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E-grāmata: Internet and Network Economics: 8th International Workshop, WINE 2012, Singapore, December 11-14, 2012. Proceedings

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  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Sērija : Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7695
  • Izdošanas datums: 05-Dec-2012
  • Izdevniecība: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783642353116
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  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Sērija : Lecture Notes in Computer Science 7695
  • Izdošanas datums: 05-Dec-2012
  • Izdevniecība: Springer-Verlag Berlin and Heidelberg GmbH & Co. K
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9783642353116

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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 8th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2012, held in Liverpool, UK, in December 2012. The 36 revised full papers and 13 revised short papers presented together with the abstracts of 3 papers about work in progress and 3 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 112 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on algorithmic game theory; algorithmic mechanism design; auction algorithms and analysis; computational advertising; computational aspects of equilibria; computational social choice; convergence and learning in games; coalitions, coordination and collective action; economics aspects of security and privacy; economics aspects of distributed and network computing; information and attention economics; network games; price differentiation and price dynamics; social networks.
Regular Papers
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of a Competitive Diffusion Process over Social Networks
1(14)
Vasileios Tzoumas
Christos Amanatidis
Evangelos Markakis
Agent Failures in Totally Balanced Games and Convex Games
15(15)
Yoram Bachrach
Ian Kash
Nisarg Shah
An Economic Analysis of User-Privacy Options in Ad-Supported Services
30(14)
Joan Feigenbaum
Michael Mitzenmacher
Georgios Zervas
Auctions with Heterogeneous Items and Budget Limits
44(14)
Paul Dutting
Monika Henzinger
Martin Starnberger
Bayesian Mechanism Design with Efficiency, Privacy, and Approximate Truthfulness
58(14)
Samantha Leung
Edward Lui
Bounded-Distance Network Creation Games
72(14)
Davide Bilo
Luciano Guala
Guido Proietti
Budget Optimization for Online Campaigns with Positive Carryover Effects
86(14)
Nikolay Archak
Vahab Mirrokni
S. Muthukrishnan
Choosing Products in Social Networks
100(14)
Sunil Simon
Krzysztof R. Apt
Efficiently Learning from Revealed Preference
114(14)
Morteza Zadimoghaddam
Aaron Roth
Funding Games: The Truth but Not the Whole Truth
128(14)
Amotz Bar-Noy
Yi Gai
Matthew P. Johnson
Bhaskar Krishnamachari
George Rabanca
Greedy Selfish Network Creation
142(14)
Pascal Lenzner
Group Activity Selection Problem
156(14)
Andreas Darmann
Edith Elkind
Sascha Kurz
Jerome Lang
Joachim Schauer
Gerhard Woeginger
Incentive Compatible Two Player Cake Cutting
170(14)
Avishay Maya
Noam Nisan
LP-Based Covering Games with Low Price of Anarchy
184(14)
Georgios Piliouras
Tomas Valla
Laszlo A. Vegh
Mechanism Design for a Risk Averse Seller
198(14)
Anand Bhalgat
Tanmoy Chakraborty
Sanjeev Khanna
Mechanism Design for Time Critical and Cost Critical Task Execution via Crowdsourcing
212(15)
Swaprava Nath
Pankaj Dayama
Dinesh Garg
Yadati Narahari
James Zou
Non-redistributive Second Welfare Theorems
227(17)
Bundit Laekhanukit
Guyslain Naves
Adrian Vetta
