|
|
x | |
Preface |
|
xi | |
|
|
1 | (14) |
|
1.1 More Frequent, More Expensive, Harder to Avoid |
|
|
1 | (4) |
|
1.2 Economics, Finance, and History |
|
|
5 | (4) |
|
|
9 | (6) |
|
|
15 | (52) |
|
1 Categories and Risk Factors |
|
|
17 | (26) |
|
1.1 An Introduction to Financial Crises |
|
|
17 | (3) |
|
1.2 Categories of Financial Crises |
|
|
20 | (2) |
|
|
22 | (18) |
|
|
24 | (4) |
|
|
28 | (2) |
|
1.3.3 Weak Supervision and Regulation |
|
|
30 | (1) |
|
1.3.4 Capital Market Liberalization |
|
|
31 | (2) |
|
1.3.5 Overvalued Currencies |
|
|
33 | (2) |
|
1.3.6 Large Trade Deficits |
|
|
35 | (2) |
|
1.3.7 Excessive Debt Levels |
|
|
37 | (3) |
|
1.4 What Do We Really Know? |
|
|
40 | (3) |
|
2 Growth, Globalization, and Financial Crises |
|
|
43 | (24) |
|
2.1 Modem Economic Growth |
|
|
43 | (3) |
|
2.2 Modem Globalization's First Wave: 1914-1950 |
|
|
46 | (5) |
|
2.2.1 Open Capital Markets |
|
|
47 | (1) |
|
|
48 | (1) |
|
|
49 | (2) |
|
2.3 Interwar Instability, 1914-1950 |
|
|
51 | (4) |
|
|
52 | (1) |
|
2.3.2 Gold and the Great Depression |
|
|
53 | (2) |
|
2.4 Bretton Woods and the Golden Age, 1950-1973 |
|
|
55 | (6) |
|
2.4.1 The Bretton Woods Exchange Rate System |
|
|
57 | (1) |
|
2.4.2 The End of Bretton Woods |
|
|
58 | (3) |
|
2.5 The Second Globalization Wave, 1973 to the Present |
|
|
61 | (3) |
|
2.5.1 Factors Behind the Increase in Financial Crises |
|
|
62 | (2) |
|
|
64 | (3) |
|
PART II FIVE CASE STUDIES |
|
|
67 | (116) |
|
3 The Great Depression, 1929-1939 |
|
|
69 | (23) |
|
3.1 Why Study the Great Depression? |
|
|
69 | (3) |
|
3.2 Factors Leading Up to the Depression |
|
|
72 | (4) |
|
3.3 What Caused the Great Depression? |
|
|
76 | (3) |
|
|
79 | (2) |
|
3.5 The Monetarist Response |
|
|
81 | (2) |
|
3.6 Two Complications to the Monetarist Story |
|
|
83 | (4) |
|
3.7 Economic Recovery and Relapse |
|
|
87 | (3) |
|
|
90 | (2) |
|
4 The Latin American Debt Crisis, 1982-1989 |
|
|
92 | (26) |
|
4.1 Conditions Leading Up to the Crisis |
|
|
92 | (2) |
|
4.2 The IMF's First Global Crisis |
|
|
94 | (3) |
|
|
97 | (2) |
|
|
99 | (4) |
|
4.5 The Search for Solutions |
|
|
103 | (5) |
|
4.6 The Return of Capital Flows |
|
|
108 | (1) |
|
|
109 | (5) |
|
4.8 From Latin America to East Asia |
|
|
114 | (4) |
|
5 The Asian Crisis, 1997-1999 |
|
|
118 | (25) |
|
5.1 Stable Economies and Rapid Growth |
|
|
118 | (2) |
|
5.2 Explanations for Rapid Growth |
|
|
120 | (4) |
|
5.3 The Onset of the Crisis in Thailand |
|
|
124 | (4) |
|
5.4 Contagion and Common Fundamentals |
|
|
128 | (4) |
|
|
132 | (3) |
|
|
135 | (8) |
|
6 The Subprime Crisis in the United States |
|
|
143 | (22) |
|
|
143 | (9) |
|
