| Acknowledgements |
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xix | |
| Introduction |
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1 | (4) |
| 1 How To Build A Game |
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5 | (57) |
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5 | (1) |
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1 Strategic Or Extensive Form Games? |
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5 | (23) |
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1.1 Strategic/normal form games |
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6 | (12) |
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6 | (1) |
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1.1.2 Story strategic/normal form games and behavioural comments |
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6 | (6) |
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12 | (6) |
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18 | (10) |
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18 | (2) |
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1.2.2 Story extensive form games and behavioural comments |
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20 | (7) |
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27 | (1) |
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28 | (12) |
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2.1 Strategies in strategic/normal form games |
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28 | (2) |
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28 | (1) |
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28 | (2) |
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2.2 Strategies in extensive form games |
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30 | (6) |
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2.2.1 Pure strategies: a complete description of the behaviour |
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30 | (1) |
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2.2.2 The Fort Boyard Sticks game and the Envelope game |
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31 | (4) |
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2.2.3 Behavioural strategies |
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35 | (1) |
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2.3 Strategic/normal form games and extensive form games: is there a difference? |
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36 | (4) |
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3 Information And Utilities |
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40 | (14) |
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3.1 Perfect/imperfect information |
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40 | (3) |
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3.1.1 A concept linked to the information sets |
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40 | (1) |
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3.1.2 The prisoners' disks game |
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41 | (2) |
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3.2 Complete/incomplete information |
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43 | (4) |
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3.2.1 Common knowledge: does it make sense? |
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43 | (2) |
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3.2.2 Signalling games and screening games |
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45 | (2) |
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47 | (7) |
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3.3.1 Taking risks into account |
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47 | (2) |
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3.3.2 Which is the game you have in mind? |
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49 | (1) |
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3.3.3 Fairness and reciprocity |
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49 | (2) |
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3.3.4 Strategic feelings and paranoia |
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51 | (1) |
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3.3.5 How to bypass utilities |
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52 | (2) |
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54 | (8) |
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Exercise 1 Easy strategy sets |
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56 | (1) |
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Exercise 2 Children game, how to share a pie equally |
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57 | (1) |
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Exercise 3 Children game, the bazooka game, an endless game |
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57 | (1) |
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Exercise 4 Syndicate game: who will be the free rider? |
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57 | (1) |
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Exercise 5 Rosenthal's centipede (pre-emption) game, reduced normal form game |
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58 | (1) |
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Exercise 6 Duel guessing game, a zero sum game |
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58 | (1) |
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Exercise 7 Akerlof's lemon car, experience good model, switching from an extensive form signalling game to its normal form |
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59 | (1) |
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Exercise 8 Behavioural strategies and mixed strategies, how to switch from the first to the second and vice versa? |
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60 | (1) |
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Exercise 9 Dutch auction and first price sealed bid auction, strategic equivalence of different games |
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60 | (2) |
| 2 Dominance |
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62 | (36) |
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62 | (1) |
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63 | (9) |
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1.1 Definitions, strict and weak dominance |
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63 | (1) |
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1.2 Dominance in normal form games |
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63 | (4) |
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1.2.1 Existence of dominated strategies |
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63 | (1) |
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1.2.2 Normal form games with dominated strategies |
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64 | (3) |
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1.3 Dominance in extensive form games |
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67 | (5) |
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1.3.1 Strict and weak dominance in the ascending all pay auction/war of attrition game |
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67 | (1) |
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1.3.2 Weak dominance and the Fort Boyard sticks game |
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68 | (4) |
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72 | (3) |
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2.1 Iterated dominance, the order matters |
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72 | (1) |
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2.2 Iterated dominance and first doubts |
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73 | (2) |
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3 Crossed Rationality And Limits Of Iterated Dominance |
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75 | (4) |
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3.1 Envelope game: K-1 iterations for a strange result |
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75 | (2) |
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3.2 Levels of crossed rationality in theory and reality |
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77 | (1) |
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3.3 Crossed rationality in extensive form games, a logical inconsistency |
