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E-grāmata: Geopolitics of U.S. Overseas Troops and Withdrawal

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Why is it so difficult for a great power or a hegemon to retrench its overseas military power? Specifically, why are U.S. military bases and troops still largely where they were five years ago, twenty years ago, or even seventy years ago? Through developing a theory of great-power persistence, this book offers an explanation. Closely aligned with neoclassical realism, the theory argues that the murkiness of the anarchic international system combines with specific psychological inclinations of individuals to produce “better-safe-than-sorry” policies. In the United States, decisions on troop deployments are powerfully influenced by the broader foreign-policy community. Its members tend to be risk-averse and highly sensitive to the possibility that even minor troop withdrawals might set off harmful geopolitical chain reactions. Preferring the status quo over any uncertain alternative, they want their country to continue to maximize its influence and project its military power abroad in order to steady wobbling geopolitical “dominoes.” The theory is put to the empirical test through a systematic analysis of U.S. overseas troop deployments, withdrawal attempts, and retrenchment resistance during the presidency of Donald Trump, which represents an ideal test case for these mechanisms. Even if U.S. voters elected a retrenchment advocate as president, and despite that the United States is a gradually declining power, the period saw very little change in U.S. overseas troop deployments. The book concludes that, barring any dramatic, unforeseeable international event, the vast network of overseas U.S. military bases and troops is likely to persist for a long time to come.

1 Introduction
1(24)
The Stayers Trump the Leavers
1(9)
The Great Continuity of U.S. Overseas Bases and Troops
2(1)
Stayers and Leavers
3(1)
The Election of a Leaver
4(2)
The Leaver Who Didn't Leave
6(2)
The Literature on U.S. Overseas Bases and Troops
8(2)
The Theory, the Arguments, and the
Chapters
10(8)
A Theory of Great-Power Persistence
10(2)
The Theory's Scope
12(2)
The Book's Structure
14(4)
References
18(7)
2 Stayers, Leavers, and U.S. Overseas Troops
25(42)
Power and Hegemony and the U.S. Military-Base Network
26(10)
Power and Geography
27(1)
The Emergence of a Superpower
28(2)
The Geography of U.S. Bases and Troops
30(4)
Power-as-Resources and Power-as-Influence
34(2)
Grand Strategies of the United States
36(7)
Pax Americana and the Stayers of the Blob
36(2)
The Offshore Balancers
38(3)
The Primacists
41(2)
Domestic Forces Counteracting Retrenchment
43(15)
Trump: The Firebrand Upholder of Continuity!
45(2)
Trump's Transactional Diplomacy
47(4)
Institutional Inertia and Domestic Constraints on a Leaver
51(3)
U.S. Public Opinion
54(1)
Vested Interests at Home and Abroad
55(3)
References
58(9)
3 Political Realism and Structural Constraints on Retrenchment
67(34)
Neoclassical Realism and System-Level Dominoes
68(11)
Pre-Empting Adverse Geopolitical Chain Reactions
68(1)
The Multi-Level Approach of Neoclassical Realism
69(2)
Systemic Constraints and the Balance of Power
71(3)
Opening Up the Black Box of the State
74(2)
Domestic Guardians of Primacy
76(3)
System-Level Forces Conducive to Retrenchment
79(8)
The Rise and Fall of Great Powers
80(2)
Perceptions of Power
82(2)
Self-inflicted Geopolitical Wounds
84(3)
Why Systemic Incentives Discourage Retrenchment
87(8)
The Pessimism of Realism
88(3)
Maximizing Influence in a Murky World
91(1)
Relative Power and the Scope for Retrenchment
92(3)
References
95(6)
4 The System, the Psyche, and the Stayers
101(40)
Prospect Theory and International Security
102(8)
Bad Is Badder Than Good Is Good
103(1)
Prospect Theory, Loss Aversion, and the Status-Quo Bias
104(2)
Changes to the Reference Point
106(2)
Prospect Theory and the International Relations Literature
