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E-grāmata: Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism

Edited by (Tuskegee University), Edited by (Purdue University)
  • Formāts: 256 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 25-Feb-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191030345
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  • Formāts: 256 pages
  • Izdošanas datums: 25-Feb-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Oxford University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9780191030345
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This volume presents a dozen essays by prominent contemporary epistemologists providing a careful examination and critical evaluation of traditional epistemic internalism. Unlike competing versions of internalism, the guiding principle of traditional internalism is not to accommodate our commonsense nonskeptical views about the rationality of our ordinary beliefs, but to emphasize the need for strong skepticism-resistant intellectual assurance that our ordinary beliefs (perceptual and otherwise) are true. The essays focus on what traditional internalism has to say about the following three topics: the nature of non-inferentially justified belief, the nature of inferentially justified belief, and the best way to respond to skepticism. The end product is a volume containing many probing objections to traditional internalism, pushing its proponents to provide creative new defenses if they want this old-fashioned view to survive in the modern world.

Recenzijas

this volume does indeed identify many of the serious challenges facing a successful traditional internalist theory, Fumerton's or otherwise. As such, it is an essential resource for anyone interested in these issues. * Sharon Mason, Philosophy in Review *

Notes on Contributors ix
Acknowledgments xi
Traditional Internalism: An Introduction 1(24)
Brett Coppenger
Chapter Abstracts
15(10)
Part I Traditional Internalism and Non-Inferentially Justified Belief
Direct Acquaintance
1 Confrontation Foundationalism
25(18)
Peter Markie
2 Acquaintance and Fallible Non-Inferential Justification
43(18)
Chris Tucker
3 Foundational Justification, Meta-Justification, and Fumertonian Acquaintance
61(24)
Matthias Steup
Perceptual Belief
4 Staying Indoors: How Phenomenal Dogmatism Solves the Skeptical Problem without Going Externalist
85(20)
Berit Brogaard
5 Experience and Evidence Abridged
105(22)
Susanna Schellenberg
Part II Traditional Internalism and Inferentially Justified Belief
6 Principles of Inferential Justification
127(17)
Trent Dougherty
7 Inferential Appearances
144(21)
Michael Huemer
Part III Traditional Internalism and Skepticism
Responding to the Skeptic
8 The Costs of Demon-Proof Justification
165(18)
Sanford C. Goldberg
9 Acquaintance and Skepticism about the Past
183(22)
Ted Poston
Skepticism and Circularity
10 On Metaepistemological Scepticism
205(19)
Duncan Pritchard
Christopher Ranalli
11 How Our Knowledge Squares with Skeptical Intuitions Despite the Circle
224(15)
Ernest Sosa
Afterword
12 The Prospects for Traditional Internalism
239(20)
Richard Fumerton
Index 259
Brett Coppenger is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Tuskegee University.



Michael Bergmann is Professor of Philosophy at Purdue University. In addition to numerous articles in epistemology and philosophy of religion in journals and edited volumes, he is author of Justification without Awareness (OUP 2006) and co-editor of Divine Evil? The Moral Character of the God of Abraham (OUP 2011), Challenges to Moral and Religious Belief: Disagreement and Evolution (OUP 2014), and Reason and Faith: Themes from Swinburne (OUP 2016).