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78 | (1) |
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4 Dominance And Structure Of A Game, A Come Back To The Prisoner's Disks Game |
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79 | (8) |
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4.1 Solving the game by iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies |
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79 | (5) |
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4.2 Dominance and easy rule of behaviour |
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84 | (3) |
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87 | (11) |
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Exercise 1 Dominance in a game in normal form |
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89 | (1) |
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Exercise 2 Dominance by a mixed strategy |
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89 | (1) |
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Exercise 3 Iterated dominance, the order matters |
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90 | (1) |
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Exercise 4 Iterated dominance in asymmetric all pay auctions |
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90 | (1) |
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Exercise 5 Dominance and value of information |
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91 | (1) |
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Exercise 6 Stackelberg first price all pay auction |
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92 | (1) |
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93 | (1) |
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Exercise 8 Pre-emption game in extensive form and normal form, and crossed rationality |
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93 | (1) |
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Exercise 9 Guessing game and crossed rationality |
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94 | (1) |
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Exercise 10 Bertrand duopoly |
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94 | (1) |
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Exercise 11 Traveller's dilemma (Basu's version) |
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95 | (1) |
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Exercise 12 Traveller's dilemma, the students' version |
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95 | (1) |
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Exercise 13 Duel guessing game, the cowboy story |
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95 | (1) |
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Exercise 14 Second price sealed bid auction |
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96 | (1) |
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Exercise 15 Almost common value auction, Bikhchandani and Klemperer's result |
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97 | (1) |
| 3 Nash Equilibrium |
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98 | (52) |
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98 | (1) |
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1 Nash Equilibrium, A First Approach |
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99 | (7) |
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1.1 Definition and existence of Nash equilibrium |
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99 | (1) |
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1.2 Pure strategy Nash equilibria in normal form games and dominated strategies |
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100 | (2) |
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1.3 Mixed strategy Nash equilibria in normal form games |
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102 | (4) |
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2 Nash Equilibria In Extensive Form Games |
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106 | (7) |
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2.1 Nash equilibria in the ascending all pay auction/war of attrition game |
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107 | (3) |
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2.2 Same Nash equilibria in normal form games and extensive form games |
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110 | (3) |
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3 Nash Equilibria Do A Good Job |
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113 | (9) |
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3.1 Nash equilibrium, a good concept in many games |
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113 | (5) |
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3.1.1 All pay auctions with incomplete information |
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113 | (2) |
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3.1.2 First price sealed bid auctions |
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115 | (1) |
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3.1.3 Second price sealed bid auctions, Nash equilibria and the marginal approach |
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116 | (2) |
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3.2 Nash equilibrium and simple rules of behaviour |
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118 | (4) |
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4 Multiplicity Of Nash Equilibria |
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122 | (5) |
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4.1 Multiplicity in normal form games, focal point and talking |
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122 | (1) |
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4.2 Talking in extensive form games |
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123 | (1) |
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4.3 Strange out of equilibrium behaviour, a game with a reduced field of vision |
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124 | (3) |
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5 To Play Or Not To Play A Nash Equilibrium, Cautious Behaviour And Risk Dominance |
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127 | (9) |
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5.1 A logical concept, but not always helpful |
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127 | (3) |
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5.2 Cautious behaviour and risk dominance |
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130 | (6) |
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130 | (3) |
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5.2.2 Ordinal differences, risk dominance |
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133 | (3) |
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136 | (14) |
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Exercise 1 Nash equilibria in a normal form game |
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138 | (1) |
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Exercise 2 Story normal form games |
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138 | (1) |
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138 | (1) |
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Exercise 4 Mixed Nash equilibria and weak dominance |
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139 | (1) |
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Exercise 5 A unique mixed Nash equilibrium |
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139 | (1) |
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Exercise 6 French variant of the rock paper scissors game |
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139 | (1) |
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140 | (1) |
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Exercise 8 Pure strategy Nash equilibria in an extensive form game |
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141 | (1) |
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Exercise 9 Gift exchange game |
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141 | (1) |
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Exercise 10 Behavioural Nash equilibria in an extensive form game |
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142 | (1) |
