion of dominated strategies
724(14)
12.3 Mixed strategy Nash equilibria
738(20)
12.4 Coordination games
758(28)
12.5 Bargaining games
786(33)
12.6 Asymmetric information, signaling, and cheap talk
819(24)
12.7 Public signals and correlated equilibria
843(9)
12.8 Strategic complements and strategic substitutes
852(11)
12.9 A Digression on Competitive Equilibrium Experiments
863(12)
13 Models of Behavioral Game Theory
875(158)
13.1 Introduction
875(6)
13.2 Quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
881(13)
13.3 Levels and cognitive hierarchy models
894(10)
13.4 Applications of level-k: and CH models
904(21)
13.5 Psychological game theory
925(37)
13.6 Correlated equilibrium and social norms
962(4)
13.7 Other behavioral models of how people play games
966(22)
13.8 Behavioral economics of auctions
988(45)
Exercise for Part 4
1003(10)
References for Part 4
1013(20)
PART 5 Behavioral Models of Learning
Introduction to Part 5
1033(4)
14 Evolutionary Game Theory
1037(55)
14.1 Introduction
1037(4)
14.2 Some preliminaries
1041(2)
14.3 Evolutionary stable strategies in two-player games
1043(4)
14.4 Relation of ESS with other equilibrium concepts
1047(1)
14.5 Replicator dynamics
1048(5)
14.6 Applications of evolutionary game theory
1053(10)
14.7 Playing the field
1063(1)
14.8 Gene-culture convolution
1063(10)
14.9 The evolution of altruism and reciprocity
1073(12)
14.10 Social learning and replicator-like dynamics
1085(7)
15 Models of Learning
1092(66)
15.1 Introduction
1092(5)
15.2 Reinforcement learning
1097(9)
15.3 Belief-based models of learning
1106(14)
15.4 The experience weighted attraction model of learning
1120(11)
15.5 Learning models: two points of view
1131(1)
15.6 The class of learning direction theories
1132(10)
15.7 Rule-based learning
1142(6)
15.8 Multiple games, complexity, and categorization
1148(5)
15.9 Possibility and impossibility of rational learning
1153(5)
16 Stochastic Social Dynamics
1158(65)
16.1 Introduction
1158(1)
16.2 Fixing ideas in stochastic dynamics
1159(7)
16.3 Perturbed Markov dynamics in 2 × 2 games
1166(8)
16.4 Memory, conventions, and risk dominance in 3 × 3 games
1174(8)
16.5 Social networks
1182(41)
Appendix A Ordinary differential equations
1186(7)
Appendix B A Note on Choice Under Stochastic Utility
1193(3)
Appendix C A Brief User's Guide to Markov Chains
1196(9)
Exercises for Part 5
1205(5)
References for Part 5
1210(13)
PART 6 Emotions
Introduction to Part 6
1223(3)
17 Emotions and Human Behavior
1226(62)
17.1 Introduction
1226(3)
17.2 Visceral influences and the rationality of emotions
1229(6)
17.3 Cue-conditioned behavior and habit formation
1235(7)
17.4 Anticipation and delay under certainty
1242(3)
17.5 Fear and anxiety under uncertainty
1245(5)
17.6 Projection bias
1250(8)
17.7 Temptation preferences: a revealed preference approach
1258(8)
17.8 Temptation and conflicts between commitment and flexibility
1266(4)
17.9 Happiness economics
1270(18)
18 Interactions between Emotions and Cognition
1288(51)
18.1 Introduction
1288(2)
18.2 Emotions and a two-modules view of the brain
1290(8)
18.3 A Dual Selves Model with Costly Commitment
1298(6)
18.4 Information asymmetries between emotions and cognition
1304(4)
18.5 Strategic ignorance, confidence, and self-esteem
1308(31)
Exercises for Part 6
1322(6)
References for Part 6
1328(11)
PART 7 Bounded Rationality
Introduction to Part 7
1339(3)
19 Judgment Heuristics
1342(109)
19.1 Introduction
1342(8)
19.2 The law of small numbers
1350(11)
19.3 Conjunction fallacy
1361(4)
19.4 The availability heuristic
1365(2)
19.5 The affect heuristic
1367(3)
19.6 Anchoring and adjustment
1370(5)
19.7 Base rate neglect and conservatism
1375(8)
19.8 Hindsight bias
1383(6)
19.9 Confirmation bias
1389(6)
19.10 Other judgment heuristics
1395(3)
19.11 Dual process models and judgment heuristics
1398(3)
19.12 Coarse thinking and persuasion
1401(6)
19.13 Mental models
1407(2)
19.14 Herbert Simon's approach to bounded rationality
1409(17)
19.15 The great rationality debate
1426(5)
19.16 Shrouded attributes
1431(5)
19.17 Limited attention
1436(13)
