In the last two decades there has been a meteoric rise of international criminal tribunals and courts, and also a strengthening chorus of critics against them. Today it is hard to find strong defenders of international criminal tribunals and courts. This book attempts such a defense against an array of critics. It offers a nuanced defense, accepting many criticisms but arguing that the idea of international criminal tribunals can be defended as providing the fairest way to deal with mass atrocity crimes in a global arena. Fairness and moral legitimacy will be at the heart of this defense. The authors take up the economic and political arguments that have been powerfully expressed, as well as arguments about sovereignty, punishment, responsibility, and evidence; but in the end they show that these arguments do not defeat the idea of international criminal courts and tribunals.
This book considers the myriad of critics of international criminal law concerning normative concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty, responsibility, punishment, economics, politics, evidence, and fairness. This is the first book to provide a thorough defense of international criminal tribunals, especially the International Criminal Court, from critics of diverse perspectives and disciplines.
Recenzijas
'Since the field's rebirth two decades ago in The Hague, the legal analysis of international criminal justice has exploded. But with this powerful and probing intervention, May and Fyfe demonstrate that it is philosophical concepts that best legitimate and critique the current practice of international tribunals. With this compelling and urgent book, a true philosophy of international criminal law has now arrived.' Jens David Ohlin, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, Cornell Law School 'The authors' analysis of the various critiques yields both normative arguments about the value of international criminal tribunals and suggestions about how the institutions can be improved. In advancing their normative claims and supporting their prescriptive suggestions, the authors draw on a deep well of philosophical and theoretical concepts, including legitimacy, fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency. The result is a book that not only canvases and addresses the broad array of critiques leveled at international criminal tribunals but adds significantly to the rather scant literature on the philosophical justifications for international criminal justice.' Margaret M. deGuzman, Ethics & International Affairs
Papildus informācija
This book considers critics of international criminal law concerning normative concepts of legitimacy, sovereignty, responsibility, punishment, economics, politics, evidence, and fairness.
Introduction;
1. Legitimacy;
2. Sovereignty;
3. Punishment;
4. Responsibility;
5. Economics;
6. Politics;
7. Evidence;
8. Fairness;
9. Concluding remarks.
Larry May is W. Alton Jones Professor of Philosophy, Law and Political Science at Vanderbilt University, Tennessee. He has published extensively in both books and leading journals, and has twice won the prize for best work on the philosophy of war and peace from the American Philosophical Association. Shannon Fyfe is currently a Ph.D. student in philosophy at Vanderbilt University, Tennessee, where she previously obtained her J.D. in 2010. Her prior work includes an internship with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda's Office of the Prosecutor, the American Society of International Law's Arthur C. Helton Fellowship for international human rights law in Tanzania, and a fellowship with the Syria Justice and Accountability Centre.