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Exercise 11 Duel guessing game |
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142 | (1) |
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Exercise 12 Pre-emption game (in extensive and normal forms) |
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142 | (1) |
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Exercise 13 Bertrand duopoly |
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143 | (1) |
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Exercise 14 Guessing game |
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143 | (1) |
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Exercise 15 Traveller's dilemma (Basu) |
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143 | (1) |
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Exercise 16 Traveller's dilemma, students'version, P<49 |
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143 | (1) |
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Exercise 17 Traveller's dilemma, students' version, P>49, and cautious behaviour |
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144 | (1) |
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Exercise 18 Focal point in the traveller's dilemma |
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145 | (1) |
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Exercise 19 Asymmetric all pay auctions |
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145 | (1) |
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Exercise 20 Wallet game, first price auction, winner's curse and a robust equilibrium |
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146 | (1) |
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Exercise 21 Wallet game, first price auction, Nash equilibrium and new stories |
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146 | (1) |
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Exercise 22 Two player wallet game, second price auction, a robust symmetric equilibrium |
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147 | (1) |
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Exercise 23 Two player wallet game, second price auction, asymmetric equilibria |
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147 | (1) |
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Exercise 24 N player wallet game, second price auction, marginal approach |
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147 | (1) |
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Exercise 25 Second price all pay auctions |
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148 | (1) |
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Exercise 26 Single crossing in a first price sealed bid auction |
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148 | (1) |
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Exercise 27 Single crossing and Akerlof's lemon car |
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148 | (1) |
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Exercise 28 Dutch auction and first price sealed bid auction |
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149 | (1) |
| 4 Backward Induction And Repeated Games |
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150 | (57) |
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150 | (1) |
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1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium And Backward Induction |
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151 | (3) |
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1.1 Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium and Nash equilibrium |
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151 | (2) |
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153 | (1) |
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2 Backward Induction, Dominance And The Good Job Of Backward Induction/Subgame Perfection |
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154 | (6) |
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2.1 Backward induction and dominance |
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154 | (2) |
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2.2 The good job of backward induction/subgame perfection |
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156 | (4) |
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2.2.1 Backward induction and the Fort Boyard sticks game |
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156 | (2) |
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2.2.2 Backward induction and negotiation games |
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158 | (2) |
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3 When The Job Of Backward Induction/ Subgame Perfection Becomes Less Good |
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160 | (9) |
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3.1 Backward induction, forward induction or thresholds? |
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160 | (3) |
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3.2 Inconsistency of backward induction, forward induction or momentary insanity? |
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163 | (2) |
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3.3 When backward induction leads to very strange results |
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165 | (4) |
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4 Finitely Repeated Games |
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169 | (10) |
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4.1 Subgame Perfection in finitely repeated normal form games |
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169 | (6) |
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4.1.1 New behaviour in finitely repeated normal form games |
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169 | (4) |
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4.1.2 New behaviour, which links with the facts? |
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173 | (1) |
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4.1.3 Repetition and backward induction's inconsistency |
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174 | (1) |
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4.2 Subgame perfection in finitely repeated extensive form games |
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175 | (4) |
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4.2.1 A forbidden transformation |
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176 | (1) |
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4.2.2 New behaviour in repeated extensive form games |
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177 | (2) |
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5 Infinitely Repeated Games |
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179 | (16) |
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5.1 Adapted backward induction |
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179 | (1) |
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5.2 Infinitely repeated normal form games |
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180 | (13) |
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5.2.1 New behaviour in infinitely repeated normal form games, a first approach |
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180 | (2) |
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5.2.2 Minmax values, individually rational payoffs, folk theorem |
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182 | (2) |
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5.2.3 Building new behaviour with the folk theorem |
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184 | (5) |
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5.2.4 Punishing and rewarding in practice |
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189 | (4) |
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5.3 Infinitely repeated extensive form games |
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193 | (2) |
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195 | (12) |
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Exercise 1 Stackelberg all pay auction, backward induction and dominance |
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198 | (1) |
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Exercise 2 Duel guessing game |
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198 | (1) |
