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E-grāmata: Handbook of Industrial Organization

Volume editor (Professor of Economics, Co-director, Center for Health and Wellbeing, Princeton University, NJ, USA), Volume editor (The Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics, University of Chicago, IL, USA), Volume editor (Department of Economics, New York University, NY,)
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Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume Four highlights new advances in the field, with this new volume presenting interesting chapters written by an international board of expert authors.
  • Presents authoritative surveys and reviews of advances in theory and econometrics
  • Reviews recent research on capital raising methods and institutions
  • Includes discussions on developing countries
Contributors xiii
Introduction to the series xv
Preface xvii
Chapter 1 Foundations of demand estimation 1(62)
Steven T. Berry
Philip A. Haile
1 Introduction
3(1)
1.1 Why estimate demand?
3(1)
1.2 Our focus
3(1)
2 The challenges of demand estimation
4(10)
2.1 The first fundamental challenge
4(2)
2.2 The second fundamental challenge
6(1)
2.3 Demand is not regression
6(1)
2.4 A surprisingly difficult case: exogenous prices
7(1)
2.5 Many common tools fall short
8(4)
2.6 Balancing flexibility and practicality
12(1)
2.7 Demand or utilities?
13(1)
3 Discrete choice demand
14(7)
3.1 Random utility models
15(1)
3.2 The canonical model
16(3)
3.3 Why random coefficients?
19(2)
4 Market-level data
21(11)
4.1 The BLP estimator
22(1)
4.2 Instruments
23(5)
4.3 Using a supply side
28(2)
4.4 Computing the BLP estimator and standard errors
30(2)
5 Nonparametric identification: market-level data
32(12)
5.1 Insights from parametric models
33(3)
5.2 Nonparametric demand model
36(3)
5.3 Identification via instruments
39(1)
5.4 Discussion
40(4)
6 Micro data, panels, and ranked choices
44(6)
6.1 Micro data
44(4)
6.2 Consumer panels
48(1)
6.3 Ranked choice data
49(1)
6.4 Hybrids
50(1)
7 Nonparametric identification with micro data
50(6)
7.1 Nonparametric demand model
51(2)
7.2 Identification
53(3)
7.3 Discussion
56(1)
8 Some directions for future work
56(1)
References
57(6)
Chapter 2 Empirical models of demand and supply in differentiated products industries 63(78)
Amit Gandhi
Aviv Nevo
1 Introduction
64(2)
2 A motivating example
66(7)
2.1 Model
68(3)
2.2 Estimation and results
71(1)
2.3 Discussion
72(1)
3 Demand
73(10)
3.1 Background
73(2)
3.2 Discrete choice demand models
75(8)
4 Demand estimation
83(21)
4.1 The estimation problem
84(1)
4.2 What variation in the data can identify the parameters?
85(5)
4.3 The general estimation procedure
90(10)
4.4 Extensions
100(4)
5 Supply
104(15)
5.1 The workhorse model of horizontal competition
105(2)
5.2 Distinguishing between models of competition
107(4)
5.3 Adding retailers into the mix
111(3)
5.4 Models of bargaining
114(5)
6 Extensions of the demand model
119(13)
6.1 Extensions to the static demand model
119(5)
6.2 Dynamic demand
124(8)
7 Concluding comments
132(1)
References
132(9)
Chapter 3 An industrial organization perspective on productivity 141(84)
Jan De Loecker
Chad Syverson
1 A productivity primer
143(2)
1.1 Background and focus
143(1)
1.2 Productivity conceptualized
144(1)
2 Empirical facts about productivity at the producer level
145(2)
2.1 Dispersion
146(1)
2.2 Persistence within producers
147(1)
2.3 Correlations
147(1)
3 A simple model of equilibrium productivity dispersion
147(5)
3.1 Demand
148(1)
3.2 Supply
148(1)
3.3 Equilibrium
149(1)