|
152 | (6) |
|
|
154 | (2) |
|
6.2.2 Maintaining Credit Availability |
|
|
156 | (2) |
|
|
158 | (7) |
|
|
159 | (2) |
|
|
161 | (2) |
|
|
163 | (2) |
|
7 The Financial Crisis in Europe |
|
|
165 | (18) |
|
7.1 The Single Currency Project |
|
|
165 | (4) |
|
|
169 | (2) |
|
7.3 Bank Debt Becomes National Debt |
|
|
171 | (2) |
|
|
173 | (3) |
|
|
176 | (3) |
|
|
179 | (4) |
|
|
183 | (113) |
|
8 Markets Do Not Self-Regulate |
|
|
185 | (12) |
|
8.1 Overconfidence in the Market |
|
|
185 | (4) |
|
|
189 | (4) |
|
|
193 | (4) |
|
|
197 | (15) |
|
|
197 | (2) |
|
|
199 | (2) |
|
|
201 | (1) |
|
9.4 Regulators and Incentives |
|
|
202 | (2) |
|
9.5 Shadow Bank Depositors |
|
|
204 | (2) |
|
9.6 Bank Panics with Shadow Banks |
|
|
206 | (2) |
|
|
208 | (4) |
|
10 Banks Need More Capital, Less Debt |
|
|
212 | (12) |
|
10.1 Other People's Money |
|
|
212 | (2) |
|
|
214 | (3) |
|
10.3 Limits to Risk Models |
|
|
217 | (2) |
|
10.4 Resistance to Increasing Capital |
|
|
219 | (2) |
|
10.5 Capital and Risk Reduction |
|
|
221 | (3) |
|
11 Monetary Policy Does Not Always Work |
|
|
224 | (13) |
|
|
224 | (1) |
|
11.2 The Rise of Monetary Policy |
|
|
225 | (3) |
|
11.3 New Classical Economics |
|
|
228 | (2) |
|
11.4 The Great Moderation |
|
|
230 | (2) |
|
|
232 | (5) |
|
12 Fiscal Multipliers Are Larger Than Expected |
|
|
237 | (15) |
|
|
237 | (2) |
|
12.2 The Keynesian Consensus |
|
|
239 | (2) |
|
|
241 | (2) |
|
|
243 | (2) |
|
12.5 Keynesians and Anti-Keynesians |
|
|
245 | (3) |
|
12.6 Testing Ideas with a Crisis |
|
|
248 | (4) |
|
13 Monetary Integration Requires Fiscal Integration |
|
|
252 | (14) |
|
13.1 The Grand Experiment |
|
|
252 | (1) |
|
13.2 The United States Is a Monetary and Fiscal Union |
|
|
253 | (3) |
|
13.3 The Euro and Optimal Currency Areas |
|
|
256 | (1) |
|
|
257 | (4) |
|
13.5 Missing Institutions |
|
|
261 | (5) |
|
14 Open Capital Markets Can Be Dangerous |
|
|
266 | (13) |
|
14.1 Assume There Are Benefits |
|
|
266 | (1) |
|
14.2 Capital Market Liberalization Defined |
|
|
267 | (3) |
|
14.3 From Open Capital Markets to a Financial Crisis |
|
|
270 | (4) |
|
14.4 Open Capital Markets and Economic Growth |
|
|
274 | (3) |
|
14.5 Should Countries Close Their Capital Markets? |
|
|
277 | (2) |
|
15 Not All Debt Is Created Equal |
|
|
279 | (17) |
|
15.1 Fear of a US Debt Crisis |
|
|
279 | (3) |
|
15.2 Households, Businesses, and Governments |
|
|
282 | (2) |
|
15.3 Sovereign Debt Crises |
|
|
284 | (4) |
|
15.4 A Second Look at the United States |
|
|
288 | (4) |
|
|
292 | (4) |
Conclusion |
|
296 | (8) |
Abbreviations and Acronyms |
|
304 | (2) |
Bibliography |
|
306 | (21) |
Index |
|
327 | |