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E-grāmata: History of Skepticism: In Search of Consistency

Series edited by Jan Hartman, Renata Ziemiska

Formāts: 306 pages
Sērija : Studies in Philosophy, History of Ideas and Modern Societies 10
Izdošanas datums: 11-Apr-2017
Izdevniecība: Peter Lang AG
Valoda: eng
ISBN-13: 9783631712566

Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

Philosophy

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Formāts: 306 pages
Sērija : Studies in Philosophy, History of Ideas and Modern Societies 10
Izdošanas datums: 11-Apr-2017
Izdevniecība: Peter Lang AG
Valoda: eng
ISBN-13: 9783631712566

Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

Philosophy

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This book reconstructs the history of skepticism ranging from ancient to contemporary times, from Pyrrho to Kripke. The main skeptical stances and the historical reconstruction of the concept of skepticism are connected with an analysis of their recurrent inconsistency. The author reveals that this inconsistency is not a logical contradiction but a pragmatic one. She shows that it is a contradiction between the content of the skeptical position and the implicit presumption of the act of its assertion. The thesis of global skepticism cannot be accepted as true without falling into the pragmatic inconsistency. The author explains, how skepticism was important for exposing the limits of human knowledge and inspired its development.

This book reconstructs the history of skepticism ranging from ancient to contemporary times. The main skeptical stances and the historical reconstruction of the concept of skepticism are connected with an analysis of their recurrent inconsistency. The author reveals that this inconsistency is not a logical contradiction but a pragmatic one.

Introduction

(4)

Chapter I The Notion and Types of Skepticism

(14)

1 Genealogy of the Term Skepticism

(3)

2 Evolution of the Idea of Skepticism

(5)

2.1 Ancient Skepticism: the Suspension of Judgements Aspiring to be the Truth

(1)

2.2 Medieval skepticism: the Weakness of Human Judgements Contrasted with God's Omnipotence

(1)

2.3 Modern Skepticism: Doubting the Value of Judgements Aspiring to be Knowledge

(1)

2.4 Contemporary Skepticism: Paradoxical Thesis on the Non-existence of Knowledge and Meaning

(2)

3 Types of Skepticism and Related Terminology

(6)

Chapter II Ancient Skepticism

(84)

1 Elements of Skepticism in the Pre-Pyrrhonian Philosophy

(4)

2 Pyrrho of Elis and Ethical Skepticism

(12)

3 Academic Skepticism (Arcesilaus and Carneades)

(13)

4 Later Pyrrhonism (Aenesidemus and Agrippa)

(10)

5 Sextus Empiricus -- Summa of Ancient Skepticism

(45)

5.1 The Concept and the Criterion of Truth

(5)

5.2 Signs and Demonstrations

(8)

5.3 Physics, Ethics and the Specialized Sciences

(8)

5.4 The Defense of Consistency

(2)

5.5 Recent Consistency Interpretations

(9)

5.6 "Throwing away the Ladder" -- Does Sextus Accept Self-Refutation?

100

(3)

5.7 Pragmatic Inconsistency of Sextan Skepticism

103

(5)

Conclusions for Ancient Skepticism

108

(3)

Chapter III Christian Reception of Ancient Skepticism and Medieval Skepticism

111

(26)

1 The Early Christian Thinkers about Skepticism

111

(3)

2 St. Augustine and the Critique of Academic Skepticism

114

(5)

3 Medieval Skeptics before William Ockham (John of Salisbury, Henry of Ghent, Peter Aureoli)

119

(7)

4 William Ockham -- Skepticism and Fideism

126

(4)

5 Ockham's Followers and Skepticism based on Divine Omnipotence

130

(7)

5.1 Nicholas of Autrecourt

130

(3)

5.2 John of Mirecourt

133

(2)

Conclusions for Medieval Skepticism

135

(2)

Chapter IV Modern Skepticism

137

(70)