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Exercise 3 Centipede pre-emption game, backward induction and the students' way of playing |
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199 | (1) |
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Exercise 4 How to share a shrinking pie |
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200 | (1) |
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Exercise 5 English all pay auction |
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201 | (1) |
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Exercise 6 General sequential all pay auction, invest a max if you can |
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201 | (1) |
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Exercise 7 Gift exchange game |
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202 | (1) |
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Exercise 8 Repeated games and strict dominance |
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203 | (1) |
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Exercise 9 Three repetitions are better than two |
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203 | (1) |
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Exercise 10 Alternate rewards in repeated games |
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204 | (1) |
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Exercise 11 Subgame perfection in Rubinstein's finite bargaining game |
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204 | (1) |
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Exercise 12 Subgame perfection in Rubinstein's infinite bargaining game |
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204 | (1) |
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Exercise 13 Gradualism and endogenous offers in a bargaining game, Li's insights |
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205 | (1) |
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Exercise 14 Infinite repetition of the traveller's dilemma game |
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205 | (1) |
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Exercise 15 Infinite repetition of the gift exchange game |
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205 | (2) |
| 5 Trembles In A Game |
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207 | (43) |
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207 | (1) |
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1 Selten's Perfect Equilibrium |
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208 | (8) |
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1.1 Selten's horse, what's the impact of perturbing strategies? |
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208 | (1) |
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1.2 Selten's perfect/trembling hand equilibrium |
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209 | (1) |
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1.3 Applications and properties of the perfect equilibrium |
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210 | (6) |
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1.3.1 Selten's horse, trembles and strictly dominated strategies |
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210 | (3) |
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1.3.2 Trembles and completely mixed behavioural strategies |
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213 | (1) |
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1.3.3 Trembles and weakly dominated strategies |
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214 | (2) |
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2 Selten's Closest Relatives, Kreps, Wilson, Harsany And Myerson: Sequential Equilibrium, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium And Proper Equilibrium |
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216 | (11) |
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2.1 Kreps and Wilson's sequential equilibrium: the introduction of beliefs |
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216 | (5) |
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2.1.1 Beliefs and strategies: consistency and sequential rationality |
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216 | (2) |
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2.1.2 Applications of the sequential equilibrium |
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218 | (3) |
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2.2 Harsanyi's perfect Bayesian equilibrium |
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221 | (4) |
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2.2.1 Definition, first application and links with the sequential equilibrium |
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221 | (3) |
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2.2.2 French plea-bargaining and perfect Bayesian equilibria |
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224 | (1) |
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2.3 Any perturbations or only a selection of some of them? Myerson's proper equilibrium |
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225 | (2) |
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3 Shaking Of The Game Structure |
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227 | (8) |
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3.1 When only a strong structural change matters, Myerson's carrier pigeon game |
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227 | (2) |
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3.2 Small change, a lack of upper hemicontinuity in equilibrium strategies |
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229 | (1) |
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3.3 Large changes, a lack of upper hemicontinuity in equilibrium payoffs |
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229 | (3) |
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3.4 Very large changes, a lack of lower hemicontinuity in equilibrium behaviours and payoffs, Rubinstein's e-mail game |
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232 | (3) |
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4 Perturbing Payoffs And Best Responses In A Given Way |
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235 | (6) |
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4.1 Trembling-hand perfection |
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236 | (2) |
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238 | (2) |
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240 | (1) |
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241 | (9) |
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Exercise 1 Perfect and proper equilibrium |
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243 | (1) |
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Exercise 2 Perfect equilibrium with weakly dominated strategies |
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243 | (1) |
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Exercise 3 Perfect equilibrium and incompatible perturbations |
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244 | (1) |
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Exercise 4 Strict sequential equiliubrium |
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245 | (1) |
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Exercise 5 Sequential equilibrium, inertia in the players' beliefs |
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245 | (1) |
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Exercise 6 Construct the set of sequential equilibria |
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246 | (1) |
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Exercise 7 Perfect equilibrium, why the normal form is inadequate, a link to the trembling-hand equilibrium |
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246 | (1) |
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Exercise 8 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium |
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247 | (1) |
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Exercise 9 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a complex semi separating equilibrium |
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247 | (1) |
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Exercise 10 Lemon cars, experience good market with two qualities |
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248 | (1) |
