This book, first published in 1997, provides a careful and balanced behind-the-scenes account of the intricate diplomatic activity of the period between the first and second Arab-Israeli wars. The author examines the recurring deadlocks in terms of the motives and calculations of the various parties, and reveals how new incentives of pressures offered by outsiders proved incapable of reversing the serious deterioration of Arab-Israeli relations as the region headed for war at Suez. The text of this volume comprises both an in-depth analysis of the period and events, and a selection of primary documents from archival sources.
1. Historical and Psychological Context 1.1. Lessons from the Mandate
Period 1.2. Changing Structure and Dynamics of the Post-1948 Conflict 1.3.
Forms of Third-Party Intervention in the Arab-Israeli Dispute 1.4. The Maze
of Mutual Perceptions and Misconceptions
2. War and Mediation, 1948 2.1.
Bernadotte's 'Suggestions', 27 June 1948 2.2. Direct Negotiations 2.3. The
Bernadotte Plan, September 1948: Acquiescence versus Agreement 2.4. Patterns
and Precedents
3. Egypt and Israel at Rhodes 3.1. United Nations Peacemaking:
Two Tracks 3.2. From Truce to Armistice 3.3. Getting to the Table 3.4.
Opening of Talks 3.5. Breakthrough: Signing the Armistice Agreement 3.6. From
Armistice to Peace?
4. The Lausanne Conference: Prenegotiation 4.1. The
Palestine Conciliation Commission 4.2. Preparing the Ground 4.3. Shuttle
Diplomacy 4.4. Quest for an Advance Gesture from Israel 4.5. PCC Beirut
Conference, March 1949 4.6. Continuing Pressure for an Israeli Gesture 4.7.
The Shadow of Rhodes 4.8. Strains in the Arab Common Front
5. Manoeuvring at
Lausanne 5.1. Opening the Conference 5.2. A Basis for Discussion: The
Lausanne Protocol, 12 May 1949 5.3. Staking out the Positions: The First
Deadlock 5.4. Israel's Offer to Incorporate the Gaza Strip
6. Lausanne: The
Final Stalemate 6.1. July Recess 6.2. Resumption of the Conference 6.3.
Israel's Offer to Repatriate 100,000 Refugees 6.4. Continued Conciliation or
Imposed Settlement? 6.5. Winding up the Conference 6.6. Lausanne Postcripts
7. Geneva Interlude 7.1. Years of Drift 7.2. From Conciliation to Mediation?
7.3. Bilateral Negotiations 7.4. PCC Geneva Meetings, January-July 1950
8.
Deterioration of the Armistice 8.1. From Negative Peace to Positive Peace?
8.2. Beginnings of the Arms Race 8.3. Regional Stability and Arms Control:
The Tripartite Declaration, May 1950 8.4. The Entrenchment of Israeli and
Arab Positions 8.5. Piecemeal Approaches: 'Knitting Tissue' over the Wound
9.
PCC Paris Conference, Autumn 1951 9.1. From Atrophy to Activity: Ely Palmer,
the State Department, and the PCC Initiative 9.2. Preparing the Conference
9.3. The Conference Begins 9.4. The PCC's Comprehensive Pattern of Proposal
10. The Paris Conference and the Demise of PCC Mediation 10.1. Draft
Non-Aggression Formulae 10.2. From Preamble to Proposals 10.3. Paris Deadlock
and the General Assembly 10.4. The Final Sessions: 14 November 1951 10.5. The
Demise of the PCC and United Nations Mediation
11. The United Nations and
Direct Negotiations, 1952-53 11.1. The Seventh General Assembly (1952):
Eight-Power Draft Resolution 11.2. Changes during 1953: Qibiya and
Israeli-Jordanian Tensions 11.3. The Israeli Call for Direct Negotiations:
November 1953
12. The United Nations Conference that Never Was, 1953-54 12.1.
Invoking Article XII: The First Stages 12.2. Arab Reactions to International
Pressure 12.3. Responses to Jordan's Refusal Aftermath
13. Conclusion 13.1.
Assessment of the Arab-Israeli Impasse 13.2. Approaches to Conflict
Resolution 13.3. American Leverage on the Parties 13.4. Techniques of
Conciliation 13.5. The Attitudes and Positions of the Parties 13.6. From War
to War
14. Documents
Neil Caplan