19.18 Do experts exhibit biases?
1449(2)
20 Mental Accounting
1451(34)
20.1 Introduction
1451(4)
20.2 Framing and mental accounting
1455(1)
20.3 Prospect theory and mental accounting
1456(3)
20.4 The behavioral life-cycle model
1459(4)
20.5 The red and black of mental accounting
1463(6)
20.6 Choice bracketing
1469(2)
20.7 Coherent arbitrariness
1471(2)
20.8 Sunk costs and mental accounting
1473(3)
20.9 Some other mental accounting phenomena
1476(9)
21 Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets
1485(92)
21.1 Introduction
1485(3)
21.2 The efficient markets hypothesis
1488(14)
21.3 Noise trader risk
1502(7)
21.4 The limits to arbitrage
1509(7)
21.5 Gradual flow of information
1516(4)
21.6 Stock market underreaction and overreaction
1520(6)
21.7 Behavioral corporate finance
1526(51)
Exercises for Part 7
1544(8)
References for Part 7
1552(25)
PART 8 Behavioral Welfare Economics
Introduction to Part 8
1577(2)
22 Behavioral Welfare Economics
1579(64)
22.1 Introduction
1579(4)
22.2 Fixing basic ideas
1583(7)
22.3 Soft paternalism
1590(11)
22.4 Regulation under imperfect self-information
1601(2)
22.5 Choice and non-choice data: What is the scope of economics?
1603(8)
22.6 Choice-based behavioral welfare economics
1611(7)
22.7 Revealed preference under limited attention
1618(5)
22.8 The contractarian approach
1623(2)
22.9 Behavioral public finance and welfare
1625(18)
Exercises for Tart 8
1635(3)
References for Part 8
1638(5)
PART 9 Neuroeconomics
Introduction to Part 9
1643(1)
23 Neuroeconomics
1644(81)
23.1 Introduction
1644(4)
23.2 A Brief Introduction to the Brain
1648(7)
23.3 An introduction to neuroeconomic techniques
1655(6)
23.4 The neuroeconomics of risky decisions
1661(8)
23.5 The neuroeconomics of social preferences
1669(17)
23.6 The neuroeconomics of time preferences
1686(3)
23.7 The neuroeconomics of strategic interaction
1689(3)
23.8 Pharmacoeconomics: an application to the social effects of oxytocin
1692(33)
References for Part 9
1695(8)
Appendix on Game Theory
1703(22)
Index of Named Authors 1725(11)
Subject Index 1736
Sanjit Dhami is Professor of Economics at the University of Leicester. He studied at the Delhi School of Economics and the University of Toronto for his Masters, MPhil, and PhD degrees in economics. He has previously taught at the Universities of Toronto, Essex, and Newcastle. His research has mainly focused on behavioral economic theory and its applications. He has published on the axiomatic foundations of the various components of prospect theory, behavioral political economy using other-regarding preferences, behavioral time preferences, foundations of behavioral game theory, and applications in tax evasion, stochastic dominance concepts under other-regarding preferences, and in behavioral law and economics.