Preface |
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vii | |
Chapter 1 The Widening Gap between the Rich and the Poor will Inevitably Divide the Society |
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1 | (26) |
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1.1 Facing the Fact of the Widening Gap between the Rich and the Poor |
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2 | (3) |
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1.2 Gini Coefficient: A Measure of the Gap between the Rich and the Poor |
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5 | (5) |
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1.3 Three Gaps and Six Combinations |
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10 | (2) |
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1.4 Regional Factors of the Gap between Urban and Rural Areas |
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12 | (3) |
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1.5 Income Gap among All Classes of Society |
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15 | (1) |
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1.6 Urban and Rural Factors in the Gap between the Rich and the Poor |
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16 | (5) |
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1.7 The Gap between the Rich and the Poor and Social Stability |
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21 | (3) |
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1.8 The Limitations of the Gini Coefficient |
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24 | (1) |
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1.9 Different Policies to Govern the Three Gaps |
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25 | (2) |
Chapter 2 Lewis Turning Point |
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27 | (44) |
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2.1 Lewis Model of Chinese Transition in a Dual Economy |
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28 | (15) |
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2.1.1 Boundary division and the basic assumption of a dual economy |
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28 | (3) |
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2.1.2 How many turning points are there? |
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31 | (2) |
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2.1.3 Three curves in the Lewis model |
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33 | (4) |
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2.1.4 Labor transfer trilogy in the Lewis model |
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37 | (3) |
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2.1.5 Six stages of labor transfer in China |
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40 | (3) |
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2.2 Incentive Mechanisms for Farm Workers to Seek Jobs and Conduct Business in Cities |
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43 | (3) |
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2.3 How to Judge the Lewis Turning Point |
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46 | (17) |
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2.3.1 Miscellaneous definitions |
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46 | (1) |
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2.3.2 Basic characteristics of the Lewis turning point |
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47 | (1) |
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2.3.3 Estimation of the rural labor price |
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48 | (3) |
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2.3.4 Estimation of the agricultural marginal productivity of labor |
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51 | (3) |
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2.3.5 Relationship between the marginal productivity of labor and the average labor productivity |
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54 | (3) |
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2.3.6 Does the increase in wages indicate the Lewis turning point? |
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57 | (3) |
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2.3.7 Regional gap and the Lewis turning point |
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60 | (1) |
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2.3.8 The income difference between the skilled labor and the unskilled labor |
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61 | (2) |
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2.4 Quantitative Analysis of the Lewis Turning Point |
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63 | (3) |
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2.4.1 Theoretical model of judging the Lewis turning point |
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63 | (1) |
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2.4.2 Estimation of the capital stock |
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64 | (1) |
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2.4.3 Results and limitations of the theoretical judgment |
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64 | (2) |
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2.5 Why is there concern about the Lewis turning point? |
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66 | (5) |
Chapter 3 Surplus Rural Labor |
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71 | (30) |
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3.1 Is There Surplus Aural Labor in China? |
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71 | (4) |
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3.2 Definition of Surplus Rural Labor |
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75 | (3) |
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3.3 Estimation Method of Surplus Labor |
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78 | (3) |
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3.4 Very Different Estimates |
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81 | (2) |
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3.5 Estimation of Surplus Rural Labor |
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83 | (8) |
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3.6 Approaches to Transfer the Surplus Rural Labor |
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91 | (3) |
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3.7 An Arduous Historical Task |
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94 | (3) |
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3.8 Removing the Obstacles in the Transfer of Surplus Rural Labor Force |
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97 | (1) |
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98 | (3) |
Chapter 4 Story Behind the Labor Shortage |
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101 | (48) |
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4.1 How Does Labor Shortage Occur? |
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101 | (5) |
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4.2 Cyclical Changes in the Population Structure |
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106 | (4) |
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4.3 Regional Characteristics of Labor Shortage |
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110 | (1) |
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4.4 Farm Workers' Rational Choice |
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111 | (6) |
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4.5 Labor Shortage and Industrial Upgrade |
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117 | (2) |
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4.6 Labor Shortage in Terms of Farm Workers' Age, Education, and Psychological Characteristics |
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119 | (4) |
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Chapter 5 Rule of Industrial Transfer |
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123 | (26) |
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5.1 Labor Shortage and Industrial Transfer |
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123 | (2) |
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5.2 Historical Track of the Transfer of Labor-intensive Products |
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125 | (1) |
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5.3 America: The First Runner in the Relay Race |
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126 | (3) |
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5.4 Japan: Recipient of the Baton from the United States |
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129 | (1) |
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5.5 Four Asian Economic Giants: Receiving the Baton from Japan |
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130 | (2) |
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5.6 China: The Fourth Baton |
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132 | (4) |
