This book, first published in 1997, focuses on the Anglo-American cooperation which began during the relatively uneventful years 1953 and 1954, and which led to a covert operation, code-named 'Alpha', which aimed unsuccessfully at convincing Egyptian and Israeli leaders to consider a settlement through secret negotiations. As with the other three volumes that make up Futile Diplomacy, this volume comprises Dr Caplan's expert in-depth analysis with a wealth of primary source documents, making this a key reference source in the study of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Part
1. The Background of Anglo-American Cooperation, 1948-54
1.
Anglo-American Support for Bilateral and United Nations Peace Efforts 1.1.
Dynamics of Anglo-American Cooperation 1.2. Support for Bilateral
Negotiations 1.3. Support for United Nations Initiatives
2. The Two-Pronged
Approach 2.1. 'A Gradual Process of Education' of the Arabs to Accept Israel
2.2. Pressure on Israel for Gestures and Concessions
3. Nibbling at the
Edges: The Failure of Conflict Management 3.1. The Tripartite Declaration
3.2. Diplomatic Representations in Support of UNTSO 3.3. Anglo-American
Proposals for Reducing Frontier Tensions 3.4. Starting a Chain of
Confidence-Building Measures 3.5. From the 'Edges' Back to the Core Issues
4.
Attempts at Conflict Resolution 4.1. Calls for a 'Positive Policy' A
Settlement by Compulsion? 4.2. American and British Plans for a Comprehensive
Settlement 4.3. Convergence of British and American Thinking Part
2. The Best
Laid Plans
5. Preparing Alpha 5.1. British Good Offices Offered 5.2. Looking
for an Arab Opening; Keeping the Israelis Reassured 5.3. From Cooperation to
Collaboration: Formulation of Anglo-American Terms of Settlement
6. First
Approaches 6.1. Eden and Nasir: First Hints of Alpha 6.2. Setbacks: Baghdad
Pact and Gaza Raid 6.3. Byroade, Fawzi and Nasir: Early Probings 6.4. London
and Paris Meetings: Fine-Tuning the Negev Proposals 6.5. Factoring in Israel:
Security Treaty versus Arab-Israeli Settlement Part
3. Stumbling from
Obstacle to Obstacle
7. From Secret Sounding to Public Pronouncements: The
Dulles Statement, August 1955 7.1. The Dulles Statement, August 1955 7.2. The
Waiting Game, April-August 1955 7.3. Dulles' Decision to Go Public 7.4. The
Dulles Statement 7.5. Aftermath
8. Arms and Alpha: The Arab Connection 8.1.
Western Arms and Aid for the Arabs 8.2. Soviet Arms for Egypt: The End of the
Tripartite Monopoly 8.3. Sharett's Hat-in-Hand Diplomacy: Paris and Geneva
8.4. Fears of an Israeli Pre-emptive Strike 8.5. New Moves to Court Nasir
9.
Eden's Guildhall Speech, November 1955 9.1. Guildhall Speech: Seeking a
Compromise between 1947 and the Status Quo 9.2. Arab Reactions 9.3. The
Israeli Reaction 9.4. Mahmud Fawzi: Principles behind the Egyptian Position
10. Showdown with Sharett 10.1. Build-Up to a Confrontation between the US
and Israel 10.2. Dulles' 'Bombshell Surprise', 21 November 1955 10.3. Not
Another Munich: Israel Sets Out its Position 10.4. A New Israeli 'Peace
Offensive'? 10.5. Finessing US-Israeli Differences 10.6. Between Optimism and
Pessimism
11. Arms and Alpha: The Israeli Connection 11.1. Hesitations
Regarding Israel's Arms Requests 11.2. Lake Kinneret Raid 11.3. Arms as
Carrots for Negotiations 11.4. Arms and the Anderson Mission 11.5. A Brief
Assessment
12. Alpha's Last Chance: The Anderson Mission 12.1. Preparing for
American Mediation 12.2. Anderson's Mission: Mandate and Expectations 12.3.
First Meetings in Cairo 12.4. First Meetings in Israel 12.5. Return to Cairo
12.6. Return to Jerusalem 12.7. Interlude: Washington, Cairo, Jerusalem
Conclusions
13. Alpha and Gamma: Post-Scripts and Post-Mortems 13.1. 'Last
Shot' at a Meeting between Nasir and Ben-Gurion 13.2. Anderson's Final Visit
13.3. From 'Alpha' to 'Omega' 13.4. The Principal Players: Nasir and Israel
14. Carrots and Sticks: The Limits of Anglo-American Coercive Diplomacy 14.1.
Militant Protagonists and International Opinion 14.2. The Context: British
and American Interests 14.3. Carrots and Sticks: An Inventory 14.4.
Anglo-American Cooperation 14.5. American and British Presumptions 14.6. The
Limits of Coercive Diplomacy 14.7. 'Arms and the Dam'
15. Documents
Neil Caplan
