|
|
xxi | |
|
|
xxxi | |
Introduction |
|
1 | (78) |
|
1 The antecedents of behavioral economics |
|
|
3 | (2) |
|
2 On methodology in economics |
|
|
5 | (5) |
|
3 The experimental method in economics |
|
|
10 | (11) |
|
4 Approach and organization of the book |
|
|
21 | (4) |
|
5 Five theoretical approaches in behavioral economics |
|
|
25 | (23) |
|
6 Five examples of behavioral evidence |
|
|
48 | (31) |
|
Appendix A The random lottery incentive mechanism |
|
|
59 | (1) |
|
Appendix B In lieu of a problem set |
|
|
59 | (6) |
|
|
65 | (14) |
|
PART 1 Behavioral Economics of Risk, Uncertainty, and Ambiguity |
|
|
|
|
79 | (4) |
|
1 The Evidence on Human Choice under Risk and Uncertainty |
|
|
83 | (27) |
|
|
83 | (1) |
|
1.2 The elements of classical decision theory |
|
|
84 | (5) |
|
1.3 Subjective expected utility theory (SRU) |
|
|
89 | (3) |
|
1.4 Eliciting the utility function under EU |
|
|
92 | (3) |
|
1.5 Violations of expected utility theory |
|
|
95 | (15) |
|
2 Behavioral Models of Decision Making |
|
|
110 | (103) |
|
|
110 | (5) |
|
2.2 Probability weighting functions |
|
|
115 | (9) |
|
2.3 Rank dependent utility theory (RDU) |
|
|
124 | (6) |
|
|
130 | (10) |
|
2.5 Elicitation of utility and probability weighting functions in PT |
|
|
140 | (8) |
|
2.6 The axiomatic foundations of PT |
|
|
148 | (4) |
|
2.7 Third generation PT and stochastic reference points |
|
|
152 | (1) |
|
2.8 Stochastic reference points in PT under rational expectations |
|
|
153 | (19) |
|
|
172 | (9) |
|
2.10 A Selection of Other Behavioral Theories |
|
|
181 | (10) |
|
2.11 Human behavior for extreme probability events |
|
|
191 | (8) |
|
2.12 Risk preferences and time preferences |
|
|
199 | (14) |
|
3 Applications of Behavioral Decision Theory |
|
|
213 | (71) |
|
|
213 | (4) |
|
3.2 The endowment effect and exchange asymmetries |
|
|
217 | (18) |
|
3.3 Prospect" theory preferences in primates |
|
|
235 | (4) |
|
|
239 | (3) |
|
3.5 Why do people pay taxes? |
|
|
242 | (6) |
|
3.6 Explanation of Rabin's paradox using PT |
|
|
248 | (2) |
|
3.7 Goals as reference points |
|
|
250 | (6) |
|
3.8 Why is it so hard to find a taxi on a rainy day in New York? |
|
|
256 | (7) |
|
3.9 Some implications of inverse S-shaped weighting functions |
|
|
263 | (1) |
|
3.10 Contracts as reference points |
|
|
264 | (8) |
|
3.11 Moral hazard, loss aversion, and optimal contracts |
|
|
272 | (6) |
|
3.12 Renegotiation, long-term contracts, and loss aversion |
|
|
278 | (6) |
|
4 Human Behavior under Ambiguity |
|
|
284 | (55) |
|
|
284 | (2) |
|
4.2 A Problem for SHU: The Ellsberg Paradox |
|
|
286 | (2) |
|
4.3 Neoclassical models of ambiguity |
|
|
288 | (13) |
|
4.4 Behavioral models of ambiguity |
|
|
301 | (38) |
|
|
310 | (6) |
|
|
316 | (23) |
|
PART 2 Other-Regarding Preferences |
|
|
|
|
339 | (5) |
|
5 The Evidence on Human Sociality |
|
|
344 | (54) |
|
|
344 | (5) |
|
5.2 Ultimatum and dictator games |
|
|
349 | (8) |
|
5.3 Gift exchange and trust games |
|
|
357 | (13) |
|
|
370 | (16) |
|
5.5 How representative is the lab evidence? |
