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Part I Understanding the Institutionalization of the ICC |
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3 | (28) |
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1.1 Negotiations on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court |
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5 | (6) |
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1.2 The International Criminal Court |
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11 | (4) |
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1.3 Normative Binding and the Institutionalization of the ICC |
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15 | (2) |
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1.4 Ratification of the Rome Statute and the Obama Effect |
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17 | (4) |
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21 | (4) |
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25 | (6) |
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27 | (4) |
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2 Theorizing the Institutionalization of the International Criminal Court |
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31 | (28) |
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2.1 Theoretical Explanations for the International Criminal Court |
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31 | (8) |
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31 | (2) |
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2.1.2 Power and the Emergence of the ICC |
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33 | (2) |
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2.1.3 Joint Gains as Motivation for the Establishment of the ICC |
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35 | (2) |
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2.1.4 ICC as a Result of Socialization |
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37 | (2) |
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39 | (9) |
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2.2.1 Normative Binding as a Reaction to the USA's Power After the Cold War |
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39 | (3) |
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2.2.2 Rationality, Legitimacy, and Legality of International Institutions |
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42 | (2) |
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2.2.3 The Binder: Legitimacy and Credibility as Sources of Influence |
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44 | (2) |
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2.2.4 Strategies of Binding |
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46 | (2) |
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48 | (11) |
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50 | (9) |
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Part II Normative Binding and the Institutionalization of the International Criminal Court |
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3 Germany and International Criminal Law |
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59 | (38) |
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3.1 The Evil Itself: Germany and International Criminal Law After the First World War |
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59 | (2) |
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61 | (2) |
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3.3 From Denial Toward Cooperation: First Decades After Nuremberg |
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63 | (3) |
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3.4 Confronting the Past: Positive Outcome of a Rule of Law Crisis |
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66 | (3) |
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3.5 Commitment to International Law |
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69 | (3) |
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3.6 Binding Attempts at the Negotiations on the Rome Statute |
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72 | (6) |
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3.7 Setting a Legalist Example: Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute |
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78 | (3) |
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3.8 Making the ICC a Binding Institution: Promotion of the Rome Statute |
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81 | (4) |
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3.9 Conclusions: From an Outlaw to a Binder |
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85 | (12) |
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88 | (9) |
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4 The USA and the International Criminal Court |
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97 | (40) |
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4.1 Beacon of International Justice |
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97 | (2) |
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4.2 The Idea of an ICC Within the Genocide Convention |
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99 | (1) |
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4.3 From Hesitance to Assertive Multilateralism: New Hope for International Criminal Law in the 1990s |
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100 | (3) |
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4.4 Clinton's Rationalist Agenda on the ICC |
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103 | (3) |
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106 | (4) |
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4.6 Making the Best Out of the Defeat |
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110 | (3) |
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4.7 Bush Administration's Campaign Against the ICC at the UN |
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113 | (3) |
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4.8 Protecting National Interests Through Coercion |
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116 | (8) |
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4.8.1 American Service-Members' Protection Act and Article 98 of the Rome Statute |
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116 | (2) |
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4.8.2 Worldwide Run for Bilateral Immunity Agreements |
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118 | (4) |
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4.8.3 Gradual Change of Mind |
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122 | (2) |
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4.9 Cooperative Turn: The Obama Effect |
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124 | (2) |
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126 | (11) |
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128 | (9) |
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5 The European Union's Support for the International Criminal Court |
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137 | (34) |
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5.1 Creating a New, Just Dimension of International Relations: European Union at the Negotiations on the Rome Statute |
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137 | (4) |
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5.2 Law and Justice for the World: The Struggle on the ICC |
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141 | (6) |
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5.2.1 Europe and the Bilateral Immunity Agreements |
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144 | (3) |
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5.3 The European Union's Universal Campaign in Support of the ICC |
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147 | (5) |
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5.4 Making the ICC Normatively Binding |
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152 | (3) |
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5.5 Conclusions: The EU's Normative Binding Agenda |
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155 | (6) |
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5.6 Conclusions on Part II |
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161 | (10) |
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162 | (9) |
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Part III Can Money Buy International Justice? |
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6 Explaining Late Ratification of the Rome Statute |
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171 | (24) |
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6.1 Ratification Decision |
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171 | (3) |
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174 | (9) |
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175 | (4) |
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179 | (4) |
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6.3 Reflectivist Explanations |
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183 | (2) |
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6.3.1 ICC as a Result of Diffusion |
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183 | (1) |
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184 | (1) |
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6.4 External Influence and Late Ratifications of the Rome Statute |
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185 | (1) |
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6.4.1 Dependence Networks |
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185 | (1) |
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186 | (9) |
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189 | (6) |
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7 The Philippines' Late Ratification of the Rome Statute |
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195 | (40) |
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7.7 The Philippines and International Criminal Law |
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195 | (2) |
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7.2 Liberal Explanations for Late Ratification |
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197 | (8) |
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7.2.1 The Executive Versus The Legislative |
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197 | (3) |
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7.2.2 The Ministries: Proponents and Opponents |
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200 | (3) |
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7.2.3 The Executive, Again: Conflict and Violence as Reasons for Non-ratification |
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203 | (2) |
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7.3 External Pressure on the Philippines |
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205 | (7) |
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7.3.1 The United States' Influence |
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205 | (4) |
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7.3.2 Gentle Push from Europe |
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209 | (3) |
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7.4 Socialization and Non-ratification |
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212 | (4) |
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7.4.1 Power of Civil Society and Persuasion |
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212 | (2) |
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7.4.2 Norm Diffusion and Common Identities in the Region of Laggards |
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214 | (2) |
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7.5 The Timing of the Ratification |
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216 | (5) |
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7.5.1 Why Now and Not Earlier or Later? |
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218 | (3) |
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221 | (14) |
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224 | (11) |
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8 Why Indonesia Has Not Joined the ICC? |
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235 | (44) |
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8.1 Indonesia at the Negotiations on the Rome Statute |
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235 | (2) |
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8.2 Liberal Explanations for Non-ratification |
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237 | (14) |
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8.2.1 Potential Legal Obstacles |
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237 | (1) |
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8.2.2 Empty Promises of the Executive |
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238 | (4) |
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8.2.3 Ministries' Differing Agendas on the ICC |
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242 | (4) |
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8.2.4 The Not-So-Transparent Legislative |
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246 | (2) |
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8.2.5 History of Human Rights Violations |
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248 | (3) |
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8.3 Unsuccessful Attempts to Influence Indonesia |
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251 | (7) |
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8.3.1 Indonesian Foreign Policy Tradition: Go to Hell with Your Aid! |
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251 | (2) |
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8.3.2 Indonesia and the BIA Campaign of the Bush Administration |
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253 | (3) |
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8.3.3 Falling on Deaf Ears: The European Union's Campaign for the ICC |
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256 | (2) |
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8.4 Socialization and Non-Ratification |
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258 | (5) |
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8.4.1 Different Strands of Persuasion |
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258 | (3) |
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8.4.2 Regional and International Reflections |
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261 | (2) |
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8.5 Conclusions: Keeping All Doors Open |
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263 | (16) |
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267 | (12) |
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279 | (10) |
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9.1 Normative Binding and the Institutionalization of the ICC |
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279 | (1) |
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9.2 Binders, Outliers, and Stragglers |
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280 | (5) |
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9.3 How to Facilitate State Participation to the ICC? |
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285 | (1) |
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9.4 The ICC's Implications to International Order |
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286 | (3) |
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287 | (2) |
Index |
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289 | |