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Exercise 11 Lemon cars, experience good market with n qualities |
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248 | (1) |
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Exercise 12 Perfect Bayesian equilibria in alternate negotiation with incomplete information |
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249 | (1) |
| 6 Solving A Game Differently |
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250 | (49) |
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250 | (1) |
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250 | (10) |
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1.1 Definitions and links with correlation and the Nash equilibrium |
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251 | (3) |
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1.1.1 Best reply matching, a new way to work with mixed strategies |
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251 | (2) |
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1.1.2 Link between best reply matching equilibria and Nash equilibria |
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253 | (1) |
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1.1.3 Link between best reply matching equilibria and correlated equilibria |
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253 | (1) |
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1.2 Auction games, best reply matching fits with intuition |
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254 | (3) |
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1.3 Best reply matching in ascending all pay auctions |
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257 | (2) |
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1.4 Limits of best reply matching |
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259 | (1) |
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2 Halpern And Pass's Regret Minimization |
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260 | (11) |
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2.1 A new story game, the traveller's dilemma |
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260 | (3) |
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263 | (3) |
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263 | (1) |
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2.2.2 Regret minimization and the traveller's dilemma |
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264 | (1) |
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2.2.3 Regret minimization and the envelope game |
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265 | (1) |
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2.3 Regret minimization in the ascending all pay auction/war of attrition: a switch from normal form to extensive form |
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266 | (2) |
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2.4 The limits of regret minimization |
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268 | (3) |
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2.4.1 A deeper look into all pay auctions/wars of attrition |
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268 | (2) |
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2.4.2 Regret minimization: a too limited rationality in easy games |
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270 | (1) |
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271 | (7) |
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3.1 Basic level-k reasoning in guessing games and other games |
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271 | (3) |
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3.1.1 Basic level-k reasoning in guessing games |
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271 | (2) |
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3.1.2 Basic level-k reasoning in the envelope game and in the traveller's dilemma game |
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273 | (1) |
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3.2 A more sophisticated level-k reasoning in guessing games |
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274 | (2) |
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3.3 Level-k reasoning versus iterated dominance, some limits of level-k reasoning |
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276 | (2) |
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3.3.1 Risky behaviour and decreasing wins |
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276 | (1) |
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3.3.2 Level-k reasoning is riskier than iterated dominance |
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277 | (1) |
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3.3.3 Something odd with basic level-k reasoning? |
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278 | (1) |
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278 | (11) |
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4.1 Kohlberg and Mertens' stable equilibrium set concept |
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279 | (3) |
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4.2 The large family of forward induction criteria with starting points |
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282 | (5) |
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4.2.1 Selten's horse and Kohlberg's self-enforcing concept |
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282 | (1) |
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4.2.2 Local versus global interpretations of actions |
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283 | (4) |
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4.3 The power of forward induction through applications |
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287 | (2) |
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4.3.1 French plea-bargaining and forward induction |
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287 | (1) |
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4.3.2 The repeated battle of the sexes or another version of burning money |
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288 | (1) |
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289 | (10) |
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Exercise 1 Best reply matching in a normal form game |
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291 | (1) |
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Exercise 2 Best reply matching in the traveller's dilemma |
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291 | (1) |
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Exercise 3 Best reply matching in the pre-emption game |
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292 | (1) |
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Exercise 4 Minimizing regret in a normal form game |
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293 | (1) |
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Exercise 5 Minimizing regret in Bertrand's duopoly |
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293 | (1) |
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Exercise 6 Minimizing regret in the pre-emption game |
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293 | (1) |
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Exercise 7 Minimizing regret in the traveller's dilemma |
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294 | (1) |
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Exercise 8 Level-k reasoning in an asymmetric normal form game |
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295 | (1) |
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Exercise 9 Level-1 and level-k reasoning in Basu's traveller's dilemma |
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295 | (1) |
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Exercise 10 level-1 and level-k reasoning in the students' traveller's dilemma |
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295 | (1) |
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Exercise 11 Stable equilibrium, perfect equilibrium and perturbations |
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295 | (1) |
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Exercise 12 Four different forward induction criteria and some dynamics |
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296 | (1) |
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Exercise 13 Forward induction and the experience good market |
