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Frontiers of Algorithmics: 19th International Joint Conference, IJTCS-FAW 2025, Paris, France, June 30 July 2, 2025, Proceedings [Mīkstie vāki]

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  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 416 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, 17 Illustrations, color; 15 Illustrations, black and white; XIII, 416 p. 32 illus., 17 illus. in color., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sērija : Lecture Notes in Computer Science 15828
  • Izdošanas datums: 30-Jun-2025
  • Izdevniecība: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • ISBN-10: 9819683114
  • ISBN-13: 9789819683116
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Frontiers of Algorithmics: 19th International Joint Conference, IJTCS-FAW 2025, Paris, France, June 30 July 2, 2025, ProceedingsPalielināt
  • Formāts: Paperback / softback, 416 pages, height x width: 235x155 mm, 17 Illustrations, color; 15 Illustrations, black and white; XIII, 416 p. 32 illus., 17 illus. in color., 1 Paperback / softback
  • Sērija : Lecture Notes in Computer Science 15828
  • Izdošanas datums: 30-Jun-2025
  • Izdevniecība: Springer Nature Switzerland AG
  • ISBN-10: 9819683114
  • ISBN-13: 9789819683116
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9789819683116.html

This book LNCS15828 constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 19th International Joint Conference on Theoretical Computer Science-Frontier of Algorithmic Wisdom (IJTCS-FAW 2025), consisting of the 19th International Conference on Frontier of Algorithmic Wisdom (FAW) and the 6th International Joint Conference on Theoretical Computer Science (IJTCS), held in Paris, France, during June 30–July 2, 2025.

The 28 full papers and 2 short papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 61 submissions. The proceedings focuses on Frontiers of Algorithmic Wisdom; Block-chain, Distributed Computing, Multi-Agents; Game Theory, Algorithmic Game Theory, Machine Learning, Electronic Commerce. 

Domination in Diameter Two Graphs and the 2 Club Cluster Vertex Deletion
Parameter.- $k$-Universality of Regular Languages Revisited.- Comparing the
Hardness of Online Minimization and Maximization Problems with Predictions.-
Complexity Classes for Online Problems with and without Predictions.-
Scheduling with Testing: Competitive Algorithms for Minimizing the Total
Weighted Completion Time in the Adversarial Model.- Mixed Graph Covering with
Target Constraints.- Multiplication of 0-1 matrices via clustering.- From
MAXCUT to MAXNAESAT: Elegant Proofs and Algorithmic Advances.- Exact
Algorithms for the Maximum $k$-Balanced Weighted Biclique Problem.-
Approximation Algorithms for Individual Preference Facility Location.- The
online power cover problem on a line.- The Subinterval Cover Problem.-
Oblivious Robots Under Round Robin: Gathering on Rings.- Finding a Set of
Long Common Substrings with Repeats from m Input Strings.- A LP-rounding
based algorithm for soft capacitated facility location problem with
submodular penalties.- Less-excludable Mechanism for DAOs in Public Good
Auctions.- TBDS: Transaction-Based Data Sharing.- Pure Nash Equilibria of
Weighted Picking Sequence Protocol is WEF1 for Two Agents.- A Comparative
Study of Waitlist Mechanisms: Deferral Versus Pay-Per-Offer.- Optimal
Repurchasing Contract Design for Efficient Utilization of Computing
Resources.- Characterizing Strategyproofness Through Score Functions in
Voting Mechanisms.- Minimizing Blocking Agents for Stable Matching with
Partial Approval Information.- The Capacity-Constrained Facility Location
Problem with Ordinal Preferences: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design
Perspectives.- Regularized Minimax-V Learning for Solving Randomly
Terminating Two-player Zero-sum Markov Games.- Improved Approximation of
Maximin Share Fair Allocation under Generalized Assignment Constraints.-
Optimal Hiring Strategy in Auction-Based Crowdsourcing Systems.- Large-Scale
Contextual Market Equilibrium Computation through Deep Learning.- Fair Value
Distribution in Cooperative Committee Election.- A Payoff-Based Policy
Gradient Method in Stochastic Games with Long-Run Average Payoffs.- Mechanism
Design for Auctions with Externalities on Budgets.