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E-grāmata: Guidelines for Initiating Events and Independent Protection Layers in Layer of Protection Analysis

  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 03-Feb-2015
  • Izdevniecība: Wiley-AIChE
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781118948712
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  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 03-Feb-2015
  • Izdevniecība: Wiley-AIChE
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781118948712
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The book is a guide for Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) practitioners.   It explains the onion skin model and in particular, how it relates to the use of LOPA and the need for non-safety instrumented independent protection layers. It provides specific guidance on Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) that are not Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS).  Using the LOPA methodology, companies typically take credit for risk reductions accomplished through non-SIS alternatives; i.e. administrative procedures, equipment design, etc.   It addresses issues such as how to ensure the effectiveness and maintain reliability for administrative controls or inherently safer, passive concepts. This book will address how the fields of Human Reliability Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, Inherent Safety, Audits and Assessments, Maintenance, and Emergency Response relate to LOPA and SIS. 

The book will separate IPLs into categories such as the following:





Inherent Safety

eliminates a scenario or fundamentally reduces a hazard



Preventive/Proactive

prevents initiating event from occurring such as enhanced maintenance



Preventive/Active

stops chain of events after initiating event occurs but before an incident has occurred such as high level in a tank shutting off the pump.



Mitigation (active or passive)

minimizes impact once an incident has occurred such as closing block valves once LEL is detected in the dike (active) or the dike preventing contamination of groundwater (passive).
List of Data Tables xi
Acronyms and Abbreviations xv
Glossary xix
Acknowledgments xxv
Preface xxix
1 Introduction 1(15)
1.1 Audience
2(1)
1.2 Scope
3(1)
1.3 Key Changes Since the Initial LOPA Concept Book
4(2)
1.4 Recap of LOPA
6(4)
1.4.1 What Is LOPA?
6(2)
1.4.2 Common Elements of LOPA
8(1)
1.4.3 When to Use LOPA
8(2)
1.4.4 Inherently Safer Processes and LOPA
10(1)
1.4.5 Advanced LOPA Techniques
10(1)
1.5 Disclaimer
10(1)
1.6 Linkage to Other CCPS Publications
11(2)
1.7 Annotated Description of
Chapters
13(3)
2 Overview: Initiating Events and Independent Protection Layers 16(18)
2.1 LOPA Elements: An Overview
16(1)
2.2 Management Systems to Support LOPA
16(2)
2.3 Scenario Selection
18(2)
2.4 Overview of Scenario Frequency
20(8)
2.4.1 Scenario Definition and Level of Analysis
20(1)
2.4.2 Equipment Failure Rate Considerations
21(1)
2.4.3 Human Error Rate Considerations
22(1)
2.4.4 Failure and Error Rate Data Sources
23(4)
2.4.5 Validation of Failure/Error Rate Data
27(1)
2.5 Overview of Consequences
28(1)
2.5.1 Evaluation of Consequence Severity
28(1)
2.5.2 Inherently Safer Design and Consequence Severity
29(1)
2.6 Risk Considerations
29(2)
2.6.1 Risk Assessment Methodologies
30(1)
2.6.2 Risk Criteria
30(1)
2.7 Conclusions
31(3)
3 Core Attributes 34(24)
3.1 Introduction to Core Attributes
34(1)
3.2 Independence
35(5)
3.2.1 Dependent Safety Systems
36(1)
3.2.2 Common Cause Failure
36(2)
3.2.3 Common Cause Modeled as Initiating Events
38(1)
3.2.4 Advanced Methods for Addressing Common Cause
39(1)
3.2.5 Common Cause Reflected in the Data Tables
40(1)
3.3 Functionality
40(7)
3.3.1 Time Dependency
41(3)
3.3.2 SCAI and Response Time
44(1)
3.3.3 Human-Based IPLs and Response Time
45(2)
3.4 Integrity
47(2)
3.4.1 Integrity of Equipment
48(1)
3.4.2 Integrity as Related to Human IPLs
48(1)
3.4.3 Revealed versus Unrevealed Failure
48(1)
3.5 Reliability
49(3)
3.5.1 Low Demand Mode
50(1)
3.5.2 High Demand Mode
50(2)
3.6 Auditability
52(1)
3.7 Access Security
53(1)
3.8 Management of Change
54(1)
3.9 Use of Data Tables
55(3)
4 Example Initiating Events and IE Frequencies 58(58)
4.1 Overview of Initiating Events
58(1)
4.2 Inherently Safer Design and Initiating Event Frequency
59(1)
4.3 Specific Initiating Events for Use in LOPA
60(53)
4.3.1 Instrumented System Initiating Events
62(5)
4.3.2 Human Error Initiating Events
67(6)
4.3.3 Active Mechanical Component Initiating Events
73(14)
4.3.4 Loss of Containment Initiating Events
87(26)
4.4 External Events
113(1)
4.5 What If Your Candidate Initiating Event Is Not Shown in a Data Table?
113(3)
5 Example IPLs and PFD Values 116(152)
5.1 Overview of Independent Protection Layers (IPLs)
116(2)
5.1.1 General Requirements for IPLs
116(1)
5.1.2 IPLs versus Safeguards
117(1)
5.1.3 Basic Assumptions for IPLs
117(1)
5.2 Specific Independent Protection Layers for Use in LOPA
118(145)
5.2.1 Passive IPLs
121(25)
5.2.2 Active IPLs
146(117)
5.3 What If Your Candidate IPL Is Not Shown in a Data Table?
263(5)
6 Advanced LOPA Topics 268(12)
6.1 Purpose
268(1)
6.2 Use of QRA Methods Relative to LOPA
269(6)
6.2.1 Use of QRA Methods in Conjunction with LOPA
269(1)
6.2.2 Use of QRA Methods Instead of LOPA
270(1)
6.2.3 Example: FTA to Evaluate a Complex IE
270(3)
6.2.4 Use of HRA to Evaluate a Human IE
273(2)
6.3 Evaluation of Complex Mitigative IPLs
275(2)
6.4 Conclusions
277(3)
Appendices 280(54)
Appendix A Human Factors Considerations
282(18)
Appendix B Site-Specific Human Performance Data Collection and Validation
300(10)
Appendix C Site-Specific Equipment Data Collection and Validation
310(14)
Appendix D Example Reliability Data Conversion for Check Valves
324(4)
Appendix E Considerations for Overpressure of Pressure Vessels and Piping
328(6)
References 334(8)
Index 342
Since 1985, the Center for Chemical Process Safety (CCPS) has been the world leader in developing and disseminating information on process safety management and technology. CCPS, an industry technology alliance of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers (AIChE), has published over 80 books in its process safety guidelines and process safety concepts series, and over 100 training modules through its Safety in Chemical Engineering Education (SACHE) series.