108(2)
Threat Sensitivity and System-Level Dominoes
110(9)
Threat Sensitivity in Games of Strategy
111(2)
The Domino Theory
113(2)
Dominoes and Political Realism
115(2)
The Domino Skeptics
117(2)
Great Powers and the Domino Theory
119(6)
The Vietnam Domino
119(2)
Dominoes of Old
121(3)
Dominoes in U.S. History
124(1)
Domino Types and the Credibility Quandary
125(9)
Dominoes Big, Small, and Smaller Still
125(4)
Reputation, Credibility, and Dominoes
129(2)
Scholars, Policymakers, and Falling Dominoes
131(3)
References
134(7)
5 The Geopolitical Logic of U.S. Overseas Troops
141(30)
Overseas Troops as Domino Management
142(6)
U.S. Troops for Deterrence
143(2)
U.S. Troops for Reassurance and Order
145(3)
Geopolitics and Prized Pieces of Geography
148(4)
Geography, Geopolitics, and Geostrategy
148(2)
Islands and Ports and Sea Lanes of Communication
150(2)
Classical Geopolitics and the Permanent Interests of a Sea Power
152(11)
Halford Mackinder and the Heartland
153(2)
Mackinder and the Geostrategy of Sea Powers
155(2)
Nicholas Spykman and Bases for the Balance of Power
157(3)
A Network of Bases on (Rim)land and at Sea
160(3)
Expectations for the Empirical Analysis
163(5)
Power
164(1)
History and Psychology
165(2)
Geography
167(1)
References
168(3)
6 U.S. Overseas Troops: Empirical Patterns, 2017-2021
171(32)
Domino Narratives
171(3)
The Numbers (and Their Defects)
174(8)
The Data
175(1)
Caveats
176(2)
The Missing Bits: Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan
178(3)
U.S. Troops in the Middle East
181(1)
Global and Regional Patterns
182(10)
U.S. Troops and Power After the Cold War
183(2)
Total Troop Numbers Under Trump
185(2)
Regional Troop Numbers Under Trump
187(3)
The Americas
190(2)
References
192(11)
7 Regional Domino Narratives and the Geopolitics of Withdrawal
203(66)
The African Dominoes
203(3)
Enduring Dominoes in the Middle East
206(14)
Troop Withdrawal and Domino Warnings, the First Syrian Version
207(2)
Troop Withdrawal and Domino Warnings, the Second Syrian Version
209(3)
Push Factors and a Partial Withdrawal from Iraq
212(3)
The Persistence of U.S. Military Bases in the Middle East
215(2)
Why the Stayers Prevailed
217(3)
The Impending Fall of the Afghan Dominoes
220(7)
A Leaver and His Troop Surge
221(2)
The Withdrawal Begins
223(1)
The Domino Warnings That Came to Naught
224(3)
The Geopolitics of U.S. Troops and Withdrawal in Europe
227(8)
A Network of U.S. Bases and Troops in Europe
228(1)
U.S. Troops for Deterrence of a Russian Bear
229(3)
An Order to Leave Germany
232(1)
The Stayers Push Back
233(2)
U.S. Troops in a Rising Asia-Pacific
235(11)
Dominoes Big and Small
237(1)
The Geopolitics of U.S. Bases and Troops in Asia-Pacific
238(2)
Troops to Balance China
240(2)
Withdrawal Threats and Bargaining Over Cost-Sharing
242(2)
The Leavers Are Stayers
244(2)
References
246(23)
8 Conclusion: Whither U.S. Overseas Troops?
269(26)
The Biden Presidency and the Afghan Debacle
270(7)
Joe Biden and U.S. Overseas Troops--Early Indications
270(3)
Withdrawal from Afghanistan
273(1)
An Afghan Domino and the Manifestation of Geopolitical Chain Reactions
274(3)
Ten Conclusions from the Book
277(7)
A Leaver's Clash with the Stayers
277(2)
System, Psychology, and the Specter of Falling Dominoes
279(2)
Power, Credibility, and Geography
281(3)
What Could Make America Retrench!
284(4)
References
288(7)
Index 295
Jo Jakobsen is Professor at the Department of Sociology and Political Science, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim, Norway. His doctoral dissertation earned him the 2008 Prize for Young Excellent Researchers in the Humanities and Social Sciences from the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences and Letters. He has since published widely in the fields of international security, geopolitical risk, and international political economy. He received the Bernard Brodie Prize for the best article published in Contemporary Security Policy in 2019.