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Islamic Finance in the Light of Modern Economic Theory 1st ed. 2016 [Hardback]

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  • Formāts: Hardback, 173 pages, height x width: 210x148 mm, weight: 3493 g, 2 Illustrations, black and white; XIII, 173 p. 2 illus., 1 Hardback
  • Izdošanas datums: 16-Dec-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Palgrave Macmillan
  • ISBN-10: 113728661X
  • ISBN-13: 9781137286611
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Islamic Finance in the Light of Modern Economic Theory 1st ed. 2016Palielināt
  • Formāts: Hardback, 173 pages, height x width: 210x148 mm, weight: 3493 g, 2 Illustrations, black and white; XIII, 173 p. 2 illus., 1 Hardback
  • Izdošanas datums: 16-Dec-2016
  • Izdevniecība: Palgrave Macmillan
  • ISBN-10: 113728661X
  • ISBN-13: 9781137286611
Citas grāmatas par šo tēmu:
Permanent link: https://www.kriso.lv/db/9781137286611.html
Keywords:
This book provides researchers and students with an understanding of the basic legal tenets of the Islamic finance industry, studying the real economic effects of those tenets using the tools of the modern economic theory. Split into four parts, the book begins with an introduction to the history and a legal framework for Islamic banking, covering typical Islamic financial products such as Sukuk and Takaful and examining the structure of Islamic financial institutions. It then analyzes and discusses the Miller-Modigliani Theorem, which is of direct relevance to Islamic banks which are prohibited to charge interest and often have to rely of profit-loss sharing agreements. Part III of the book introduces the reader to modern mechanism design theory, paying particular attention to optimal contracting under hidden action and hidden information, and final part  of the book applies the tools of economic theory to understand performance of Islamic financial institutions such as Islamic banks and Takaful operators.