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5.7 Changing the Rule of Wages in Industrial Transfer |
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136 | (1) |
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5.8 Industrial Transfer: Inexorable Law of Economic Development |
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136 | (3) |
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5.9 Length of Time for Holding the Labor-intensive Products |
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139 | (2) |
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5.10 Industrial Transfer and the Migrant Worker |
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141 | (3) |
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5.11 Passing the Baton of Industrial Transfer to the Next Economy |
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144 | (5) |
Chapter 6 Consumption and Expansion of Domestic Demand |
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149 | (22) |
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6.1 Theory of Economic Growth Stages |
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150 | (1) |
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6.2 Expansion of Domestic Demand and Investment in Infrastructure |
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151 | (3) |
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6.3 Residents' Consumption Does Not Decline |
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154 | (5) |
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6.4 The Increase in Residents' Consumption Level Requires Comprehensive Treatment |
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159 | (6) |
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6.5 Do Government Subsidies Stimulate Consumption? |
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165 | (3) |
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6.6 The Drinker's Heart is not in the cup |
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168 | (3) |
Chapter 7 How Long Can the High Savings Ratio Last? |
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171 | (24) |
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7.1 Is the High Savings Rate at Fault? |
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172 | (2) |
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7.2 Consumption and Savings: Any Increase for One Must Mean a Decline for the Other |
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174 | (2) |
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7.3 Savings Ratio of Countries in the World Varies Considerably |
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176 | (2) |
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7.4 Consumption Theory and Elements that Determine Savings |
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178 | (3) |
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7.5 First-Generation Effect of Savings |
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181 | (3) |
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7.6 Empirical Analysis of China's Savings Rate |
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184 | (6) |
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7.7 How Long Can the High Savings Rate Last? |
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190 | (2) |
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7.8 Never to be Misled by Others in Exceeding the Proper Limits in Righting a Wrong |
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192 | (2) |
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194 | (1) |
Chapter 8 The Proportion of Labor Compensation |
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195 | (22) |
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8.1 The Confusing Question |
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196 | (1) |
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8.2 Is the Proportion of Labor Compensation Actually Declining? |
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197 | (3) |
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8.3 Change in the Statistical Rules Reduces Labor Compensation |
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200 | (4) |
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8.4 Change in the Industrial Structure Results in the Declining Proportion of Labor Compensation |
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204 | (3) |
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8.5 Influence of the Adjustment in the GDP Data on the Proportion of Labor Compensation |
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207 | (3) |
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8.6 Is the Proportion of China's Labor Compensation in the GDP Low? |
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210 | (2) |
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8.7 Neither Meeting Trouble Halfway Nor Making Much Ado About Nothing |
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212 | (5) |
Chapter 9 Is the Gap Between Urban and Rural Areas Widening or Narrowing? |
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217 | (14) |
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9.1 Determining the Cause and Applying the Right Solutions |
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218 | (1) |
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9.2 The Strange Phenomenon Violating the Economic Theory |
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219 | (2) |
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9.3 The Division of Urban and Rural Populations |
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221 | (2) |
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9.4 Space Distribution of the Farm Workers |
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223 | (2) |
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9.5 Is the Farm Workers' Income Included in that of the Urban Residents or the Rural Residents? |
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225 | (1) |
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9.6 Narrowing the Gap between Urban and Rural Areas is A Serious Challenge at Present |
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226 | (5) |
Chapter 10 The Minimum Wage Law is a Double-edged Sword |
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231 | (36) |
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10.1 The Trend in Increasing the Minimum Wage |
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232 | (3) |
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10.2 Minimum Wage in Countries all over the World |
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235 | (8) |
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10.3 The Calculation Method for the Minimum Wage |
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243 | (1) |
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10.4 The Dispute Sparked by the Minimum Wage Law |
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244 | (3) |
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10.5 When to Set up the Minimum Wage |
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247 | (2) |
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10.6 Market Mechanism and the Minimum Wage Law |
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249 | (2) |
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10.7 Balance Between the Market and the Government |
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251 | (2) |
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10.8 The Timing of Implementing the Minimum Wage Law |
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253 | (3) |
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10.8.1 Timeline of the implementation of the minimum wage law of the four Asian economic giants |
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254 | (130) |
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10.8.1.1 Chinese Taiwan: 1968 |
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254 | (1) |
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10.8.1.2 South Korea: 1986 |
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254 | (1) |
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10.8.1.3 Chinese Hong Kong: In discussion |
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255 | (1) |
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10.8.1.4 Singapore: No minimum wage legislation |
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256 | (1) |
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10.9 Relationship Between the Minimum Wage and the Unemployment Rate |
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256 | (6) |
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10.10 Postponement of Increasing the Minimum Wage |
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262 | (2) |
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264 | (3) |
Chapter 11 The Population Trap and the Demographic Dividend |
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267 | (20) |
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11.1 Distinguishing the Stock and Increment of Labor |
