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xxi | |
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xxiii | |
Introduction to Volume 6 |
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1 | (6) |
Introduction to Behavioral Economics and the Book Volumes |
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7 | (35) |
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1 Some antecedents of behavioral economics |
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9 | (1) |
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2 On methodology in economics |
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10 | (6) |
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3 The experimental method in economics |
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16 | (12) |
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3.1 Experiments and internal validity |
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17 | (2) |
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3.2 Subject pools used in lab experiments |
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19 | (1) |
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3.3 Stake sizes in experiments |
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20 | (1) |
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3.4 The issue of the external validity of lab findings |
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20 | (2) |
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3.5 The role of incentives in economics |
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22 | (3) |
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3.6 Is survey data of any use? |
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25 | (2) |
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3.7 Replications in experimental economics |
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27 | (1) |
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4 Approach and organization of the book |
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28 | (5) |
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5 Appendix A: The random lottery incentive mechanism |
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33 | (1) |
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6 Appendix B: In lieu of a problem set |
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33 | (9) |
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1 Evolutionary Game Theory |
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42 | (55) |
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42 | (4) |
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46 | (2) |
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1.3 Evolutionary stable strategies in two-player games |
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48 | (4) |
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1.4 Relation of ESS with other equilibrium concepts |
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52 | (1) |
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53 | (5) |
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1.6 Applications of evolutionary game theory |
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58 | (10) |
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1.6.1 Prisoner's dilemma game: monomorphic equilibrium |
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58 | (4) |
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1.6.2 The game of chicken: polymorphic equilibria |
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62 | (2) |
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1.6.3 Non-existence of an asymptotically stable equilibrium |
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64 | (2) |
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1.6.4 A two-population model of coordination |
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66 | (2) |
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68 | (1) |
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1.8 Gene-culture coevolution |
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69 | (9) |
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1.8.1 Basics of gene-culture coevolution |
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69 | (4) |
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1.8.2 A formal model of cultural evolution |
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73 | (5) |
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1.9 The evolution of altruism and reciprocity |
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78 | (12) |
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1.9.1 Kin selection and inclusive fitness |
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78 | (2) |
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1.9.2 Group selection or multilevel selection |
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80 | (2) |
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1.9.3 Reciprocal altruism or direct reciprocity |
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82 | (1) |
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1.9.4 Indirect reciprocity |
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83 | (2) |
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1.9.5 Repeated games, cooperation, and classical game theory |
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85 | (1) |
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1.9.6 The indirect evolutionary approach |
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85 | (4) |
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1.9.7 Other issues in evolutionary explanations of cooperation |
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89 | (1) |
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1.10 Social learning and replicator-like dynamics |
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90 | (7) |
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1.10.1 Social imitation and emulation dynamics |
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90 | (2) |
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1.10.2 Some microfoundations of replicator dynamics: imitation learning |
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92 | (2) |
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1.10.3 Social dynamics based on payoff monotonicity |
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94 | (3) |
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97 | (67) |
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97 | (6) |
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2.2 Reinforcement learning |
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103 | (8) |
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2.2.1 The one-parameter reinforcement learning model |
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103 | (2) |
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2.2.2 The three-parameter model of reinforcement learning |
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105 | (1) |
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2.2.3 Some other variants of reinforcement learning |
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106 | (1) |
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2.2.4 Optimality of reinforcement learning in a stationary environment |
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107 | (1) |
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2.2.5 Empirical evidence on reinforcement learning |
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108 | (3) |
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2.3 Belief-based models of learning |
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111 | (15) |
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2.3.1 Empirical evidence on some belief-based models |
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117 | (4) |
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2.3.2 Reinforcement learning versus fictitious play: empirical evidence |
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121 | (5) |
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2.4 The experience weighted attraction model of learning |
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126 | (10) |
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2.4.1 Special case: reinforcement learning |
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128 | (1) |
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2.4.2 Special case: belief-based learning |
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128 | (1) |
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2.4.3 Empirical evidence for the EWA |
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129 | (2) |
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2.4.4 Functional EWA (fEWA) |
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131 | (2) |
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2.4.5 Sophisticated EWA learning and strategic teaching |
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133 | (3) |
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2.5 Learning models: two points of view |
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136 | (2) |
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2.6 The class of learning direction theories |
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138 | (10) |
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2.6.1 Learning direction theory |
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138 | (2) |
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2.6.2 Impulse matching theories |
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140 | (5) |
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2.6.3 An explanation of the data from order statistic games |
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145 | (3) |
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148 | (6) |
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2.7.1 A formal model of rule learning |
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149 | (4) |
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2.7.2 Evidence from rule-based models |
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153 | (1) |
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2.8 Multiple games, complexity, and categorization |
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154 | (5) |
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2.9 Possibility and impossibility of rational learning |
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159 | (5) |
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3 Stochastic Social Dynamics |
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164 | (28) |
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164 | (2) |
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3.2 Fixing ideas in stochastic dynamics |
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166 | (6) |
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3.2.1 Stochastic dynamics in a coordination game |
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167 | (3) |
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3.2.2 A model of technology adoption |
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170 | (2) |
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3.3 Perturbed Markov dynamics in 2 × 2 games |
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172 | (8) |
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3.3.1 Dominated strategies as stochastically stable states |
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173 | (3) |
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3.3.2 Risk dominance under perturbed dynamics |
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176 | (2) |
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3.3.3 Extensions of the basic model |
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178 | (2) |
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3.4 Memory, conventions, and risk dominance in 3 × 3 games |
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180 | (8) |
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3.4.1 Boundedly rational play and fully rational outcomes |
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184 | (1) |
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3.4.2 Of norms and social evolution |
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184 | (2) |
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3.4.3 A brief selection of further applications |
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186 | (2) |
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188 | (4) |
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3.5.1 An application to agrarian contracts |
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190 | (2) |
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4 A Guide to Further Reading |
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192 | (41) |
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192 | (2) |
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4.2 Complexity and economics |
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194 | (13) |
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4.2.1 An example of inductive reasoning: the El Farol problem |
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198 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Increasing returns and the choice of technology |
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199 | (4) |
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4.2.3 Neighborhood segregation as an emergent property |
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203 | (2) |
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4.2.4 Chaos and the logistics map |
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205 | (2) |
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4.3 Agent-based models (ABMs) |
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207 | (7) |
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4.3.1 An ABM of the UK housing market |
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209 | (3) |
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4.3.2 A critical assessment of ABMs |
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212 | (2) |
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214 | (13) |
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4.4.1 Bargaining under one-sided asymmetric information |
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221 | (5) |
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4.4.2 An application to choices among risky lotteries |
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226 | (1) |
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4.5 Exercises for Volume 6 |
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227 | (6) |
Appendix A |
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233 | (8) |
Appendix B |
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241 | (3) |
Appendix C |
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244 | (9) |
References for Volume 6 |
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253 | (12) |
Name Index |
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265 | (4) |
Subject Index |
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269 | |