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E-grāmata: Justification and the Truth-Connection

(University of Texas, San Antonio)
  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 07-Jun-2012
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781139512350
  • Formāts - PDF+DRM
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  • Formāts: PDF+DRM
  • Izdošanas datums: 07-Jun-2012
  • Izdevniecība: Cambridge University Press
  • Valoda: eng
  • ISBN-13: 9781139512350

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The internalism-externalism debate is one of the oldest debates in epistemology. Internalists assert that the justification of our beliefs can only depend on facts internal to us, while externalists insist that justification can depend on additional, for example environmental, factors. In this book Clayton Littlejohn proposes and defends a new strategy for resolving this debate. Focussing on the connections between practical and theoretical reason, he explores the question of whether the priority of the good to the right (in ethics) might be used to defend an epistemological version of consequentialism, and proceeds to formulate a new 'deontological externalist' view. His discussion is rich with insights and will be valuable for a wide range of readers in epistemology, ethics and practical reason.

Littlejohn challenges the traditional evidentialist view of justification by arguing that a person's intellectual responsibilities depend largely upon the moral responsibilities they have. Written for academic researchers, graduate students and advanced undergraduates of ethics studies and epistemology, the book addresses some long-standing disputes about the ethics of belief.

Recenzijas

'In this book Clayton Littlejohn defends the unorthodox view that there are no justified false beliefs. But his book will be a must-read for anyone, orthodox or not, who is interested in the theory of justification, and in epistemic normativity more generally. I cannot say whether his view will win the day; but I can say that his arguments will be a core part of the debate going forward.' Sanford Goldberg, Northwestern University 'This is an up-to-date and accessible treatment of core areas of concern in contemporary epistemology. Highly recommended.' Trent Dougherty, Baylor University

Papildus informācija

Presents and defends a bold new approach to the ethics of belief and to resolving the internalism-externalism debate in epistemology.
Acknowledgments vi
1 Introduction
1(61)
2 Epistemic value
62(27)
3 Reasons for belief (I)
89(32)
4 Reasons for belief (II)
121(36)
5 Assertion
157(34)
6 Action
191(32)
7 Justification
223(31)
References 254(11)
Index 265
Clayton Littlejohn is a Lecturer in Philosophy at King's College London. He has published a number of articles on epistemology and ethical theory in journals including the Journal of Philosophy and American Philosophical Quarterly.