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xxi | |
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xxv | |
| Introduction to Volume 7 |
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1 | (6) |
| Introduction to Behavioral Economics and the Book Volumes |
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7 | (38) |
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1 Some antecedents of behavioral economics |
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9 | (1) |
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2 On methodology in economics |
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10 | (6) |
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3 The experimental method in economics |
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16 | (12) |
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3.1 Experiments and internal validity |
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17 | (2) |
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3.2 Subject pools used in lab experiments |
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19 | (1) |
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3.3 Stake sizes in experiments |
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20 | (1) |
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3.4 The issue of the external validity of lab findings |
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20 | (2) |
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3.5 The role of incentives in economics |
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22 | (3) |
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3.6 Is survey data of any use? |
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25 | (2) |
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3.7 Replications in experimental economics |
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27 | (1) |
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4 Approach and organization of the book |
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28 | (5) |
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5 Appendix A: The random lottery incentive mechanism |
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33 | (1) |
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6 Appendix B: In lieu of a problem set |
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33 | (5) |
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References for Introduction |
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38 | (7) |
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1 Emotions and Human Behavior |
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45 | (62) |
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45 | (3) |
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1.2 Visceral influences and the rationality of emotions |
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48 | (7) |
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1.2.1 Visceral influences |
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48 | (2) |
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1.2.2 Rationality and emotions |
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50 | (5) |
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1.3 Cue-conditioned behavior and habit formation |
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55 | (7) |
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1.3.1 Solution to the no-cues model |
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57 | (2) |
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1.3.2 Solution to the cues model |
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59 | (3) |
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1.4 Anticipation and delay under certainty |
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62 | (2) |
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1.5 Fear and anxiety under uncertainty |
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64 | (6) |
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1.5.1 An outline of the framework |
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65 | (1) |
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1.5.2 Life-cycle consumption, portfolio choice, and asset prices under anxiety |
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66 | (4) |
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70 | (7) |
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1.6.1 Preferences under projection bias |
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71 | (1) |
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1.6.2 Habit formation, life-cycle consumption, and projection bias |
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72 | (3) |
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1.6.3 An application to consumer durables |
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75 | (1) |
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1.6.4 Other applications of projection bias |
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76 | (1) |
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1.7 Temptation preferences: a revealed preference approach |
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77 | (8) |
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78 | (6) |
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1.7.2 Interpreting temptation preferences in a planner-doer framework |
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84 | (1) |
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1.8 Temptation and conflicts between commitment and flexibility |
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85 | (5) |
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86 | (1) |
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1.8.2 The optimal commitment solution under asymmetric information |
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87 | (2) |
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1.8.3 Some empirical evidence on self-control |
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89 | (1) |
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90 | (17) |
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1.9.1 Why should we be interested in subjective well-being? |
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90 | (3) |
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1.9.2 The relation between life-satisfaction/happiness and GDP |
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93 | (10) |
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1.9.3 Other important economic correlates of well-being |
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103 | (4) |
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2 Interactions between Emotions and Cognition |
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107 | (50) |
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107 | (2) |
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2.2 Emotions and a two-modules view of the brain |
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109 | (9) |
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2.2.1 An introduction to the two-modules view |
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109 | (1) |
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2.2.2 An illustrative framework |
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110 | (8) |
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2.3 A dual selves model with costly commitment |
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118 | (5) |
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2.3.1 The model without commitment |
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118 | (2) |
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2.3.2 Commitment via a cash-in-advance constraint |
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120 | (3) |
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2.4 Information asymmetries between emotions and cognition |
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123 | (4) |
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2.4.1 The full information equilibrium |
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124 | (1) |
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2.4.2 The asymmetric information equilibrium |
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125 | (2) |
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2.5 Strategic ignorance, confidence, and self-esteem |
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127 | (14) |
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2.5.1 Strategic ignorance |
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128 | (2) |
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2.5.2 Confidence, motivation, and self-esteem |
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130 | (11) |
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141 | (6) |
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147 | (10) |
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Part II BEHAVIORAL WELFARE ECONOMICS |
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3 Behavioral Welfare Economics |
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157 | (66) |
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157 | (4) |
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161 | (7) |
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3.2.1 The basic framework |
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162 | (3) |
