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E-grāmata: Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics

Edited by (University of Sheffield), Edited by (John Jay College/City University of New York)
  • Formāts: 304 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 01-Apr-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191078828
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  • Formāts: 304 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 01-Apr-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191078828

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There is abundant evidence that most people, often in spite of their conscious beliefs, values and attitudes, have implicit biases. 'Implicit bias' is a term of art referring to evaluations of social groups that are largely outside conscious awareness or control. These evaluations are typically thought to involve associations between social groups and concepts or roles like 'violent,' 'lazy,' 'nurturing,' 'assertive,' 'scientist,' and so on. Such associations result at least in part from common stereotypes found in contemporary liberal societies about members of these groups.

Implicit Bias and Philosophy brings the work of leading philosophers and psychologists together to explore core areas of psychological research on implicit (or unconscious) bias, as well as the ramifications of implicit bias for core areas of philosophy.Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprised of three sections. 'Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias' contains chapters examining the relationship of implicit biases to concepts that are central to moral responsibility, including control, awareness, reasons-responsiveness, and alienation. The chapters in the second section--'Structural Injustice'--explore the connections between the implicit biases held by individuals and the structural injustices of the societies in which they are situated. And finally, the third section--'The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice'--contains chapters examining strategies for implicit attitude change, the ramifications of research on implicit bias for philosophers working in ethics, and suggestions for combatting implicit biases in the fields of philosophy and law.

This volume can be read independently of, or in conjunction with, Volume I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, which addresses key metaphysical and epistemological questions on implicit bias, including the effect of implicit bias on scientific research, gender stereotypes in philosophy, and the role of heuristics in biased reasoning.

Recenzijas

Overall, Implicit Bias and Philosophy, volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics is comprehensive, insightful, and often innovative. It is required reading for all philosophers working on implicit bias, and all psychologists interested in the theoretical implications of psychological research on implicit bias. Philosophers working on moral responsibility might be interested in the diversity of approaches to responsibility stimulated by implicit bias research. As the issues discussed in the book have important practical implications, they should be of interest to a non-academic audience, including policymakers. * Katherine Puddifoot, Hypatia: A Journal of Feminist Philosophy * The volume is an invaluable resource for understanding the link between moral philosophy and implicit bias--especially as it concerns moral responsibility. A review cannot do justice to the painstaking attention that nearly all the authors devote to empirical research in this area. * Jeffrey A. Gauthier, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews *

Introduction 1(10)
Michael Brownstein
Jennifer Saul
Part 1 Moral Responsibility for Implicit Bias
1.1 Who's Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias
11(26)
Natalia Washington
Daniel Kelly
1.2 Alienation and Responsibility
37(25)
Joshua Glasgow
1.3 Attributability, Accountability, and Implicit Bias
62(28)
Robin Zheng
1.4 Stereotypes and Prejudices: Whose Responsibility? Indirect Personal Responsibility for Implicit Biases
90(25)
Maureen Sie
Nicole van Voorst Vader-Bours
1.5 Revisionism and Moral Responsibility for Implicit Attitudes
115(32)
Luc Faucher
Part 2 Structural Injustice
2.1 The Too Minimal Political, Moral, and Civic Dimension of Claude Steele's "Stereotype Threat" Paradigm
147(26)
Lawrence Blum
2.2 Reducing Racial Bias: Attitudinal and Institutional Change
173(18)
Anne Jacobson
Part 3 The Ethics of Implicit Bias: Theory and Practice
3.1 A Virtue Ethics Response to Implicit Bias
191(24)
Clea F. Rees
3.2 Context and the Ethics of Implicit Bias
215(20)
Michael Brownstein
3.3 The Moral Status of Micro-Inequities: In Favor of Institutional Solutions
235(19)
Samantha Brennan
3.4 Discrimination Law, Equality Law, and Implicit Bias
254(25)
Katya Hosking
Roseanne Russell
Index of Names 279(4)
Index of Subjects 283
Michael Brownstein is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at John Jay College/City University of New York. His research focuses on philosophy of psychology and cognitive science, with emphasis on the nature of the implicit mind. In 2014-2015 he was a Visiting Scholar at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the American Council of Learned Societies, and visiting faculty at Deep Springs College. His published articles on automaticity, spontaneity, and implicit bias have appeared in journals such as Philosophical Studies, Mind and Language, and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. These mark a small transition from his first publication, 'The Wonderful World of Tame Reptiles', in Reptile Hobbyist.



Jennifer Saul is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sheffield and Director of the Society for Women in Philosophy UK. Her research is primarily in philosophy of language, feminist philosophy, and philosophy of race. She is the author of Lying, Misleading, and What is Said (OUP, 2012); Simple Sentences, Substitution, and Intuitions (OUP, 2007); and Feminism: Issues and Arguments (OUP, 2003). She directed the Leverhulme International Network in Implicit Bias and Philosophy (2011-2013) that gave rise to these volumes. She has also served as a consultant on a zombie movie script.