1 The Beginning of Modern Skepticism (Erasmus, Pico, Sanchez)

137

(5)

2 Montaigne's Skepticism

142

(15)

2.1 Ancient Themes

143

(5)

2.2 Christian Themes

148

(3)

2.3 Renaissance Themes

151

(2)

2.4 An Attempt to Avoid the Inconsistency Charge

153

(2)

2.5 Montaigne's Followers (Charron, de la Mothe le Vayer)

155

(2)

3 Descartes' Hypotheses and the Radicalization of Skepticism

157

(20)

3.1 The Dream Hypothesis and the Evil Demon Hypothesis

158

(3)

3.2 Idealism and Making Skepticism Deeper

161

(2)

3.3 Methodic Skepticism

163

(2)

3.4 An Attempt to Rebut Skeptical Hypotheses

165

(6)

3.5 Skepticism between Descartes and Hume (Huet, Pascal, Bayle)

171

(6)

4 Hume and Searching for Skepticism Consistency

177

(16)

4.1 References to Ancient Tradition

177

(3)

4.2 Acceptance of the Cartesian Hypotheses

180

(2)

4.3 Broadening the Skeptical Arguments

182

(4)

4.4 Instinct as a Rescue from Skepticism

186

(1)

4.5 The Critique of Total Skepticism

187

(2)

4.6 Searching for a Consistent Moderate Skepticism

189

(1)

4.7 Dialectics of Skepticism and Naturalism

190

(3)

5 Kant's Transcendental Skepticism and its Continuations

193

(14)

5.1 Kant and the Skeptical Tradition

193

(2)

5.2 Futility of Skepticism and the Value of the Skeptical Method

195

(1)

5.3 Transcendental Skepticism

196

(3)

5.4 Hegel about Skepticism

199

(2)

5.5 Nietzsche's Skepticism

201

(4)

Conclusions for Modern Skepticism

205

(2)

Chapter V Contemporary Skepticism

207

(66)

1 The Problem of Skepticism and the Change of the Concept of Knowledge at the Beginning of the 20th Century

207

(17)

1.1 Pragmatism

207

(6)

1.2 Analytical Philosophy

213

(8)

1.3 Phenomenology and Existentialism

221

(3)

2 Peter Unger and Contemporary Cartesian Skepticism

224

(9)

2.1 Knowledge as an Absolute Limit Term

224

(4)

2.2 Hypothesis of the Evil Scientist and Brain-in-a-Vat

228

(2)

2.3 Other Protagonists of Skepticism

230

(3)

3 The Discussion with the Cartesian Skepticism

233

(19)

3.1 Knowledge Does Not Require Certainty (Fallibilism)

233

(2)

3.2 Knowledge is Not Governed by Deductive Rules (Nozick)

235

(2)

3.3 Knowledge Does not Require Knowledge about Knowledge (Externalism)

237

(1)

3.4 Standards for Knowledge are Changeable (Contextualism)

238

(6)

3.5 Justification Does Not Require the Procedure of Justification (Williams)

244

(5)

3.6 Inconsistency of Brain-in-a-Vat Hypothesis (Putnam)

249

(3)

4 Meaning Skepticism by Kripke-Wittgenstein

252

(11)

4.1 Thought Experiment with quus

252

(3)

4.2 Practice as a Rescue from Skepticism

255

(3)

4.3 Meaning Skepticism about Other Minds

258

(2)

4.4 Skepticism about Self-Consciousness

260

(3)

Conclusions for Contemporary Skepticism

263

(4)

Conclusion: Pragmatic Inconsistency of Skepticism

267

(6)

Bibliography

273

(22)

Chronology and Geography of Skepticism

295

(2)

Index

297

Renata Ziemiska is professor of philosophy and chair in epistemology at the University of Szczecin, Poland. She is member of The Committee on Philosophical Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, member of Society for Skeptical Studies and International Society for the Study of Skepticism.

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