|
|
386 | (9) |
|
|
395 | (3) |
|
6 Models of Other-Regarding Preferences |
|
|
398 | (55) |
|
|
398 | (3) |
|
6.2 The Fehr-Schmidt model |
|
|
401 | (9) |
|
|
410 | (2) |
|
6.4 Fairness and stochastic dominance |
|
|
412 | (5) |
|
6.5 Behavioral political economy |
|
|
417 | (9) |
|
6.6 Fairness, general equilibrium, and welfare |
|
|
426 | (5) |
|
6.7 Evidence on models of social preference and reciprocity |
|
|
431 | (13) |
|
6.8 A Discussion of Other Promising Models |
|
|
444 | (9) |
|
7 Human Morality and Social Identity |
|
|
453 | (25) |
|
|
453 | (2) |
|
|
455 | (10) |
|
|
465 | (13) |
|
8 Incentives and Other-Regarding Preferences |
|
|
478 | (105) |
|
|
478 | (5) |
|
8.2 Moral hazard and other-regarding preferences |
|
|
483 | (12) |
|
8.3 Incomplete contracts under other-regarding preferences |
|
|
495 | (15) |
|
8.4 Reciprocity and long-term contracts |
|
|
510 | (17) |
|
8.5 Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation: theoretical framework |
|
|
527 | (13) |
|
8.6 Extrinsic and intrinsic motivation: empirical evidence |
|
|
540 | (43) |
|
|
562 | (4) |
|
|
566 | (17) |
|
PART 3 Behavioral Time Discounting |
|
|
|
|
583 | (3) |
|
9 The Evidence on Temporal Human Choice |
|
|
586 | (19) |
|
|
586 | (1) |
|
9.2 The discounted utility model |
|
|
587 | (1) |
|
9.3 The exponential discounted utility model (EDU) |
|
|
588 | (6) |
|
9.4 Anomalies of the EDU model |
|
|
594 | (11) |
|
10 Behavioral Models of Time Discounting |
|
|
605 | (39) |
|
|
605 | (2) |
|
10.2 Explaining the sign and magnitude effects |
|
|
607 | (4) |
|
10.3 Explaining the common difference effect |
|
|
611 | (16) |
|
10.4 Attribute-based models |
|
|
627 | (5) |
|
10.5 The reference time theory (RT) |
|
|
632 | (12) |
|
11 Applications of Present-Biased Preferences |
|
|
644 | (65) |
|
|
644 | (2) |
|
11.2 Two frameworks for modeling present-biased preferences |
|
|
646 | (5) |
|
11.3 Optimal consumption under hyperbolic discounting |
|
|
651 | (13) |
|
11.4 Endogenous retirement decisions |
|
|
664 | (5) |
|
11.5 Procrastination and preproperation |
|
|
669 | (8) |
|
11.6 Interdependence, multiple activities, and competition |
|
|
677 | (2) |
|
|
679 | (4) |
|
11.8 Investment and leisure goods |
|
|
683 | (5) |
|
11.9 Other applications of hyperbolic discounting |
|
|
688 | (21) |
|
|
692 | (8) |
|
|
700 | (9) |
|
PART 4 Behavioral Game Theory |
|
|
|
|
709 | (4) |
|
12 The Evidence on Strategic Human Choice |
|
|
713 | (162) |
|
|
713 | (11) |
|
12.2 Iterated deletion of dominated strategies |
|
|
724 | (14) |
|
12.3 Mixed strategy Nash equilibria |
|
|
738 | (20) |
|
|
758 | (28) |
|
|
786 | (33) |
|
12.6 Asymmetric information, signaling, and cheap talk |
|
|
819 | (24) |
|
12.7 Public signals and correlated equilibria |
|
|
843 | (9) |
|
12.8 Strategic complements and strategic substitutes |
|
|
852 | (11) |
|
12.9 A Digression on Competitive Equilibrium Experiments |
|
|
863 | (12) |
|
13 Models of Behavioral Game Theory |
|
|
875 | (158) |
|
|
875 | (6) |
|
13.2 Quantal response equilibrium (QRE) |
