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Introduction to Theory of Control in Organizations [Hardback]

  • Formāts: Hardback, 346 pages, height x width: 234x156 mm, weight: 632 g, 5 Tables, black and white; 69 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sērija : Systems Evaluation, Prediction, and Decision-Making
  • Izdošanas datums: 02-Mar-2015
  • Izdevniecība: CRC Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 1498714234
  • ISBN-13: 9781498714235
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  • Cena: 105,42 €
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  • Formāts: Hardback, 346 pages, height x width: 234x156 mm, weight: 632 g, 5 Tables, black and white; 69 Illustrations, black and white
  • Sērija : Systems Evaluation, Prediction, and Decision-Making
  • Izdošanas datums: 02-Mar-2015
  • Izdevniecība: CRC Press Inc
  • ISBN-10: 1498714234
  • ISBN-13: 9781498714235
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:

Introduction to Theory of Control in Organizations explains how methodologies from systems analysis and control theory, including game and graph theory, can be applied to improve organizational management. The theory presented extends the traditional approach to management science by introducing the optimization and game-theoretical tools required to account for the special nature of human beings being viewed as control objects.

The book introduces a version of mechanism design that has been customized to solve the problems that today’s managers must contend with. All mathematical models and mechanisms studied are motivated by the most common problems encountered by managers in firms and non-profit organizations.

Requiring no prior knowledge of game theory or mechanism design, the book includes a systematic introduction to the underlying methodology of modern theory of control in organizations. The authors use formal methods to construct robust and efficient decision-making procedures which support all aspects and stages of management activity over all decision horizons—from operational to strategic management.

The mathematical and methodological backgrounds of the organizational mechanisms discussed are not limited to game theory but also include systems analysis, control theory, operations research, and discrete mathematics.

The book includes a set of exercises in each chapter—from simple to advanced—that provide the reader with the understanding required to integrate advanced methods of optimization, game theory, and mechanism design into daily managerial practice.

Introduction vii
1 Control and Mechanisms in Organizations
1(56)
1.1 Control Problems in Organizational Systems
7(17)
1.2 Models of Decision Making
24(7)
1.3 Basics of Game Theory
31(14)
1.4 Classification of Control Problems in Organizational Systems
45(12)
2 Examples of Control Mechanisms
57(16)
2.1 Planning Mechanisms
57(6)
2.2 Taxation and Pricing Mechanisms
63(5)
2.3 Multichannel Mechanisms
68(1)
2.4 Incentive Mechanisms for Cost Reduction
69(4)
3 Incentive Mechanisms
73(48)
3.1 Incentive Problem
76(10)
3.2 Basic Incentive Mechanisms
86(11)
3.3 Incentive Mechanisms in Multi-Agent Systems
97(10)
3.4 Mechanisms of Distributed Control
107(14)
4 Planning Mechanisms
121(48)
4.1 Incomplete Information in Organizational Systems
123(2)
4.2 Revelation of Information
125(7)
4.3 Mechanisms of Resource Allocation
132(10)
4.4 Mechanisms of Transfer Prices
142(5)
4.5 Expert Mechanisms
147(6)
4.6 Basic Model of Adverse Selection
153(5)
4.7 Rank-Order Tournaments
158(11)
5 Informational Control Mechanisms
169(64)
5.1 Model of Informational Control
173(6)
5.2 Reflexive Games
179(7)
5.3 Informational Equilibrium
186(13)
5.4 Applied Models of Informational Control
199(34)
6 Mechanisms of Organizational Structure Design
233(72)
6.1 Problems of Organizational Hierarchy Design
233(25)
6.2 Models of Organizational Structure Design
258(10)
6.3 General Model of Management Hierarchy
268(15)
6.4 Optimal Tree-Shaped Hierarchies
283(22)
Conclusion 305(2)
Topics for Self-Study 307(2)
Literature 309(12)
Index 321
Vladimir Burkov, Doctor of Sc., Professor, Full member of Russian Academy of Natural Sciences.

In 1960s Vladimir Burkov was the father of the academic school of control in organizations. Now he is the author of dozens books on control theory, game theory, graph theory, discrete optimization, and management, a vice-president of IPMI-SOVNET, and the manager of many successful consulting projects. V. Burkov is a head of the department at the V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences, the leading academic center of Russian control theory.

Mikhail Goubko, Doctor of Sc., Professor of Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.

Mikhail Goubko belongs to the core of the academic school of control in organizations. He studies mathematical methods of complex systems' structure optimization and their applications in different fields. Works at the V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences.

Nikolay Korgin, Doctor of Sc., Professor of Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology.

Nikolay Korgin belongs to the core of the academic school of control in organizations. His interests include mechanism design and experimental game theory along with their applications in management. He has rich experience in research and teaching the theory of control in organizations. Works at the V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences.

Dmitry Novikov, Doctor of Sc., Professor, Head of Control Sciences Department at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Corresponding member of Russian Academy of Sciences.

Dmitry Novikov is the leader of the theory of control in organizations. He is the author of dozens of books and hundreds of papers on different aspects of control and management. D. Novikov is a deputy director of the V.A. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences of Russian Academy of Sciences.