Islamic Finance in Light of Modern Economic Theory brings together all the necessary technical tools for analyzing the economic effects of Islamic frameworks and can be used as an advanced textbook for graduate students who wish to specialize in the area, as a reference for researchers and as a tool to help economists improve the design of Islamic financial institutions. 
Part I Islamic Finance: Rationale, History, Instruments and the Legal Framework
1(52)
Reference
2(1)
1 Introduction
3(28)
1.1 Overview
3(1)
1.2 The Two Worlds of Finance
4(2)
1.3 The Rationale of Islamic Finance
6(21)
1.3.1 The Development of Islamic Banking Worldwide
7(3)
1.3.2 IBF in the Middle East
10(8)
1.3.3 IBF in South Asia
18(2)
1.3.4 IBF in the Southeast Asia
20(3)
1.3.5 IBF in Africa: Sudan
23(1)
1.3.6 IBF in European and Western Countries
23(3)
1.3.7 IBF in Australia
26(1)
1.4 Conclusions
27(4)
References
27(4)
2 Islamic Financial Instruments
31(18)
2.1 Overview
31(1)
2.2 Equity-Based Instruments
32(5)
2.2.1 Musharakah
33(2)
2.2.2 Mudarabah
35(2)
2.3 Debt-Based Instruments
37(9)
2.3.1 Murabahah
37(3)
2.3.2 Salam
40(2)
2.3.3 Istisna'
42(2)
2.3.4 Ijarah
44(2)
2.4 Takaful
46(3)
References
47(2)
3 The Historical Roots and Evolution of Islamic Financial Thought
49(4)
Part II The Law of Unexpected Consequences
53(20)
References
54(1)
4 The Incidence of Taxation
55(6)
4.1 Exercises
58(1)
4.2 Bibliographic Notes
59(2)
Reference
59(2)
5 The Basics of Corporate Finance: The Miller-Modigliani Theorem
61(12)
5.1 The Miller-Modigliani Theorem
62(2)
5.2 Hidden Information and the Breakdown of the Miller-Modigliani Theorem
64(3)
5.3 Prohibition of Riba in the Light of the Miller-Modigliani Theorem
67(1)
5.4 Exercises
68(1)
5.5 Bibliographic Notes
69(1)
5.6 Unexpected Consequences of the Provisions of Islamic Law
69(4)
References
71(2)
Part III Game Theory and Mechanism Design
73(38)
References
74(1)
6 Game Theory
75(8)
6.1 The Normal Form and the Extensive Form
75(2)
6.2 Mixed Strategies and Behavioral Strategies
77(1)
6.3 Simultaneous-Move Games of Complete Information
77(3)
6.3.1 Dominant and Dominated Strategies
77(3)
6.4 The Nash Equilibrium
80(1)
6.5 Simultaneous-Move Games of Incomplete Information
80(3)
6.5.1 Harsanyi's Doctrine
81(2)
7 The Revelation Principle
83(2)
7.1 Bibliographic Notes
84(1)
Reference
84(1)
8 Monopolistic Screening
85(18)
8.1 The Monopolistic Screening Model with Two Types
86(2)
8.2 The Unidimensional Screening Model
88(1)
8.3 The Spence-Mirrlees Condition and Implementability
89(4)
8.4 The Concept of the Information Rent
93(1)
8.5 Three Approaches to the Unidimensional Relaxed Problem
94(4)
8.5.1 The Direct Approach
94(1)
8.5.2 The Dual Approach
95(1)
8.5.3 The Hamiltonian Approach
96(2)
8.6 The Hamiltonian Approach to the Unidimensional Complete Problem
98(5)
References
100(3)
9 The Multidimensional Screening Model
103(8)
9.1 The Hamiltonian Approach and the First-Order Conditions
105(2)
9.2 An Example
107(2)
9.3 Exercises
109(2)
References
109(2)
Part IV Mechanism Design Applications to Islamic Finance
111(58)
10 Business Loans, Trust, and Contract Restriction Faced by Islamic Banks
113(14)
10.1 Model
113(10)
10.1.1 The Optimal Contract for a Linear-Exponential Model
116(7)
10.2 Comparing the Performance of a Conventional and an Islamic Bank
123(1)
10.3 Bibliographic Notes
124(3)
References
125(2)
11 Loans Provision and Adverse Selection Within Orthodox Religious Communities
127(6)
11.1 The Model
127(6)
References
132(1)
12 Shariah Compliance and Risk-Incentive Trade-Offs
133(12)
12.1 A Simple Principal-Agent Model
133(2)
12.2 The Principal-Agent Model Under a Mudarabah Contract
135(2)
12.3 Social Norms and Risk-Incentive Trade-Offs
137(5)
12.4 Bibliographic Notes
142(3)
References
143(2)
13 Shariah Compliance, Positive Assortative Matching and the Performance of IFI's
145(8)
13.1 Costs and Benefits of Asset Restrictions
146(1)
13.2 Positive Assortative Matching as a Magnification Mechanism
147(4)
13.3 Bibliographic Notes
151(2)
References
151(2)
14 Optimal Incentives for Takaful Operators
153(4)
14.1 Exercises
155(1)
14.2 Bibliographic Notes
155(2)
References
155(2)
15 Can Short-Selling Prohibition Be Optimal?
157(8)
15.1 Stable Distributions
158(7)
References
163(2)
16 Conclusions
165(4)
References
168(1)
Bibliography 169(2)
Index 171
Suren Basov obtained a PhD in Economics in 2001 from Boston University. He held positions at University of Melbourne and La Trobe University and is currently a visiting scholar at Deakin University. Over the course of his career he has published extensively in the field of economic theory and Islamic Finance in leading international journals.





M. Ishaq Bhatti is the founding Director of Islamic Banking and Finance Program at Latrobe University. Previously, he worked at Monash, Islamic University, UAE, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. He is an award-winning teacher and has authored more than 100 articles and five books. He consults for IDB, AusTrade, Vict. Dept of Education, Iraqi, Turkish & Pakistani central Banks and is an Advisory Board member of the National Zakat Foundation (NZF) of Australia.  He is also involved in 'Zakat@ICV' and NILS-No interest loan Qard Hassan, and is editor of an Islamic Business Series published by Routledge.