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165 | (1) |
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3.2.3 Indirect paternalism |
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166 | (1) |
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3.2.4 Libertarian paternalism |
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167 | (1) |
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3.2.5 Effect of other policies |
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168 | (1) |
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168 | (12) |
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3.3.1 Libertarian paternalism |
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169 | (2) |
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3.3.2 Asymmetric paternalism |
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171 | (2) |
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3.3.3 A pragmatic approach |
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173 | (1) |
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3.3.4 Some applications of soft paternalism |
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174 | (3) |
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3.3.5 A critique of soft paternalism |
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177 | (1) |
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3.3.6 A note on behavioral welfare criteria |
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178 | (2) |
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3.4 Regulation under imperfect self-information |
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180 | (2) |
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3.5 Choice and non-choice data: What is the scope of economics? |
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182 | (7) |
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3.6 Choice-based behavioral welfare economics |
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189 | (7) |
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3.7 Revealed preference under limited attention |
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196 | (6) |
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3.8 The contractarian approach |
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202 | (1) |
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3.9 Behavioral public finance and welfare |
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203 | (10) |
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3.9.1 Limited attention and tax elasticities |
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203 | (2) |
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3.9.2 Tax incidence under limited attention |
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205 | (2) |
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3.9.3 Excess burden under limited attention |
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207 | (4) |
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3.9.4 A note on reduced-form approaches to behavioral public finance |
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211 | (2) |
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3.10 Exercises for Part II |
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213 | (4) |
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217 | (6) |
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223 | (62) |
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223 | (4) |
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4.2 A brief introduction to the brain |
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227 | (7) |
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4.3 An introduction to neuroeconomic techniques |
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234 | (6) |
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4.3.1 Criteria for evaluating neuroeconomic measurement techniques |
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235 | (1) |
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4.3.2 Single unit recording |
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235 | (1) |
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4.3.3 Electroencephalography and magnetoencephalography |
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236 | (1) |
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4.3.4 Positron Emission Tomography |
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236 | (1) |
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4.3.5 Functional magnetic resonance imaging |
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237 | (1) |
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4.3.6 Manipulation techniques |
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238 | (2) |
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4.4 The neuroeconomics of risky decisions |
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240 | (8) |
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4.4.1 Neural basis of value and risk |
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240 | (2) |
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4.4.2 Reference dependence |
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242 | (2) |
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244 | (2) |
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4.4.4 Non-linear probability weighting |
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246 | (2) |
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4.5 The neuroeconomics of social preferences |
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248 | (17) |
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4.5.1 Computation of social rewards in the brain |
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248 | (1) |
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4.5.2 The neural basis of inequity averse preferences |
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249 | (3) |
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4.5.3 Neural basis of social punishment and trust |
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252 | (11) |
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4.5.4 Human virtues and the brain |
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263 | (1) |
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4.5.5 Neural interplay of guilt and social preferences |
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264 | (1) |
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4.6 The neuroeconomics of time preferences |
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265 | (3) |
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4.7 The neuroeconomics of strategic interaction |
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268 | (3) |
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4.8 Pharmacoeconomics: an application to social effects of oxytocin |
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271 | (3) |
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274 | (11) |
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Part IV A GUIDE TO FURTHER READING |
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5 A Guide to Further Reading |
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285 | (46) |
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285 | (2) |
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5.2 Temptation, commitment, and self-control |
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287 | (4) |
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5.3 Additional evidence on projection bias |
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291 | (2) |
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5.4 The need for a holistic approach to behavioral public policy |
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293 | (2) |
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5.5 More on the effectiveness of nudges |
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295 | (1) |
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5.6 A consideration of unexpected effects of nudges |
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296 | (6) |
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5.7 Nudges and costs of overriding defaults |
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302 | (3) |
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302 | (3) |
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305 | (1) |
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5.8 Default nudges and present biased preferences |
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305 | (9) |
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306 | (7) |
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313 | (1) |
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5.9 Behavioral public finance |
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314 | (3) |
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5.10 Some fundamental issues in behavioral welfare economics |
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317 | (4) |
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5.11 Some new findings in neuroeconomics |
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321 | (4) |
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325 | (6) |
| Name Index |
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331 | (6) |
| Subject Index |
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337 | |
Biežāk uzdotie jautājumi par e-grāmatām