|
|
881 | (13) |
|
13.3 Levels and cognitive hierarchy models |
|
|
894 | (10) |
|
13.4 Applications of level-k: and CH models |
|
|
904 | (21) |
|
13.5 Psychological game theory |
|
|
925 | (37) |
|
13.6 Correlated equilibrium and social norms |
|
|
962 | (4) |
|
13.7 Other behavioral models of how people play games |
|
|
966 | (22) |
|
13.8 Behavioral economics of auctions |
|
|
988 | (45) |
|
|
1003 | (10) |
|
|
1013 | (20) |
|
PART 5 Behavioral Models of Learning |
|
|
|
|
1033 | (4) |
|
14 Evolutionary Game Theory |
|
|
1037 | (55) |
|
|
1037 | (4) |
|
|
1041 | (2) |
|
14.3 Evolutionary stable strategies in two-player games |
|
|
1043 | (4) |
|
14.4 Relation of ESS with other equilibrium concepts |
|
|
1047 | (1) |
|
|
1048 | (5) |
|
14.6 Applications of evolutionary game theory |
|
|
1053 | (10) |
|
|
1063 | (1) |
|
14.8 Gene-culture convolution |
|
|
1063 | (10) |
|
14.9 The evolution of altruism and reciprocity |
|
|
1073 | (12) |
|
14.10 Social learning and replicator-like dynamics |
|
|
1085 | (7) |
|
|
1092 | (66) |
|
|
1092 | (5) |
|
15.2 Reinforcement learning |
|
|
1097 | (9) |
|
15.3 Belief-based models of learning |
|
|
1106 | (14) |
|
15.4 The experience weighted attraction model of learning |
|
|
1120 | (11) |
|
15.5 Learning models: two points of view |
|
|
1131 | (1) |
|
15.6 The class of learning direction theories |
|
|
1132 | (10) |
|
|
1142 | (6) |
|
15.8 Multiple games, complexity, and categorization |
|
|
1148 | (5) |
|
15.9 Possibility and impossibility of rational learning |
|
|
1153 | (5) |
|
16 Stochastic Social Dynamics |
|
|
1158 | (65) |
|
|
1158 | (1) |
|
16.2 Fixing ideas in stochastic dynamics |
|
|
1159 | (7) |
|
16.3 Perturbed Markov dynamics in 2 × 2 games |
|
|
1166 | (8) |
|
16.4 Memory, conventions, and risk dominance in 3 × 3 games |
|
|
1174 | (8) |
|
|
1182 | (41) |
|
Appendix A Ordinary differential equations |
|
|
1186 | (7) |
|
Appendix B A Note on Choice Under Stochastic Utility |
|
|
1193 | (3) |
|
Appendix C A Brief User's Guide to Markov Chains |
|
|
1196 | (9) |
|
|
1205 | (5) |
|
|
1210 | (13) |
|
|
|
|
1223 | (3) |
|
17 Emotions and Human Behavior |
|
|
1226 | (62) |
|
|
1226 | (3) |
|
17.2 Visceral influences and the rationality of emotions |
|
|
1229 | (6) |
|
17.3 Cue-conditioned behavior and habit formation |
|
|
1235 | (7) |
|
17.4 Anticipation and delay under certainty |
|
|
1242 | (3) |
|
17.5 Fear and anxiety under uncertainty |
|
|
1245 | (5) |
|
|
1250 | (8) |
|
17.7 Temptation preferences: a revealed preference approach |
|
|
1258 | (8) |
|
17.8 Temptation and conflicts between commitment and flexibility |
|
|
1266 | (4) |
|
|
1270 | (18) |
|
18 Interactions between Emotions and Cognition |
|
|
1288 | (51) |
|
|
1288 | (2) |
|
18.2 Emotions and a two-modules view of the brain |
|
|
1290 | (8) |
|
18.3 A Dual Selves Model with Costly Commitment |
|
|
1298 | (6) |
|
18.4 Information asymmetries between emotions and cognition |
|
|
1304 | (4) |
|
18.5 Strategic ignorance, confidence, and self-esteem |
|
|
1308 | (31) |
|