On Budget-Balanced Group-Strategyproof Cost-Sharing Mechanisms
244(12)
Nicole Immorlica
Emmanouil Pountourakis
On Coalitions and Stable Winners in Plurality
256(14)
Dvir Falik
Reshef Meir
Moshe Tennenholtz
On the Efficiency of Influence-and-Exploit Strategies for Revenue Maximization under Positive Externalities
270(14)
Dimitris Fotakis
Paris Siminelakis
On the Efficiency of the Simplest Pricing Mechanisms in Two-Sided Markets
284(14)
Volodymyr Kuleshov
Gordon Wilfong
Optimal Pricing Is Hard
298(11)
Constantinos Daskalakis
Alan Deckelbaum
Christos Tzamos
Privacy Auctions for Recommender Systems
309(14)
Pranav Dandekar
Nadia Fawaz
Stratis Ioannidis
Redistribution of VCG Payments in Public Project Problems
323(14)
Victor Naroditskiy
Mingyu Guo
Lachlan Dufton
Maria Polukarov
Nicholas R. Jennings
Simultaneous Single-Item Auctions
337(13)
Kshipra Bhawalkar
Tim Roughgarden
Smooth Inequalities and Equilibrium Inefficiency in Scheduling Games
350(14)
Johanne Cohen
Christoph Durr
Nguyen Kim Thang
Social Context in Potential Games
364(14)
Martin Hoefer
Alexander Skopalik
Take It or Leave It: Running a Survey When Privacy Comes at a Cost
378(14)
Katrina Ligett
Aaron Roth
The Max-Distance Network Creation Game on General Host Graphs
392(14)
Davide Bilo
Luciano Guala
Stefano Leucci
Guido Proietti
The Power of Local Information in Social Networks
406(14)
Christian Borgs
Michael Brautbar
Jennifer Chayes
Sanjeev Khanna
Brendan Lucier
The Price of Anarchy for Selfish Ring Routing Is Two
420(14)
Xujin Chen
Benjamin Doerr
Xiaodong Hu
Weidong Ma
Rob van Stee
Carola Winzen
Triadic Consensus: A Randomized Algorithm for Voting in a Crowd
434(14)
Ashish Goel
David Lee
Truthful Mechanism Design for Multidimensional Covering Problems
448(14)
Hadi Minooei
Chaitanya Swamy
What I Tell You Three Times Is True: Bootstrap Percolation in Small Worlds
462(13)
Hamed Amini
Nikolaos Fountoulakis
Short Papers
Ad Allocation for Browse Sessions
475(7)
Anand Bhalgat
Sreenivas Gollapudi
Computing a Profit-Maximizing Sequence of Offers to Agents in a Social Network
482(7)
Sayan Bhattacharya
Dmytro Korzhyk
Vincent Conitzer
Convergence Analysis for Weighted Joint Strategy Fictitious Play in Generalized Second Price Auction
489(7)
Lei Yao
Wei Chen
Tie-Yan Liu
Convergence of Best-Response Dynamics in Games with Conflicting Congestion Effects
496(8)
Michal Feldman
Tami Tamir
Forming Networks of Strategic Agents with Desired Topologies
504(8)
Swapnil Dhamal
Yadati Narahari
Homophily in Online Social Networks
512(7)
Bassel Tarbush
Alexander Teytelboym
Limited Supply Online Auctions for Revenue Maximization
519(7)
Piotr Krysta
Orestis Telelis
Lower Bounds on Revenue of Approximately Optimal Auctions
526(6)
Balasubramanian Sivan
Vasilis Syrgkanis
Omer Tamuz
On Fixed-Price Marketing for Goods with Positive Network Externalities
532(7)
Vahab S. Mirrokni
Sebastien Roch
Mukund Sundararajan
The Competitive Facility Location Problem in a Duopoly: Connections to the 1-Median Problem
539(7)
Daniela Saban
Nicolas Stier-Moses
The Ring Design Game with Fair Cost Allocation [ Extended Abstract]
546(7)
Angelo Fanelli
Dariusz Leniowski
Gianpiero Monaco
Piotr Sankowski
Tight Lower Bounds on Envy-Free Makespan Approximation
553(6)
Amos Fiat
Ariel Levavi
Working Papers
Biased Assimilation, Homophily, and the Dynamics of Polarization (Working Paper)
559(1)
Pranav Dandekar
Ashish Goel
David Lee
Generalized Weighted Model Counting: An Efficient Monte-Carlo Meta-algorithm (Working paper)
560(1)
Lirong Xia
The AND-OR Game: Equilibrium Characterization (working paper)
561(2)
Avinatan Hassidim
Haim Kaplan
Yishay Mansour
Noam Nisan
Author Index 563