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296 | (1) |
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Exercise 14 Forward induction and alternate negotiation |
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297 | (2) |
| Answers To Exercises |
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299 | (138) |
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301 | (15) |
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Answers 1 Easy strategy sets |
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301 | (1) |
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Answers 2 Children game, how to share a pie equally |
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301 | (1) |
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Answers 3 Children game, the bazooka game, an endless game |
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301 | (1) |
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Answers 4 Syndicate game: who will be the free rider? |
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302 | (1) |
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Answers 5 Rosenthal's centipede (pre-emption) game, reduced normal form game |
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303 | (2) |
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Answers 6 Duel guessing game, a zero sum game |
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305 | (2) |
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Answers 7 Akerlof's lemon car, experience good model, switching from an extensive form signalling game to its normal form |
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307 | (2) |
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Answers 8 Behavioural strategies and mixed strategies, how to switch from the first to the second and vice versa? |
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309 | (3) |
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Answers 9 Dutch auction and first price sealed bid auction, strategic equivalence of different games |
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312 | (4) |
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316 | (20) |
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Answers 1 Dominance in a game in normal form |
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316 | (1) |
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Answers 2 Dominance by a mixed strategy |
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316 | (1) |
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Answers 3 Iterated dominance, the order matters |
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317 | (1) |
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Answers 4 Iterated dominance in asymmetric all pay auctions |
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317 | (2) |
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Answers 5 Dominance and value of information |
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319 | (1) |
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Answers 6 Stackelberg first price all pay auction |
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320 | (1) |
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321 | (1) |
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Answers 8 Pre-emption game in extensive form and normal form, and crossed rationality |
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322 | (1) |
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Answers 9 Guessing game and crossed rationality |
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323 | (1) |
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Answers 10 Bertrand duopoly |
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324 | (1) |
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Answers 11 Traveller's dilemma (Basu's version) |
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325 | (1) |
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Answers 12 Traveller's dilemma, the students' version |
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326 | (1) |
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Answers 13 Duel guessing game, the cowboy story |
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327 | (4) |
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Answers 14 Second price sealed bid auction |
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331 | (2) |
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Answers 15 Almost common value auction, Bikhchandani and Klemperer's result |
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333 | (3) |
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336 | (30) |
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Answers 1 Nash equilibria in a normal form game |
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336 | (1) |
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Answers 2 Story normal form games |
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337 | (1) |
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338 | (1) |
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Answers 4 Mixed Nash equilibria and weak dominance |
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339 | (1) |
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Answers 5 A unique mixed Nash equilibrium |
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339 | (1) |
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Answers 6 French variant of the rock paper scissors game |
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340 | (1) |
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341 | (1) |
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Answers 8 Pure strategy Nash equilibria in an extensive form game |
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342 | (1) |
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Answers 9 Gift exchange game |
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342 | (1) |
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Answers 10 Behavioural Nash equilibria in an extensive form game |
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343 | (1) |
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Answers 11 Duel guessing game |
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344 | (1) |
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Answers 12 Pre-emption game (in extensive and normal forms) |
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345 | (2) |
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Answers 13 Bertrand duopoly |
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347 | (1) |
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348 | (1) |
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Answers 15 Traveller's dilemma (Basu) |
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348 | (2) |
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Answers 16 Traveller's dilemma, students' version, P<49 |
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350 | (1) |
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Answers 17 Traveller's dilemma, students' version, P>49, and cautious behaviour |
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351 | (1) |
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Answers 18 Focal point in the traveller's dilemma |
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352 | (1) |
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Answers 19 Asymmetric all pay auctions |
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352 | (2) |
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Answers 20 Wallet game, first price auction, winner's curse and a robust equilibrium |
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354 | (1) |
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Answers 21 Wallet game, first price auction, Nash equilibrium and new stories |
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355 | (1) |
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Answers 22 Two player wallet game, second price auction, a robust symmetric equilibrium |
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356 | (1) |
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Answers 23 Two player wallet game, second price auction, asymmetric equilibria |
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357 | (2) |
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Answers 24 N player wallet game, second price auction, marginal approach |
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359 | (1) |
