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E-grāmata: Internalism and Epistemology: The Architecture of Reason

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(Western Michigan University), (Western Michigan University, USA.)
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This book is a sustained defence of traditional internalist epistemology. The aim is threefold: to address some key criticisms of internalism and show that they do not hit their mark, to articulate a detailed version of a central objection to externalism, and to illustrate how a consistent internalism can meet the charge that it fares no better in the face of this objection than does externalism itself.

This original work will be recommended reading for scholars with an interest in epistemology.

Introduction 1
1. Internalism and the Collapse of the Gettier Problem 7
Two senses of 'justification' and closure
8
The externalist use of the Gettier problem
10
Is the Russellian solution too permissive?
19
Is the Russellian solution too restrictive?
29
The collapse into the regress
32
2. The Connection to Truth 35
The problem of the connection to truth
35
Crucial distinctions
38
Non-deductive inference and the epistemic interpretation of deduction
41
The asymmetry between inference forms and practices
44
Replies to objections
47
3. Internalism, Externalism, and the Metaregress 54
Externalism and internalism: A first approximation
54
Object level and metalevel
57
Internalist metalevel vs. externalist metalevel
58
Advantages of armchair internalism
62
Epistemic circularity and the metaregress
65
From externalism to the metaregress
68
4. What's Wrong with Epistemic Circularity 70
Internalism, externalism, and higher level requirements
70
What's wrong with epistemic circularity
77
Why should the externalist care?
81
The Great Pumpkin and Plantingian defeaters
85
"Practical rationality" and "significant self-support" to the rescue?
89
Conclusion
92
5. Analytic a priori Knowledge 94
Analyticity articulated
94
Against semantic externalism
99
Phenomenology and fallibilism
103
Ontological worries
110
Uncertainty, conceptual learning, and analyticity
113
Williamson's anti-luminosity argument and infallible knowledge
118
Conclusion
125
6. The Problem of Deduction 126
Tu quoque?
126
Intuition, demonstration, and the status of metatheory
129
Objection: Fallible logical knowledge?
133
Conclusion
137
7. The Ground of Induction 138
Hume and "Hume's problem"
138
Direct inference and the problem of induction
141
Linear attrition
146
Randomness, fairness, and representative samples
148
Success versus rationality
153
Sampling the future: The modal barrier
157
Conclusion
160
Notes 161
Bibliography 176
Index 181


Western Michigan University, USA.