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268 | (1) |
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11.2 The Necessary Condition for the Population Trap |
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269 | (3) |
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11.3 Cyclic Fluctuation of Population Distribution in China |
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272 | (4) |
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11.4 Disturbance of the Population in China |
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276 | (1) |
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11.5 Population Fitted Line of Developed Countries |
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277 | (2) |
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11.6 Trend of the Population Structure Change in Developing Countries |
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279 | (4) |
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11.7 Demographic Dividend and Economic Growth |
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283 | (4) |
Chapter 12 Tax Reform and the Gap between the Rich and the Poor |
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287 | (40) |
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12.1 Three Level's of the Distribution Mechanism |
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288 | (1) |
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12.2 A Vague Statement is Difficult to be Implement |
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289 | (4) |
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12.3 How to Promote Fairness in the Production Linic |
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293 | (2) |
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12.4 The Goal of Tax Reform is to Reduce Taxes |
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295 | (2) |
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12.5 The Planned Economy Characteristics of the Current Tax System |
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297 | (4) |
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12.6 Basic Concept of Tax Reform |
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301 | (3) |
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12.7 The Computable General Equilibrium in the Tax Reform |
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304 | (4) |
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12.8 Scenarios and Results |
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308 | (8) |
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12.9 Will the Reduction of the Tax Rate Diminish the Government Tax Revenue? |
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316 | (2) |
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12.10 Property Income and the Income Gap |
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318 | (3) |
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12.11 Specific Conditions of Tax Reform |
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321 | (2) |
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12.12 Why is Tax Reform Extremely Difficult to Implement? |
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323 | (4) |
Chapter 13 Preparing for Danger in Times of Peace to Prevent a Financial Crisis |
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327 | (24) |
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13.1 Financial Risks Brought by Excess Currency Liquidity |
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328 | (3) |
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13.2 The Dammed Lake Formed by the Savings Deposits of Urban and Rural Residents |
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331 | (3) |
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13.3 Seriously Distorted Fund Flow |
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334 | (3) |
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13.4 Threat of the Negative Interest Rate |
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337 | (2) |
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13.5 Will Deflation Occur? |
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339 | (2) |
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13.6 Prevent Imported Inflation |
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341 | (1) |
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13.7 Preparing for Danger in Times of Peace and Strengthening Awareness of Crisis |
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342 | (3) |
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13.8 Characteristics of a Flnancl41 Crisis |
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345 | (1) |
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13.9 Rapid Economic Development Does Not Mean No Financial Risk 3 |
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346 | (3) |
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13.10 Deal with the Situation Calmly to Solve the Crisis |
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349 | (2) |
Chapter 14 Populism Experiment of Latin America |
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351 | (14) |
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14.1 The Results of Promoting Populism Come in Opposites |
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352 | (3) |
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14.2 The Rise and Fall of Peronism |
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355 | (4) |
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14.3 The Mud Left by Populism |
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359 | (2) |
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14.4 Chile's Populism Tragedy |
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361 | (2) |
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14.5 The Lessons of Populism in Latin America |
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363 | (2) |
Chapter 15 Who Divides Thailand? |
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365 | (16) |
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15.1 Where Did the Red-Shirt and Yellow-Shirt Armies Come From? |
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365 | (4) |
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15.2 Source of the Upheaval in Thailand |
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369 | (3) |
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15.3 Polarization Intensifies the Gap between the Rich and the Poor |
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372 | (3) |
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15.4 Blood-stained Street Full of Violence and Unrest |
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375 | (2) |
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15.5 Division of Society Led to Unending Trouble |
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377 | (4) |
Chapter 16 Criticizing Populism and Depending on Market Mechanisms to Narrow the Gap between the Rich and the Poor |
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381 | (28) |
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382 | (2) |
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384 | (5) |
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16.2.1 Noble intellectual stage of populism |
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384 | (2) |
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16.2.2 Civilian intellectuals paved the way for the Bolshevik |
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386 | (2) |
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16.2.3 Populism and social morality |
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388 | (1) |
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16.3 Variability of Populism |
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389 | (1) |
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390 | (1) |
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16.5 Reasons and Conditions for the Spread of Populism |
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391 | (5) |
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16.6 Consequences of the Spread of Populism |
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396 | (2) |
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16.7 Guided Populism According to Circumstances and Taking Precaution Beforehand |
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398 | (2) |
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16.8 Dangerous Sign of a Divided Society |
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400 | (1) |
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16.9 Two Sides of a Coin: Market Mechanism and Government Intervention |
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401 | (2) |
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16.10 The Sole Basis of Government Policies is to Liberate Productive Forces and Promote Social Progress |
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403 | (6) |
References |
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409 | (8) |
Index |
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417 | |