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Answers 25 Second price all pay auctions |
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360 | (1) |
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Answers 26 Single crossing in a first price sealed bid auction |
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361 | (1) |
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Answers 27 Single crossing and Akerlof's lemon car |
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362 | (1) |
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Answers 28 Dutch auction and first price sealed bid auction |
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363 | (3) |
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4 Backward Induction And Repeated Games |
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366 | (29) |
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Answers 1 Stackelberg all pay auction, backward induction and dominance |
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366 | (1) |
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Answers 2 Duel guessing game |
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367 | (1) |
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Answers 3 Centipede pre-emption game, backward induction and the students' way of playing |
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368 | (2) |
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Answers 4 How to share a shrinking pie |
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370 | (1) |
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Answers 5 English all pay auction |
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371 | (2) |
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Answers 6 General sequential all pay auction, invest a max if you can |
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373 | (2) |
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Answers 7 Gift exchange game |
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375 | (1) |
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Answers 8 Repeated games and strict dominance |
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376 | (2) |
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Answers 9 Three repetitions are better than two |
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378 | (1) |
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Answers 10 Alternate rewards in repeated games |
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379 | (1) |
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Answers 11 Subgame perfection in Rubinstein's finite bargaining game |
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380 | (3) |
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Answers 12 Subgame perfection in Rubinstein's infinite bargaining game |
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383 | (1) |
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Answers 13 Gradualism and endogenous offers in a bargaining game, Li's insights |
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384 | (1) |
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Answers 14 Infinite repetition of the traveller's dilemma game |
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385 | (8) |
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Answers 15 Infinite repetition of the gift exchange game |
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393 | (2) |
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395 | (19) |
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Answers 1 Perfect and proper equilibrium |
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395 | (1) |
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Answers 2 Perfect equilibrium with weakly dominated strategies |
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396 | (2) |
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Answers 3 Perfect equilibrium and incompatible perturbations |
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398 | (1) |
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Answers 4 Strict sequential equilibrium |
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399 | (1) |
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Answers 5 Sequential equilibrium, inertia in the players' beliefs |
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399 | (2) |
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Answers 6 Construct the set of sequential equilibria |
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401 | (1) |
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Answers 7 Perfect equilibrium, why the normal form is inadequate, a link to the trembling-hand equilibrium |
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402 | (2) |
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Answers 8 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium |
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404 | (2) |
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Answers 9 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, a complex semi separating equilibrium |
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406 | (1) |
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Answers 10 Lemon cars, experience good market with two qualities |
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407 | (1) |
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Answers 11 Lemon cars, experience good market with n qualities |
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408 | (2) |
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Answers 12 Perfect Bayesian equlibria in alternate negotiation with incomplete information |
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410 | (4) |
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6 Solving A Game Differently |
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414 | (23) |
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Answers 1 Best reply matching in a normal form game |
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414 | (2) |
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Answers 2 Best-reply matching in the traveller's dilemma |
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416 | (3) |
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Answers 3 Best-reply matching in the pre-emption game |
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419 | (2) |
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Answers 4 Minimizing regret in a normal form game |
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421 | (1) |
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Answers 5 Minimizing regret in Bertrand's duopoly |
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422 | (1) |
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Answers 6 Minimizing regret in the pre-emption game |
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423 | (1) |
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Answers 7 Minimizing regret in the traveller's dilemma |
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424 | (2) |
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Answers 8 Level-k reasoning in an asymmetric normal form game |
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426 | (1) |
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Answers 9 Level-1 and level-k reasoning in Basu's traveller's dilemma |
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426 | (3) |
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Answers 10 Level-1 and level-k reasoning in the students' traveller's dilemma |
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429 | (2) |
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Answers 11 Stable equilibrium, perfect equilibrium and perturbations |
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431 | (2) |
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Answers 12 Four different forward induction criteria and some dynamics |
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433 | (1) |
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Answers 13 Forward induction and the experience good market |
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434 | (1) |
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Answers 14 Forward induction and alternate negotiation |
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435 | (2) |
| Index |
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437 | |
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