3.4 Empirical implications
149(3)
4 Measurement of output and inputs
152(5)
4.1 Output measurement
152(2)
4.2 Input measurement
154(2)
4.3 Data sources
156(1)
5 Recovering productivity from the data
157(37)
5.1 Operating environment and unit of analysis
158(4)
5.2 Factor shares
162(2)
5.3 Production function estimation (producer level)
164(18)
5.4 Multi-product production
182(6)
5.5 Cost versus production functions
188(2)
5.6 Measurement and specification errors
190(4)
6 Productivity analysis
194(15)
6.1 Producer-level productivity analysis
195(5)
6.2 Aggregate analysis: resource (re/mis)allocation
200(7)
6.3 Misallocation
207(2)
7 Looking ahead
209(7)
7.1 Market power and productivity data
209(6)
7.2 Technological change and market-level outcomes
215(1)
8 Conclusion
216(1)
References
216(9)
Chapter 4 Dynamic games in empirical industrial organization 225(120)
Victor Aguirregabiria
Allan Collard-Wexler
Stephen P. Ryan
1 Introduction
227(3)
1.1 Role of dynamic games in empirical industrial organization
227(2)
1.2 Organization of this chapter
229(1)
2 Models
230(12)
2.1 Basic framework
230(2)
2.2 Markov perfect Nash equilibrium
232(3)
2.3 Examples
235(1)
2.4 Extensions of the basic framework
236(6)
3 Identification and estimation
242(30)
3.1 Data
242(2)
3.2 Identification
244(9)
3.3 Estimation methods
253(15)
3.4 The promise of machine learning
268(4)
4 Empirical applications
272(56)
4.1 Earlier empirical work on dynamic games
272(14)
4.2 Innovation and market structure
286(9)
4.3 Antitrust policy towards mergers
295(4)
4.4 Dynamic pricing
299(4)
4.5 Regulation
303(6)
4.6 Retail
309(7)
4.7 Uncertainty and firms' investment decisions
316(5)
4.8 Network competition in the airline industry
321(2)
4.9 Dynamic matching
323(2)
4.10 Natural resources
325(3)
5 Concluding remarks
328(3)
References
331(14)
Chapter 5 Moment inequalities and partial identification in industrial organization 345(88)
Brendan Kline
Ariel Pakes
Elie Tamer
1 Introduction
346(3)
2 Definitions and background
349(5)
3 Revealed preference
354(21)
3.1 Primitive assumptions
355(4)
3.2 Paths to estimators
359(3)
3.3 Examples
362(13)
4 Generalized discrete choice approaches
375(25)
4.1 Models of discrete games with complete information
376(2)
4.2 Simple game example
378(5)
4.3 Using both necessary and sufficient conditions for Nash equilibrium
383(13)
4.4 Models of auctions
396(3)
4.5 Alternative assumptions
399(1)
5 Estimation and inference
400(14)
5.1 Estimation
401(2)
5.2 Overview of inference
403(2)
5.3 Moment inequality approach
405(5)
5.4 Criterion function approach
410(1)
5.5 Random set approach
411(1)
5.6 Bayesian approach
412(2)
6 Implementation of partial identification
414(6)
6.1 Computational considerations
414(1)
6.2 Simulation based approaches
415(2)
6.3 Reporting empirical results from a partially identified model
417(3)
7 Conclusions
420(2)
References
422(11)
Chapter 6 Frictions in product markets 433(52)
Alessandro Gavazza
Alessandro Lizzeri
1 Introduction
434(1)
2 Transaction costs
435(9)
2.1 Vertical differentiation
436(3)
2.2 Market power and secondary markets
439(1)
2.3 Empirical research
440(3)
2.4 Role of intermediaries in overcoming transaction costs
443(1)
3 Asymmetric information
444(6)
3.1 Theory
444(4)
3.2 Empirics
448(1)
3.3 Role of intermediaries in overcoming asymmetric information
449(1)
4 Search frictions
450(20)
4.1 Theoretical models
451(9)
4.2 Empirical contributions
460(6)
4.3 The role of intermediaries in search markets
466(4)
5 Matching frictions
470(7)
5.1 The role of intermediaries in matching markets
475(2)
References
477(8)