|
1322 | (6) |
|
|
1328 | (11) |
|
PART 7 Bounded Rationality |
|
|
|
|
1339 | (3) |
|
|
1342 | (109) |
|
|
1342 | (8) |
|
19.2 The law of small numbers |
|
|
1350 | (11) |
|
|
1361 | (4) |
|
19.4 The availability heuristic |
|
|
1365 | (2) |
|
19.5 The affect heuristic |
|
|
1367 | (3) |
|
19.6 Anchoring and adjustment |
|
|
1370 | (5) |
|
19.7 Base rate neglect and conservatism |
|
|
1375 | (8) |
|
|
1383 | (6) |
|
|
1389 | (6) |
|
19.10 Other judgment heuristics |
|
|
1395 | (3) |
|
19.11 Dual process models and judgment heuristics |
|
|
1398 | (3) |
|
19.12 Coarse thinking and persuasion |
|
|
1401 | (6) |
|
|
1407 | (2) |
|
19.14 Herbert Simon's approach to bounded rationality |
|
|
1409 | (17) |
|
19.15 The great rationality debate |
|
|
1426 | (5) |
|
19.16 Shrouded attributes |
|
|
1431 | (5) |
|
|
1436 | (13) |
|
19.18 Do experts exhibit biases? |
|
|
1449 | (2) |
|
|
1451 | (34) |
|
|
1451 | (4) |
|
20.2 Framing and mental accounting |
|
|
1455 | (1) |
|
20.3 Prospect theory and mental accounting |
|
|
1456 | (3) |
|
20.4 The behavioral life-cycle model |
|
|
1459 | (4) |
|
20.5 The red and black of mental accounting |
|
|
1463 | (6) |
|
|
1469 | (2) |
|
20.7 Coherent arbitrariness |
|
|
1471 | (2) |
|
20.8 Sunk costs and mental accounting |
|
|
1473 | (3) |
|
20.9 Some other mental accounting phenomena |
|
|
1476 | (9) |
|
21 Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets |
|
|
1485 | (92) |
|
|
1485 | (3) |
|
21.2 The efficient markets hypothesis |
|
|
1488 | (14) |
|
|
1502 | (7) |
|
21.4 The limits to arbitrage |
|
|
1509 | (7) |
|
21.5 Gradual flow of information |
|
|
1516 | (4) |
|
21.6 Stock market underreaction and overreaction |
|
|
1520 | (6) |
|
21.7 Behavioral corporate finance |
|
|
1526 | (51) |
|
|
1544 | (8) |
|
|
1552 | (25) |
|
PART 8 Behavioral Welfare Economics |
|
|
|
|
1577 | (2) |
|
22 Behavioral Welfare Economics |
|
|
1579 | (64) |
|
|
1579 | (4) |
|
|
1583 | (7) |
|
|
1590 | (11) |
|
22.4 Regulation under imperfect self-information |
|
|
1601 | (2) |
|
22.5 Choice and non-choice data: What is the scope of economics? |
|
|
1603 | (8) |
|
22.6 Choice-based behavioral welfare economics |
|
|
1611 | (7) |
|
22.7 Revealed preference under limited attention |
|
|
1618 | (5) |
|
22.8 The contractarian approach |
|
|
1623 | (2) |
|
22.9 Behavioral public finance and welfare |
|
|
1625 | (18) |
|
|
1635 | (3) |
|
|
1638 | (5) |
|
|
|
|
1643 | (1) |
|
|
1644 | (81) |
|
|
1644 | (4) |
|
23.2 A Brief Introduction to the Brain |
|
|
1648 | (7) |
|
23.3 An introduction to neuroeconomic techniques |
|
|
1655 | (6) |
|
23.4 The neuroeconomics of risky decisions |
|
|
1661 | (8) |
|
23.5 The neuroeconomics of social preferences |
|
|
1669 | (17) |
|
23.6 The neuroeconomics of time preferences |
|
|
1686 | (3) |
|
23.7 The neuroeconomics of strategic interaction |
|
|
1689 | (3) |
|
23.8 Pharmacoeconomics: an application to the social effects of oxytocin |
|
|
1692 | (33) |
|
|
1695 | (8) |
|
|
1703 | (22) |
Index of Named Authors |
|
1725 | (11) |
Subject Index |
|
1736 | |