Chapter 7 Two-sided markets, pricing, and network effects 485(108)
Bruno Jullien
Alessandro Pavan
Marc Rysman
1 Introduction
487(8)
1.1 Terminology and background
490(5)
2 Monopoly
495(14)
2.1 Basic framework and notation
495(2)
2.2 Profit-maximizing prices
497(2)
2.3 Welfare-maximizing prices
499(1)
2.4 Distortions
500(1)
2.5 Miscellaneous: chicken & egg problem, non-negative prices, distortionary taxation
501(6)
2.6 Dynamic pricing
507(2)
3 Competition for the market
509(9)
3.1 Divide-and-conquer strategies
509(3)
3.2 Congestion within sides
512(2)
3.3 Multi-homing
514(1)
3.4 Dynamic competition
515(3)
4 Competition on the market
518(22)
4.1 Single-homing
519(8)
4.2 Multi-homing
527(6)
4.3 Concentration, merger and collusion
533(3)
4.4 Exclusivity and bundling
536(4)
5 Alternative modeling of competition, coordination and beliefs
540(7)
5.1 Richer price structures
540(4)
5.2 Quantity competition
544(2)
5.3 Passive beliefs
546(1)
6 Matching design
547(11)
6.1 Second-degree price discrimination and matching design
547(8)
6.2 Targeting and third-degree price discrimination
555(1)
6.3 Dynamic arrivals and evolving private information
556(2)
7 Identification of network effects
558(14)
7.1 Direct network effects
559(4)
7.2 Some solutions for direct network effects
563(7)
7.3 Indirect network effects
570(2)
8 Estimating indirect network effects
572(3)
8.1 Dynamics
572(1)
8.2 Exclusions in two-sided markets
572(3)
9 Empirical work on pricing in platform studies
575(5)
9.1 Price as endogenous
576(2)
9.2 Price as exogenous
578(1)
9.3 Matching
579(1)
10 Conclusion
580(1)
References
581(12)
Chapter 8 Information markets and nonmarkets 593(80)
Dirk Bergemann
Marco Ottaviani
1 Introduction
594(3)
2 Buying and selling information
597(9)
2.1 Value of information and experiment
597(3)
2.2 Selling experiments
600(2)
2.3 Selling realizations
602(2)
2.4 Information products
604(1)
2.5 Returns from information and data
605(1)
3 Markets for information
606(8)
3.1 Value of information in a normal quadratic environment
606(2)
3.2 Selling information to competing firms
608(2)
3.3 Information sharing among competing firms
610(1)
3.4 Data intermediation
610(2)
3.5 Data markets and data externalities
612(2)
4 Instruments to trade and monetize information
614(10)
4.1 Third-degree price discrimination
614(5)
4.2 Ratchet effect and privacy
619(2)
4.3 Ratings and recommender systems
621(2)
4.4 Certification and expert markets
623(1)
5 Forecasting and aggregation of predictions
624(20)
5.1 Forecasting nonmarkets
624(4)
5.2 Prediction markets
628(8)
5.3 Automated market maker
636(1)
5.4 Performance of prediction markets
637(7)
6 Science as nonmarket
644(12)
6.1 Organization of science
645(2)
6.2 Measuring influence
647(1)
6.3 Selection, publication, and funding
648(1)
6.4 Economics of statistical inference
649(7)
7 Conclusion
656(1)
References
657(16)
Chapter 9 Structural empirical analysis of contracting in vertical markets 673(70)
Robin S. Lee
Michael D. Whinston
Ali Yurukoglu
1 Introduction
674(2)
2 Theory
676(25)
2.1 Multilateral settings with externalities
681(20)
3 An empirical framework
701(23)
3.1 Supply: modeling vertical contracting
702(11)
3.2 Supply: estimation and identification
713(3)
3.3 Demand
716(8)
4 Recent applications
724(11)
4.1 Horizontal mergers in vertical markets
724(2)
4.2 Effects of vertical integration and mergers
726(2)
4.3 Price discrimination
728(3)
4.4 Nonlinear contracts
731(2)
4.5 Exclusive vertical contracts
733(2)
5 Concluding remarks
735(1)
References
736(7)
Index 743
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